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participate in the society."
25
International Viewpoint #268 July 1995
Palestine/Israel
When I looked at the agreement, I saw that the PLO was to become a part of the 'new order', that nothing was mentioned about Palestinian rights. Even the word 'occupation' was not mentioned. Israel was not committed to withdrawing from the occupied territories, or to dismantle the settlements or give back Jerusalem which represents by itself 30% of the West Bank. Israel will not even withdraw from the Gaza strip?. The refugee issue is far from being settled. So, I did not care about the symbols of independence: it is not a matter of flags or even coins. Not only are basic rights not being adressed, but the agreement is a disaster for the whole Palestinian national movement. It is the best solution for Zionism, a very big victory. - everybody knows this by now. • Supporters of the agreement would say that it was a compromise, including many gains for the Palestinian people, and that, precisely because of these gains, the Zionist government is delaying implementation.
There are no substantial gains for the Palestinian people in the agreement. It was actually a setback for them, because its condition was putting an end to the Intifadah. Although the Intifadah was already on the decline, there were armed actions against the occupation and Israel was still afraid of the possibility of a renewed uprising. What's more, the Washington accords played into the hands of the Arab states. It was a kind of 26
International Viewpoint #268 July 1995 compromise that they could accept. It gave them a good argument, or rather a pretext to start normalising relations with Israel. And finally, the agreement divided the Palestinian people and the PLO. Arafat negotiated the agreement, not all [Arafat's hegemonic faction within the PLO] Fatah leaders. Many Fatah and PLO leaders didn't agree with it.
People thought however that the appearances of direct Israeli military occupation would be removed much faster. Even the left wing Palestinians took it for granted that, after Washington, the army would withdraw and that very soon Arafat would be put in control of the West Bank.
There was a kind of euphoria among the Palestinian people inside, Washington. The mistake was based upon underestimation opposition, above all [the fundamentalist Islamic Resistance Movement] Hama. Arafat cannot abolish them. Israel exerts constant pressure upon him to disarm Hamas, but he cannot do it: not because it is strong — which Hamas certainly is -but because the population supports them morally. Arafat cannot afford to disarm Hamas while the occupation continues. He has no social legitimacy to do so. He relies on part of [his own organiation,] Fatah: 20,000 people from Fatah are paid by the Palestinian Authority, either as officials or as police forces (there are seven kinds of security services!).
On the other hand, there is no organisation which has a concrete alternative to offer, not even Hamas. So, if there are elections, Arafat will obtain his 51% of the votes. It doesn't mean that people support him. It means that things are at a standstill: the situation is full of contradictions, everything is open. The occupation continues and life is much worse than before. • How could life be worse?
This is another thing which we did not realize fully: everything is still connected to Israel, down to the smallest business. Economic life is totally tied. You need a permit for anything: for instance, you want to renew your identity card in Greater Jerusalem, you must show that you pay taxes... You want to visit your family in Gaza, or to go from the North to the South — this is one country! — you can't, you need a permit, the same for going to the hospital, to the school, etc. Just name it: every detail of life makes you dependent on Israeli bureaucracy.
And of course, there are no jobs. 120,000 Palestinians were working in Israel, now they are maybe only 30,000 left. Meanwhile, nothing is developed in Gaza or in the West Bank. Unemployment reaches 50% in Gaza!
Torture continues, arrests continue, the daily harrassment continues. During the Intifadah, you could find support, you had the networks of the popular committees, the grassroot women movement, even trade unions, although weak and led by Fatah; you had some nucleus of social organisation providing moral and material support. Now all this is totally dispersed, atomised, you are alone. There are eight thousand prisoners, and no pressure to free them. Half a year ago, the streets were still full with mass demonstrations on their behalf, and they are now totally neglected It is in this sense that things are worse now in the West Bank.
But even in Gaza, under the Palestinian Authority, things are worse: the Authority adopted all the repressive measures of the Israelis, they arrest without orders, they torture (already two or three died under torture), they shut down newspapers without even issuing decrees, orally! A lad went to the daily Al-Nahar and closed it. If it were not so sad, it would be farcical. Editors received threats from the Authority because they had described a demonstration organised by Hamas as involving several thousands, instead of claiming that there were only one thousand.
### PASSAGE
FOR JEWS
• Is Hamas the main reason why Rabin is delaying implementation of the agreement?
Rabin is only fulfilling a very symbolic part of the agreement. There was a date set for the Israeli army to withdraw from populated areas of the West Bank, and he did not keep his promise. Arafat now even agrees to an Israeli withdrawal from just some towns. There is no limit for Arafat: in this framework of the disaster, Rabin can play like he wants.
His only problem is that Arafat cannot deliver the goods and that there will be elections in a year's time. Hamas is no real danger for Israel; it only creates a feeling of personal insecurity that Israel can stand. But of course, the Israeli right wing are using it against Rabin and this he cannot afford. Thus Hamas is a spoke in the wheel of the agreement: Arafat cannot obey Israel in trying directly to abolish Hamas. For political reasons, he cannot destroy them, whatever he might have promised Rabin. • Why is Hamas so popular? Because of its religious ideology?
Hamas is popular because there is no other opposition whatsoever! Many secular youngsters joined Hamas' armed struggle. Hamas represents Palestinian opposition to the occupation - not to the Washington agreement, but to the occupation. Both are now connected, since the Palestinian Authority does not challenge the continuity of the occupation, the opposition to Arafat appears as an opposition to the occupation. • How is Arafat considered by those in the occupied territories?
It is difficult to tell. The polls show that he still holds some popularity. Of course, it depends on which sectors of the population we are talking about. For many, he is now a joke, but at the same time he is the frightening leader of a frightening regime. There is no longer admiration for him, otherwise he could have done much more to please the Israelis. His power base is part of the Fatah who live by him, all those salaried or hoping to get something from him, and of course the simple people who believe that nothing better is available. But even the most supportive of polls among the Palestinians show that Arafat won't get in direct elections more than 50%.
• What about the Palestinian left ? Why does Hamas seem to be the only opposition?
The left did not realise how deep the wreck brought by the Washington agreement was. If one thinks that the agreement is not so bad, then we can discuss the kind of political strategy needed. If however it is considered as an attempt to quash the national movement, as they described it, then you have to start organising for confronting the new regime. They should have foreseen that the main problem will be confronting the Palestinian regime, after the removal of the main symbols of Israeli direct control. • But Hamas is not popular because it fights Arafat, but because it fights Israeli occupation.
Of course. But when the agreement was signed, the left did not know to what extent direct Israeli occupation would continue. We also thought that the army would retreat, that there would be a certain autonomy and that the main struggle would be to push Arafat to go beyond the limits of the agreement. In a certain way, there is a continuity in the position of the left towards the PLO: all the time, for the sake of unity, they did not work really for an alternative to Arafat. Only now they are speaking about building a new PLO, but these are merely words, there is no alternative strategy.
The whole conception of a transitional program, the whole idea of starting from the current needs of the masses is alien to them. They lose time again and again. For instance, a year ago, the whole issue of Greater Jerusalem was put on the agenda;
Palestine/Israel [Arafat supporter] Faysal Husseini and others wanted to do something. So the left started quibbling about whether they should go together with Husseini or not, and thus missed the opportunity. Now the whole thing is lost, Husseini will not do it and no one will go for anything. They had also at one point the opportunity to take the lead of a renewed Intifadah on the land issue, but they were hardly present. They should have concentrated on that, a tremendous potential was involved there: for the land, the masses are ready to fight,
What prevails among the left is disorientation, despair, a very deep crisis. There is also the problem of the bureaucratisation of the parties, the criticism from the young generation. More and more people leave the left parties, but remain emotionally very much attached to the left which used to represent the genuine national aspirations. • But the Palestinian left has denounced the Washington agreement in the same way as Hamas. So what makes Hamas more popular? Involvement in the continuing armed struggle against
27 International Viewpoint #268 July 1995
Palestine/Israel Israeli occupation?
This is only one aspect. Hamas has developed military and grass-root organisations. Their bases inside the communities are strong, even stronger than their military units. Hamas is very strong on typical community issues: like schools, childcare, mosques, economic assistance. Whereas, at the time of the Washington agreement, the Palestinian left had lost its infrastructure: the grass-root organisations of the Intifadah had been dispersed, only some NGOs remained. They did not strive to build a grass-root community and workers based movement, like in South Africa.
Take, for instance, the trade union movement. During the years of the Intifadah, Fatah did what they wanted, because the conception of a trade union was never one of an organisation dedicated to the defence of the workers. It was always conceived as a branch of the PLO, of the nationalist struggle.
Take also the women's organisations: they are subservient to the political organisations. They are the women of the Popular Front, of the Democratic Front, of Fatah, but not autonomous women's organisations. Sure, they had roots in the communities and they participated in the popular committees of the Intifadah. They were even leading the popular committees, because the men were in prison. But they never developed any kind of activity around specific women's issues. So, when the Intifadah went down, these women's organisations could not fulfil any needs of women. You can see presently independent women's centers or NGOs going around, while those subservient to the political organisations are shrinking. • Would it be possible for the left to become the major pole of the opposition instead of Hamas?
Not now. Just after the Washington agreement, there was still hope. They should have mobilised around concrete demands. For instance, they criticised the agreement, but they did not suggest any alternative. They should have started answering the immediate needs of the 28
International Viewpoint #268 July 1995 people, like mobilising about prisoners (every family has its own prisoners), against taxes. They should have started building the community-based daily struggles - not even against Arafat, but against the occupation and not necessarily military.
Take the elections. The left is against holding them, and keeps saying no. But elections are going to be held, and the people in the streets do not know what the arguments of the left against the elections are. Why cannot they use the elections? why cannot they say: "Yes to elections, but under conditions", so that people can understand clearly what the left wants?
Another part of the problem is that the left gets orders from its leaderships abroad, while people on the spot know much better. • How has the Israeli left been affected by the decline of the Palestinian left ?
When we speak of the Israeli left, we have to distinguish always between the so-called Zionist left and the non-Zionist and anti-Zionist left, which is very much smaller, to be sure. The Zionist left is no longer in the opposition, because it supports Rabin. Meretz, the civil rights movement, sits in the government while Rabin is torturing and doing other things they used to protest against. But there is also no prominent progressive, non-Zionist opposition force.
The anti-Zionist left joined a protest movement, which does not reject the accords altogether, but mobilises around concrete issues, like against settlements, Greater Jerusalem, etc. Our weakness is that, while doing so, we do not explain our whole programme and criticise the Palestinian Authority. There was no political force, including Matzpen, that spoke firmly and unequivocally against the Washington accords and explained to those few hundreds who were willing to listen, what the agreement really is. There is no Israeli mobilisation force which calls for cooperation with the anti-accords Palestinian left. This should have been the role of the real left in Israel now.
Instead, we are only joining with forces that accept the agreement, that call it a 'peace process', and this blurs the few hundreds who listen to us. We should struggle both against the occupation and against the Washington agreement, which implies the continuation of the occupation. No force inside Israel does it, not even among the Palestinians inside Israel.
Here you can see the absurdity of two left movements, which concentrated almost exclusively on the national dimension: the anti-Zionists inside Israel, years, neglected all the international, anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist and class dimensions. You can hardly hear people speaking in class terms, analysing the Israeli society in class terms. We utilised the slogan: "the way to class struggle inside Israel passes through the national conflict", and with that, we adopted the conception of us as a group which deals only with the national issue. As for the Palestinian left, they render only lip service to Marxism. Here we meet: on a purely nationalistic conception of the issue.
The Israeli protest movement against the occupation would not have existed without us, but they are not hearing our unique voice. We used to say that the Israeli society has its own objective built-in contradictions: class, ethnic, gender. Without that we could never talk of joint struggle with the Palestinians: the oppressed Israeli masses, the women, the mizrahim [Oriental Jews], the workers have an objective interest in abolishing Zionism. But why then should we combine only with the middle class left Zionists, who are less interested in ending the Zionist state. The mizrahim majority of blue-collar workers are talking about Zionism and their oppression, doing community work, and we never refer to them. We never relate to the working class.
We should seek to work with these strategical allies whose objective interests are anti-Zionist. Building a movement exclusively upon the objective contradiction between humanistic values and occupation is not Marxist.
We have reached a stage where we need a thorough rethinking! * Notes
1. Revolutionary Communist League, Fourth International Section in the Israeli state
240% of land in Gaza, the most fertile parts, are held by the Israelis, as are 70% of lands in the West Bank.
Sweep away the regime !