Yeltsin: a new Napoleon ?
The anti-war rhetoric of some of Russia's generals is more motivated by their shame for this imperial army in tatters than by any new concern for human rights in the region.
Developments in the Russian Peace Movement
This war in has finalized the divorce between the nostalgic media, while the left has tried to organize through grass-root
"Communist" and "nationalist" elements of the old opposition to structures, like the human rights group "Memorial" and the
Yeltsin (the "red-brown" alliance). Virtually all the chauvinist, non- "Movement for Democratic and Human Rights in Russia".
Communist forces, including Vladimir Zhirinovsky's party, the fascist Also, a significant part of the Perestroika left has effectively "sold
"Russian National Unity," have backed the war. And all the out" and joined forces with the lukewarm war opponents in the KPRF
Communist groups have come out against it. Having said this, the or the new Russian Social Democratic Union.
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF - Russia's largest One striking aspect of the war resistance is the role played by political party) seems to be opposing the war more to improve its women in what is usually the all-male world of Russian politics.
position in the coming elections than out of a sincere desire to stop Opinion polls show women as consistently more anti-war then men, the war. It has consistently subordinated peace initiatives to tactical The "Soldiers' Mothers" movement has been intensively active and considerations. The public remains opposed to the intervention. shows great courage in fighting the military bureaucracy, while the
Opinion polls have shown a constant 65-70% of citizens as opposed Women of Russia faction in parliament has a consistent opponent of to the war. And less than 10% say they approve of President Yeltsin the war.
as a leader. But this turn in public opinion has not ended the apathy The government's plans to abolish students' exception from military and withdrawal into private life and "making do" which characterize service, will drag students into the potential anti-war camp. While society. But reflex obedience to, or at least fear of the state has gone, working youth will also be affected by plans to extend military service probably for good. After decades of Stalinist dictatorship, official from two years to three.
propaganda is no longer able to set the agenda for the media, nor The workers movement has played no significant role in the antipersuade people to support 'their leaders. This is an exciting change. war movement so far and it remains weak, divided and mired in local
So why is the peace movement, and the movement for democratic struggles inside the plants, such as the threat of bankruptcies and rights, is only able to mobilize tiny crowds? For one thing, there is no mounting unemployment. The one-day warning strike of 500,000 unified peace or democracy movement. Each party or group works miners on February 8 could indicate a change in the situation. Miners through its own channels, and no-one has the authority to rally all are still the vanguard of working class resistance in Russia, and their war-resisters on an unified platform. The liberals and the Communist unions are now threatening to call a general strike to demand the
Party have a strong parliamentary basis, and wide access to the resignation of the government and new presidential elections. *
International Viewpoint #264 MARCH 1995
By Poul Funder Larsen
Boris Yeltsin has the support of less than 10% of the Russian electorate, according to recent polls. The Chechnya crisis has weakened the ruling group to the point where it is virtually impossible to hold onto power by constitutional means. Like Bonaparte, Yeltsin's power increasingly rests on his contract with the "power ministries" (Defence, Interior) and the various Secret Services, and on the constant generation of external 'crises.'
The army has been loosing influence within the Soviet/Russian elite for at least ten years, ever since the defeat of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Ever since, the army has played no independent role in Russian politics, not during the confrontation in Moscow in 1991 and 1993, and not during the Chechnya crisis.
Corruption and crime are rampant in the army. The ideological, economic and structural integration of the armed forces disappeared with the Soviet Union. The resulting armies, at least the Russian army, is divided and disorganized. This crisis became visible during the Chechnya crisis when the most prominent leaders of the Afghan generation - General Boris Gromov and General Alexander Lebed, spoke out against the war. Neither man is a democrat. Gromov is a very vocal hard-liner and Lebed has often advocated a Pinochet-style dictatorship.
What is under way is a power struggle about the future role of the repressive forces. Grachov wants to see the army become a subordinate to the political elite, under a weak leadership. Boris Gromov wants the army to play an independent role in a semiauthoritarian regime. Neither faction has any time for the democratic movement. "How can you consider yourselves Russians if you are trying to break up Russia?" Grachov recently asked peace activists. "Why are they doing this? Why, for that stinking green dollar!" he explained to his supporters (Moskovskie Novosti, 22 January 1995)
But with thousands of soldiers dead in the Chechnya campaign, and the prestige and morale of the army in tatters, Yeltsin is shifting his alliances towards other parts of the repressive apparatus, which could represent more loyal long-term partners. The elite units of the Ministry of the Interior and the Federal CounterIntelligence troops (FSK- the former KGB) are particularly valued. After all, these units can be deployed rapidly to quell internal uprisings, as in October 1993.
One new factor coming into play is the elite's reliance on para-military armies linked to large commercial companies. Tens of thousands of well-equipped mercenaries are employed in Moscow alone. These men made up a significant proportion of the 'governmental' troops which battered the White House into submission in October 1993.
Yeltsin, however, is worried that neither the "power ministries" nor the private armies of the top capitalists are a secure enough support for his regime. He has already started building up a Presidential Guard, which will eventually number several tens of thousands of crack troops, with armored support. This force could
One new factor coming into play is the elite's reliance on para-military armies linked to large commercial companies. Tens of thousands of wellequipped mercenaries are employed in Moscow alone. These men made up a significant proportion of the "governmental' troops which battered the White
House into submission in
October 1993 prevent the situation in Moscow and St. Petersburg getting "out of control," if, for example, Yeltsin cancelled the 1996 presidential elections. *
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