The Palestinian elections by Salah Jaber
The elections in Gaza and the West Bank on 20 January brought no big surprises.
Yasser Arafat's victory had been announced well in advance. His victory became a kind of plebiscite. As he had hoped.
The Islamic and secular opposition had decided to boycott passively the elections. They could not be surprised by the high rate of participation on the day, easily predictible in light of the previous, massive voter registration. The opposition lost nevertheless, by giving Arafat's bureaucratic and collaborationist Palestinian Authority the monopoly of "legitimate" representation of the Palestinians. TO BE SURE, THIS WAS NOT THE FIRST TIME a rotten regime won a vote without having to tamper with the ballot boxes. But this is a leadership which even the best-intentioned observers are unanimous in criticising for autocracy, repression, nepotism and corruption. A leadership which has transformed itself into the proxy police force of the Israeli occupation. Most of the Palestinian territory invaded by Israel in 1967 is still occupied and riddled with colonial settlements. And almost one Arab resident in 1,000 is still confined in an Israeli prison.
How could a leadership like this win a plebiscite-type vote in a population which. only yesterday, was engaged in an exemplary intifada?
True, there were a number of irregularities in the electoral process, which did not match all the rules of parliamentary democracy. The entire opposition, including the institutional opposition, represented by many of the "independent" candidates (those who were not nominated by the Palestinian Authority), protested in vain against the particularly short official campaign period. Among these 'independents' were a number of Fatah militants from the occupied territories, who had been selected by their comrades, but removed from the 'official' candidate list to make place for notabilities, or more docile Fatah candidates. The chief of the European Union observers delegation himself felt the need to protest publicly, after being on the spot for a few days. Nevertheless, no-one could say that the election results were substantially deformed by fraudulent practices.
There are two fundamental explications for Arafat's clear success. Neither is connected to electoral fraud. The first is the political and social nature of the support which the President of the Palestinian Authority enjoys in the territories which the Israeli government has entrusted him with. The second is connected to the nature of the opposition facing Arafat, and the political choices this opposition has made.
Even if the opposition to Arafat had been impeccable, the head of the PLO would still have benefited from the allegiance of an important part of the population of the Palestinian territories under his control. Several factors contribute to provide him with a secure social base.
One is that Arafat has, for decades, personified Palestinian identity. He has managed to maintain this image to this day, through lying about the Accords which tie him to Israel, and in cultivating the duplicity in which he has long been a master. ARAFAT'S DOUBLE TALK
So, Arafat presented his condolences to Hamas for the assassination on his "autonomous" territory of Yehia Ayash, considered to be the main organiser of the anti-Israeli attacks of recent months. Meanwhile, Arafat's numerous and diverse "security services" continue to collaborate with the occupying authorities in seeking out those Fundamentalist militants who are determined to continue their struggle against the occupation. And only a few weeks earlier, Arafat used an Israeli Army helicopter to visit Yitzhak Rabin's widow in Tel Aviv, to present his condolences...
Moreover, the possiblity of holding an election was seen by most Palestinians as an important achievement, and the confirmation of their desire for independence. Few of them though have any real illusions about the nature of the events which are under way. But they see no alternative, except for continuing the occupation, in those towns and villages from which the Israeli Army has withdrawn. And the regime of house arrest to which the Palestinians are submitted today is preferable, without a doubt, to the
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* Palestine collective imprisonment which they have suffered for nearly 30 years.
There is a strong feeling of resignation in this part of the world, five years after the Gulf War inaugurated the era of unchallenged US domination. The Iraqi population is still suffering under the assassin-blockade, and the embargo on Libya is carried on, while world public opinion is indifferent, if not supportive.
These political factors combine with a crucial social factor in shaping the popular foundation of Arafat's leadership. As a matter of fact, the authority and political factors. But the relative weight of these two pillars has varied with time. The fact that the prestige of the leadership is seriously weakened today could only increase the importance of material factors in establishing the leadership's social base. It just so happens that, for the same reason, the PLO leadership does have greater resources available. For more than 20 years now, we have characterised the PLO as "a state apparatus without territory". We used this analysis to explain their orientation towards the acquisition of a territory at any price. This step has now been made. The state apparatus has its territory, at the price of a signed and dated capitulation.
Arafat's rump state might look like an operetta dictatorship, but it already has many of the bureaucratic and police features which characterise several states in the Arab world. If the state bureaucracies of the world were measured as a proportion of their host population, the Palestinian - Come ste Plent
Authority would be somewhere at the top of the list. Several months ago the PalestinianAmerican writer Edward Said, member of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) from 1977 to 1991, estimated that the Arafat government supports roughly 350,000 people (employees and their dependents) from a total population of only 2.2 million. As you would expect, the police apparatus of the dictatorship is particularly bloated: something like 2% of the population. Not counting the clouds of informers, brokers, businessmen and speculators of all kinds, the traditional parasites of 'lumpen states' like this one. THE WEIGHT OF TRADITION
Palestinian society has not escaped either from the lot of the traditional societies of the region, despite the massive pouring in of refugees in 1948, years of occupation, and the intifada. Its social tissue is similar to that 18 International Viewpoint February 1996 of southern Lebanon and Jordan, with which Palestine formed a continuous sociogeographic entity until successive partitions established barriers between them. The West Bank, Gaza, and the Palestinian islands within the State of Israel still suffer under the weight of structures of hierarchy of tribal or feudal origin, and religious traditionalism. Far from seeking to overturn them, Fatah has tried to integrate itself into these structures and traditions, adding the weight of its own authority and material resources. And these same structures have been reproduced inside Fatah.
So it is hardly surprising that the electoral system chosen by Arafat conforms to the Lebanese and Jordanian model of adaptation to traditional structures, rather than the Israeli model of full proportional representation, which is a much more democratic and modernising system. (And don't forget that the smallest details of the Palestinian Authority's electoral system were subject to approval by the Zionist government, under the 1993 Accords). One of the best western observers, Le Monde correspondent Patrice Claude, recently noted that
"Mr Arafat has preferred to divide the small territories in which his compatriots live into sixteen distinct constituencies, rather than applying a simple, proportional representation system, with a single constituency, as in Israel. This would have significantly reduced the clan phenomenon, and allowed the smaller parties to take their place in the Legislative Council. Instead, Mr Arafat has made an alliance with the Leading families, and taken the risk of awakening the old demons of his people
Le Monde, 17 January 1996 OPPOSITION IS POSSIBLE
Taken together, these factors largely explain Arafat's success. They could have been challenged nevertheless. Perhaps not enough to put Arafat in a minority position. Not in a system he had tailor made for himself. But enough to challenge the popular legitimacy which he appropriates (now more than ever). The fact that the rais (leader's) only rival, Samiha Khalil, a woman who is a mild critic of the IsraeloPalestinian Accords, could win almost 10% of votes in such a traditionalist society is a
All other potential candidates were discouraged, by verbal and physical intimidation. Arafat allowed Khalil to stand because he knew she would not put him in a shadow, and this would give him a democratic alibi, a 'feminist' one moreover. In fact, only 28 of the 700 candidates in the
A detailed breakdown of results was not available as International Viewpoint went to press. But the resounding victory of several opponents of Arafat demonstrates the existence of a real potential for the expression of opposition ideas in the electoral sphere, which went largely untapped for lack of credible candidates. Victories like that, in Gaza, of Dr Haidar Abdel Chafi, former President of the Palestinian delegation at the Israelo-Arab peace negotiations, and a harsh critic of the Accords Arafat signed with the Zionist government behind his back. If Chafi had presented himself in the presidential election, he would have represented a serious threat to Arafat. This might have led the PLO leader to use fraudulent tactics, something he did not judge necessary this time. But such a candidature would have demanded an extraordinary moral and physical courage. Too much for a single man, unless he could have been supported by the entire nationalist opposition.
The latter, both the left and the Fundamentalists, preferred passive abstention however. Some of its members broke with the official position of their organisation and "played the game" sometimes with the tacit support of their group. They got elected as independent candidates in several instances. But the leadership of the various opposition forces shut themselves up in a sterile refusal to challenge Yasser Arafat on the electoral front. Even though it was clear that the population's desire to vote was unstoppable (which was why the opposition did not go so far as to actively call for a boycott. Their abstentionist line was not followed by all their own militant base, and certainly ignored by most of their sympathisers. HAMAS
Hamas, the Islamic Fundamentalist movement, hesitated for a long time before deciding to abstain. They were involved in negotiations initiated by Arafat for an 'amicable' division of seats (to his own benefit). But it was difficult for Hamas to reconcile their Islamic-nationalist *maximalism' with the legitimation, through participation, of the structures of an evil Palestinian Authority. They are unable to formulate realistic goals, starting from the faits accomplis of the process established by the Washington Accords, in order to subvert the whole process by refusing to endorse the continuing Israeli occupation, and re-affirming the national rights of the entire Palestinian people, including its Diaspora. The Fundamentalists preferred to stick to their traditional
intransigence. In so far as this position results in real acts of resistance and challenge to the occupation and the settlers, it ensures continued and new sympathy from the population.
The proof, cited in apprehension by the media of the world, was the funeral of Yehia Ayash, Hamas' bomb chief. This was Gaza's biggest ever mass meeting. And much bigger than the demonstration to mark Arafat's return to Palestine! In short, the Fundamentalists' chiefs have chosen, for the moment, to prefer the rifle to the ballot box. A sign of their political incapacity to combine the two. The high rate of voter participation seems to criticise them. But their strategy may prove a winner in the long term. The Fundamentalists expect that, once the joy of voting "freely"
passed, there will be rapid disillusionment with a Council even more rump than the Authority it is supposed to
After all, the new assembly should have been named the consultative Council, given the limits of its powers. The political system which Arafat has designed, under the supervision of his Israeli sponsors, reflects the reality of the Palestinian Authority, and justifies the non-flattering comparisons which have been made with Vichy France or the Bantustans of South Africa. The powers of the Authority itself are restricted to the tight limits and constraints imposed by the Israeli protectorate on which it depends. As for the Council, the questions it is supposed to deal with are even more modest. It will meet as and when the President decides. Arafat is allowed to reject any of the Council's propositions. Definitively.
It is reasonable to expect that the Palestinian masses will quickly be disillusioned with the assembly which they have just elected, just as they have become disillusioned by their contact with the *actually existing' Palestinian Authority. Then there will remain the great frustration of having lost the dignity of a people of resistants, to be granted the status of Bantustan population. The role of an African National Congress must be met again among the Palestinians, now that the PLO has capitulated. This is what Hamas is counting on, even though the Fundamentalist movement is still incapable of formulating a democratic programme like that of the South African organisation. A DISASTER FOR THE LEFT
The left opposition has lost on every front. After years of adapting itself to the Arafat leadership of the PLO, the left cannot go back to a secular version of the Fundamentalists' present nationalist maximalism. This was the trade mark of George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in the 1970s. And it seems that, for both objective and subjective reasons, the left's militant network in the occupied territories is unable to relaunch an armed struggle against the Zionist occupation. There is no renewal, and a continual drain. Arafat's security services, which collaborate with their Israeli counterparts know plenty about this network. The militants are deeply demoralised moreover, sandwiched as they are between the bankrupcy of their long history of adaptation to the rightist leadership of the PLO, and the sterility of their new line of adaptation to the Fundamentalists. Then as now, everything in the name of 'national unity"
There was a lively debate in these left circles before the elections. One opportunist wing suggested participation, aiming at a reconciliation with Arafat's Authority. A second, nationalist wing, supported by the leadership in exile, argued for a boycott. Their tactical view was similar to that of the Fundamentalists. But they lack Hamas" strategic efficiency. Only a small minority of the left argued for a third position, that of participation with the aim of presenting a revolutionary challenge to the Washington Accords, and the Palestinian Authority which is the result. Unfortunately, these militants did not convince the others. The left turned its back on a golden opportunity to campaign openly against the Israeli occupation and domination, and the Palestinian capitulation and dictatorship. The left also cut itself from an assembly which, even if it has no real authority over events, is nevertheless an ideal platform for political agitation. By participating in the assembly, it would have been much easier for the left to put the Palestinian Authority "into the corner."
Yasser Arafat is now obliged to respect the next step of his contract with the Zionist
Palestine * government. He must repudiate the PLO's nationalist political heritage, as symbolised by its Charter. To do so, the Palestinian President must call a meeting of the Palestinian National Council (PNC), which is the only body entitled to amend the Charter. Just as Israel made an exception to its opposition to the return of the Palestinian Diaspora to allow Arafat, his bureaucrats and his policemen to return, so as to assure a better domination over the population of the territories conquered in 1967, Prime Minister Shimon Peres has now "magnanimously' authorised the entry of all members of the PNC into Arafat's "autonomous" territories. There is, of course, a flagrant contradiction between the alleged "autonomy" and the fact that it is Shimon Peres and not Yasser Arafat who gives out the visas.
Arafat needed this green light from Israel because he wants to organise the PNC meeting in territory under Israeli control. This way he knows some of his opponents will refuse to attend. He did the same thing in 1984, when he called a PNC meeting in Amman, Jordan. Arafat was allying at the time with the Jordanian monarch, who had massacre of Palestinians in 1970. The statement by George Habash, born in Haifa and exiled since 1948, that he will not go to the territories conquered by Israel in 1967 until all the exiled Palestinians are able to do so is an honourable decision.
Contrarily to the case of the massive elections which have just been held in Gaza and the West Bank, it is quite useless to lend the PNC any representativity. As is well known, the PNC composition is controlled by Arafat, and the only purpose of the planned meeting is to rubber-stamp a pre-determined transformation of the PLO into a diplomatic appendage to the Palestinian Authority of collaboration with the Zionist state.
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