The West's desperate logic of the horrors of the past and by the terrorism of the militia. But above all these fears are linked to the uncertainties of the present, to the absence of a social project guaranteeing socio-economic and national equality, and guaranteeing the right to live toge-
International Viewpoint #254 March 1994
WERE we really - and are we still — on the verge of a NATO military intervention in Bosnia? The logic of ultimatums pointed in this direction, and may soon force those making them to follow their words with action. But the political goal of all the countries involved was and remains clear: get the Serbo-Croat plan taken up by Owen-Stoltenberg) signed, thus entrenching the division of Bosnia into three States. CATHERINE SAMARY 22 February 1994
### BOSNIA
HATEVER the public differences governments might be with regards to the crisis in ex-Yugoslavia, there has been a rapprochement, a division of labour and agreement to re-involve Russia in the process as a major player in the diplomatic game.
Before the Gulf War, the media prepared public opinion for a military intervention that had already been given the go ahead in the highest echelons of power. This time however, it is noninterventionist governments that have come under the pressure of the media's images of horror - the broadcast by American cameras of the atrocity at the Sarajevo market shook public opinion, and over the space of 24 hours shifted it in favour of intervention.
Nevertheless, the bellicose declarations that followed upon these images have not affected the various governments' approaches. As a result, there was intense diplomatic activity to avoid what is explicitly called the "worst case scenario". Even aerial strikes aimed at saving NATO's reputation in the face of overt "bad faith" in the Serbian camp would be accompanied by an active search for a negotiated way out according to the approach of the current "peace plans".
The powerlessness and lack of credibility of Western governments in the settling of this first "post-Communist" conflict are such that it is essential for them to present the results of these recent operations as a "Serbian retreat under the pressure of NATO's unwavering determination". The truth is quite different.
### Introduction
THE Wester "powers" are increasingly trapped by the contradictions of their policy in the Bosnian conflict. They hope to prevent by "ultimatum" what they themselves entrenched in their "peace plans" - the building of States through the "ethnic cleansing" of mixed territories. And they have been forced to carry out threats of air strikes, without actually wanting to get caught up in the logic of war. As we go to press, four Serbian planes have been shot down in circumstances which remain unclear. There can be no prediction about what military response will follow, which the various high commands may very well be in no position to control. It is the very logic of the peace plans that entrench the policies of a Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia that is now at an impasse. This logic will continue to come up against the determined resistance of those who remained threatened by genocide. No bilateral alliance will save Bosnia-Herzegovina — neither the Serbo-Croatian plan that gives the Muslims unviable enclaves nor the plan for a "Croat-Muslim community" which the United States has recently "suggested". The US goal is clearly to disassociate itself somewhat from European plans that it has criticised all along, without, of course, changing their approach in any noticeable way. It may also provide a counterweight to the Russo-Serb rapprochement, which has been too triumphant not to be perceived as dangerous - especially when we can't be sure if "the Russians" are "the good guys or the bad guys", to use the language of the American press. We can be sure — and this is confirmed by the comments made by the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, following the proclamation of the "Croat-Muslim territory" - that such an approach would actually encourage and not hinder the formation of a Greater Serbia. A Balkan war or a Balkan union? Tensions between Greece and Macedonia, the explosive character of the Albanian question, the return of the Serbo-Croat war -these are all related to the same crisis that is now tearing Bosnia apart. The governments in place are out to secure territory in the name of ethnicity, to make viable States out of the entities that have emerged from the decomposition of ex-Yugoslavia. As for the populations concerned, there are fears fed by the manipulation of memories ther. - Catherine Samary ©
Many had hoped this flexing of muscles would be favourable to the Bosnian cause. Paradoxically, it will actually serve to accelerate the signing of the accord to divide up Bosnia along ethnic lines. From here on, the American role will be to pressure its Muslim "friends"; whereas before the ultimatum the White House was criticising European plans to impose this very accord on the Bosnian Muslims.
For its part, Germany is threatening the Croatian government with reprisals if it continues its armed intervention in Bosnia. The recent sidelining of Mate Boban is undoubtedly a consequence of these pressures, as is opposition within Croatia to President Franco Tudjman's Bosnia policy.!
It is too early to know if there has been a real change in this area. The recent US proposal to establish a "CroatMuslim community" was rejected a few weeks ago by Izetbegovic in his meetings with Tudjman. The proposal is in sharp conflict with the ethnic cleansing now underway in Mostar.
The Russians were to exert pressure on their Serbian allies. The Serbs were all the more likely to accept that the plan
1. Leader of the "Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna", and a member of Croatian President Franco Tudiman's party.
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International Viewpoint #254 March 1994 to demilitarise Sarajevo places an equal sign between Bosnian arms and their own and would place Sarajevo under UN control, which would include a presence of Russian troops. Would this UN control uproot or entrench the division of Sarajevo and its current state of siege?
In other words, the "Serbs are retreating" because it is only a formal retreat, and the Russian intervention means that they are not caving in to NATO pressure — even though it was NATO itself which requested Moscow's services.
As such, the Kremlin has got what it wanted in the area of its relations with NATO — co-operation with separation,
Flexing muscle will accelerate the division of
Bosnia along ethnic lines which allows Russia to remain (or reemerge as) an "autonomous" power. This is indispensable for the stability of the Russian government, against its "patriotic" opponents.2 In this arrangement, the West can also re-involve Russia in the diplomatic game — especially so in Bosnia where there are no clear stakes involved.
Ex-Yugoslavia lost its strategic importance for the US and European governments with the coming of Gorbachov and the fall of the Berlin Wall. The uncertainties of "post-Communism" have weighed heavily on the nature of the governments in place in the republics of ex-Yugoslavia as in other countries of Eastern Europe.
There are still no clear answers to the questions concerning either future "enemies" or the share of influence in the region. This is also true for Russia: NATO's hesitations in this regard are telling. Do Western governments know for certain on whom to rely to control the new "order" in central and eastern Europe and the Balkans? The question is 4 all the more vexing in that Maastricht
Europe has yet to stabilise, and the tremendous impact of German unification has to be taken into consideration.
There are clearly zones of influence inherited from history and partially differentiated interests can be distinguished from one government to the next. Through its sheer politico-economic weight, Germany has tended to reconquer what it lost during the Second World War. But the German government is not blind to the pseudo-democracy of its Croat ally. It is also worried
— as Gensher was previously3 — about involving Russia in the settling of European conflicts.
France and Britain, traditionally closer to Serbia, want to limit German influence, which is now based in Slovenia and Croatia. But they have chosen to support the Serbo-Croatian alliance to temper extremist forces in both camps, running the risk of sacrificing the Bosnian cause.
### Alternative
For its part, the United States does not want the European Union to be an alternative political and military force to NATO, and wants to keep the door open to Russia and Turkey. With Turkey in mind, the US is trying to pose as the "good friend" of the Bosnian Muslims (and Albanians) who in turn help it to give NATO a better image in Europe.
But the White House does not want to lose its "boys" for the Bosnian cause. This is why it gave its support - meekly - to the idea of lifting the arms embargo and criticised European peace plans. It only went along with the idea of decreeing ultimatums when it saw that its NATO partners did not want to intervene, and that such an intervention could in all likelihood be avoided.
The NATO general command does not want to get involved without "clearly defined objectives". And while the military heads of UN troops have expressed the discomfort they feel being in a war situation where they are supposed to be "peacekeeping", many of them have highlighted the uncontrollable logic that air strikes would unleash - unless they were given massive military back up on the ground, in a yet to be determined political direction. The Belgian General, Briquemont, evoked the myth of the "technological, clean war" in the Gulf and said it was "inadequate for the Bosnian conflict". The thesis of a single (Serbian) "external" aggressor ned by a number of features of the curnian Serb support in a referendum for a "Serbian republic"; vic-Tudjman alliance in favour of the plan to divide up Bosnia; the Croat offensive against Muslims and the ethnic "cleansing" of Mostar, whose fate is worse than Sarajevo's; and finally, the spreading out of the conflict onto new fronts. The cynicism of realpolitik has done the rest.
This is why the ambiguities of the Vance-Owen plan have given way to official acceptance in the Owen-Stoltenberg of the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina in to "three States" along ethnic
From this angle, the "Muslims" or the "Bosnians" are troublesome, and responsible for the continuation of the war. But is this the basis for a peace plan?
This question is of course central for all those opposed to this dirty war. There is widespread feeling that such a plan could be a lesser evil, given the hatred and wounds produced by the war and the need to find a compromise that can at least lead to a cease-fire.
2. These are the forces that criticise the Yeltsin government's subordination to the International Monetary Fund and the dismantling of the USSR.
3. The German minister of foreign affairs that supported a policy oriented towards Gorbachev.
International Viewpoint #254 March 1994
This is a legitimate debate. Let us simply say that it is not up to "us" (the anti-war movement broadly speaking) to decide, while we may have our opinions. To sign the agreement or not, to continue to fight or not - these are decisions that only the communities concerned can make. But we must support the right to self-defence, and the right to refuse to sign under pressure.
There will be no peace without an acceptable solution for the Bosnian people, from all the different communities. From this angle, a negative judgement can be made of two opposing approaches that both lead to an impasse: the ethnic division of this mixed territory; but also the establishment of a "unitary" Bosnian State that does not take into consideration the ethnic-nationalist polarisation within.
### Threat
If the "Muslim" State comes into being one day, it will be in the grip of governments that denounce it as "fundamentalist" from the very beginning. It would run the risk of being constantly under threat, and of genuinely becoming fundamentalist. Everyone would continue to try to enlarge their territory in order to protect their ethnic group, defend their borders or merely acquire some "living space".
The "security zones" that the UN Protection Force has promised to defend more forcefully look a lot like "Indian reservations" cut off from the rest of the world. Moreover, the defence of these zones is worse than illusory — given the arms shortage, the encirclement by Serbian and Croatian forces, and the unwillingness of UN countries to provide ground troops. This is the answer to those who base their approach on the creation of "protectorates".
An opponent of the Geneva "peace plan", Tariq Haveric, a leader of the Bosnian Liberal Party, is aware of the grim consequences in store for the so-called "Muslim" State.
In the 20 October 1993 issue of the French daily Libération, he said, "It is above all village folk that will return to a devastated Bosnia. [...] But the majority of doctors, engineers, technicians, economists and university professors who have found refuge in Western countries will not decide out of sheer patriotism to return to the economic and political uncertainties of such a rump State. But without them Bosnia will be thrust a hundred years backwards. [..] Many have lost all their loved ones, have been tortured and humiliated in Serbian and Croatian camps, and now that the international community has betrayed them they will be advocates of extremism. Worse, by signing the plan, Izetbegovic will relieve the instigators of the Muslim genocide of all historical responsibility. They will always be able to say that the international community supported them, that the co-existence of the three peoples in one single State was never possible and that the war was only a way to oblige the Muslims to accept a division which, in the end, everyone agreed was logical."
The practical effect of this "peace plan" is the spreading out of the conflict onto new fronts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with 2.7 million displaced people and refugees, 3.5 million over the whole of ex-Yugoslavia and 70 thousand refugee applicants outside this territory.4
Instability
Contrary to the expectations of the negotiators, the Serbo-Croat plan sup ported by Owen and Stoltenberg is producing major instability for all the States and communities concerned. On the one hand, the logic of ethnic separation forces the concerned parties into permanent war, to try to make unviable States viable — by establishing "ethnic corridors", getting access to the sea, and increasing their territory in order to host hundreds of refugees in each community.
On the other hand, ethnic cleansing will continue everywhere insofar as it is accepted as the basis for the formation of States. In spite of the massacres and the refugees, not a single region is homogeneous. There will be a generalisation of situations where minorities are oppressed, and a tendency towards the infinite fragmentation of existing States.
But the alternative is not a war for the reconquest of territories to establish a "unitary" State. Tariq Haveric has spoken of a "war of national liberation" against the plans for a Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia sketched out in Belgrade and Zagreb. But this approach only addresses one of the many issues
Such Serbo-Croat plans — and not inter-ethnic conflicts — are indeed the major cause of the war. But they have won support in Bosnia itself. The Bosnian State cannot survive if it excludes any one of its constituent communities. While the armed forces of Karadzic and Boban have received substantial support in arms and men, from Belgrade and Zagreb respectively - and while a joint offensive was being prepared on the eve of the market massacre - the war is not only one of foreign aggression. It is also the consequence of the "ethnic votes" that brought even the nationalist parties to power in Bosnia.
The workers of Tuzla in central Bosnia represent the embryo of resistance to the reactionary policies of ethnic cleansing. However weak their forces might be, we have to support them and help them to chart an alternative course thus the importance of an international campaign.
It was clearly difficult for the "Citizens Party" — an ex-Communist, liberal reformist party which supports a multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina — to find spokespeople that would defend an alternative orientation. Handicapped by the siege of the cities and the lack of arms - the arms embargo has only hurt the Bosnian forces - these currents were also divided amongst themselves.
### Entourage
A section chose to participate in the government, supporting President Alija Izetbegovic. As Bogdan Useljenicki has suggested: "It is in the hope of foreign military intervention that these parties agreed to legitimise Izetbegovic's government and its entourage, and to remain silent concerning its political ambiguities."6
To get this support, Izetbegovic spoke in secular terms of a multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina — but he did not seek to mobilise the communities concerned. One can understand how giving him support appeared to be the only possible option for extremely weak non-nationalist parties. But did this not contribute to the "suffocation of Tuzla", the symbol of an alternative resistance?
In the non-nationalist opposition in Tuzla and Sarajevo, it is said that the "Territorial Defense" of Tuzla, which had held on to its arms, was ready to free Sarajevo from the summer of 1992 onwards. Apparently, Izetbegovic was against such a move.
Conflicts continue within the Bosnian forces. Tariq Haveric has criticised the orientation of the Bosnian army in central Bosnia. "Instead of eliminating the HVO (Croatian militia) as a military force and doing everything to protect the Croatian civilian population, some Bos-
4. Le Monde Diplomatique, January 1994
5. Head of the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia".
6. Libération, 8 November 1993.
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ment. Solidarity committees, trade union and student organisations, political and Denmark, it has received significant support from the trade union move- founded in October 1993. It is present in eight European countries. In Sweden held in Amsterdam. This network of solidarity with workers in the Balkans was ON 26 and 27 February the third meeting of International Worker's Aid was International Workers' Aid
International Viewpoint #254 March 1994 nian units have themselves engaged in 'cleansing' operations in central Bosnia."7
All this reflects the uncertainties within the "Bosnian" camp. Were liberal and "citizen"-based answers sufficient to counteract the divisive logic and fears of parties (such as the German PDS), have given their support to the European the crisis-ridden "small Yugoslavia"?
solidarity convoy with the industrial and multi-ethnic city of Tuzla.
Or of the big one? These kinds of questions should not cease at a time when,
A rendez-vous has been set for the city of Split in the first week of April. From there, specially purchased trucks will make their way to Tuzla. The objectives more than ever, multi-ethnic Bosnia is of the convoy are to provide humanitarian assistance oil, flour and sugar facing the threat of death and deserves to which will be distributed by the miners union), and to break the isolation of the be defended.
working class and social movements of Tuzla.
The first to be sacrificed are those
Bosnians that want to live together,
At the time of the first convoy, in November 1993, contacts were established with the miners and energy workers unions, as well as with the women's especially Muslims, who have no other union of Tuzla. The first convoy is documented in the film "From Timex to
State than Bosnia-Herzegovina. One can
Tuzla", distributed by International Workers Aid. o understand why they would try to enlarge the "Indian reservations" that are generously given to them. But no community has benefited from these policies; there has been a flight abroad of
, "bad Mus-
"bad Serbs", "bad Croats"
lims"
, an economic catastrophe, a "brain drain" and desertion by youth. The suicides of old people increase every day in
Serbia. There have been victims of cold and hunger in all communities this win-
"From Timex to Tuzla"
A forty-five minute video documenting the first International
Each "camp" is politically differentiated. This is perhaps the only hope for
Workers' Aid convoy to Tuzla last November.
pluralism. But without the redefinition of a common project, without the defeat of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia, nothing will stop the on-going decom-
• confrontation with the United Nations in Zagreb position. Support for those who oppose
• the journey over the southern route into central Bosnia the current logic, and the defence of their right to expression and independent organisation is the basis for an alternative approach throughout the Balkans.
There is no purely "Bosnian" solution to
• miner's brigade at the front line defending the city the break-up of Bosnia.
It appears that a plan for a Bosnia, decentralised into cantons, is currently
This unique video records the progress of one of the most importanbeing proposed by the government against the logic of the three republics.
timportant campaigns of international working class solidarity for
This corresponds to the vital need of many years, and the direct links which have been forged with the bringing the State closer to local communities accustomed to living together, in order to rebuild confidence. But is this possible without taking into account the trauma and fear associated with the war?
International Workers' Aid
Without a new union which allows for permeable borders, and for the protection of different ethnic groups in all the States, the logic of dividing up borders will be continued by the war. The
...for the following solidarity donation to the next convoy:
rebuilding of socio-economic links based on solidarity - and ensuring the development of all communities - is the only real cement that can guarantee people's right to live together. *
7. Libération. 20 October 1993.
8. This refers to Bosnia-Herzegovina, a multi-ethnic
State without a majority nationality.
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Footage includes: • initial campaign to raise the aid Interviews with • miner's union • mayor of Tuzla • Tuzla women's organisation • power workers' union Bosnian trade unions. Available from... 12-14 Thornton Street Fax: (+44) 71 738 5868 5 (+44) 71 978 8622 London SW9 OBL £30/250FF/1500FB/90 gilders 75DM/$US50
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