### MexIco
HERE can be no denial that on 21 August the sixty year old State party system made its full weight felt in the Mexican election. Its "triumph" was rooted in large-scale fraud, manipulation of state resources, and corporate control, intimidation and blackmail. The results can only postpone and lead to a more bloody transition to democracy and the end of a dictatorship which, although it does have a real social base, oppresses more and more the majority of those who voted for it.
* Some extremely serious mistakes were made by the democratic camp, which contributed to the results. Sections of the democratic movement are now beginning to believe that under a State party system there can be no free elections, nor can democratic forces hope to win, until the mechanisms of control are broken and there are new rules by which to play.
In any case, what has been shown by the results is that the transition to democracy will be a long and complex process. In this process the National Democratic Convention (CND), founded in Chiapas on the initiative of the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) must play a central role. The CND represents the ultimate popular army-in-waiting against the State. Consolidating and broadening the Convention, organising resistance to fraud, advancing a programme of struggle which will go beyond the present political situation, and repairing the democratic and leftwing forces while learning lessons from our defeat, will help to prevent another illegitimate government or at least reduce the time period before the PRI dictatorship can be challenged once more.
### Fraud
The PRI wanted not only to win the election but to win an absolute majority. It also wanted to force its real opposition into a poor third place. One strategy was to crush public opinion and to demoralise that opposition by way of an avalanche of opinion polls purporting to show that it would win.
Further, there is no doubt amongst the democratic movement that, independently of other political factors (which will be dealt with later), on 21 August a huge fraud was committed which effectively distorted the vote. Gradually, more and more evidence of this fraud has come to light. As Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the PRD presidential candidate has stated, there were around 10 million fraudulent votes, or nearly 30% of the officially registered vote.
The government made good use of its six years in power to prepare the ground for the fraud, carrying out numerous practice exercises in local and federal elections. The result was an almost "clean" fraud (with neither the violence nor theft of ballot boxes expected by the Mexican and international observers) which combined placing false names upon the electoral register, refusing to place potential electors upon it on the basis that they were for some reason ineligible to vote and, later, removing electors from it. Nor should we forget the hundreds of people who had more than one voting document and who on
* The author is a member of the Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRT, Mexican section of the Fourth International).
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International Viewpoint #260 October 1994 election day were taken from one polling station to another to vote for the official party, there being more voting papers than voters, the buying of votes, the direct intimidation on election day itself, or the later manipulation of data which has produced results which do not coincide with polling station records.
In contrast, the democratic opposition did not make use of the six years of Salinism to prevent the fraud. There was a great deal of naivety and too great a faith in purely political measures. In the end there was too little time for it (or Civic Alliance/Observation 94, the main citizens' grouping concerned with overseeing the elections) to set up an effective system of monitoring the various forms of fraud and, more importanly, preventing it.
Documenting and systematising the fraud, to show how it was possible, is a task of first importance for the democratic movement. On this depends not only in large part its credibility with the public, so that it will be supported in future actions, but recovery of its confidence in itself.
Weight of the system
Although the importance of the fraud cannot be underestimated, there were other factors which determined the result.
The PRI is still able to rely upon a considerable social base. There is nothing strange in this, despite the crisis in the State system of domination. After all, Pinochet achieved almost 50% of the vote in the Chilean referendum. A dictatorship can have an important social base without ceasing to be a dictatorship, and this is especially true of the PRI, with 65 years in power and a complete political and social network.
Although the apparatus of domination is cracking, the system showed at the election that the mechanisms of corporate control continue to weigh heavily upon broad sectors of society. Many of the votes in favour of the PRI came from citizens still influenced by its ideology or by direct coercion from these mechanisms.
Corruption - which in 65 years has permeated and corroded the whole of society — and clientism also brought in a large number of votes. In addition to those votes bought directly, others were bought by promises of favours, land, payment of debts and so on. The clientist programmes created by President Salinas de Gortari under the guise of combatting poverty (the National Soli18 darity Programme — Pronasol - and the Country Solidarity Programme -Procampo) also had an effect.
In addition, the PRI also built for its "victory" by spending thousands of millions of dollars belonging to the State. Not only did it spend State money directly upon its campaign, it reduced its foreign currency reserves by at least fifty percent in the last six months before the election using the money to maintain the value of the Mexican dollar and to bolster the economy generally.
The only thing more offensive than the "triumph" of Ernesto Zedillo is the success of Salinismo in having increased poverty to desperate levels in order to later exploit it, buying votes with charity, corruption and promises.
### Real vote
It is also vital to understand the nature of what we might term the real vote. If the votes of PAN and PRD are added together, then there is a majority for change. However, if it is the PRI and PAN votes which are added - which fraud makes it impossible to tell whether or not there is a majority for change and, if so, how great it is, it is clear that a large proportion of the vote was for these two parties, and was a conservative vote, not one which calling for the removal of the State party system.
S: PACE
PAN captured an enormous number of votes. In addition to its conservative ideology, its gradualist strategy and the political alliance between its leadership and the government gave specific meaning to these. Particularly as a result of the televised debate between the PRI, PAN and PRD presidential candidates, PAN recovered its role of protagonist and wrested a large number of votes from the Cardenistas. There is also evidence that in some cases the fraud favoured PAN. Some commentators have taken the view that, while the PAN vote was a vote for change, it was a vote for a "soft landing". ". Others have seen it as the triumph of the gradualist approa ch. Without doubt it is an obstacle to the defeat of the State party. The best that might be said is that it is a vote for its partial correction. In this sense also it represents a conservative vote.
There are many explanations for the real vote for PRI and PAN. There seems to be agreement that it was a result of fear of what might happen if there was a vote for change. However, there is no agreement on what was behind the fear. Cecilia Soto, the presidential candidate of the small Workers Party (PT) which has increased electorally during the last six years, has stated that Zapatista Subcommander Marcos gave many votes to Zedillo. There are even some Cardenistas who believe that Cárdenas' vote was damaged by his rapprochement with the Zapatistas, and particularly by his visit to the EZLN in Aguascalientes. They believe that the people were afraid of "violence" from the Zapatistas and therefore from Cárdenas, and that he should have pursued a more moderate line, when the reality is that if anything damaged his vote it was the confusion generated by his toning it down. This will be dealt with later.
In fact the Zapatista uprising, as is widely recognised, awoke huge sympathy and gave great impetus to the movement for change; towards the end of the campaign it gave it the CND
Those who gave votes to Zedillo were the killers of Luis Donaldo Colosio, the original PRI candidate, assassinated on 23 March during a campaign meeting. So did those political mafias which, while presenting themselves as civil pressure groups, sowed doubt upon the feasibility of defeating the State and said that it was searching for a "civilised rapprochement".
The people were not afraid of Cárdenas or the Zapatistas but of a violent reaction from the State, of mafia terrorism, of boycott by big business and
International Viewpoint #260 October 1994
United States capital. In other words, they were blackmailed by the powerful, as occurred in Nicaragua. Overcoming this fear is a major challenge for the democratic and revolutionary forces in Central and South America, if they are to come to power.
However, none of the above political considerations must be allowed to disguise the serious mistakes which contributed to the Cárdenas campaign not achieving the massive vote which it had calculated upon as being sufficient to overcome any fraud.
For one thing, the campaign did not in reality take heed of what Cárdenas repeated again and again: that the 1994 election was different to that of 1988. The "Cárdenas effect", which in 1988 took the system by surprise and produced a widespread conviction that his candidacy was the way to bring down the PRI and an end to the crisis which was crushing the State, would not repeat itself automatically. Further, in a country undergoing great changes, the struggle for the vote would be more difficult. Notwithstanding this, triumphalism began to paralyse the campaign.
### Mistakes
By triumphalism is meant not the belief that victory was possible, but that it was taken for granted that the popular vote was guaranteed and that it was merely a matter of removing the obstacles to its recognition. Mistakenly, it was more preoccupied with convincing the most reactionary sectors both inside and outside the country that it should not oppose a democratic victory, rather than with winning a majority of the popular vote. For some months the speeches and activity of Cárdenas were directed principally at these sectors, and this ambiguity created great confusion concerning the programme and objectives of the Cardenista movement. It was forgotten that the only way there can be negotiation with the powerful is by first winning majority popular support, and that the best way of attracting those who have doubts or fears is by taking a firm Stance.
The campaign also gradually lost its social definition. Originally it imagined a scenario in which there would be polarisation not along party lines but between social blocs. The Cárdenas candidacy was to be the expression of the majority popular bloc, and should rest upon a broad social spectrum, upon social committees and citizens groups, not just political organisations. Yet such vision became secondary. Speeches became less positive, offering few alternatives and avoiding commitment on
No less costly was the signing on 27 January of the inter-party pact which gave breathing space to the government when it most needed it, when it found itself cornered by the effects of the Zapatista uprising.
The most spectacular mistake of the Cárdenas campaign was without doubt the televised debate on 12 May which, for a number of reasons, had catastrophic consequences from which it found it difficult to recover. The most grave was that PAN was able to present itself as a serious protagonist and so the electoral contest became one between three parties, rather than simply between the PRI and the PRD.
The PRD also lost a great deal of credit by the way in which it selected its deputies, senators and assembly members. It reneged upon its public commitment on the percentage of candidates who would be non-party members (meaning from the organisations which made up the National Democratic Alliance); there was a disgraceful display of internal infighting, which resulted in a short-sighted and bureaucratic approach when it came to selection.
The last two months before the election saw the campaign re-orient itself towards political mobilisation, contact with the people and a more committed approach to social issues. However, it was too little, too late.
### Evolution in political situation
The national political situation has produced all kinds of about-turns and surprises this year
On 1 January the armed insurrection of the EZLN moved national politics towards the left, encouraging radicalism and the hope that the Priista regime would come to an end. The assassination of Colosio moved the political scene back to the right, by injecting uncertainty, fear and conservatism.
However, the assassination was only the most dramatic manifestation of the decomposition of PRI power. The public perceived this, and it lost a great deal of prestige.
The crisis pervaded the atmosphere; Although the democratic opposition did clear that it squandered its chance. Nothing should have been accepted which would not make a radical change to the rules of the game, including election organisation. It was mistaken in its calculation that it would achieve such a huge vote that fraud could be overcome.
What is painful is that, while the Zapatistas made sacrifices and played their part in creating that chance, the democratic citizens movement did not
The regime has recovered a certain degree of control over the situation, both on the economic and political plane. It has now defused the most explosive elements and, although there is the internal divisions amongst the ruling class on the one hand, and on the other the founding of the CND, they have as yet not had a decisive influence on the mind of the State nor on the conscience of the broadest sections of the population.
The results are there to see; but it would be a serious error of judgement to suppose that the situation is intractable and that the regime is about to enjoy a new period of stability. The State party continues to be rocked by conflict and the democratic tasks which have characterised this period still remain.
Tasks and perspectives
What was made clear on 21 August is that the transition to democracy, and the end and dismantling of the Priista dictatorship, will be both a longer and more complex process than anticipated. But the process is on-going. A Cárdenas victory would have avoided many problems and reduced the time period: This was the view of those on the revolutionary left who decided to support his candidacy. This is what the Zapatistas understood, who in contrast to sectarians and ultra-leftists, knew that he could not nor should not avoid the electoral scene, and that the consequences of their actions would touch all of us, even though we preferred to close our eyes.
While others have a gradualist vision of transition, we believe that for there to be real change there must first be a rupture. In the short term the possibility of this was posed in the possibility of a Cárdenas victory. What has happened now is that the rupture has been postponed, and it will be a great challenge to discover the routes by which we may once again reach this possibility.
The advances made in proving the illegitimacy of the election, the persistence of the democratic movement against the State party, the possibility that major financial scandals will come to light and that new evidence will be
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"Triumph" rooted in fraud
Internationa/ Viewpoint #260 October 1994 uncovered of the crimes in which the "mafias of power" are involved, and further infighting and fresh splits amongst the decadent Priista "family" will continue to threaten the regime. All this is happening within a framework in which, despite the announcement of growth and stability following the victory of the PRI, Salinismo has left undermined key areas of the economy and generated huge unrest, including amongst sectors of the business world - not to mention the majority of the population, for whom any growth which has taken place in the last six years has been nothing more than a growth in poverty and unemployment.
The most difficult problem for the PRI continues to be Chiapas, where there is a strong possibility that the electoral fraud will be overturned and which is still on the brink of civil war. While clearly the EZLN did not benefit from the outcome of the election, its local and national presence cannot be effaced by the government. Even away from the Chiapaneco problem, the existence of armed organisations is a permanent problem for the State.
### Gradualism fails
There continues to be head-on struggle with the State party dictatorship. Gradualism has proved to be a failure, yet in return for some minor concessions it has continued to give it oxygen.
On all fronts, not just political, we must put forward initiatives aimed at the dismantling of the State party. To do so we must politicise the social struggle in the unions, the urban areas, the country, and so forth.
Changes also have to be made in the importance ascribed to the various social and political protagonists which have been struggling against the State party. As a result of the election result we are possibly witnessing the wane of the Cardenista leadership in this struggle. This is not because Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas did not demonstrate great integrity or was not important, but because the role of the political forces is changing in the new scenario. If the pre-electoral scenario - with the social and citizens 20 movement, the Zapatistas, the "mediating" forces and the Cardenista campaign- was inevitably compartmentalised, the post-electoral scenario is even more so. It is vital that we learn to combine, co-ordinate, and synchronise the different social and political protagonists.
The National Democratic Convention founded in Aguascalientes, Chiapas, should play a fundamental role in this. Seen in defensive terms, the CND represents the ultimate army-in-waiting to deal with the oppressive intentions of the regime and its preservation is vital for all. However, seen in the medium term, the CND should be the space in which the different social and political protagonists in the struggle against the State party dictatorship are unified and which forms a focus for change at this moment of crisis in traditional politics.
The CND cannot give respite to the regime. The objectives upon which it was founded a transitional government and a Constituent Assembly) are more valid than ever and should guide its activity at all times. The ways, means and time period in which to meet these objectives may be various. But it is clear today that the only way in which the extensive and long-suffered State party system will be vanquished is through a broad social alliance: the CND may serve as the seed. *
EZLN demands respect
9. The EZLN reaffirms its decision to hold to its demands of: 8. In response to the warlike attitude of the usurper of federal executive power, the EZLN has placed all its troops on scheme of the usurper Salinas de Gortari for the creation of a situation favourable to his desire to hold on to power. 7. An end to the ceasefire upon the part of the federal troops, and the consequent outbreak of war, fits in with the fight back and have received orders to defend our land until the last. We will fight with honour and dignity. conducts itselt in accordance with military honour and with respect for the civilian population. Our troops are ready to has been decided that armed force should be the response to our demands for democracy, liberty and justice, it 6. The EZLN is addressing itself to the federal army, to its high command, officers and soldiers to ask that, although it 5. In high governmental circles a military solution has already been decided upon. They are only awaiting an oppor- tune moment in which to attack the Zapatista positions. sion, federal army warplanes carried out intimidatory manoeuvres above dwellers in the towns of Las Margaritas and During the night of 12 September, the same date that the usurping power threatened the Chiapanecos with suppres- 4. The federal air force has resumed night flying, carrying out low-altitude flight manoeuvres above civilian areas. dating the civil population and forcing an end to the ceasefire. patrols outside their actual territory and gone into Zapatista territory with the intention of provoking our troops, intimi- 3. The federal troops which occupy the municipal centres of Ocosingo, Altamirano and Las Margaritas have begun here, the supreme government is attempting to strike fear into the rebellion of the EZLN against the fraud and illegiti- macy which it is aiming to establish with the support of the communications monopolies in Mexico. honourable voice of the Zapatistas. With these even greater in number than the 50 thousand federal troops already 2. The armed forces of this wicked government have now sent ten divisions to the southeast with which to crush the experts in the field of operations, intimidating the civil population and the suppression and murder of fighters by its logue. The supreme government is preparing for a military solution by increasing the number of troops and military 1. Salinas de Gortari has deceived both national and international public opinion with his so-called desire for dia- The Underground General Committee of the EZLN denounces and declares the following: Communiqué from the Underground General Committee of the Zapatista To the peoples and governments of the world: To the national and international press: Army of National Liberation, Mexico. To the people of Mexico: Brothers and sisters: 15 September 1994
From the mountains of south-east Mexico.
paramilitary forces.
"Red Alert".
Democracy!
Liberty!
Justice!
With respect.
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