The future of the FMLN
International Viewpoint #261 November 1994
FOLLOWING the split in the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) represents, both numerically and in terms of influence, the most important of the five forces which make up the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMILN). To discover their analysis of the situation in El Salvador and the conflict within the Front, International Viewpoint spoke with MERCEDES PENA, co-ordinator of the FPL's international relations department.
• EL SALVADOR!
HE PEACE accords signed in Chapultec in 1992 between the ARENA government and the FMIN have still not come fully into force. How is the process progressing?
It should be remembered that the Republican Nationalist Alliance (ARENA) government did not sign the accords of its own free will. Therefore it was clear from the beginning that it would do everything possible to put a spoke in the wheels of the process and to drag things out, so forcing modification of the timetable.
There are still problems around the civil national police (PNC).' While it is true that it has increased in number and that it is now deployed throughout the country, the government's central objective is to militarise it. ARENA continues to campaign for transfer into the organisation of contingents from the former national police. Joining the PNC is meant to be an individual process, following a training course at the new police academy, and tests to determine suitability. If the government succeeds in integrating repressive former contingents, then the PNC will not fulfil the role assigned to it by the accords: a police force which respects the people, which is not corrupt nor uses violence.
Without doubt, the most fundamental of the accords is that which deals with the transfer of land occupied during the conflict by those who made up the social base of the FMLN.2 Land has begun to change hands in the last few months, but the delay has had serious effects. More than two and a half years after the signing of the peace accords, many peasants are still working land which does not legally belong to them, and often without credit, as the banks will not lend to those who do not hold proper title deeds. This has led to some demoralisation amongst our peasant bases, who have gained the impression that the accords are worthless. The government was aiming for this effect. Thanks to unceasing pressure by the FMLN and by ONUSAL3 on the government, the transfer of land programme is still continuing. But this struggle is using up all the energies of the cadres in the FMLN rural communities, and is preventing them from working on other tasks.
There is also the problem of the collection of private weapons. Many people have them in this country. The rich and large-scale land-owners have veritable arsenals, and, with the increase in delinquency, there is organised arms trafficking in working-class districts. There is no control worthy of the name and presently nothing is being done about this. How should the social movement respond to the neo-liberal plans of the government?
The neo-liberal programme is aimed at privatising everything, from the national telephone company to healthcare and education. The FMLN does not oppose all privatisation automatically. For example, during the recent privatisation of the sugar industry, FMLN deputies led and won a battle for it to be sold to workers organised in co-operatives, when the government initially wanted to sell it off to the private sector.
But, as a general rule, the privatisation campaign is aimed at protecting and increasing the interests of a minority and not at responding to the needs of the majority of the people.
1. Within the goal of demilitarising society, the PNC, made up of 20% former guerillas, 20% former members of the army (entering on an individual basis) and 60% civilians, will replace the former repressive bodies such as the National Guard and the Rural Police.
2. The transfer affects nearly 18% of agricultural land. The former owners did not have it compulsorily purchased. They have been indemnified by a Land Bank set up by one of the accords. The peasants are buying the land through Land Bank loans of 30,000 colons per occupier (1 colon= £14.32/US$8.82), repayable over thirty years.
3. The United Nations mission which has been observing the peace process since the summer of 1991 It is due to leave the country this December.
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International Viewpoint #261 November 1994
The FLN has twenty-one deputies in the National Assembly; what role can it play there, despite the public split on Ist May?
Despite the internal problems of the FMLN, the number of its representatives in the National Assembly is far from negligible: the fact that we have twentyone deputies means that ARENA can't make decisions without taking into account the views of the FMLN and other opposition parties.
Further, the FMLN representatives have noted that the people are beginning to have confidence in them. They have realised that they are the true representatives of the Salvadorean people. We want to achieve a certain level of representativeness and respectability, and this can be seen in the proposals put forward by our group in connection with economic policy, changes to the electoral code and so on.4 All this is still very recent: our participation in the National Assembly is a new experience for us, particularly given that the FMLN has never participated in any form of power befo
Control
We have already had a number of successes. For example, ARENA, which obtained control of the executive after its victory in the presidential election, and a simple majority in the Assembly, wanted to continue to control the Supreme Court of Justice. The FMLN succeeded in reaching agreement with all the other opposition parties on a united and firm refusal to ARENA's hegemonic intentions. For a whole month we completely blocked Assembly business so that ARENA was unable to do anything. This had never happened to it before. As a result of our action the Supreme Court is now more balanced than those which preceded it, and, in contrast to those of the past, does not hinge exclusively upon decisions made by ARENA. ARENA's deputies now realise that they must debate with all the opposition. The same thing will happen with the appointment of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, because once again the opposition has reached a joint position.
As soon as our deputies are used to this new experience at the heart of power, we will become a force for putting forward proposals which reflect the most pressing needs of the people. There must be a direct link between the people and their representatives, and not a separation, as has happened in the past.5 32
Following the elections, the FMLN has also taken a number of ltown halls. What type of municipal management has the Front put in place?
Ten of the fifteen councils won by the FMLN were won by the FPL. Although we had hoped to win more this was still a good result. It is enough to begin to put into place a new framework for local power, where the interests of the people are truly represented. We have begun by giving specific training to our mayors. Most of them are former guerilla leaders, and while they have plenty of enthusiasm they greatly lack the training and experience needed to exercise their new responsibilities: carrying out weddings, notarising documents, carrying out a whole host of legal procedures and so on.
We have also organised "cabildos abiertos" (public meetings). These are provided for by the Civil Code, which states that once per month the demands and needs of the community must be put forward. In most of the Front-held town halls, during the first cabildo abierto a report has been presented on finances. This has been a surprise for the people because no town hall has ever done this before. Previously, the town halls were making their own decisions on municipal expenditure, and in a number of cases quite simply pocketing the money. Our town halls have informed the people of their own projects, those of the government and the possibility of forei-
Working closely with the people, our municipal teams have begun to make lists of the needs of each community and will use this as a basis upon which to draw up their priorities. We are trying to obtain financial support from three sources: from central government, which is presently receiving much foreign economic aid (mainly from the US and the European Union), but which balks at benefiting municipalities won by the FMLN; from non-governmental organisations; and from solidarity groups, which finance more modest pro-
The greatest problem which we are facing is the ARENA policy of snuffing out the FMLN gains: in the absence of central government funding, how will the town halls find the money to carry out their projects of improving infrastructures and economic and social development (roads, electricity, drinking water, schools, health centres and so
Where the town halls have been won by the FMLN, the people are waiting for them to carry out their demands, believing that they are the true representatives of the people. Moreover, other municipalities have their eyes fixed on those held by the FMLN to see if changes really will happen: it is therefore vital that our municipal administrations are a success. In 1997 we must again win the town halls which we hold today, and, with the 1999 presidential elections in mind, win other municipalities. If in 1997 we suffer disastrous results in the municipal and parliamentary elections, the 1999 presidential election will be extremely difficult for us. Can you tell us about the internal crisis in the FMLN!
Each party, and no doubt each individual member, has their own view on this. Firstly, it should be borne in mind that the FMLN is a front rather than a single party, and that there have been differences between us since it was first founded. There has always been five separate organisations, with different interests. We did of course share an identical goal: the bringing about of change in our society. We were all fighting on behalf of the masses, and adopted a common mode of action: the politico-military struggle. This united the five organisations but each continued to analyse the situation in the country in its own way. During the war, there were numerous disputes within the FMLN, but which we succeeded in overcoming There is nothing new about what is happening now. All that has changed is the context.
### Logical
The present split in the FMLN does not worry us: it is a logical development in the left-wing movement in this contry. What must be asked now is whether the FMLN can still guarantee change in this country. Would it not be more sensible to replace it by a larger movement or a single party? Is the FMILN still right for the job?
4. The FMLN has demanded, amongst other things, that the procedure for electoral registration be simplified and that there are registration offices in each village, not just in the towns.
5. The FMLN deputies have tried to make as many links as possible with their community activists. Accordingly, in mid-August, when there was discussion of a law aimed at cancelling peasant debt of less than 500 colons, numerous delegates from land co-operatives attended the Assembly.
International Viewpoint #261 November 1994
Then there is the question of internal democracy. This is a serious problem for the Front. The FPL has proposed that the election of delegates to the next FMLN convention be organised according to the number of members in each party, not by quota. We believe that the democratisation of the Front should begin with votes by individuals, not by
The FPL believes that it is time to form a single party, with the different organisations which make up the FMLN merging into a single structure. A single party which will defend the interests of the masses, which will make pacts and alliances with all the forces in this coun try which refuse to compromise on the fundamental issues for which thousands of Salvadoreans gave their lives; for while we are maintaining relations with all the political parties, this does not mean that at a given moment we will negotiate so as to obtain this or that posi-
Paralysed
We cannot remain paralysed. This has been the case since May and we have to act. We must respond to a number of political events and stop ARENA profiting from the internal divisions within the Front. It is urgent that solutions be found to the future of the FMLN, because there is just enough time to re-organise and to prepare properly for the municipal and parliamentary elections in 1997. If the Front does not form a single party it will become stuck in endless internal debate. Would such a party accept the existence of tendencies?
No. We want a single party with no tendencies, although there can be different personal opinions. In the FPL there are different opinions, but that does not mean that we have factions or that everyone does what suits them. We envisage a single party where there are different views but where decisions are respected once they are made. This is not the present case in the FMLN, where everyone is acting as they please. Doesn't the proposal for a single party risk appearing, in the eyes of other parties in the FMLN, to be an attempt at hegemony by the FPL?
Of course, there is that fear because the FPL is the most important organisation in the Front. But I believe that we have to look at political reality. The FMLN as it exists now is no longer viable and we are presenting a disastrous image to the people. Many believe that the FMLN represents an alternative, but if the crisis continues, they may turn away from us.
Either the FMLN becomes an opposition bloc of different political parties in the Assembly, without internal discipline, or it becomes a single party. I believe that political reality demands a single party.*
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05 12im099 vent 2noiele 1600l tness 096 10 26916. 6. Up until now, all the organs of the FMLN leadership have been elected on the basis of one representative per party, irrespective of the numbers within it. 33