Introduction
THE agreement which will inaugurate the first stage of the Palestjinian-
Israeli peace accords will be signed in
Cairo on 4 May. The US Secretary of
State Warren Christopher will be present, and will bring along trucks generously offered by the American army to transport the new "Palestinian police" who have been trained in Egypt and Jordan. A few days before, an economic protocol was signed in
Paris, under the auspices of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs Alain
Juppé, which called for "free trade" for products between Israel and the territories under "Palestinian authority".
International Viewpoint brought together two left-wing activists - Adel
Samara and Michel Warshawsky — for another kind of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Adel Samara is the editor of
Canaan, the main publication of the
Palestinian left opposition in the
Occupied Territories. He was imprisoned for eight years as a result of his
### PALESTINE
S ALAH: There were dif-
ferent reactions to the Washington Accord on the Palestinian and Israeli left. Were they due mostly to the difference of the political environment between the two sides or are there more substantial disagreements which have appeared in the wake of the Accord?
ADEL: I think that the differences are not due to the environment. There are some Israeli leftists who agree with the Accord and some who don't. It is the same for the Palestinians. I think that there is a theoretical reason behind this position. There are many people in the Middle East, and all over the world, who feel that this is the era of defeat and, accordingly, that there is no chance to fight or oppose an agreement which is imposed by imperialism and capital in general. Their readiness to continue to struggle against the agreement was
The other point is that the leftwing organisations who have a mass base in the Occupied Territo-
Adel says, out of despair and the feeling that nothing else can be done, or in the belief that this was an agreement which could be a very positive step towards a progressive outcome to the negotiations. This is why we have chosen - and we believe the Palestinian left should have done the same, obviously in their own ways and with their own demands -not to focus on whether we do or do not support the agreement but to make clear what the conditions are which could make this agreement work, and to mobilise around these issues. And then what are the possibilities? Either these mobilisations will be able to change the nature of the agreement and transform it into a positive step or — which was the more probable and is, in fact, what happened - they will be confronted by these obstacles and prove that this agreement could not be a step further.
In a statement produced in the first week of September we formulated everything in a conditional way: If there is no change concerning the settlements then there is no chance of the Oslo Accords being the first step towards peace, and so forth. There will not be a political activities. Michel Warshawsky is a founder member of the Revolutionary Communist League-Matzpen and the director of the Alternative Information
Centre in Jerusalem. He was detained for several months as a result of his support for the struggle of the
Palestinian people.
Salah Jaber O 28 ries are against the Accord, while the small organisations who have no grass-roots relationship with the community were very quick to support it. For example, the
Popular Front is against the
Accord. While on the other hand you have small organisations like the traditional Communist Party, or a current within the Democratic Front, called Fida, who are supporting the Accord. So for me there are two main points: the theoretical basis of the organisations, and their social relationship with the masses.
MICHEL: I don't think that the debates which we have had inside our own organisation and between ourselves is about the nature of the Accord whether it is a good or a bad agreement.
The discussion was more about how should we formulate our position in our mass work. Both in Palestinian society, and in the progressive part of Israeli society, there were tremendous illusions concerning this agreement whether, as radical change in the Occupied Territories nor the mass release of the deportees and so forth. Now it is really clear, with the Hebron massacre even more, that because these issues are not dealt with properly, because they are not part of the deal, because they are not dealt with by the Israelis, we are in a dead end. Or we have an agreement which has nothing to do with the expectations of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, and tens and hundreds of thousands of Israelis - an expectation that we are turning over a new page. Rather, it is an old page with an attempt to reform it in order to gain PLO participation in running the occupation in a new way.
SALAH: I think that makes the framework of the debate which followed the signing of the Accord clear. As a first reaction the question of "Ir?", as Michel described it, might be considered a good way to deal with the situation from the stand-point of the Israeli left. But the question is whether on the Palestinian side you could say "If?" because the answer seems obvious, taking into account
International Viewpoint #256 May 1994 the character of the Arafat leadership and the way in which they struck this deal, even behind the backs of its own representatives in the Occupied Territories.
ADEL: What is the role of the Palestinian left? Is it to try to find out what is good in the Accord? If the Palestinian left continues to do that it would seem they continue to follow Arafat, as was the case before. It is my view that now is the time to cut this form of relationship and the left should look for its own programme. Especially now because the agreement itself is a continuation of the occupation — a permanent colonialism of the Occupied Territories. If the left was trying to find out what the good points of the agreement are, then it will lose its supporters.
My last point is that how can we support an agreement where, for instance, land, water, indirect taxation are in the hands of the Israeli civil administration. The structure of this "Palestinian self-rule" is just to fit better into the structure of occupation.
MICHEL: So, Adel is convinced, and I am convinced with him, that this agreement cannot by any means bring Palestinian independence. It is a train which is going to Tel Aviv, but there is an argument that you can hijack the train — that it is possible to confront such a situation in a positive way by putting on the agenda concrete demands and mobilisations which will achieve or prove your case.
SALAH: We all agree that these Accords do not amount to the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people as we understand it. The two main points of the debate were: is it possible to work within the framework of the Accords or do you have to fight against its very framework? Are the Accords a first step forward or are they a kind of self-limitation imposed on itself by the Palestinian leadership, under pressure from the Israeli government and the USA. These were the first elements of the debate. On this level, I think that after the Hebron massacre we can try to make a balance sheet of the present position of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO): It is in a sense a prisoner of the Accords - Rabin has said, "You have signed. You cannot put the settlements on the table today... a discussion on the removal of settlements is out of the question. You can only discuss things which are within the framework of the agree-
The second element of our debate was about how you relate to the PLO. On this question my view was that you can not have the same relations with the PLO on both sides of the border, the "green line". If you are working in Israel you cannot say "Down with the PLO!" and things like that. But on the other hand the Israeli left should not criticise the Palestinian left because they have a critical attitude towards the PLO leadership. I think that if the Palestinian left had not taken the position it did — if it had taken a position in favour of working within the framework of the agreement in order to better it or to "hijack" it — then the only real opposition current on the ground would have been the Islamic fundamentalist Hamas. They would have said this agreement is a fake, a betrayal of some basic rights, a selflimitation imposed on us, a capitulation by Arafat - and they have been saying that for years now - and if they were the only people to say that then the result would have been much more disastrous than it is. We all agree that the growth of Hamas is not a positive factor. But it could have been worse if the Palestinian left had continued, as in the past, to tail-end the PLO leadership. Nevertheless, the main issue is not to fight the agreement as such but to continue to fight for rights, dismantlement of the settlements, for withdrawal of the Israeli army - despite the agreement and beyond the agreement.
ADEL: I think there are some points which should be clear, not only for the left in fact, but for all those who are oppose the agreement, including Hamas. The chance of explaining, working or fighting for your position inside the Occupied Territories is not available for those who reject the agreement. There is no Israeli democracy inside the Occupied Territories, and if there is now some lee-way it is only for Fatah and other supporters of the Accord. It is important to emphasise that because the international media believes everyone has the same chance and that it is a democracy.
The second point which I wanted to make is that the left should continue to develop its social programme and understanding of the situation in the Occupied Territories, not only according to the agenda of The Israeli police will continue to keep an eye on the Palestinians even after withdrawal the agreement. The left should not limit itself to the agreement. If there are some points which the agreement already guarantees for the masses we should use them without accepting the agreement itself. If there is a chance for us to be represented in the municipal councils, why not? But we do not have to say that we agree with the Accord and the occupation because it has made these things available for us.
Concerning the PLO, it is necessary to differentiate between its leadership who signed the Accords and the militants on the ground. If the PLO remains a captive of the Arafat leadership then I think the left should start to develop its own front. By this, I mean to fight for the leadership of the Palestinian masses and their struggle, both inside and outside. The most important thing is for the left to have its own front and programme and to continue to insist on the Palesti-
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International Viewpoint #256 May 1994 nian Charter. The most important point is that the PLO leadership around Arafat is finished and we should not try to support him. This leadership is now a captive of the Israelis and there is a clear division between this leadership and the masses.
MICHEL: The main success for the Israelis is that they have achieved their primary objective since the PLO became a political force. They have tried for more than ten years to build a local leadership outside the PLO, against the PLO, but since they found that they could not do that, then it was better to take the PLO leadership outside the Occupied Territories and make it the leadership inside. The main achievement of the PLO was to be the embodiment of the Palestinian national question. The next step could be, and this would be a catastrophe for the Palestinian people, that there will be two PLOs. There will be a PLO "inside", the one now based in Tunis, and there will be a PLO "outside", whether it is inside or outside the Occupied Territories, who will continue to represent the Palestinian national question as a whole and not just those resident in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Concerning the potential of the Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories: In the last few months, specifically since the Hebron massacre, the idea which was very strongly situated amongst Palestinian political currents, among Palestinian opinion makers, and quite a lot among progressive Israeli specialists (I would say it has had an impact even within Matzpen) that the problem with which we are confronted is the fact that the Palestinian movement has had no support from Arab states with regard to Israeli-American dictats, and therefore it had to change its policy. The option of the Arab world is closed. The option of the Intifada is closed. So what remains? I have to say, even from a self-critical point of view, that we discovered a tremendous potentiality. It is far from over. After the Hebron massacre, twenty-nine people have been killed. And you have an explosion — people are not afraid of anything. It reminds me of the first days of the Intifada.
But here we can see the crime of the Palestinian leadership. I am convinced that if, the day after the massacre, the PLO leadership or any other authoritative leadership had said "We do not accept the curfew. There will be no curfew", everyone would have been in the streets. I am convinced. There is the fee30 ling that people are waiting for leadership — the kind which the "united leadership" of the Intifada used to be. It is totally lacking. As someone said, the Palestinian organisations in their leaflets acted as if they were in solidarity with the Palestinian people (rather than acting as a leadership). There is still a tremendous amount of energy among the masses in the Occupied Territories which is not harnessed either to improve the Palestinian options in the negotiations, or to confront the PLO line in the negotiations. It is a wasted energy, but it exists. To say simply that the page which was opened in December 1987, with the Intifada, is closed is mistaken.
SALAH: What is your assessment of the line which the PLO leadership is following now, in the wake of the Hebron massacre? They are to sign ton Accord.
MICHEL: I believe that here too we will agree. James Baker said you go on the train or you stay on the platform. The PLO has accepted this conception and there has been, and will continue to be crises. This is not making Israel unhappy because time is on their side. At the same time Jerusalem is becoming a Jewish city completely. The Greater Jerusalem area is becoming more and more a part of Israel, more and more settled, more and more integrated through a new network of roads. The problem - for Rabin obviously, but Arafat is stuck in this conception too — is that it is a zero-sum game. We have a mass and we have to divide it. Every time the Palestinians gain the Israelis feel they are loosing. If there is a massacre you have to pay. This is why from left to right in Israel everyone said Baruch Goldstein had ruined the bargaining position. "We killed forty Palestinians now we have to add forty policeman, or sixty policeman, or six-hundred police-
— release a few hundred prisoners." If tomorrow the Palestinians make a mistake they will have to pay and instead of Jericho fifty-kilometers it will be Jericho forty-kilometers. This is the whole framework, in the narrow sense, of the negotiations. But in this
I think the Israelis will have to make some small amendments to the agreement concerning Hebron, some small changes concerning the settlement in Hebron itself. But it will not be accepted by the Palestinian population in the
West Bank. It will strengthen the opposition to Arafat but it will go on. I still think that as long as there is no accepted alternative leadership Arafat can go on. And while there is a very large opposition to Arafat, and while there are currents rooted in the masses - Hamas on the one hand, the radical left on the other — it is acting as an opposition, as a critic, and not developing a counter-strategy which can harness this potential combativity among the masses and turn this into a real alternative. It doesn't express itself as coherent action. Rather, there is a reaction to the occupation, a reaction to what the Israelis are doing, and many jokes and sharp articles against Arafat, but it hasn't resulted in an alternative leadership. It's not easy, certainly. But it is a task to be fulfilled. There were attempts to rebuild a national leadership of the Intifada presenting, as it used to, concrete perspectives for the population in the medium and the short-term, and presenting a kind of strategic alternative. For the PLO the strategy is in Oslo. This is their strategy. When other Palestinian leaders say that the Intifada must be escalated this must be translated into a concrete perspective understood by the
ADEL: Two points: I agree with Michel about the potential of the Palesti-
The other point is this: Since Rabin rejected any amendment to the Oslo agreement itself it proves there can be no positive developments in the agreement.
Concerning the future, its clear, as we have both said, that the current PLO leadership is a captive of the Israeli government and the USA. This did not occur only after Madrid, it has a long history, developing significantly after 1982 when Arafat left Beirut for Cairo although Egypt had signed a peace treaty with Israel. It was sign of where he was going. He is the leader of a large organisation which is rooted in the Palestinian community and until most or a large part of this community are persuaded that Arafat and his leadership is finished we have a lot of work to do. That is why Arafat still has some steam. Until now I agree that the rejectionist view has not crystalised as an alternative leadership which has its own programme. I agree that the left, until now, has been unable to draft its own programme for the new era, whether this means creating a new PLO leadership or a new PLO, or creating a front for the left who reject the Accord. The critical point is that the most noticeable forms the struggle, for
example Hamas' violent actions, attract the most people. Even when the left has been responsible for a certain campaign or initiative the Israeli media has attributed it to Hamas. It might be that they want to support the idea that the only people who are opposed to the agreement are religious and that it is simply against the Jews, and therefore it is not related to a national struggle.
The left should also concentrate on producing a social programme. We believe that the agreement, as it is now, will continue and will be applied because the rejectionists have so far been unable to stop it. There is some debate between the leftists in the rejectionist camp on whether to stand in the forthcoming legislative elections, in the West Bank and Gaza (according to the Washington Accords). Most are for boycotting these elections but these points should be clarified and explained in the social programme of the rejectionist front and especially the leftist front. At the moment these things are not elaborated in a proper way, but I think the time is coming when these things have to be
SALAH: The last question is for Michel. Both the Zionist left and the Palestinian right in general are trying to sell the idea that the Rabin government wants this whole process to lead to a two state solution but that they need time. So, what comments would you make on that and what do you think should be the tasks of the Israeli left?
MICHEL: This is the main line of division in the Israeli peace movement. The main-stream identified the Labour Party with its own aspirations and for that reason they drew clear conclusions. They had to support the government because they are dedicated to a peaceful resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Therefore they sharply criticise everyone who is in opposition to this
They believe that if you oppose Rabin then you oppose peace. Our conception is exactly the opposite. The burden of proof that Rabin intended to translate the framework of Oslo into Israeli-Palestinian peace is on him. Firstly, because of his personal biography. Secondly, because in the agreement itself he did everything he could to make it unclear. Thirdly, and most importantly, everything since the Accord has gone the other way. Every step taken, or not taken, by the government was opposite to the optimistic reading of the Accord. The government says that what it wants the public is against, whereas the truth is that it's exactly the other way round. After Oslo the majority of public opinion was ready for anything — a withdrawal in six months, a Palestinian state.
The right was totally disorganised. If we look at the demonstrations organised by the right they involved a very narrow segment of the population. It is a religious, settlers', right. The masses of Likud are not coming out for demonstrations. The Israeli government has two positions, those of Rabin and Peres. Peres' conception does not deal with the Palestinians — they are small change. It is an overall conception about the role of Israel. It is an economic vision of how Israel can strengthen itself. It is an understanding of what the "New World Order" is, that the "Cold War" has ended, that there is no Arab nationalism in this period, the modus operandi for achieving their aims. This explains why the Palestinians were ready to accept something which was a huge risk. They paid cash and all they got was some vague promises.
But Rabin and his friends are not the authentic representatives of Israeli capital. They are the representatives of crude 1948 Zionism and the army establishment. And they said, in effect: "this is what we have signed -there will be nothing more." Rabin is pragmatic — not ideological. He doesn't want a Palestinian state, but on the other hand, he is not opposed in principle. If the relation of forces or pragmatic reasons require a Palestinian state he will get on with it. While Rabin identifies with the settlements he will not fight for every settlement. But he will fight as much as possible to keep as many as possible, not out of tactics, but because he is a Zionist. Peres is thinking in terms of the Zionism in the 21st century. Rabin is thinking in terms of 1948.
Matzpen decided after the Oslo agreement to make clear inside the radical and peace movement that we are against the government. This is the line of division. We don't oppose everything Rabin is doing but we are in opposition.
Our main task is to create a movement of opposition to the government, because this government is not leading to peace. You can believe what you want about the Oslo agreement but this government is not leading to peace. *
31 International Viewpoint #256 May 1994