International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

Bosnia: The Cynicism of the Great Powers

· International Viewpoint No. 270, October 1995 · pp 7-9 · 2,324 words

Eastern Europe Scandinavia United States France

The cynicism of the great powers

There is no single, consistent imperialist position on the The real divergence in interest between the imperialists must crisis and subsequent war in former Yugoslavia. Bosnia has be weighed against their common interests: affirm ing the neither oil nor a direct strategic interest. It makes more sense to "civilising" role of the club of rich countries, finding a talk of cynical "statesmanship" in the pragmatic defence of the partnership with Russia in order to manage the crises of "postcommunism", and staying outside any Balkan war.

International Viewpoint n° 270 — October 1995 7 interests of the major powers. YOU CANNOT UNDERSTAND the "gesturing" of NATO and the UN in Bosnia unless you understand the fundamental contradiction in their policy. They want to play the role of policeman, capable of intervening by force, but they want to do this without going to war, and without loss of life of their troops in a ground operation. Positions are evolving rapidly, and this contradiction is probably the only constant factor. The recent NATO bombings [of Bosnian Serb targets] doesn't modify this basic contradiction.

Until the declarations of independence in June 1991, the USA (which means the International Monetary Fund too) and the principal European governments opposed the separatist tendencies, preferring a strong pan-Yugoslav state, able to manage the country's foreign debt and willing to carry out a privatisation programme. In 1989 they clearly supported the liberal federal government of the Croat Ante Markovic, in his conflicts with the leaders of all Yugoslavia's constituent republics. Encouraged by his international support, Markovic encouraged the Yugoslav Army's intervention in Slovenia. At this time the army was already polarised between those who saw Markovic as a means of maintaining a Yugoslav state which would defend their privileges, and other officers who were switching from "Yugoslav" to Serbian nationalist goals.

Croatia and Slovenia quickly sought German and Austrian economic support for their bids for independence. This they obtained, thanks to the powerful Croat by Catherine Samary

Paris, 19 September 1995 lobby and historic anti-Yugoslav "tradition" in Germany, and the historical links between Austria, Slovenia and Croatia from the time of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. German support for the Croatian and Slovenian seccession from Yugoslavia also hoped to see the emergence of "Mitteleuropa" (Central Europe), a German-dominated DM zone built out of the most developed regions of the former "socialist" countries of central Europe. GErMaNY presented the other great powers and European states with a fait accompli. The common construction of Europe obliged Britain and France to line up with Germany, at least formally. This opened the way to the diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, and later on Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite the negative recommendations of the Badinter Commission. 1

The main concern of British and French negotiators has been to seek a Serbian counter-balance to Germany's influence. They have placed their hopes in a Serb-Croat alliance (personified by Serbian and Croatian Presidents Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman), which they hope will be capable of imposing stability in the region.

German support depended on Croatian oscillation between two strategies, an alliance with the Bosnian Moslems against the Serbs, and a tacit accord with Serbian President Milosevic But there is an increasing tendency for

Germany to support the United States position.

The United States for a long time stayed outside what they considered to be an European problem. They were overjoyed to see the difficulties of the formation of a "common" European policy. In the second phase, the US tried to meet several objectives: presenting themselves as defenders of the Muslims, though without real commitments, in order to satisfy public opinion agitated by the mortar attacks on Sarajevo; improving, through Turkey, US influence in the region, and at the same time, recognising the effect on public opinion of the Vietnam trauma and Somalia fiasco, to avoiding involvement in any war. For Clinton the demand to lift the arms embargo for the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a way of incorporating all these objectives. He can support the Muslims without really getting involved, and criticise European plans which "sanctify of the ethnic cleansing of the aggressors" in grand moral and legal language.

His first bet was on a Croato-Muslim alliance against the Serbs, and he put his support behind the current Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Siladzic, leader of the nonclerical, pro-American wing of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action, mainly Moslem]. American support for the establishment of the Croato-Bosnian Federation in spring 1994, military aid for this coalition, and American proposals for NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb

8 International Viewpoint n° 270 - October 1995 targets were all intended to modify the balance of forces on the ground.

Then Clinton changed his position. European leaders were demanding that he participate in a common front, accepting the Europeans logic of "political settlement". The US President accepted the constitution of the "Contact Group" (France, Germany, Britain, Russia and the United States), which sought to harmonise the conflicting positions of the great powers. In concrete terms, Clinton reversed his support for lifting the embargo for the Bosnians. An unilateral US rejection of the embargo would have meant the end of the European "peace plans" and made it necessary to withdraw the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) from Bosnia, to avoid reprisals.

European negotiators accused the US of blocking their negotiation process, and placing European ground troops in danger. They also opposed US proposals for air strikes. Their fears were confirmed when Bosnian Serbs did indeed take UNPROFOR troops hostage. The European powers told Clinton that if he lifted the arms embargo unilaterally, he should send US ground troops to ensure the orderly withdrawal of the UN. THE REPUBLICAN MAJORITY in both houses of the US parliament used the Bosnia question to mark their opposition to Clinton, transforming it into a domestic issue. The Republicans voted massively in favour of a bill lifting the embargo on arms for the Bosnian governmental forces, which Clinton then vetoed.

In July the Bosnian Serb forces of Radovan Karadzic launched an offensive against the "safe zones" of Zepa and Srebrenica, marking their growing disinterest in the UN, NATO and, by implication, American promises to protect the besieged populations of "the zones". The collapse of these pockets, and the pictures of the murder and misery of their "cleansed" population, who had been denied the means to defend themselves, could only magnify the decline in Clinton's popularity in American public opinion. fury of the Islamic world, where people increasingly perceive the abandoning of the Bosnian Muslims, and the Russian intervention in Chechnya as an antiMuslim drift in policy dating back to the war with Iraq and the continuing embargo against that country.?

This context has had an effect on American diplomatic and military policy over the summer and into the autumn. The aim has become a quick diplomatic success at any cost, which will push the arms embargo debate out of the centreground, and reinforce Clinton against his domestic opponents. A "new plan". But how to make this new plan credible if, just like the previous European plans, it is based on a tacit agreement between the Serbian and Croatian presidents Milosevic and Tudjman, and the ethnic partition of Bosnia?

The Croatian Army's offensive against the Krajina? certainly had the "green light" from Belgrade, but also from Washington. To say nothing of American weaponry.

The "tough talk" which has accompanied spectacular bombardment of Bosnian Serb targets in September has not challenged the legitimacy of the declared goals of the secessionist Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic. Unlike all the previous "peace plans", the new plan recognises the "Serbian Republic" in Bosnia as a statewithin-the-state, to be doted with its own constitution, armed forces, currency and its links with the neighbouring state -Serbia proper.

The new plan takes up the Contact Group's old ideas of partition, only with more cynicism. The "principle" behind the new percentages of territory allocated to each entity is simple: the new states should be defensible, or in other words should not comprise indefensible enclaves. Of course, this means more or less explicitly renouncing the supposed ethnic justification for the frontiers of the proposed cantons. "Realpolitik" will do for the leopard-skin map of Bosnia and Herzegovina what all the grand speeches

NATO and the Rapid Reaction Force have recently acquired a new autonomy of action designed to bypass the slow decision making process of the UN. The main beneficiary alongside Clinton is the French President. Jacques Chirac can frequency of his condemnations of the "Serbian aggressor" and his support of a "multi ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina". Though it was the "slap in the face" of the honour of our soldiers" which led him to support the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). And for all the grand speeches, the ethnic partition of "sovereign" Bosnia has never been so "organised", in both military and political terms. RUSSIAN CONCERN with NATO and RRF air strikes does not reflect a real concern with NATO's "anti-Serb genocide" (as the bombardment). All Russia wants is for its pretensions about being a major power to be taken at least a little bit seriously. The marginalisation of Russia reflects its impotence and its incapacity to have an influence on events. The symbolic presence of Russian troops will perhaps be the way to save face and reinsert Moscow into the diplomatic game. The Bosnian Serbs could also save face if they make the evacuation of a part of their heavy weapons conditional on the deployment of a Russian buffer or observation force.

But there is also a tacit deal being made between Clinton and Yeltsin: Russia accepts the application of the US plan for Bosnia, and Washington agrees to consider Chechnya as a purely

The United Nations come out of all this rather discredited. But this is benefiting a militarist logic. NATO's role as the armed wing of the United Nations

Ship to Bosnia

Radvaldsgaten 14, 118 46 Stockholm, Sweden. tel. +84620532

International Viewpoint n° 2700iber 1995 9 and "policeman of the civilised world" has never seemed so legitimate. Never has the United States seemed to be as "efficient" a high command as today.

It is difficult to oppose the call for NATO air strikes for some very simple reasons. The major movements informing about Bosnia and mobilising against ethnic cleansing see NATO air strikes as the way to silence the mortars which have been bombarding Sarajevo, and a way to end the war. What is more, these activists think that the air strikes will disarm the military forces on the ground. So even the pacifists are being swept up into this logic.

Second, the mediatisation of the war has made everyone aware of the most visible history of violence - that of the nationalist Serbian forces. The visibility of Serb nationalist violence is certainly in part the result of "anti-Serbian" sentiments - plenty of warmongers have been calling for the bombing of "Milosevic-Hitler" in Belgrade. But we cannot respond effectively to these pressures (in other words convince people whose anti-imperialist instinct is, to say the least, very weak) by abstract "anti-imperialist" slogans. And adopting a "proSerb" position which would not denounce the extreme right Serbian currents called up by the sorcerer's apprentice Milosevic would be of even less use to us. We should express our outrage together with all those who refuse ethnic cleansing. And

IN 1994 SWEDISH DOCK WORKER and trade unionist Leif Jansson visited the Bosnian mining town of Tuzla as part of an International Workers Aid (IWA) delegation. The journey gave him the idea of organising a ship of solidarity - sailing from port to port in Europe collecting food, medicines and clothes for the people of Bosnia.

THIS IDEA IS NOW REALITy! On 30 September the cargo ship Haväng left the harbour of Luleå in northern Sweden. Hospitals in the Finnish capital Helsinki have donated hospital materials, and our principle should be to denounce these one of the Swedish farm workers' unions has provided a fire-fighters' practices wherever and whenever they take place. Not just in one of the "camps".

We should oppose the NATO truck.

THERE IS SPACE for 100 containers on board. The ship left Sweden intervention, by showing the cynical logic with 35, thanks to solidarity from the national graphical workers' and which hides behind it, and its incapacity to oppose, never mind block or reverse, food processing workers' unions, and the active support and publicithe reactionary policies present on the ty of the social-democratic daily newspaper Aftonbladet.

ground. The current to build is also the current of systematic opposition to state

THE SHIP will reach the Croatian port of Makarska before the end of policies, and systematic encouragement of the year. On the way it will pick up aid provided by Scottish trade multiple, internationalist links with the unions (in Aberdeen), public service unions in Antwerp, and the CGT populations concerned.

AT A RECENT MEETING in Geneva four international union federations, Metalworkers, Food, Construction and Public Employees, deciunion confederation in Barcelona.

ded to support the campaign.

Notes

1. Established by the European Community to study the requests for recognition of the various successor states.

The recommendation was positive for Slovenia and Croatia,

Trade unionists in ex-Yugoslavia are waiting!

but expressed reservations about recognising Croatia, since there were insufficient practical guarantees concerning the Serb minority there. The Commission opposed the

Don't let your union miss the boat!

recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, given the depth of the constitutional crisis in the former Yugoslav Republic.

2. Telethons in late July raised $7 m. in Jordan and $43 m. in the United Arab Emirates. The tonnes of material aid arriving testify to the emotion and solidarity of the Muslim population of a number of other countries.

3. Area of Croatia under the control of secessionist

Serbian Croats from the beginning of the Yugoslav conflict until its (re)-conquest by Croatian forces in August 1995.

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