US troops settle in
International Viewpoint #261 November 1994
GENERAL Shelton, who commands the US forces, says that: "We must not become the enemies in Haiti." Yet soldiers have been arresting paramilitaries only to hand them over to the Haitian police, who immediately release them. A very strange way of making friends with the Haitian masses. ARTHUR MAHON examines the real objectives behind the US occupation.
N THE night of Sunday 16 October a rumour spread throughout Haiti: General Duperval, who had a week earlier replaced Cédras as head of the army, had planned to assassinate President Aristide. American guards had discovered grenades in his car. During the night, some thousands of people gathered in front of the national palace in Port-auPrince. Some carried machetés and clubs. Having enjoyed some days of liberty, they were determined that a new 30 September 1991 would not take place. A nightmare for the US officials. The next day a hundred US soldiers were stationed before the national palace, together with a number of security agents. All wore the same khaki shirts,
### HAITI which scarcely concealed their bulletproof vests. All through the night and morning, US officers with all kinds of special-vision binoculars kept scanning the multitudes. According to the UPI agency, "the work has begun to identify rabble-rousers"
The episode reveals the central role played by the US forces in Haiti. Having had access to the roof and balconies of the national palace to protect the president, they used this privileged position to build up files on those who came to defend him. In the name of the restoration of democracy, they are seeking to secure their control of Haitian society, using not only the national palace, but also its principal inhabitant.
### Edifying
The true objectives of the US intervention can best be assessed by examining the motives of those who planned it. This has been done by the American journalist Allan Nairn, who writes on US policy in Latin America and Asia.' The views he canvassed during the weeks preceding the invasion were edifying. According to one of his interviewees, the objective was to create a situation in which the Haitians "don't think that they can do as they want". Who was the invasion supposed to protect? In the words of one intelligence officer, it was
"the middle class, those who have an American style training, some sectors of the business community". Major Louis Kernizan, an American of Haitian origin, was a representative at the US embassy in Port-au-Prince from 1989 to 1991, and now works for the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). He is one of the principal strategists of the occupation and expresses himself frankly: "Who are we going back to save? You're going to end up dealing with the same folks as before, the five families that run the country, the military and the bourgeoisie. They're the same folks that are supposed to be the bad guys now, but the bottom line is you know that you're always going to end up dealing with them because they speak your language, they understand your system, they've been educated in your country. It's not going to be the slum guy from Cité Soleil." Kernizan is opposed to wage increases because "you have to use your advantages and in Haiti it's cheap labour". Another intelligence officer agrees with Kernizan on this subject. Speaking of Aristide, he told Allan Nairn that "that old reformist economic programme is now history, and he won't be allowed to revive it". Is there nothing to fear, then, from Aristide? Obviously, these gentlemen do not like him. Yet, according to a Pentagon man, "the sooner that we can bring Aristide back to
1. The Nation, 03.10.94 (New York)
Aristide returns... ...after three long years in exile
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Clinton has recently granted $5 million to the
International Viewpoint #261 November 1994 give his message of reconciliation, of law and order, the better it will be." "Others", according to Nairn, "are uncertain whether he will play the game but note that anyway he will not really lead. A psychological operations expert said that, under the occupation, the grea- CIA to carry out test part of the Haitian army and the administrative infrastructure will trans- "non-specified political fer its loyalty to the new 'gwo nèg' [he who makes the rules]. And the new strong man, he said, will be the United States."
While Kernizan was sceptical about the possibility of a popular uprising, not everybody shares his opinion. Nairn again: "A US psychological operations expert who specialises in Haiti predicts that if there is an invasion, the people will begin by applauding the departure of Cédras, but an anti-American sentiment - and thus attacks against the forces of the United States - could develop in the space of four weeks. That will be less probable if Aristide returns rapidly, but even in this case, he said, the danger of uprising remains if the popular expectations are not rapidly met." In any case, "according to documents and long conversations with the US military and intelligence strategists, whatever the manner in which Cédras goes — through an invasion, a coup, or an understanding — the US will contain the popular movement, by force if necessary." For this, the necessary equipment has been prepared: "A supplier who works for the State Department has said that the naval force now off Haiti has replaced its stocks of antitank weapons by instruments of crowd control, like shields, gas masks and batons." Yet some continue to say that the US forces will be withdrawn after several months. And afterwards? Nain: "It is envisaged that a whole army of US soldiers, CIA advisers and civilians will remain behind to participate in Haitian affairs more deeply than they have for some years. For example, the International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP, the US agency charged with reconstructing the Haitian police force, should, according to its chief strategist, remain for three years, with several hundred US trainers who will have the job of fashioning a Haitian force of 5,000 men." According to a Pentagon source, this police force will be there to prevent any attempt at
The United States will not rely solely on repression or espionage to control Haitian society. "Some US officials", writes Nairn, "say that, although they are prepared to keep a tight rein on the popular movement, its capacity for resistance has been weakened by the unrestrained terror of the armed forces and of FRAPH [Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti]." Consequently, "low intensity war" can now give way to what the American researcher William Robinson calls "low intensity democracy" 2
Infiltrate
Under the dictatorship, as a complement to the repression, the United States, had already, in several ways, tried to infiltrate the popular movement and buy it off. They are now going to devote themselves to constructing an "organised civil society" in their own fashion. This is considered, according to Nairn, as the "key to any programme of control of the population". They will also, of course, act on the political plane. According to the weekly Haiti Progrès (Volume 12, no. 29), which quotes a memorandum from the US embassy. they intend to encourage and finance "the responsible elements inside the popular movement" and "the moderate Duvaliériste sectors". According to the New York Times, Clinton has recently granted $5 million to the CIA to carry out "non-specified political actions".
The reasoning of the military officials interviewed by Allan Nairn before the invasion was based on over-formal schemas. What happened after the arrival of the US troops was not really foreseen in their programme, to the extent that US strategists have had to modify their plans from day to day. Moreover, the presence of US soldiers excited popular mobilisations rather than holding them back. In fact, at least in the big towns where US soldiers were numerous, increasingly large and audaactions"
cious Haitians used them as shields to regroup, demonstrate and defy the Haitian army. At Cap Haitien, the US soldiers had to halt their patrols one night because, from the moment when they appeared, the people came onto the street and followed them.
### Substitute
One of the objectives of the accord signed on 18 September by Jimmy Carter and the putschist leaders was to prevent the collapse of the Haitian army, through co-operation between the two armies. The US army did not wish to substitute itself for the Haitian army and assume the functions of a police force, on the one hand because, as one officer said, "to become the police is to become a target", on the other because the US officials wanted the Haitian state apparatus to continue functioning, without rupture. In several towns, this schema was able to function. In some, the US soldiers were too few in number to be used as "shields" by the people. In others, they strictly applied the orders following from the 18 September accord, at the risk of seeing their popularity founder.
At Cap Haitien and Cayes, it was different. The US soldiers rapidly found themselves in a vacuum; before the mounting of popular protest, the Haitian soldiers preferred to abandon their barracks. At Port-au-Prince, where the greatest part of Haitian soldiers are concentrated, it was another case. After the Haitian police had killed some demonstrators who had been emboldened by the US presence, the project of common patrols between the two armies was abandoned. And the US military police supervised the forces of Haitian repression. The latter showed themselves inca-
2. Covert Action, Spring 1994 (Washington).
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US troops settle in
US troops allowed the thugs of FRAPH to demonstration
International Viewpoint #261 November 1994 pable of assuming certain missions which the US military commanders wished to assign to them (disarming the paramilitaries, protecting demonstrations). Finally, faced with increasingly audacious demonstrations, which went so far as the sacking of police stations, the soldiers deserted the streets of the capital.
U NTIL now, the US army had
watched, intelligently, to preserve its popularity. Its attitude during the demonstration of 30 September, which was to render homage to the victims of the dictatorship, is however very revealing of the devious policy which it has adopted. The organisers of the demonstration had been promised that the US soldiers would protect them. Finally, after a consultation with the White House, a sharing of tasks was decided. The Haitian army would oversee the route of the demonstration. For their part, the US soldiers would keep their distance and block the crossroads leading to the bourgeois quarters and the official buildings. But the Haitian soldiers never appeared. And, although posted not far away, the US troops allowed the thugs of FRAPH to attack the demonstration. To conserve its credit, the US army organised a raid on some arms caches and arrested a few dozen people. By raiding the FRAPH local, the 10
US soldiers became heroes although they had not lifted a finger three days earlier when its occupants fired on the demonstrators.
### Responsibility
One can trace a parallel between this episode and what has happened since 1991; the United States bears an overwhelming responsibility for the coup d'état and the repression which followed, and yet they could finally emerge considered to be the "liberators of Haiti". Act I of the play must be forgotten — only Act II should remain in the memory. The US embassy had a large hand in the coup. The CIA now acknowledges that it knew in advance of the putsch. Emmanuel Constant, one of the chiefs of FRAPH, has revealed to Allan Nairn? that CIA and DIA leaders were at the army GHQ at the time. The FRAPH is a paramilitary structure which sows terror throughout the coun try. The United States would like to make it the equivalent of the Salvadoran ARENA. According to Constant, it was a DIA agent, Colonel Patrick Collins, who has very recently returned to Haiti, who asked him to create FRAPH after the coup d'état. Constant already worked for the CIA and for its Haitian emanation, the SIN (Service d' intelligence nationale), a structure which has organised political repression since 1987.
Constant's links with the United States are so close that on the day after the raid against FRAPH the US embassy organised a press conference for him, providing a microphone, technicians and protection!
### Return
The return of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, on 15 October, was greeted by explosions of joy in the popular neighbourhoods. But the crowd which gathered before the national palace was smaller than anticipated. The fear of repression remains great. Some days before, a truck filled with FRAPH members had fired on a demonstration in the south of the country, killing 24 people. In some rural areas, the section chiefs continue to make the law. What will happen in the months to come cannot be a replica of the first seven months of the Aristide presidency. A lot of things have changed. The coup d'état allowed the reconstitution of a network of auxiliaries of the army and strongly implanted paramilitaries. They dispose of considerable weapons supplies. Aristide wants the US army to disarm them. But there would be much to fear in a large scale operation of house searches. When, following denunciations by the people, the US soldiers seized some arms depots, they began by searching a house of Aristide supporters, acting on a tip-off from a attack the
3. The Nation, 24.10.94.
4. Multinational Monitor, July/August 1994 (Washingtan).
International Viewpoint #261 November 1994 pro-putschist leader in Cap Haitien. The problem of the paramilitaries can only be settled by a general mobilisation of the population. It must have the right to protect itself. Aristide himself, before taking office in February 1991, made reference to the vigilante brigades which had been formed several times during
1986. During the night of 16 and 17
October, when the rumours of a coup spread, one again saw the inhabitants of the popular neighbourhoods setting up roadblocks to control vehicles. Yet Aristide no longer seems disposed towards this kind of initiative, and the Minister of Information, Hervé Denis, has announced that anybody found taking part in looting or attacks on the houses of political opponents (in other words, the pro-putschists) will be arrested. This is the first time that one of Aristide's ministers has spoken the language of repression, and undoubtedly it will not be the last. The political course adopted by Aristide has its consequences. He has announced that he wishes to include representatives of Haiti's richest families in the government, which would mean there would be no question of allowing the crowds to besiege the parliament or barricade the doors of the tribunals where the corrupt judges sit, as happened in 1991. The economic policy to which Aristide is commited could lead him to give his approval to acts of repression. It will be one of the great problems in the period to come.
### Economic orientation
In 1991, Aristide had not yet chosen a well defined economic orientation. However, the programme presented by his representatives to a meeting of financial backers held in Paris in August 1994 is very clear. It was notably drawn up by Leslie Delatour, who was finance minister in the first government which followed the fall of Duvalier. The neoliberal economic policy which he has undertaken to carry out would have catastrophic consequences. The programme presented in August envisages in particular the suppression of half the jobs in the civil service, the privatisation of state industries, and the abolition of import duties (except, for the moment, on some agricultural products). A nondefined "social safety net' is proposed. Interviewed on the subject of this plan three weeks after its presentation, Chavannes Jean-Baptiste, founder of a peasant movement, replied that, although he was a member of Aristide's private cabinet and resident in Washington, he had never been consulted and he had never been able to procure a copy of the text.
After having read some extracts, he said: *This is the plan of the World Bank and the IMF. It's the same plan they've always offered for years, what they used to call the "American Plan' "4 In line with this plan, US officials have proposed that the funds for compensating victims of repression, envisaged by the ambiguous amnesty law voted at the beginning of October (which Aristide is to interpret in a decree) should take the form of shares in the privatised public
This economic programme has a formidable logic. In order to attract foreign investment, it is necessary that the environment is "secure and stable", as they love to say in Washington. It follows that the poor must keep quiet and leave the Haitian (or rather HaitianAmerican) state to settle their affairs. It would be disastrous if the Haitian left were to follow President Aristide down this road. *
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US soldiers arguing with a woman, accused by her neighbours of hiding an "attaché"
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