Fundamentalists in local government
In Turkey, 1994 was unquestionably the year of the Islamic fundamentalist Refah (Prosperity) Party.
Ever since its victory in the municipal elections of 27 March 1994, Kefah's management of local government, and the spectre of a seizure of power by the party, has been at the centre of public debates.
by Erdal Tan
Istanbul, 17 June 1995
IN FACT, the score obtained by Refah should be put in context, as much in terms of its breadth (19% on a national scale) as in terms of its electoral progression (an increase of 4% in relation to the legislative elections of 1991). But the unanticipated swing to Refah in Ankara and Istanbul, which gave the fundamentalists control of the principal cities of the country, amplitied the scope of their victory. Certainly, even there, it should be stressed that in Turkev the mavors are elected by a direct vote in a single round. The division of the traditional bourgeois parties and the social democrats allowed Refah to carry all before it in these two cities with scores of 25% and 27% respectively. The progress of the fundamentalists can be explained partial ly by the impact of Refah on the Kurdish electorate, both in the Kurdish region of the south east and in the popular suburbs of the big western cities. Many Kurds who had voted for the left in 1991 have turned their backs on social democracy weight in the Kurdish electorate and which seems to them to be the party most radically opposed to the regime. Moreover, the majority of Refah vote is a protest vote. Barely 1/3 of the electors voted for it because of its ideology and its Islamic programme. The social base of Refah is heterogeneous; conservative small traders and semi-wholesalers, popular layers of rural origin recently urbanised and living in the middle provincial bourgeoisie. The exercise of municipal power by Refah has then certainly given it the means to extend its influence, but has also brought its internal contradictions to the fore. 8 International Viewpoint n° 269 — September 1995
Refah adopted a rather low profile in the first months of its municipal reign, but subsequently launched an aggressive ideological offensive, employing a strategy of tension. Seve ral factors explain this. In reality, Refah has no serious social and economic programme to govern these modern cities of several million inhabitants, and still less a complex anc industrialised country like Turkey. Having nothing to offer except demagogy on the defects and shortcomings of the system, it was inevitable that it would shift the debate onto the ideological plane. It is on the terrain of religion, culture and lifestyles that it has concentrated its offensive. DURING THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN, Refah wanted • "modernise" its profile so as to extend its appeal an reach new, less Islamicised, layers breaking with the traditic nal parties: hence the demagogy around its principle slogan, "the just order" , which promised above all social justice. But this new look did not correspond to the reality of Refah, or ir any case not to that of the old guard grouped around party president Erbakan. The party's attempt to appear more open and tolerant, impelled by its "modernist renovating" current carried within itself a mortal contradiction. The muting of the Islamic identity was galling to the militants and traditio nal electors of the party. Moreover, even the party's young up and coming generation (the intermediate cadres), while taking on a more modernist aspect, are no less faithful to the Islamic identity, which is the cement of the movement. A reorientation became inevitable, so as to avoid being "overtaken from the right" by the more radical Islamic formations Moreover, once Refah had arrived in municipal power, it was necessary to satisfy the aspirations of the traditiona electorate and show that "something had changed". Finally the only way to make the new electorate faithful to Refah was also to "Islamicise" it.
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