Post-election debate opens
International Viewpoint #260 October 1994
THE FOLLOWING is a contribution from the national committee of the Socialist
Democracy tendency (DS, which identifies with the positions of the Fourth
International) of the Workers'
Party (PT) to the debate which must be held in the light of the election results, and in particular that of the presidential election.
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### BRAZIL
A FTER our defeat in the
98 presidential election, the PT set to work within the perspective of a possible victory in 1994. We concluded that there had to be a "qualitative leap in the Brazilian popular democratic movement", without which it would be impossible to win the struggle for central government. Aware of what was at stake, the bourgeoisie achieved its own qualitative leap.
Yet we did not! During the past year, the PT did not prioritise the building of the party, fuel the political debate with its own alternative socialist projects, set up the necessary mechanisms with which to impose its hegemony upon the country, ensure that it had its own press, or develop the reinforcement and politicisation of the social movements. Indeed, it reduced its activity! Our trump card in the electoral battle was the prestige of Lula. The gravity of our defeat shows clearly that this was not enough.
The PT has shown that it was not ready for the level of confrontation required to win government on the basis of the transformation of society, a battle where conservative forces must suffer serious harm. We underestimated a dangerous enemy, while overestimating the strength both of our own forces and those of our allies.
We all share responsibility for the mistakes which were made. We must draw up a harsh balance-sheet, and learn from it, so as not to commit them a third time. Other currents within the party have already given, in the national press, an analysis diametrically opposed to our own, which in our view can only increase our difficulties.
The following document is only a preliminary balance-sheet. The results from the second rounds of the elections in which we are taking part - for the governorships of the Federal District and the states of Rio Grande do Sul, Espirito Santo, Sergipe and Amapa -may yet further emphasise the depth of our defeat. Our main task up until 15 November (when the second rounds take place) is to battle for victory in these states.
### Results
On 3 October the left in general -and the PT in particular- suffered a crushing defeat in electoral terms, but an even worse one politically. The election results mark a qualitative change in the national political framework, and will mean changes to our present points of reference.
The main change in terms of national politics is the new role played by the Brazilian Social-democratic Party (PSDB).!
We were defeated not only because the battle was won in the first round by the coalition between the PSDB, the Liberal Front Party (PFL) and the Brazilian Workers' Party (PTB), 2 but also because the Brazilian Popular Front never had, even at the end, a clear political line.
1. Contrary to its name, the PDSB is not linked to the popular democratic movement, and is situated half-way between social-democracy and liberalism. From this party came Femando Henrique Cardoso, soon to be President and inventor of the "Plan Real".
2. The PFL is strongly identified with the military dictatorship. Its candidate was Paulo Maluf (former Governor of the state of Sao Paulo) but he withdraw due to the level of united conservative support for Cardoso. The PTB is a rightwing party led by a rich banker.
The bourgeoisie are now better placed than before to
International Viewpoint #260 October 1994
### Important defeat
The Brazilian people, and the Brazilian left, have suffered an important defeat, the significance of which cannot be underestimated. Accordingly, it cannot be regarded simply as a closed chapter in Brazilian history.
The bourgeoisie are now better plaadvance their project ced than before to advance their project of "development" for a third of the population (and increasing the exclusion of "development" of the other two thirds); they want to make Brazil part of the neo-liberal "normality" of present-day capitalism.
However, neo-liberal adjustment is a long and conflictual process (as can be seen in Argentina, Chile and Mexico. It will meet with widespread social resistance, and there must also be taken into account the experience of struggle and organisation within the popular sectors. The role of the PT in the organisation of this resistance will be crucial to preventing (or not, if we fail) Brazil becoming aligned with the dominant international economic, social and political bosses. Its success or otherwise will determine the political future of the country.
A new development on the national political scene is the formation of a bourgeois strategic centre around the alliance between the PSDB and the PFL, which is even closer to the imperialist decision-makers than the military dictatorship, and which testifies to the new degree of internationalisation of the dominant class. Not only have we returned to the beginning of the 1990s, and the classical, harsh neo-liberal programme of Fernando Collor de Melho, but further are witnessing a possible end to the crisis in the bourgeois leadership of the state and the fragmentation which has existed in the bourgeois camp since the end of the dictatorship. The popular sectors could lose a trump card which up until now has been critical to maintaining our political space.
Our defeat has been lightened a little by the fact that the votes for Fernando Henrique Cardoso were above all an expression of support for the "Real Plan"3 — and, whatever the media might say, not for the neo-liberal project, as occurred in the Mexican presidential election. Moreover, abstention greatly increased (17.7%) and so did blank and void votes (11.4 and 11.8% respectively, or 23% of the votes cast, in the presidential election, and 42% of the total cast in the election for the Chamber of Deputies - where 12% were blank and 30% void). This indicates that a large part of the population felt both alienated from the political process and mistrustful of politicians.
The defeat could also be lightened (although not annulled) by second round victories in Rio Grande do Sul, Brasilia and Espirito Santo. Up until now these electoral battles have taken place in a national electoral context dominated by our opponents. It might still be possible to win some important bridgeheads for political action and to increase our political presence.
The aggressive way in which the State apparatus was placed at the service of one candidate, electoral legislation made to the detriment of the PT, the media, opinion polls, and in particular the TV channel Globo used in favour of Cardoso, and the application of the "Plan Real" to direct electoral objectives, prove that the State was not playing by the rules. Contrary to what was said by the national press, there was no "affirmation of Brazilian Democracy". 4
However, it has been difficult to challenge the illegitimacy of the electoral process. This is due not only to the skill with which it was managed by the ruling class but to the timidity of the PT itself in denouncing these frauds. If we do not do so then we risk our opponents consolidating their position and the "Mexicanisation" of Brazilian political life.
### Decisive test
These elections have been not just a great battle but a decisive test for us. We have ended them on the defensive, having committed many mistakes. The
PT turned out to be incapable of winning central government on the basis of Lula alone. It underestimated the degree of resistance which would be shown by the bourgeoisie. It also neglected aspects such as building the party, the ideological battle, co-ordination and encouragement of the socialmovements and the linking of our work in municipal apparatuses with the global political battle. Given the structure of Brazilian society and the existing conditions of class struggle, we will only win central government with a much more cohesive and better organised party, which has the support of a larger, more active and more politicised social movement. We cannot minimise the defeat by pointing to how many deputies were elected or the number of second rounds in which we were involved. This is because not only was the increase in both cases much less than expected, but also because the potential for intervention in the political battle which they represent can only be achieved by a strengthening of the party and the social movements.
3. The introduction of a new currency, the Real — effectively devaluation of the existing Brazilian currency.
4. O Estado de São Paulo, 8 October 1994.
5. The number of federal PT deputies increased from 35 elected in 1990 to 49 in 1994 and the number of state deputies fron 79 to 92 over the same period.
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Post-election debate opens
International Viewpoint #260 October 1994
Central role of the PDSB T HE KEY factor in our defeat was the PDSB. With the aim of preventing a Lula victory, it built a solid conservative alliance, even larger than those of the last two decades - including the Democratic Alliance, which in 1984 put Tancredo Neves and José Sarney into power. The 1994 front included not only the closely linked PFL and PTB, but also parties such as the Progressive Party (PP)6 and the Liberal Party (PL), as well as wellknown personalities such as Antonio Brito from the Movement for Brazilian Democracy (PMDB)? and Jaime Lerner of the Democratic Workers' Party (PDT).8
A resolution passed by the 8th national meeting of the PT defined the PDSB as a party where neo-liberal ideology predominated, but which also included some progressive sectors. The latter have turned out to be marginal in importance. The party has undergone a qualitative change, moving from the centre to the right to strengthen the leadership of the Brazilian bourgeoisie, commiting itself to the application of neo-liberal policy and building solid links with the dominant oligarchies.
Contrary to the view of many in the PT, the PDSB is not the hostage of the PFL. The sectors closest to international capital and its strategies are organised in the PDSB around Cardoso. Today the PDSB represents the modern, dynamic and pro-active right, with the most coherent antipopular project and the ability to take the initiative. It is working to reestablish the solid hegemony by the bourgeoisie over Brazilian society. The PDSB has become our main and most dangerous enemy — for it is more difficult to unmask than the traditional right even though it puts forward the same project — a society based upon exclusIon.
Efficient application in Brazil of the neo-liberal project would not alter its harmfulness to the majority of the popu22 lation which is excluded from the formal job market. There would be small islands of prosperity linked into the global market, but no social progress in the rest of the country. The majority of the population would be reduced - at best
- to dependence on social security. This would mean even greater social fragmentation and inequality. Accordingly, keen not to provoke social resistance, so as to prove its ability to govern, the PDSB is likely to place a greater emphasis upon social questions in its neo-liberal programme.It will also seek to attract sectors of the left by reference to welfare benefits and "solidarity programmes".
The PT must stand in clear opposition to the new government, if we are to gain support for our programme. It will be an even more dangerous adversary than the previous government, due to its more organic links with the bourgeoisie and its greater legitimacy in the eyes of a party which is larger and more influential than that of Collor. We must clarify the position of the party on the PDSB when deciding on the support which we will give candidates from other parties in the second round of the state governorship elections. It must be made clear that the PDSB is no longer to be considered our ally, and that from now on it is to be regarded as a right-wing current even more dangerous than the traditional right.
Reasons for defeat
We must examine both the advances made by the bourgeoisie and our own weaknesses, and evaluate the part played by both conjunctural and structural factors in these elections. We must recognise that many fundamental structural factors — accumulating over the last five years — contributed to our defeat. Yet, if we had not also made the mistakes which we did, Lula would have gone through to the second round. And if there had been a second round, the result might have been different.
The bourgeoisie knew, much better than us, how to learn from their experience in 1989.
• It built around the Cardoso candidacy a united conservative force not seen before in this country (which was even able to achieve the withdrawal of Paulo Maluf, the PFL candidate).
• It learnt to use the media skilfully and to its full potential.
• It used the State machinery to the advantage of Cardoso.
• It had international contacts from which it learned how other parties confront the left at elections. It had direct assistance from the World Bank and the IMF, as well as from those who ran the Clinton campaign in the United States.
• It gave these elections the character of a plebiscite.
• It developed a powerful ideological offensive in support of neo-liberalism and against any challenge to this.
The building of a united conservative force, media manipulation, and the utilisation of state resources were not solely responsible for the Cardoso victoгу. If the most united bourgeois camp in the last few decades was the main reason for the Cardoso victory, the "Plan Real" was the electoral instrument by which it took place.
The matter was skilfully handled. The bourgeois camp needed an extremely important issue around which there was was widespread public concern (this applied to stabilisation of prices) where the government (the Finance Minister and the Central Bank) could produce short-term results. The problem was that numerous anti-inflationary measures had already been applied in Brazil, all without success. While another anti-
6. The PP is a right-wing party. To this party belongs Luis Antonio Medeiros, President of Fuerza Sindical, the organisation most openly opposed to CUT (the main Brazilian trade union federation).
7. The PMDB is a centre/centre-right party. Its president is Orestes Quércia, former governor of the state of São Paulo.
8. The PDT is centre-left populist party, affiliated to the Socialist International.
International Viewpoint #260 October 1994 inflationary measure might increase distrust and lead to accusations of an electoralist operation, at least it allowed the team behind the "Plan Real", which had been half-considering other plans, to be able to rely upon experience. Further, it was an issue where it was possible to look to examples in other countries and to international ideas, especially those of the World Bank.
The decline in social struggles since 1989 was equally important. The recession unleashed by the application of neo-liberal adjustments under the Collor government, which meant not only the worst social crisis in the history of Brazilian capitalism but the incapacity of the popular movement to combat this offensive, led to a huge decrease in the level of activity in the mass movement in comparison to 1988-9. While there was some remobilisation during the government of Itamar Franco, this was extremely weak.
Mistakes made by PT
Some structural limitations which were not dealt with at the 8th and 9th national meetings contributed to the disarming of the PT in the electoral battle.
It should be said that most of those who attended the meeting of the national leadership (DN) of the PT on 12 and 13 August have already stated certain of the problems which have been raised here, and believe in the need for a change of course. However, as there was no quorum, it could neither debate or vote upon confrontation between the different projects for society and the proposal of a democratic revolution in Brazilian society. Our campaign wavered between the line agreed at the last two national meetings and a (vain) attempt to present the party as the party of the poor while also trying to engage the confidence (or at least the neutrality) of the rich. This wavering was decisive in demobilising militants.
Yet Cardoso also denounced the social situation, on television — even the calamitous state of public healthcare, which he himself helped to create.
It was argued that it was not necessary for the presidential campaign to attach itself so closely to the campaigns for the state governorships. This had some disastrous consequences, for example in São Paulo, where a greater identification of Lula with José Dirceu might have enabled him to go through to the second round the situation in this instance being aggravated by the fact that some sections of the party were stating publicly throughout the campaign, that he should withdraw and that there should be an alliance with the PDSB While Lula obtained 27% of votes cast in that state, Dirce only obtained 17%, when 22% was needed for him to go through to the second round
From December 1993, we saw the putting into place of the "Plan Real" (originally entitled "Plan FHC-2") by the government and the first attempts to use it in such a way that Cardoso would be elected President of the Republic. It became more and more clear, as the bourgeoisie gathered around him, that the "Plan Real" would be the trump card of our main political adversary.
However, we were incapable of putting forward a Lula proposal for fighting inflation at the most favourable moment, when he was ahead in the opinion polls and the currency had not yet been changed. We did not recognise inflation as one of the most important issues in the campaign. There were differences between our party economists as to how stabilisation should be achieved, but more important was a general tendency, both by them and the campaign leadership, to underestimate the potential impact of the "Plan Real".
This underestimation was coupled with differences and errors of analysis concerning the short-term effect of the introduction of the new currency. The predominant vision was that put forward by, amongst others, Aloizio Mercadante (the main spokesperson for the party on economic issues and an extremely influential member of the Campaign Coordination Committee when it came to these). This foresaw a number of short-term problems for the Real, notably that it would lead to recession and the people to note a marked loss in purchasing power. Up until the end of July, and even into the beginning of August, it counted upon a change of opinion on the part of the population when it received its salary for July (the month when the Real was introduced).
The difficulties in the debate upon and analysis of the "Plan Real" in the campaign leadership resulted in the campaign having a very contradictory position on this. On the one hand, we any resolutions.
Throughout May and June the PT
The campaign carried believed that the political situation was more than favourable, when this was not the case. At the time a political void had out by most of the party been created by the withdrawal of Sarney and Maluf from the presidential election and the bourgeoisie were completely occupied in forming an alliance was not within the around the PDSB, the PFL and the PTB.
It was then that there began to be a triumphalist atmosphere, which, as framework of the speeches predicted a first-round victory, increased the pressure for our campaign to be stretched to the maximum at the resolutions of the 8th earliest possible moment. Much energy was wasted in preparing for a future
Lula government.
and 9th national
The campaign carried out by most of the party was not within the framework of the resolutions made at the 8th and
9th national meetings — which were centred around structural reforms, the
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Post-election debate opens
International Viewpoint #260 October 1994 began by denouncing the Plan as an electoralist operation, with recessive effects and a consequent loss of purchasing power, but on the other let it be understood that we would follow it. In consequence, Lula did not have clarity or firmness on this issue and so did not appear a reliable alternative on the principal theme of the campaign.
A campaign with such characteristics needed more than anything else a strong political leadership, capable of permanently re-evaluating the situation and of taking political initiatives.
The campaign leadership should have been the Campaign Co-ordination Committee. While this was basically elected by the DN of the PT, it also included several members directly nominated by Lula and, from July 1994, members from the leaderships of other organisations in the Brazilian Popular Front. However, it became progessively weaker. Some of its members never took on any real responsibility, as, for example, in the case of José Genoino, who was in principle responsible for relations with the parliamentary group, or the politologue Francisco Weffert, who in his articles in the national press waxed strangely lyrical on the Cardoso candidacy. Neither of these two attended any of the meetings.
Further, any serious discussion was almost impossible due to the continual bombardment by the national press, fed not only by the formal declarations of party leaders and parliamentary deputies who were opposed to the decisions which were taken, but also by the "unofficial" declarations of the leaders and officials who completely disowned the Committee. The contradiction between the debates within the Committee and the declarations in the press appeared with most acuteness during the replacement of Eduardo Bisol. Following this incident the Committee played no role whatsoever in effective political leadership.
### Alliances
This was the main point of conflict between the left and right wings of the party. It is completely untrue that, under 24 the leadership of the left, the PT would have had only a narrow policy on alliances! And in these elections all possible alliances were made. Where alliances were not made, this was because those with whom it was proposed that we should ally did not want an alliance with the PT, or alternatively would have imposed unacceptable conditions.
There was also discussion of the type of alliance where we would abandon our political project and place ourselves in the position of subordinate partner to bourgeois hegemonic currents. This was the case with the proposal of the withdrawal of our candidate in São Paulo in favour of Mario Covas, the PDSB candidate. Attempts to set up this type of alliance, an extreme option which would not have been viable without disowning the PT, weighed against us and placed serious strain upon
The confusion in our relationship with the PDSB challenged the entire project of the PT. Yesterday's "ally" rapidly transforming itself into today's enemy was a decisive factor in disarming us. Cardoso was already the main proponent of PDSB entry into the Collor government and became Lula's chief adversary from the moment when he became Finance Minister. He gained in strength before our very eyes yet the PI did not combat this, continuing to treat him as a privileged partner.
Affirming the necessity to broaden our appeal amongst the middle class, by moderating our proposals, ignores the figures. We have lost because, once again, we have been incapable of addressing ourselves in a meaningful way to the majority of the electorate, the "shirtless ones", , the unorganised popular mass which brought Collor to power in 1989. It was this majority of the excluded which, deceived by the Real, allowed Cardoso to be elected.
Limits of the PT
These elections have been a test for the party, sharpening its contradictions and holding its limitations up to view. The result is worrying if one believes the PT to be an instrument for construction of an alternative to the hegemony of neo-liberal capitalism and for the radical democratisation of Brazilian society. The electoral battle has revealed a dilution of the socialist perspective of the party. Equally it has shown that the party has only a fragmented and partial understanding of what is meant to be the centrepiece of our programme: universal citizenship for all. This was translated into abstract speeches, including certain proposals for workers to be incorporated in the marketplace and have access to social services, coupled with general rhetoric aimed at the majority of the nation, the excluded. The real majorities, women and black people, and important minorities, such as lesbians and gay men and youth, did not appear in the project which we put forward for society. Finally, the concessions made to conservative forces, such as the Catholic Church and the armed forces, revealed an ambiguous approach.
In the course of the electoral battle party structures were liquified, literally diluted in inclusive lists of candidates. The verdict from the ballot boxes reveals the extent of demobilisation of the militant layers, which for five years have been treated by the press and part of the parliamentary group as a "party bureaucracy". The non-existence of a party press has only worsened the political and ideological dispersion of the PT.
Both our social base and our militant layers have for information only the bourgeois press. This has seized every opportunity to undermine the unity and coherence of the party. Even our right to free television time during the electoral campaign was held up to ridicule.
The relationship between the party leadership and the deputies in the federal parliament is an old problem which has never been resolved. During the debate over revision of the Constitution, the leadership put forward the party line in the face of opposition from the parliamentary party. This cost us a great deal of effort and a long and devastating argument in the press. The impetuous declarations made in the media by front-ranking deputies had a negative effect upon our campaign at critical moments - such as during the discussion on Bisol or when they stated that from the second
International Viewpoint #260 October 1994 round they would direct the campaign themselves.
The PT is in the process of re-organising its leadership: this was begun at the 8th national meeting in June 1993, with the intention of more firmly opposing the government of Itamar Franco and constitutional reform. However, most of the leadership was not sufficiently united politically or forceful enough to lead the Lula campaign, and it dissolved into the Campaign Co-ordination Committee. This was centred upon Lula, with the result that during the campaign power was concentrated in his hands. This can be seen in all the important campaign decisions taken since the 9th national meeting - such as the choice of Aloísio Mercadantes as the understudy for Lula, the general tone of the campaign, the content of speeches aimed at the media and even the different responses which we gave to the "Plan Real".
### Non-definitive balance-sheet wing candidates of the PDSB. This means that the PT will either have to explain that it does not support any candidate or alternatively emphasise that one does not have to vote. There is a strong tendency among wellknown party personalities advocating that the PT should support Covas in São Paulo and Azevedo in Minas Gerais, both PDSB candidates. This shows a deep misunderstanding of the new circumstances in which we find ourselves, where the PDSB is our principal enemy. We should not support or give legitimacy to candidates who, if victorious, will strengthen the neo-liberal camp in the most important states in Brazil.
SAO PAULO, 17 OCTOBER 1994.* leadership was not
Our intervention in the political sufficiently united arena will differ according to whether we win the second round of the elections politically or forceful for the governorships of Rio Grande do
Sul, Brasilia and Espirito Santo. Rio enough to lead the
Grande do Sul is one of the most important states in the country, where Lula
Lula campaign won the first round of the presidential election this year, and where the party is better organised than anywhere else in
Brazil. In this state, our administration of Porto Alegre has created a role model for public administration which serves the people, and constitutes a trump card in the electoral battle. A victory could give us a national "shop window". Brasilia, as the capital, plays an important role on the national political scene. It is vital that we snatch victory in these two states on 15 November.
Our task, in the vast majority of the states, is to contribute to the defeat of the
PDSB and the political bloc which it leads, given that it will be our main opponent in the years to come.This must be done while preserving our independence: in other words, where we transfer our votes to a non-PT candidate we must do so without making any commitment to any elected government or reaching any programmatic agreement.
In the case of São Paulo and Minas
Gerais, the candidates opposing those of the PDSB are from the traditional rightwing, which makes it impossible to support them against the "modern" right-
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Most of the