From ethnic conflict to power struggle
Have the ethnic wars in the Transcaucasus reached their limits? Successive attempts to break the May
1994 cease-fire between Azerbaijanis and Armenians in Gorni (Mountainous) Karabakh have failed. So have attempts to break the cease-fire on the Georgian-Abkhasian front.
The cease-fire has transformed the epicentre of the struggle for power and domination to the domestic scene. It has not brought relief from the extreme tension in the region.
by Vicken Cheterian
Geneva
IN THE LATE 1980's, popular movements erupted in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. National claims were combined with democratic demands. Repression from the centre and radical nationalism. At the time of independence, the titular nations in each of the three republics were influenced by the idea of creating "greater" national homelands, challenging the legitimacy of the borders defined in the early 20s, and accepted by the United Nations following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.1 The policies of the new leaders enjoyed initial popularity. But the substantial ethnic minorities in Georgia and Azerbaijan felt threatened by the rise of chauvinism. The old-new ruling elite insisted on their right to self-determination, but could not accept the same right for other ethnic groups living on 'their' territory. These minorities turned to Russia for support, in self-defence. These invitations corresponded with the agenda of the new rulers in the Kremlin, who sought hegemony in what they now called the "near abroad". But Russian intervention (sometimes direct, sometimes indirect) reinforced the majority sentiment in Tblisi and Baku (the capital cities of Armenian and Azerbaijan respectively) that their struggle against the ethnic minorities in "their republics was a struggle for their own independence from the "Russian empire". There was a time when the Karabakh conflict might have been solved "internally", by the agreement of Armenians and Azerbaijanis. But since the Russian intervention, the conflict has an international dimension, and finding a solution is now much more complicated. Beside the open wars in Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia the region also suffered a number of hidden conflicts, which did not reach the same degree of "heat"2. The polarisation of the population around new national identities created the tension. Once sponsors were found to provide the hardware, bloodshed was almost inevitable.
But the mood of the populations changed rapidly. Their image of their "great nation" was torn to pieces or became irrelevant in the face of a sudden, violent degradation of their daily living conditions. Nationalist politicians had presented as the means towards economic progress and cultural renaissance. But they failed drastically. One year after independence, Armenia lived through a winter without heating or electricity, with industries paralysed. Over half a million Armenian citizens left the republic to seek a better life elsewhere. Azerbaijan gained independence but lost control not only over the ethnically Armeniandominated province of Karabakh, but a larger territory surrounding the rebel province and linking Karabakh to Armenia proper. Azerbaijan now has over one million displaced persons. As for Georgia, once one of the richest Soviet Republics, the average wage had fallen to $ 5-6 US, while prices are approaching those on international marMISERY AND LUXURY Nowhere else in the former Soviet Union has the fall in living standards been as dramatic as in the Caucasus. And the population could only watch as the new ruling elite began to exhibit their new riches: imported luxury cars, huge new country houses, and travel to Europe and North America. The new ruling elite condemns Soviet egalitarianism as "old-fashioned" and "an obstacle to progress" Corruption was certainly commonplace in the Brezhnev era, but it has grown out of all proportion since independence. The isolation of the ruling circles in the middle of "their" impoverished nations could hardly have happened faster. At the beginning of the Armenian-Azeri conflict, those who fought in and around Karabakh were mainly volunteers. But both sides soon had difficulty recruiting soldiers. Military police began raiding markets and metro stations, collecting all 18-45 year old men, and sending those who could not pay a bribe to the front. Arriving at the front line a few days later, these men often went into combat without training, and probably without motivation. The war has
International Viewpoint n° 270 - October 1995 21
* TRANSCAUCASUS been frozen for over a year now, but forced recruitment continues. The objective is probably no longer military, but political - the intimidation of the population. GEORGIA In January 1995 former Georgian Defence Minister Tengiz Kitovani organised a military campaign to "liberate" Abkhazia. Before setting off from Tblisi he announced that the war in Chechnya gave Georgia the best opportunity to find its own military solution, and that he had a promise of Russian support in his adventure. His convoy was stopped by the Georgian army near Zugdidi, and Kitovani is still imprisoned. Kitivani's main aim was not Abkhazia, but de-stabilising the regime of President Eduard Shevardnadze. He calculated that the unresolved questions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Karabakh, with their hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons, would provide a rich source of instability. But if his adventure shows one thing, it is that the population is tired. The medium to start ethnic wars is no longer present. Two wars against ethnic minorities, and two civil wars have created a real crisis of legitimacy for whoever rules in Tblisi. President Shevardnadze came to power in 1992 after an armed rebellion. Through careful manoeuvring, and streng thening the secret police, he has tried to marginalise armed militias like the Mkhedrioni of Jaba loseliani. The capital city came close to explosion in May this year, when President Shevardnadze demanded that loseliani disarm his group Ioseliani formally capitulated, but his Mkhedrioni not only retained their arms, but continue to dominate the most lucrative trading in the city, including the petrol business. Political assassinations are increasingly frequent as the country approaches the general elections scheduled for November.3 AZERBAIJAN The struggle for power has spawned several "mini" civil wars. Each defeat on the Karabakh front has brought the ruler in Baku near to downfall. President Elichibey was overthrown in one such rebellion, and succeeded by former Politburo member Haydar Aliev. In his turn Aliev survived two putsch attempts. The first attempt followed his September 1994 authorisation of an $8,000 m. oil deal with western companies which excluded Russian interests. The second revolt, in March 1995, left scores of dead, wounded and arrested. Oil-rich Azerbaijan has the means to solve its economic and social problems, and become a factor contributing to the development of the whole region. But the history of the Middle East (which starts at Georgia's borders) how how petro-dollars can be a source of tragedy. Azeri oil already generates international competition and interference. As in the Arabo-Persian gulf, instability combines with oil money to support arms purchases, which only add to the insecurity of the region. Oil revenues and the related corruption are also leading to the social polarisation of Azerbaijan, deepening discontent and fuelling new struggles. 22 International Viewpoint n° 270 - October 1995
ARMENIA The republic for a long time enjoyed a level of political stability unique among the Caucasian states, and this despite the persisting war in and around Karabakh. One factor of this stability is the homogenous ethnic makeup of Armenia - less than 5% of the population describe themselves as other than Armenian. Yerevan authorities claimed that theirs was the most democratic country of the CIS, with an active opposition and free media, and without political prisoners. The paradox is that this relative superiority evaporated just as the war in Karabakh stopped. The end of the war enabled the power struggle in Yerevan to grow sharper. A number of journalists were beaten up by unidentified attackers in the Autumn of 1994, and several newspaper offices attacked with molotov cocktails. Opposition sympathiser Hampartisum Galistan, former mayor of Yerevan, was assassinated, which sent a shock wave through the opposition. In December 1994 President Ter-Petrossian accused the main opposition party Tashnaktsutiun of harbouring a secret organisation, "Dro", responsible for terrorist attacks and drug trafficking. The party was banned, several activists imprisoned, and over a dozen publications closed, including the country's largest daily Yekir. Opposition and independent figures criticised the illegal methods used by the president and the Minister of the Interior, which seemed to be part of the forthcoming election campaign. TROUBLE AHEAD The ruling group in Armenia won the parliamentary elections of July 1995 by marginalising the opposition. The same scenario might be repeated in Georgia and Azerbaijan, where general elections are scheduled for the end of the year. Unpopular ruling elites are ready to sacrifice what is left of press freedom, human rights and democracy in order to preserve their power. And political power in the Transcaucasus is closely linked to economic power and the possibilities of becoming fantastically rich in the period of "privatisation" of the former Soviet economies. Ethnic war might be less and less probable, but these newly-independent republics risk become police-states once again. Notes 1. Armenian president Lev Ter-Petrossian was previously leader of the "Karabakh Committee" which mobilised the Armenian population for the unification of Armenia and Karabakh (a relatively autonomous ethnic Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan). Former Azerbaijan president Abulfaz Elichibey fought against the secession of Karabakh from Azerbaijan, for the independence of Azerbaijan from Russia. He also made a number of declarations in favour of unification with "north" Azerbaijan (the former Soviet Republic) and "south" Azerbaijan (the north-wester province of Iran). And Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the first freely elected president of Georgia, tried to abolish the autonomous status of South Ossetia and Adjara. 2. Between 1990 and 1993 tension or clashes took place between the Georgian authorities and the autonomous republic of Adjaria, the Armenians in Akhalkalak and the Azeris in Mameuli. The overthrow of Gamsakhurdia by an alliance of his former supporters and his enemies deepened the schism in Georgian society between the Kartveli majority and the Megrels of Western Georgia. In Azerbaijan, the authorities repressed the July 1993 proclamation by rebel army officers of the "Talish-Mughan Republic" in a region bordering on Iran. At the same time they confronted the Legin national movement Sadval, which demanded the unification of mainly ethnic Legin regions in Azerbaijan with the autonomous Russian region of Daghestan. Violent clashes took place on the border between Armenia and the Azerbaijani enclave of Nachichevan in Summer 1992, threatening to spread the war from Karabakh to the west, close to the Iranian and Turkish borders. 3. The victims include Soliko Khabeishvili, Shevardnadze's close friend and the Chairman of the Democracy and Revival of Georgia Foundation.
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