Zapatistas speak for the poor
Whilst written, in the main, prior to the commencement of negotiations between the Zapatista National Liberation Army and the PRIgovernment, our Mexican correspondent builds upon his February article to further examine the impact and repercussions of the 1 January armed
International Viewpoint #255 April 1994
State; secondly, there are sectors which, due to their own social structure, were more opposed to the policy of modernisation. The intention behind the reforms to Article 27 of the Constitution was to uprising. SERGIO RODRÍGUEZ LASCANO* — Mexico City, 21 February 1994
T HE action taken by the
Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) on 1 January brought to a head the hidden crisis within the Mexican political system. Why did the crisis arise? President Salinas de Gortari was not, as some believe, simply attempting to implement neo-liberal economic policy, but, fundamentally, to restructure the way in which capital was accumulated and to play a more active role in relocating centres of labour. To Salinas the Free Trade Agreement not only made use of Mexico's geographical location, but also its potential productive capacity, and this would guarantee substantial economic growth.
### Abandoned
To make his approach credible Salinas abandoned State populism, believing that through the national social security programme, Pronasol, the people could be compensated for all the social costs which his vision would entail. However, a series of interventons by the large state social organisations, which operate as mechanisms of bureaucratic control, were ineffective. This does not mean (as we shall see later) that there is already a social movement which has broken the mechanisms of control.
The effectiveness of the Zapatista action relates to many of the features described in the February issue of International Viewpoint! (its indigenous nature, mode of action, policy of making alliances, and historical roots). But there is another fundamental feature: the existence of a popular democratic movement which since 1988 has consistently defied the government. This democratic movement is the greatest safeguard of Zapatism but at the same 8 time Zapatism has given it a new impetus. It is their connection which has brought about the present crisis in the Mexican State.
To separate the two would deal a death-blow to both. While it is true that the democratic movement is centred around the campaign for electoral democracy it has found a great many echoes among the Zapatistas. While the EZLN action was fundamentally military in nature, it also seeks to end the "State party" system. To want to separate them or to believe that one is more important than the other (or worse, that the Zapatistas will be able to resolve all the political problems facing the democratic movement or that the democratic movement can disguise itself as Zapatism would not only be to misunderstand what is happening throughout the coun try but also an immense political error.
Certainly, Sub-commander Marcos of the EZLN has stated, when asked whether they were planning to take power by force of arms: "No. Unlike the Maoists, we have no conception of a peasant army descending on the cities from the mountains. If there were no workers there would be no possibility, political or military, of achieving any-
And he has also stated that there can be agreement with the popular movement in other organisations: "...this agreement with other sectors would have to be something larger and broader than the EZLN. For this reason we speak of a national revolutionary movement. If this banner were to be raised we would rally to it."2
The government project could not overcome two obstacles. Firstly, important sectors of the population no longer accept the suffocating national political system, which attempts to keep "those below" under the total control of the re-organise the country-side at any cost, even though this involved destruction of the indigenous communities. Luis Téllez, Under-Secretary of the organisation Agrarian Reform, put it clearly when he ca (USA), which ended in the almost total destruction of the indigenous peoples. Sub-commander Marcos again: "There was stagnation until the "supreme" government had the brilliant idea of reforming Article 27. This was a powerful catalyst for the communities. The reforms wiped out all legal possibility of holding land, and it was this which finally led to the formation of a paramilitary group for self-defence. Then there was the electoral fraud of 1988. [...] These two were the detonators, but I think what most radicalised the comrades were the reforms to Article 27, which closed the door to the indigenous peoples surviving in a legal and peaceful manner."3
The series of images, actions and comuniqués during the uprising are a new message from the poor. They are trying to establish a dialogue between "those below" and the State. They are opposed to the myth that "modernity" will bring progress and First World standards for all. The vision of Joseph Córdoba Montoya (chief adviser to the Mexican regime, architect of Mexican "restructuring" and historical illiterate) is now confronted by the vision of the Zapatistas. Years of struggle have found renewed strength in the Zapatista project.
There are huge problems which must be resolved if our people are to have the chance of survival.4 Adolfo Gilly calls these the points which "mark the line" for the construction of a new * The author is a member of the Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRT), Mexican section of the Fourth International
1. See Sergio Rodriguez Lascano, The new Zapatistas', International Viewpoint, no. 253, February 1994. 2. Interview from La Jorada, 6 February 1994.
3. Ibid
4. Inprecor para América Latina, no. 25, September 1992
----- pull-quotes on this page -----
MEXICO
International Viewpoint #255 April 1994 socialist ideology. The Zapatista vision is not simply a programme set out for the Mexican people but encompasses their demands, after years of struggle, for work, land, housing, food, health, education, independence, liberty, democracy and justice. If these are achieved peace will be possible.
As a result of its actions, gestures and communiques, the people are identifying with the EZLN project. The Zapatistas destroying the town halls with spades and pick-axes yet at the same time saving the historical archive of San Cristóbal de las Casas, affected popular consciousness, which already distrusted the government-Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) institutions. No longer were "those below" "barbarous Mexi-
The government has attempted to fragment in various ways but in particular by television. Adolfo Gilly has explained it thus: "Capitalist use of television separates, debate, space, reason, and possibilities of social autonomy in the interpretation of the world."5
The EZLN has had a truly impressive capacity to gain access to the means of communication. In this it has made reality of Gilly's certainty that the "perverse attempt at fragmentation" through "the obsessive and solitary spectacle" will ultimately have a cost for capital. For example, "the revolutionising of images" promoted by television, has led to many viewers identifying Sub-commander Marcos with Juan del Diablo.6 "Tiger" Azcárraga? is being destroyed on his own terrain, by images which have captured the consciousness of the people. This struggle has not finished and it would be a mistake to think that
The EZLN has now humiliated three of the four most important institutions in the country - the Presidency, the army, and Televisa — and helped to divide the fourth, the Church. This is a major achievement. However, the Mexican political system has many more resources than those of its friends in El Salvador and Guatemala. In less than two weeks it gained a great deal of ground in the politics of "the low intensity war", including by Camacho Solís recognising the EZLN as a "political current in process of formation" and hinting at the possibility of its being recognised as a legal party in the near future. This is because the Mexican regime believes that any person or organisation can be corrupted.
The significance of this strategy was described thus by North American,
Gabriel Kolko: "The war does not consist simply in the confrontation of rival armies...(but) between opposing social systems... (around)... political, economic and cultural institutions... The longer the war continues, the more likely that it will be decided outside the field of battle!" The government objective is obvious: faced with the impossibility or indeed the cost of a military victory, it is attempting to destroy the EZLN politically. To do so the conflict must be isolated, presented as a conventional confrontation and its support undermined, locally as well as nationally and internationally.
This is what the government has tried to do. Since the announcement of the amnesty, all its actions have had a double character. On the one hand, it has responded to the pressures which have been placed on the State but on the other, it is attempting to break the dialogue between the EZLN and the general democratic movement. For this reason, "democratic peace" as referred to by Camacho Solis has been understood as the maintenance of the status quo.
The government sought the signature of an "Agreement for peace, democracy and justice", from the only party opposed to it which is legal However, the same day that the signing of this pact was announced (including by Cuauhtémac Cárdenas, which was what gave the document credibility), Salinas showed that he is not committed to a transition to democracy when at a meeting with ministers, representatives from the Supreme Court of Justice and PRI deputies and senators, he stated that the economic model had not failed in Chiapas, nor had Pronasol or the State reforms. The only thing to fail had been their intelligence network. In signing the pact he was attempting to isolate the Zapatistas, so forcing them to negotiate from a weak position and manoeuvring them towards Cardenism; but he did not appreciate his position of weakness. Further, the Cardenista response to Salinas' words was unexpected, making clear, as it did, the links between events in Chiapas and the fate of the democratic movement in general. Cárdenas: "If this has been done with us and our signatures... what can be the credibility of the promises made by the Commissioner in Chiapas, in the negotiations with the EZLN?"9 He stated this even more clearly on 13 February, at the end of the "One-hundred hours march for democracy" 10 when he declared: "The Chiapas rebellion made all our country and society think. We could see the causes which motivated the uprising and also many other political, social and economic problems. [...] We wish there to be correlation between what was signed and what happens in practice to resolve once and for all the problems and complaints of the Mexicans concerning work, land, housing, food, health, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice and peace. These are the claims which came from the heart of Chiapas. We can only agree with these
The government's counter-insurgent project has been successful only in that the truce has allowed it time to prepare for future confrontation, should negotiation not have the result which it desires.
### Failed
The situation which has been created within the regime cannot be resolved. The PRI Presidential candidates campaign has failed to awaken the least interest and indeed seems certain to collapse. Each time Salinas believes that the worst is over and that the PRI can return to its previous behaviour, another event occurs.
The army feels itself to be the victim of a con-trick. If it has yielded to the traditional temptation to step in, it has also made it clear that it did so at the request of the civil State. Again. the army has a double character in that within the hierarchy there will likely be those who favour a coup, but there will be others who will not wish to risk the army on an irresponsible venture, besides which they do not completely reject the Cardenista position. Although Cárdenas himself has denounced the excesses of the army and demanded an inquiry he has placed responsibility for them on the civil State. He also recognises the military character of the EZLN, always speaks
5. Inprecor para América Latina, no. 32, May 1993.
6. Juan del Diablo is the main character in the most popular television serial in Mexico, which is broadcast by Televisa, the powerful Mexican television monopoly.
7. "Tiger" Azcárraga is the main shareholder in Televisa and the most important of the fifteen Mexicans among the richest people in the world.
8. Gabriel Kolko, 'Anatomy of a war: Vietnam the United States, and the moder Historical Experience.
9. Cuauhtémac Cárdenas, discussion on 5 February, on the constitution of the National Democratic Alliance, which supports his Presidential candidacy.
10. From 9-13 February, thousands of people marched uninterruptedly for one-hundred hours in support of clean elections, which Cárdenas had called for in his speech on 5 February. It consisted in repeatedly going around the perimeter of Mexico City's main square (the Zócalo); at the same time, similar actions were carried out in other places.
9
International Viewpoint #255 April 1994 of two armies and tends to analyse them symmetrically. This has provoked a completely disproportionate reaction from the PRI.
Salinas appears to have found himself in the same crisis as Porfirio Díaz, the President of Mexico toppled by the forces of Emiliano Zapata. Aware of Mexican history, Cárdenas put it thus: "The fate of the country is in the hands of one man, Carlos Salinas de Gortari [..] on whether he resolves, in the interests of the country, on an electoral cleanup which will have active support across the political, economic, social and intellectual spectrums and also for thousands of citizens... Not to do so would not only indicate that he does not want clean elections, but that he wants to rule the country by force."Il
The problem is that Salinas will find it very difficult to accept the road to representative democracy. The political system of one-party domination has existed in Mexico for decades. The whole structure of bureaucratic control of the people (by unions, peasants' and other "popular" organisations), the political structure of regional control (governorships and municipal presidencies), the judicial system, all the "legislative" apparatus, absolutely everything, from police corruption to multi-million dollar frauds on the Stock Exchange or the privatisations which have sold the country off cheap, are based upon office not being taken different parties, but in there being a State party, in electoral fraud.
The neo-scientists who govern us do not have the knowledge of Mexican history held by their forebears. This handful of adventurers are however expert in outlining "critical routes" and "political scenarios" and our country, as designed by them, had momentary possibilities while they were able to co-opt, through corruption, many leaders of social organisations and members of opposition parties. But they have never known how to deal with true opponents, and with them turn to abuse, violence and even assassination (for example the disappearance of José Ramón García Gómez Revolutionary Workers' Party militant and defender of the Cardenist triumph - shortly after Salinas took power, and the more than two-hundred and fifty assassinated members of the Party of Democratic Revolution): for Salinas politics is a continuation of the war by
In Chiapas, as in the rest of the coun try, the demand for democracy is the very least which is ready to be accepted at this stage. And when we speak of 10 democracy, it is not merely a question of changes to the electoral law. The majority of the Mexican people believe that our country deserves a political system where the government and its party does not decide everything for them. This also applies to the social problems of land, housing, health, education and so forth, which would be confronted differently if there were no institutionalised structures of dictatorial control over society (the National Peasants Confederation, the Federal Electoral Institute, Pronasol, Televisa...). Democratic change would allow the different social sectors to express themselves.
### Skill
Through fear of this occurring the government has set up negotiations intended to prevent the EZLN from pronouncing on the national situation. However they have been unsuccessful, due not just to the skill of the EZLN but, above all, the echo which is beginning throughout the country. The cane cutters of Michoacán to the indigenous peasants of Guerrero Mountain, the peasants of Puebla, the more than two-hundred and twenty peasant organisations in Chiapas and many others have pronounced not only that they support the EZLN, and that they are in total agreement with its approach, but also that it has authority to propose alternatives for the nation.
It is extremely unlikely that the Chiapas conflict will be resolved early in negotiation and we see it rather as an opportunity for the ideas of "those below" to be heard throughout the country. All the Mexican people will be hanging on what is said. The government, through its representative Camacho Solis, will first offer money and more assistance from Pronasol; from time to time it will make a veiled threat. It will try to slip away from the debate around democracy while prompting the conversion of the EZLN into a legal party. It will refuse to amend the reforms to Article 27 of the Constitution but will make some vague remarks concerning indigenous self-government. For its part, the EZLN will very probably insist on the amendment of Article 27. They will not accept that the situation can be resolved by more assistance from Pronasol, but by fair distribution of land. At the same time it will explain its position on the great national problems, and in particular that of democracy.
The fate of Mexico will be decided in the negotiations. In spite of it being unlikely in the present crisis, a government recovery cannot be totally ruled out. It has the resources to do so. The Mexican government does not want there to be a social movement which makes demands. They will attempt to corrupt through money, and, if necessary, use repression.
### Fundamental
The democratic-electoral movement headed by Cárdenas is also gambling its future. It would be totally wrong to demand that this movement should follow the same direction as the Zapatistas (although at a basic level it is almost the same); but it is fundamental to maintain an alliance based on the similar objectives. The Underground General Committee of the EZLN has already stated: "We organise ourselves as we do because it is the only form left to us. The EZLN salutes the honest and important development of all the independent and progressive organisations which struggle for freedom, democracy and justice for the whole nation. There are and will be other revolutionary organisations. There are and will be other popular armies. We do not intend to be the one and only true historical vanguard. We do not intend to force under our Zapatista banner all honest Mexicans, although we offer it. There is a larger and more powerful banner under which we can all gather: the banner of a national revolutionary movement which, while it can embrace different tendencies, ideas, and forms of struggle, encapsulates the common desire for freedom, democracy and justi-
The possibility of a Cárdenas electoral victory is greater than ever. According to opinion polls, if the elections were held today, he would win easily. There is a two-fold problem; firstly, there must be popular mobilisation and secondly that legitimacy must be won in the eyes of broad sectors of the population including sections of the army, employers and so on). The two are not always compatible. At this stage the problem will not be resolved by the socialist forces alone who can fulfil the first objective, but will forget the importance of the second.
The Zapatistas will continue to act in accordance with the legitimacy which they have won among the people. the most probable scenario is there is fresh electoral fraud is an explosion of great
11. Cuauhtémac Cárdenas, speech on 13 February, at the end of the march.
12. EZLN communique, 20 January 1994
International Viewpoint #255 April 1994 social violence. This is the responsibility which has been placed on Salinas by Cárdenas and is even greater with the appearance of the EZLN It is almost impossible that the conflict will resolve itself before the elections in August.
### Conclusions
• The indigenous insurrection in Chiapas has shown the validity of earlier analyses of the interrupted nature of the (original) Mexican revolution; certainly Trotsky's analysis, on the subject of the second six-year plan of the Lázaro Cárdenas government, is still appropriate: "It is necessary to complete the democratic revolution by giving the land, all the land, to the peasants. On the basis of this already established victory there must be given to the peasants an unlimited period in which to reflect, compare and experiment with different agriculture methods. They must be given technical and financial help but not placed under an obligation. To sum up, it is necessary to complete the work of Emiliano Zapata."13 That revolution, as Adolfo Gilly has insisted, still exists in the consciousness of large numbers of the Mexican people. The Zapatistas and (whether we like it or not) the Cardenistas, will revive in this consciousness the emancipatory claims of the 1910-17
• In a country where it seemed that everything could be bought and sold, where the buyers and sellers played a perverse game in which frustrations at the high prices were interspersed with winks of complicity, where ethics had been erased by "realism" which both over-determined and was an excuse programmatic changes, the uprising of the EZLN brings a fresh spirit. Both with its ability to carry out a military action with great repercussions and its ability to about dialogue with "those below", the EZLN has given a lesson on dignity. When Camacho Solis threatened "Peace with democracy or else" its response was that it sought "peace with dignity or war with dignity", the dignity of Emiliano Zapata.
• It is not only incorrect but would be suicidal to separate the Chiapaneco Zapatista movement and the democratic-electoral movement. The two movements are not equivalent but they are complementary. The development of their alliance depends in large part on the possibilities of destroying the dictatorial system of the State party. Support for the alliance is not only based upon the common social and democratic problems, but above all on the firm conviction that the way to begin a "democratic transition" is to eject the PRI from the National Palace. Whether this can be achieved without huge social costs depends on how swiftly the social movement develops. The theory that mobilisation will lead to repression is completely false. Far worse is the consistent. smothering of the popular
• We Mexican socialists have placed ourselves in the middle of this great social movement which has developed throughout the country both before 1 January and since. We are not Zapatistas nor Cardenistas but recognise ourselves as part of the movement directed by both. We also regard both forces as allied to our emancipatory project. We are responding to the calls by the EZLN for the building of this great "national revolutionary movement" and of the alliance which, around the candidacy of Cárdenas, is working for the destruction of the PRI. We are struggling to advance the self-organisation of the social sectors and the self-government of the people. We know that the fall of the State party system is the first and necessary step if. the different social sectors are to act using all their potential. But it is also necessary to recognise that both movements have increased present crisis among the socialist currents. The recent events in Mexico have obliged us to reflect more fully. To paraphrase the editorial by Peruvian revolutionary José Carlos Mariategui, in the first issue of Amauta: "This debate on the intellectual plane does not concern only one group. On the contrary, it is about a movement, a spirit." Without this spirit socialism will not succeed. *