New phase begins
ON 9 January, in the Katlehong township near Johannesburg, an African
National Congress (ANC) delegation, including Joe Slovo and Cyril
Ramaphosa!, was the target of an ambush by residents of a workers' hostel controlled by Chief Buthelezi's Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP). One journalist was killed and several people were injured; Slovo and
International Viewpoint #253 February 1994 and exploited sectors of South African society.
Two different errors can be made in analysing the current situation in South Africa. The first is to underestimate the scale of the changes which are under-
Ramaphosa were unhurt. Had one of the two leaders been killed, the whole political situation could well have taken a dramatic turn. PETER BLUMER - 19 January 1994
WE HILE it appears
both the government and the leadership of the ANC are calmly and amicably preparing for the elections on 27 April, South African society itself remains as explosive as ever.3 The long-term effects of apartheid - its violence and prejudice — continue to play an active role. Allies and former allies of the government — sections of the police apparatus, the far right, and reactionary movements such as the IFP - can still disrupt the situation with attacks such as the one in Katlehong.
However, a new phase of political life has begun, after a long period during which the government negotiated while at the same time carrying out various activities aimed at weakening the ANC. In so doing, it hoped to weaken the ANC's activist base and force it to adopt a new political approach. Among the methods employed, was terror from death squads — the famous "third force", which was never threatened or unmasked — and political and terrorist pressure from the IFP and the Nazi far right.
Today, a large part of the desired political compromises have been secured. The ANC and F.W. de Klerk's National Party (NP) are now preparing to co-manage the South African State. The ANC will do so based on its enormous electoral support from the Black masses; the NP will use the positions it already holds in the State apparatus.
According to a recent opinion poll, the ANC will win 67% of votes in the April elections.4 The NP will win 17% while 6% will go to the IFP. The PanAfricanist Congress (PAC) will win no more than 2%, and the right and far right together will score at most 7%.
While serious polls are not commonplace in such a society, there can be no doubt that support for the ANC will continue to grow until the election date. The overwhelming majority of "African" peoples (according to the apartheid classification) will vote for Nelson Mandela's organisation, including in Natal and Kwazulu provinces, where the ANC will win 51% of votes compared to 32%
However, the votes of the Indian" and "Coloured" communities will be much more divided. A study indicates that 30% of the "Coloured" population in the Cape region will vote for the NP and only 20% for the ANC, which is seen by some as an "African" move-
The strength of the ANC vote will determine a number of things. Even though it has already been established that over the next five years the government will be an open coalition of all parties with more than 5% of the vote, the relative representation of each one will be determined by the outcome of the
The ANC vote will express the social and political expectations of a movement which is not only hegemonic among the oppressed population in general, but also among the Black working class. Further expectations will be raised if it obtains more than 66% of the vote, which then would give it some powers in selected legislative spheres.S
Furthermore, candidates from the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) will be on the AN ticket. Even though ANC votes will reflect a number of different social interests and political trajectories, it is clear that most of them will be cast by the majority of the most oppressed way in the country, some of which are structural in nature. The second is to overstate these changes and declare that the country is on the threshold of a glorious era of "economic reconstruction" and national unity.
It is perhaps useful to recall that it took almost a century of total white domination before Blacks obtained the right to vote. On 27 April, the majority of South Africans will be voting for the first time! While we need to understand the contradictory reasons behind the compromises and reforms currently under-way, it would be terribly wrong to underestimate the importance and the impact of this new right to vote, and this new acquisition of full citizenship
In the new political system, all the official rules of racial segregation have disappeared. The Bantustans will no longer exist as separate administrative and "State" units. The army will be open to all citizens; sections of the armed wings of the ANC and the PAC are already being prepared for integration into this army.® And while the high command will remain dominated, in numbers and rank, by officers from the old system, this does not change the fact
1. Both are national leaders of the ANC. Slovo is also the main leader of the South African Communist Party.
2. The IFP is the government party in Kwazulu. It is a reactionary party, basing its propaganda on manipulation of
3. The Transitional Executive Council (TEC) was set up as a kind of temporary government to run the country until the elections. All the traditional political forces are represented, from the ANC and the National Party to the Bantustan
The fascist far right and the FP rejected the results of the negotiations and do not participate in
4. Business Day Johannesburg, 11 January 1994.
5. See Mark Harper's article 'Backlash against compromise', International Viewpoint, no. 250, November 1993. In any case, even if they win more than 66% of the vote they will still not be able to legislate on most of the areas agreed by the high commands. This is a tremendous obstacle to the "Constituent" nature of the future "Constituent Assembly". Further, on 19 January Nelson Mandela declared that, in spite of the probable victory of the ANC, the future President may not be an ANC member.
6. A Joint Military Command Council was set up with cadres from the army, the ANC's armed wing, and forces from the Venda, Transkei and, soon, Ciskei Bantustans. For the time being, Kwazulu and Bophuthatswana have refused to join, opting instead for an alliance with the far right.
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International Viewpoint #253 February 1994 that in general the army will be neither racially homogeneous nor committed to the defence of apartheid, as previously.
A peacekeeping force (the nearly ten thousand-strong National Peacekeeping Force) has been set up for the elections, and may well become a new police force.
All this — once again, whatever the political reasons may be — constitute structural reforms of a character sufficiently thoroughgoing to change the Black masses' perception of the State apparatus.
It is not only the Black middle class who will change their perception of the State and its institutions, but also a significant sector of the Black working class. This evolution will be all the more pronounced if, as is likely to happen on 27 April, the votes of the Black masses produce a government in which the ANC and the Communist Party are in the majority.
This political shock will not, however, free South African society from its racist heritage. The poverty of the poorest layers has actually deepened over the last three years. The considerable changes in the political and institutional spheres have not led to a situation in which basic social relations are no longer intimately related to those of a "racial" nature.
An editorial commentary in the 28 May 1993 issue of Johannesburg's Business Day newspaper explains, "If de Klerk has his way, South Africa will remain the last country in Africa with 14 entrenched white power. Whites will not rule, but they will effectively share power in a Cabinet where major decisions require consensus, giving whites an effective veto. And this is not just for five years, but for as long as the situation lasts before the constitution is changed."
In the face of such a challenge, the political line of the ANC has been essentially to advocate a neo-Keynesian approach of economic revival and the reduction of inequalities through State intervention within the framework of a market economy. This is, to say the least, a little short of what is really required by South African society!
We are already seeing how the coalition government with the NP is being put forward as an obstacle to any kind of radical socio-economic reforms, and there are other blind spots in the ANC's project.
### Land
One such blind spot is in the area of land reform. The proposed reform requires Blacks to bring their land claims to a court of law. Can the land question really be solved in this way? And above all, how is the dismantling of the Bantustans to proceed? There is already tremendous pressure for "illegal" occupations, including the appearance of rural women's committees.
The strangest - and most naiveANC and COSATU positions are those which foresee economic "reconstruction" through a combination of improvements in South African competitiveness on the world market and State intervention to increase the size of the domestic
Even the term "reconstruction" is itself questionable. It implies that the current political phase is a kind of period of revolutionary transition, as if there were a "reconstruction" of a country in some way destroyed by apartheid.
But this is certainly not the case; one need only examine the economic functioning of the country and the crushing weight of the huge financial conglomerates. South African capitalism is in the process of reforming the State and the way production is organised in the contry. Apartheid may have run its course as a specific form of regulation, but the South African economy is certainly in no need of "reconstruction".
The plan to reach a "national" consensus around competitiveness and the redistribution of wealth can only work if employers' profits rise at least as quickly as salaries. In other words, if the objective of the AN and COSATU position is to achieve a broad social contract with the employers, the ruling class will have to be convinced that such a course will not cut into their rate of profit.
This is why we are now seeing — at the same time as the setting-up of the National Economic Forum (NEF), which brings together the employers, the trade unions and the government - a series of major employer offensives which aim at compensating for salary increases through job cuts and other cost-cutting measures.
To be sure, there will be new gains for working people. But the end of sanctions and the opening of the country to new external constraints will cause problems which the current ANC line has not taken into consideration.
Just two years ago, the very idea of a broad coalition government would not have been raised by anyone in the ANC leadership. When the negotiations began, the ANC explained that they were merely to determine the conditions for the transfer of power on the basis of the "victories of the liberation movement". COSATU itself followed suit in discussions it had around its future relationship to an ANC government.
But the relationship of forces produced a different outcome. The constituent assembly which emerges from the 27 April elections will in many ways be
Assets
On 7 January a study by the Johannesburg Financial Mail gave a list of
South Africa's wealthiest families. In first place is the Oppenheimer family the main stockholder in the Anglo-
American mega-firm (which holds about 55% of capital held as stock on the Johannesburg stock market).
Oppenheimer assets are estimated at 4 billion Rand (about US$1.25 billion). In second place is the Ruper-Hertzog family, with assests of more than 3 billion Rand. *
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in a Constitution which the "Constituent Assembly" will be unable to alter...
• The NP backed down on its insistence that Cabinet decisions be taken on the basis of loaded majorities. But rather than spell out the enormity of the NP concessions, the
International Viewpoint #253 February 1994 but reflects a desire to break with an analysis based on social classes.?
There was tremendous confusion last November when the trade union base objected strongly to the employers' right to lockout, which was part of the agreement of the National Manpower Comparties used a vaguely worded statement which stated that a future Cabinet should function "in a manner which gives consideration to the consensus-seeking spirit underlying the concept of a government of national unity as well as the need for effective government". One for the ANC.
• The ANC dropped its insistence that democratic elections should be held when the new constitution is in place, agreeing that national elections should not be held until
1999, unless the Cabinet loses the confidence of Parliament. One for the NP, although not too much lost by the ANC.
• Regional boundaries, powers and functions were entrenched, requiring a two-thirds majority in the Senate before they can be changed. If the deadlock-breaking mechanism comes into operation, a 60 percent majority in the Senate is required. One for the
NP, which insisted on federalism.
• Provincial Legislatures will have the right to adopt their own constitutions, as long as they are consistent with the constitutional principles and the national Constitution. One for the NP
• Deadlock-breaking procedures for the adoption of the new Constitution are dependent on a sixty percent majority. Another one for the NP
• Then came the NP's major concession to the ANC: a single ballot paper for the election of national and provincial legislatures. * source: Weekly Mail, 19 November 1993 powerless, since 27 areas for decision- making (including most of the Constitution) have already been set aside during the course of the negotiations as legislative "no go areas"
for the elected government.
Whole segments of the old structures are simply going to be co-opted into the new State apparatus. For example, the armed forces of Ciskei,
Transkei and other Bantustans will be integrated into the new united army.
Components
We have seen a clear evolution in the political explanations furnished by the three components of the Alliance the ANC, the SACP and the COSATU
The idea of "co-management" between employers and trade unions which surfaced in a few documents at the end of the 1980s has today become dominant.
In its New Year's message, the
COSATU leadership called on employers to take workplace democratisation seriously, saying, "productivity improvements would only follow meaningful participation of workers."
In fact, the ideological and political evolution of the Alliance leadership has proceeded at a quicker pace than the deterioration of the existing relationship of social forces in South African society.
In order to understand this desynchronisation, one must keep in mind the rapid bureaucratisation which has taken place in their apparatuses, as well as the tendency towards debates of a technocratic nature.
Dozens of forums have been set up where all the different social, political and ethnic layers debate and negotiate over various aspects of the reforms. Hundreds of movement cadres and thousands of activists have been seized by this kind of activity, in which the "reconstruction" theme has been determinant. A large number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which played an active role in supporting the social movements have also been seduced by the forums.
"Mandela generation"
The business of co-option has just begun. But already there is no single large enterprise which does not seek to integrate ANC cadres into their management. The "Mandela generation" is being absorbed into public and private structures, and quickly abandoning all loyalty to their former beliefs.
The needs of "civil society" have been incessantly evoked to justify this linking of the still vibrant social movements with top-level negotiations. But for those who still remember the political themes of the 1980s, there can be no doubt that this terminological backpeddling is not just a question of semantics, mission, and accepted by the COSATU leadership.
The COSATU leadership was forced to organise a big demonstration, "(but the) employers refused to budge, and the ANC was clearly embarassed and impatient with COSATU. Some phrases were rearranged, but essentially the employers ability to lockout and the workers' right to strike are both included in the interim Bill of Rights." The same thing happened around the question of the reorganisation of the public administration.
The ANC did not hold back on compromises when it came to drawing up its slate of candidates for the elections even though nothing has indicated that this was necessary to secure the votes of the Black masses. Thus they accepted the right to belong to both the AN and another movement. This was not done for the benefit of the SACP, whose leaders are also ANC leaders, but for political movements from the apartheid era, such as Allan Hendrickse's Labour Party (LP).
The Labour Party is a "Coloured" organisation which, in the 1980s, ran in elections for the famous "Coloured" House. Hendrickse, who currently represents the LP on the Transitional Executive Council, was offered ANC membership so that he could be on their electoral slate. The same thing applies to General Holomisa — "Head of State" in Transkei — and several others.
The goal of the ANC is not merely to win votes. For example, a recent poll in the Cape region showed that were the LP to run alone it would only gain 3% of coloured votes. The ANC is attempting to broaden the social and political composition of its apparatus once it takes office
In response to independent socialist currents which argued for combining democratic struggles and a break from capitalism in one historic movement, the SACP counterposed the notion of a "first stage" of national and democratic revolution.
7. Evoking the need to involve "civil society", the ANC has tried to persuade people totally unconnected with politics on to their electoral slate. These have included sports figures and Miss South Africa 1993!
8. Karl von Hold, South African Labour Bulletin, November-December 1993, Johannesburg.
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International Viewpoint #253 February 1994
Whilst never specifying the social nature of the new "national-democratic" institutions which it proposed, the SACP was able to present them, in the South African context, as a major socio-political shake-up. Its interpretation of the ANC's Freedom Charter went in this direction: nationalisation of monopolies, redistribution of wealth and the social hegemony of the working class. Between 1985 and 1990 these were the main themes of its work among trade unionists and youth. And in 1986-1987 it wrongly characterised the situation as one of dual power between the popular insurrection on the one hand and the government on the other.
### Confusion
But were the SACP now to compare its former creed to the reality of their compromises today, it would conclude that things are still very far from the first stage of the democratic revolution. This is why there is now tremendous internal confusion and why a variety of theoretical interpretations have emerged.
Some see there as being an additional stage before the democratic and national stage, while others declare that this is the normal path taken in the long march to socialism. Indeed, the very existence of the SACP as such is now in doubt. In theory, it can choose one of the following courses: either to disappear by becoming definitively absorbed into the ANC; or to carve out some autonomy for itself as an independent political force, which could be radical reformist in nature.
In reality, however, we may see something altogether different. There is a strong possibility that the apparatuses of the ANC, the SACP and COSATU will progressively fall apart as their social and bureaucratic interests diverge between managing the State and running a trade union.
Already many in COSATU are worried about the kind of trade union control there will be over the ANC slate. In mid-November, the ANC prevented COSATU from mounting a poster campaign bearing the faces of twenty candidates which it had chosen to stand for Parliament. The ANC did not want the trade union movement to decide too quickly, and on its own terms, the number and names of its representatives.
Other conflicts have arisen in relation to the "reconstruction" strategy. "The big three (NUM, NUMSA, SACTWU) tend to see industrial strategy, industry-wide retrenchment and retrai16 ning funds, and increasing industrial competitiveness, as the solutions to job losses... This is at least in part because they have greater policy-making capacity, and can exert industry-wide influence through centralised bargaining forums. The smaller affiliates, without these resources, and bogged down in endless retrenchment negotiations, tend to coun ter with fighting talk about struggling for a moratorium on retrenchments."9
Opposing views are also developing in the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO). In SANCO there are, on the one hand, plans for radical campaigns (particularly around housing and land), while on the other, for the worst sort of top-heavy managerial compromises. There is therefore a strong possibility that these conflicts will grow in depth and number until the new social and political interests are clearly defined.
Due to the numerous national and international causes behind this evolution of the situation, it is unlikely that independent and alternative political and trade union leaderships will quickly emerge.
However, over the last few months there has been talk once again of the need for a mass workers' party. This is a recurring theme in a country where two conceptions of the liberation struggle have always been at loggerheads: one which emphasises the "national" and socially diverse character of the political project; the other insisting on the need for specifically socialist and working
In the current situation, it is quite normal that the question of the working class movement and its organisational independence should return to the fore The idea that in a social formation like South Africa, there can be a single, united and disciplined liberation movement — representing a new nation in formation — is sectarian and wrong. It would lead to division rather than unity in daily struggles. Although the trade union left fought this approach in the 1980s, it took it up in 1986-87.
This debate will not take shape again until a number of conditions are met. Whether in the political or trade union field, these include a thoroughgoing recomposition through struggle and through new leadership.
A mass party which expresses the vast array of working class and popular demands — in part as a function of its pluralist character — cannot be built on any type of substitutionalist approach.
As a result, for the moment the main tasks are centred around the coming elections. What is said and done over the next three months will have tremendous importance for the post-election period. Neither the PAC nor the Azanian People's Congress (AZAPO) represent a credible alternative for those millions of Blacks who will express for the first time through the ballot box their aspirations for change and full citizenship.
The PAC, after long hesitation, has rallied to the electoral process, despite having no alternative approach for improving the terms of negotiation between the ANC and the NP. As for AZAPO, it is planning a "boycott", and falling into a desperate paralysis.
For the revolutionary left, there is obviously an increasing gap between what it would have liked and what it will be able to do. For a full understanding of its current difficulty in offering anything more than a symbolic alternative, we would need to look at the last ten years.10
In order to be heard, the revolutionary left must avoid isolating itself from the thousands of cadres, activists, women and youth who — while having no direction from and being critical of the ANC - have every intention of voting for it and against all other parties in the coming elections. *
9. Ibid.
10. In a future article we will come back to the question of voting options for forces critical of the ANC.