Russia's "near abroad"
Today, all the major players in Russian politics administration has made it clear that it will not support a "Monroe Doctrine" regarding Russian accept any weakening of its influence on the interests in the Community of Independent territory of the ex-soviet Union (except for the States (CIS). The Chechnya crisis and the debate
Baltic states). Respect for the borders with the it has provoked about the role of the army is a
Ukraine and Kazakhstan, drawn in the Soviet conflict about how to implement this doctrine;
not about the goals of foreign policy.
International Viewpoint #265 April 1995
Since the 1991 "coup," the Yeltsin period, is not automatic 1. by Poul Funder Larsen
YELTSIN HAS TRADITIONALLY emphasised economic tactics, exploiting the enormous Russian advantage in resources and markets. Yet there has been no shortage of Russian "peacekeeping" initiatives, covert actions, and open intervention in the "near abroad." The Russian secret service was involved in the toppling of democratically elected governments in Georgia and Azerbaijan. In 1992, the Russian 14th Army in Moldova supported separatists in the Russian-speaking eastern districts. And today in Tadjikistan 24,000 Russian border guards are entrenched in a partisan war with the Islamic opposition.
"Russia first" rhetoric in official discourse increases as the economic situation and political climate continues to deteriorate. Yeltsin's speech to the newly elected Russian Duma (parliament) in February 1994 concentrated almost exclusively on "the defence of Russian statehood." He then spent the summer making bellicose statements against Estonia and visiting the border region of Pskov.
In Chechnya, the Moscow-sponsored "Provisional Council" tried to overthrow President Dudayev. When this failed, Moscow stepped up covert actions in Chechnya, until dozens of Russian agents were uncovered and arrested in November following a failed attack on the presidential palace in Grozny. Faced with this disaster, the Russian government launched the invasion of Chechnya. 3 Integration: at what price?
Botched interventions in Chechnya reveal the panic in ruling circles. That panic is based on the belief that current developments in the ex-USSR threaten Russian national interests. Seen from the Kremlin, the past five years have been a period of unbroken retreat: the loss of the East European satellites, demise of the
Warsaw Pact, the independence of first the Baltic republics, and then all the other non-Russian republics. All this resulted in a weakened Russian state and a disorganised Russian army spread over several "international" borders. Most Russians share this view of events, but don't draw the aggressive, imperialist conclusions of Zhirinovsky or Yeltsin.
The epoch of withdrawal ended when the last remaining troops were pulled out of Germany and the Baltic republics. Chechnya marks the beginning of a new period, characterised by tendencies toward re-integration and regional tensions among the ex-Soviet republics. Economic integration has been reinforced by the creation of a customs union between Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, along with separate bilateral agreements on political cooperation between Russia and these two countries. 4
These new arrangements are not evidence of a new spirit of cooperation. This is the reluctant cooperation of economies still suffering from the deformations of bureaucratic planning and the transition to capitalism.
Gross National Product (GNP) in the Ukraine is now lower than in Nigeria. Inflation is 2000% a year, and GNP fell 28% in 1994. With 80% of output exported to CIS states, mainly Russia,
Chechnya/C.I.S. Ukraine has no choice other than strengthening economic ties with Russia. 5
Political cooperation has been more difficult for Yeltsin. The CIS never evolved into a serious political entity. According to Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma,"a shapeless entity like the CIS has no future. So far not a single decision made has been implemented."6 Rather than developing the CIS into a real body, decisions are made on a bilateral basis, with Russia at the centre of the web.
In military and strategic terms, the most immediate problem for Moscow has been stemming the Chechen drive for independence, and controlling the increasingly assertive Association of Mountain People, which groups many of the small nations of the frontier North Caucasus region. But Russia's leaders
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International Viewpoint #265 April 1995
Chechnya/C.I.S. have a strategic interest in the whole postSoviet space, which is now engulfed in wars, separatist rebellions, and economic collapse. In both Georgia and Azerbaijan Russia has used "divide and rule" tactics: selectively supporting armed rebellions, and supporting pro-Moscow leaders from the old nomenclatura, like Edouard Shevardnadze in Georgia or Aliev in Azerbaijan.
Recent results of this interference have not been fantastic for Russia. At the end of 1994, the supposedly pro-Russian Aliev leadership of Azerbaijan signed a major agreement on exploitation of the Caspian Sea oil fields. Russian interests were given a minor stake, with Western multinationals taking the key positions. One reason for the intense Russian concern with Chechnya is precisely the need to reverse the decline of Russian influence in the whole region.?
Next to collapse: the
The war in Chechnya is a war against the Chechen people! The "illegitimate" regime of
General Dudajev or the struggle against the mafia are only pretexts. The resistance of
Russian Federation?
the Chechen militias against the Russian army has large popular support. This
The collapse of the Russian Federation
The nationalism of the Chechen people, whatever form it has, should not be seen as is a recurring nightmare for the Russian equivalent to Russian imperial chauvinism, on the basis of which attempts are being elite. The shelling of the White House made to reconstruct a strong, oppressive state in Russia. Once again, we see the
(Russian Parliament) in October 1993 was proof that a nation which oppresses another cannot itself be free. Measures taken as much a warning to rebellious regions recently against the freedom of the press in Russia are testimony to this.
trying to profit from Yeltsin's weakness as
The complicity of the Western powers with those responsible for the invasion is a response to the Moscow opposition.
flagrant. Their hypocrisy is clear if we only compare the way they encouraged the
Several regionalist dynamics are at dismantling of the Yugoslav Federation with the arguments they use to justify Russian work in the Russian Federation:
The breakdown of the centre's
The cowardly silence of the "responsible" left towards this crisis is just as bad. The only ray of hope in this dirty war is the resistance developing in Russia itself, where the authority is most acute in regions where media refuses to simply echo official statements, and where anti-war demonstrations non-Russians are a majority-Chechnya, have been larger than their organisers expected.
Ingushetia, and Dagestan in the North
But how many more thousands of Chechens must die, how many more Russian
Caucasus, or the Tuva Republic, which soldiers must return home in coffins, before protest activities are organised in the rest forms part of Russia's border with
Mongolia. In these regions, the drive
Wherever we are, it is urgent that we demand the immediate and unconditional towards autonomy, and sometimes withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, and that we demand the respect of the independence, is fuelled by national right of the Chechen people to self-determination! * aspirations and not economic interests
(though the latter may play a role, as with
Declaration issued by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International in March 1995 the oil lobbies in Chechnya).
In some relatively rich regions with a strong Russian population, local leaders see autonomy as a way to ensure direct control of valuable local resources, while reducing their contribution to the central budget. Examples are the diamond-rich
Siberian Republic of Yakutia, and the
Volga republics of Tatarstan and
Bashkortostan.
In the long run, the greatest threat to
Moscow may arise when regional economic interests develop into a desire for political autonomy, or even separation.
Oil-rich Tatarstan has already made hesitant several towards moves independence. The brutal repression of
Chechnya will certainly influence local thinking. *
20 resistance has a real legitimacy.
control over Chechnya.
of the world?
1. "Yeltsin extends his power", International Viewpoint no. 212, September 1991.
2. Over 120,000 Russian troops are stationed in the other ex-Soviet Republics, according to the C.I.S. Statistical Committee. For a summary of the Russian debate on the C.I.S. see the author's "More equal than the others," International Viewpoint no.237, October 1992.
3. The Kremlin anticipated a brief, successful war to strengthen Russian hegemony in the region, and Yeltsin's position in the elite. But there were other factors at play: the influential Southern Russia lobby in Moscow wanted to eliminate a second potential centre of power in the Northern Caucasus, the Minister of Defene and the General Staff needed to divert attention from a mass of corruption scandals, and other lobbies were irritated by Dudayev's role in various shady oil-transactions.
4. Kazakhstan (where the 'national' ethnic group is in a minority) has come under considerable Russian pressure, and recently accepted military cooperation with Russia, and the principle of dual citizenship with the Russian Federation.
5. The depression in Ukraine has been particularly hard on the industrial working class in the eastern part of the country. And this group is mainly Russian-speaking.
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6. Reuters, 8 February 1995.
7. One impact of the war has been to convince Abkhaz separatists in Georgia to accept negotiations for limitted autonomy in a single state, rather than continue an armed conflict with the pro-Moscow Georgian government.
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Chechnya: Troops Out!
NAFTA's northern crisis