Safety valve set to burst
International Viewpoint #257 June 1994
WE squatted cross-legged on the rooftop of a huge white house in the El Helmeya El Guedida district of Cairo. All around us we could glimpse rows of faces, their features barely revealed in the flickering torch light, young and bearded, or veiled, looking upwards in rapt attention at the Supreme Guide Hassan El Banna as he went on speaking in his quite rhetorical, sometimes rambling, style. Others seemed lost in thought, their heads down cast, their eyes brooding with the distant vacuous look common in people who spend their lives in prayer and in muttering verses about God. It was a clear night in the summer of 1945, sometime during the middle of the fasting month of Ramadan. Hassan El Banna, a short man, dressed in a suit, wearing a squat red fez on his head with prayer beads dangling in one hand, stood in front. That was the period when the Muslim Brothers began to have a visible influence on the lives of Egyptians. NAWAL EL SAADAWI & SHERIF HETATA 28
### EGYPT
T HE Muslim Brothers orga-
nisation was founded in 1928 by the school teacher Hassan El Banna. He started his da'a wa, or preachings, in the city of Ismaileya, bastion of the Suez Canal Company and advanced command of the British occupational forces. It was started in the very arms of the "enemy" so to speak, a detail perhaps worthy of attention.
After the Second World War, the Muslim Brotherhood grew rapidly, encouraged at a distance by the British and King Farouk to become a force which could oppose, or deviate the movement for national independence led by the Party of the Wafd, and to channel its energies into other paths.
At the University and schools, the Brothers countered the slogans raised for national independence and democracy with other slogans against drinking alcohol, for "moral" rectitude and the need to obey the ruler (King Farouk) and worship Allah. "God is Great" was their battle cry and to impress this on our minds they beat students up with iron chains or stabbed them in the flesh with long curved knives if they happened to belong to the Wafd, to a nationalist group, or to the left.
### Coalition
Together with the semi-fascist Misr El Fatta (Young Egypt) and the reactionary political group Gabhat Mist (Front of Egypt) led by Ali Maher Pacha, who was known for his close links with the Palace, the Brothers formed a coalition against the Wafd and other national democratic or left-wing movements.
After the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, which enabled them to train and arm a military wing, they made a first bid for power. In the process, they assassinated Nokrachi Pasha, the prime minister, after he outlawed their movement whic had started to engage in various terrorist attacks. The regime retaliated by assassinating their supreme guide, Hassan El
When the Free Officers movement challenged the rule of King Farouk in July 1952, and gradually took over the reins of power from the old ruling class, the Muslim Brothers flirted with them, hoping to exercise a leading role and eventually complete control over the revolution. In 1954, Nasser wrested full power from Naguib, the short-lived president of the Revolutionary Council. Naguib, in an attempt to consolidate his position and his views, had conjured the support of forces within the army, of the old political parties, and of the Muslim Brotherhood
Now that he held the reins of power firmly in hand, Nasser felt free to engage in negotiations with the British for an eventual withdrawal of their forces as part of a new agreement emphasising the independence of Egypt and the severing of its remaining links with colonialism. The Muslim Brotherhood, after some time, started parallel secret talks with the British, perhaps as a pressure game on the new regime, but also in an attempt to replace Nasser as interlocutors in this process and present themselves as an alternative force. When Nasser cracked down on their movement, they tried to assassinate him in Alexandria in the summer of 1955 while he was addressing a quarter of a million people in the huge square of El Mancheya.
All this does not mean that the Islamic political movement has no popular basis and has no potential as a liberating force. It could mean, however, that since it was founded, most, if not all, leaders of this movement have tended to use the fervor of its adherents for ends which have little to do, or more often, have nothing to do with the hopes of the majority of people in Egypt who hope for real independence, social justice, and democracy — which, when expressed in concrete measures, would lead to a better life.
It would appear that religion, especially in societies where economic, social and democratic development has been retarded by colonialism, neo-colonialism and the corrupt autocratic regimes linked to them, has been, and still can be, a suitable instrument for deluding the masses. The British colonialists, and the corrupt ruling classes which collaborated with them, therefore saw that political religious movements were a powerful force with a popular following which could be channeled to serve their purposes.
International Viewpoint #257 June 1994
However, the leaders of this powerful and explosive movement were always tempted, whenever the occasion arose, to take over power directly and rule. It was at such moments that they clashed openly with the ruling regime.
When Sadat came to power in Egypt after Nasser's death, he quickly emerged as a ruler who had different views and represented different interests to those of Nasser and his immediate collaborators. For him, the future of Egypt lay in a complete dependence on the USA, the capitalist world power which had replaced the British and the French in the Middle East after the tripartite invasion of Egypt (Britain, France, and Israel) in October 1956.
This old new vision of things necessitated peace with Israel and a complete reversal of economic and political strategies which had attempted to chart a middle course between capitalism and socialism, between the USA and the Soviet Union, between Western democracy and an autocracy built on a one-party system and Arab unity.
For Sadat, the solution of Egypt's problems lay not in a planned economy, but in a market economy, which would give free rein to competing forces even if the result, or perhaps because the result, irrespective of official discourse, would be an ascendancy of the richest and most powerful over those who had neither money nor power, or little of either, even if it meant the big fish eating the little fish, and an increasing gap between both the rich and the poor, and between men and women. Even if it meant replacing British colonialism with the military and economic ascendancy of the United States coupled with growing dependence of Egypt on the West, more freedom for speculators and brokers at the expense of industrial and agricultural production and a foreign debt which grown by leaps and bounds. Even if it meant replacing Nasser's anti-democratic politics by other antidemocratic measures hidden behind the thin veil of a multi-party system controlled by a few, who danced to the tune of a rigged-up majority ruling party, and replacing partlycontrolled corruption by a corruption let loose. Even if it meant throwing overboard any hopes of Arab unity and therefore a more just peace with Israel for the Palestinians, the Syrians, the Jordanians, the Lebanese, the Egyptians, and the Arabs in general.
### President believer
Sadat had to overcome those who opposed his views. After naming himself Al Raiss El Moumin, which means the President Believer, he reverted to the old game of reviving the Islamic political movement to use it in the struggle against the opposition composed of Nasserites, nationalists, progressives, liberals, and left-wing movements. Once again, the followers of the Islamic political movement started to become visible, the young men bearded, and the women veiled. Their slogans "God is Great" or "Islam is the solution" reappeared on the walls or were shouted down the gullets of microphones. This time, however, there were significant changes, a greater complexity, sophistication, and more violence. The movement seemed to have split. On the one hand, there were numerous radical groups, like the Jihad and Al Gam'a a El Islameya prone to terrorist teachings, methods, and attacks.
On the other, a softer "moderate" mainstream, the Muslim Brotherhood This group, after learning from past experience, was now prepared to play the electoral game, infiltrate into professional, cultural and informational and other institutions, into the administration at all levels, central and local, and into the parliament and the judiciary.
It also set up a network of social services. Most important of all, many members of the Brotherhood who had worked in the Gulf countries and gone into voluntary exile, had learned how to make money and had understood the importance of an economic base composed of a network of banks with Arab, Islamic and international connections. After all, way back in history, and even in more recent times, some Arabs had been wily traders.
The Islamic fundamentalists who were not worried about art or culture, or the future of our life on the planet could fit in very well with an economy built on brokerage, trade and speculation. They were at home in a world order, and a national or regional system where money was the commodity to be played with plus a sideline in drugs or in arms. Why not? "God forgives all sins except that of giving your allegiance to another
This way, the roles wer nicely divided. The Muslim Brotherhood no longer had any need for a military wing. The other "radical terrorist Islamic groups" could throw the bombs for them. This way they were not responsible. Their role was more important and strategic. They provided the ideology and presented themselves as a moderating force to the government, and to everyone else. They alone could deal with the fanatics, and save us from them by coming to power. They would retore our lost security, our vanishing stability, and save us
So while the radicals threw the bombs and disrupted the economy, the Muslim Brotherhood could steal to power, by gradually expanding their base in the governmental and quasigovernmental institutions, including Al
But their plan was cut short momentarily. As they became stronger, their opposition to Sadat, who had conjured
Anwar El Sadat (right), the "President Believer, revived the Islamic movement as a weapon against his political opponents 29
International Viewpoint #257 June 1994 them up, grew vociferous. The growing opposition in the country was threatening his reign. So on 5 September 1981, seized by panic he arrested all the oppositional parties and groups in one swoop. 1,352 people were rounded up in 36 hours.
"Demon"
One month later, on 6 October 1981, the Islamic "demon" let out of the flask, assassinated its master as he stood reviewing his troops. This setback was only temporary. Mubarak released all the people whom Sadat had imprisoned two months after he took over. But, as time went on, it was clear that his policies would not differ much from those of Sadat. The "liberalisation" process continued more rapidly under the watchful eye of the World Bank, and the pressures exerted by the donors. Prices continued to soar and inflation was the monster that devoured the meagre earnings of a population that was forced to import what it needed most rather than produce and work as all human beings prefer to do.
The government continued to encourage the Islamic political in a multitude of ways, to knuckle down to the pressures exerted by Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries, especially after the Gulf War had eliminated all resistance, from Iraq or anyone else.
Oil
Perhaps the oil countries could be enticed to invest: a hope which has not materialised except to a limited extent. The governments of the big oil countries are now in debt and only private capital has the money to invest. Yet it has been quite hesitant, providing nothing that really fills the gap. Food and clothing for the rich, luxury buildings and hotels, and speculation in urban development and currency trade. All the things that make things worse, marginalise the poor and women, push them to the edge, and satisfy the rich.
Religion has been and still functions as a safety valve so the government pampered the Islamic political movement and at the same time tried to hold it back. But the government kept losing ground. The new strategies of the fundamentalists were proving themselves. Inflation served them well and so did the policies of the capitalist West, backing Israel all along the line, knocking down the Arab countries one by one, and tightening the economic clamp.
The policies followed by the Egyp tian government under Sadat and then Mubarak, have been largely supported by the US and other western powers. The Islamic political movements were utilised to fight in the Afghanistan war, supplied with money and arms through Saudi Arabia and Pakistan with technical aid from the CIA and other sources of help. Recourse was had to the most fanatic and terrorist groups such as Al Jihad and Al Gama'a El Islameya, Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman — the spiritual leader of the second group who was arrested in the USA from his home in New Jersey in connection with the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York who is known to have been involved actively in the Afghan war.
### Army
Today in Egypt the Islamic political movement feels strong enough to make a decisive bid for power. Its success or failure depends on many things, not least movement
AL-MITRAQA no
Revolutionary communist review for the Arab region rth Internationalists debate the PLO-Israeli Accords
FOU
• Salah Jaber for the Bureau ofthe Fourth International
• Sergio Yahni & Michel Warshawsky for the majority of
Revolutionary Communist League, seetionor the Fourth of which is the position of the army, whose favour the present government has done a lot to woo.
On 15 June 1991, the Egyptian government closed down the Arab Women's Solidarity Association which we founded in April of 1982 along with a group of Arab women and men. This measure was the culmination of systematic attacks on the Association and its founders emanating from the different Islamic political groups, from
Saudi Arabia and different governmental institutions and administrations. Women's rights and women's
International in the Israeli State
• Tikva Honig-Parnass for the minority of the section movements have always been considered as anathema to these Islamic political movements and to the State religious institution of Al Azhar. Only a small minority of progressive Islamic intel-
• Analysis of Islamic fundamentalism in Palestine plus...
Copies are available for 25FF (including postage) from
International Viewpoint, BP 85476622 Pars, CEDEX 11, France
30 lectuals and thinkers had some sympathy for the efforts made by women to struggle for their rights.
One of them, the late
Farag Foda, was assassinated by a terrorist group on 8
June 1992. But many other intellectuals and independent thinkers are threatened by a similar fate. Several professionals, journalists, and writers have been killed
International Viewpoint #257 June 1994 in Algeria. The names of those under threat have figured on various death lists circulated in Arab countries such as Egypt, Yemen, Sudan, Algeria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
One of the paradoxes of this situation is that a number of them are being protected by security guards employed by the very governments which they oppose. In addition, these fundamentalists have infiltrated into many government administrations, including those responsible for security. Hardly a comfortable thought for those under guard who have the double task of opposing movements using religion whether Islamic, Judaic, Christian, Hindu, or other. Religious fundamentalist movements have grown in many parts of our "postmodern" world, including Western countries of the "First World". *