Bavarian metal workers have taken a decisive fraction of the European working class has step towards reduced working hours across shown the way: it is possible to decrease
Europe. The best paid and best organised working time while increasing wages!
International Viewpoint #265 April 1995
THOUGH GERMAN TRADE-UNIONISM IS
FAR from suffering the weakening that trade unions in other European countries are experiencing, years of attack from business have not left it unscathed.
Between 1980 and 1993, the share of wages in the national income dropped from 72% to 68%. In 1985,new legislation made striking more difficult 1. The increase in unemployment and the ideological offensive of the bourgeoisie which followed the absorption of East
Germany came at a time when the trade union movement was paralysed and its leaders caught in less and less effective routinism. The result was a drop in activism and a loss in membership of most unions?.
In 1993, at the worse of the recession, business led a intensive campaign for work force flexibility on the theme of maintaining the industrial base and value added in Germany. They pointed to the
2.5% drop in national income and 11% fall in metallurgy production. Increased unemployment -- officially 3.5 million unemployed and 1.5 m. people in training programmes - put constant pressure on
"The bosses agree to the 35 hour week, an 11 % wage increase over 18 months, flexibilityl... Not much of an example !"
Jean Gandois, Chairman of the French employers' federation (CNPF), in l'Humanité, 28 March
What was obtained
The 7 March agreement covers the next 24 months.
t involves an immediate bonus of 150 D/month,, a 3.4% increase in wage on 1 May, and another
3.6% increase on 1 November 1995. The working week will come down to 35 hours on 1 October 1,
1995, and wages increased to maintain weekly earings at the same level. End-of-year bonuses will be increased from 60% to 90-100% of the monthly wage), which represents a 4-5 % increase im annual wages. * wage-earners. The effects were soon felt. In the chemical industry, unions accepted the principle that new workers would have lower wages than those fixed by previous collective bargaining. Deregulation also meant the increased flexibility of working hours, and led to a decrease in real wages of about 7 % between 1992 and 1994.
In 1994, as the economic recovery was announced, the captains of the metal industry tried to bring the workers to their knees: they wanted to abolish the leave bonus (50 % extra pay during the six weeks annual leave) and to reduce the end of year bonus. These two measures would have amounted to a 13 % drop in annual wages. This provocation met a strong reaction. 1.5 million workers participated in "warning strikes" (a few hours long), called by the IG Metall trade union, and an overwhelming majority voted for strike action. On the eve of the strike, IG Metall leaders, under threat of a generalised lock-out, signed a convention freezing nominal wages for one year across the sector. This agreement, signed behind the backs of the strikers, had a demoralising effect. IG Metall, the strongest and the most belligerent of the German trade unions, had shown its powerlessness.
The wage gains won on 7 March 1995 do not fully compensate the losses of previous years. And this despite the fact that, in the second semester of 1994 alone, profits rose 22 %, and the labour cost per employee fell 7.5 %. For the most belligerent of the trade-unionists, a better agreement was within our reach, given that 91% of the employees in question voted in favour of the strike). Furthermore, the success of the struggle is largely due to the change in trade union strategy by the leadership of IG Metall. Taking into
Germany consideration new legislation, the management used a computer programme to avoid the paralysis of the non-striking sectors during a rotating strike. It chose Bavaria, in view of the division of the local business (many small and medium enterprises with full order books wishing to end the strike as soon as possible). This tactic was effective and popular in the eyes of the public, but limited the autonomous activity of the wage-earners concerned by the demands3 , and increased their dependence on the trade union full-timers who led the struggle.
Nevertheless, confidence of German workers in collective action increased, even though the most keen feel let down. The result in Bavaria is an encouragement to fight for all of Europe's workers. * Notes 1 The article puts an end to unemployment insurance coverage during technical unemployment caused by a strike. It was passed after a strike by metal workers in 1984 - which had opened the way towards the decrease in working hours - during which an IG Metallled strike of 57,000 workers, paralysed the work of 155,000 others Article 166 enables management to counter a limited strike by a massive lock-out, forcing the strike fund to support tens of thousands of workers (or to be accused of lack of solidarity). 2 The main trade union central DGB has lost 2.2 million members since 1992, and now has only 9.8 m. members). The trade unions are also affected by unemployment and the ageing of their members: 35% of IG Metall members pay the reduced unemployed and retired membership fee, and the union lost 70,000 members in 1994 alone. 3 The strike initially involved only 11,000 workers in 22 companies, later increased to 21,000 in 36 companies. Most IG Metall members did not take part.
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