The left and the elections by Manuel Gari THE ANALYSTS GOT IT WRONG BEFORE THE March 3rd general elections. The right won, but the People's Party (PP) hardly triumphed, as the pundits predicted. The PP does not have an outright majority, and cannot govern alone. And while the socialist party (PSOE) is no longer in government, and no longer the country's largest party (which it has been ever since 1982), it was not destroyed by this election. To the left of the PSOE, the United Left (IU) improved its results, but only took 21 seats, compared to the 25-30 it would need
People's Party leader (now Prime Minister) José Maria Aznar (right) greets fans at a pre-election concert, along with Julio Iglesias (left) to challenge the PSOE's claim to represent the left as a whole. IU failed to win the votes of the left-wing section of the socialist electorate, and made only modest inroads into the youth vote (1.5 million people voted for the first time on March 3rd.)
The polarised atmosphere contributed to high participation: 78% of the country's 32 million registered voters. Polarisation also favoured a concentration of votes for the two largest parties, except in Euskadi (the Basque Country) and Catalonia. This was a two-party presidential-style election rather than a multi-party parliamentary election.
The People's Party of José Maria Aznar won 39% of the vote, not enough of a majority to rule alone. This opens a period of political instability, given the balance of forces within parliament. The economic elites will exert strong pressure in favour of "governability." This implies some kind agreement between the various bourgeois nationalists: Aznar's "Españolista" People's Party, the Basque National Party (PNV) and Catalonia's dominant political force, the conservative CiU coalition.
Everyone is talking about government pacts of one kind or another. But this was not at all what the PP expected to have to do once they won. The party has always refused to accept the Spanish state's various 'national facts,' particularly in Euskadi and Catalonia. Some PP supporters will find it hard to stomach an agreement with these minority 'national' parties. But, for the moment, negotiations between the PP and the PNV, CiU, and the centre-right Canary Island Coalition have concentrated on the system for collection and redistribution of central taxes to the various national autonomous governments.
The economic elites want governmental stability, so that they can carry out the "adjustments" necessary if the Spanish state is to meet the convergence criteria of the
Maastricht Treaty in the relatively short time remaining before the crucial 1997 EU intergovernmental conference. This goal is shared by all the right-wing parties. And by the PSOE.
Unless the PP government can secure stable support from several smaller parties, its resulting fragility will make their goal of immediate application of a reinforced austerity policy much more difficult to implement. The chances of a social mobilisation against cuts and austerity would be increased. Having said this, it is not impossible that the PP will propose some kind of social pact, regrouping most of the country's political parties behind a more modest adjustment programme.
The PSOE is no longer the country's largest political party. But 9.4 million votes is still an excellent result. The party's social-liberal leadership, under former Premier Felipe González, has not been defeated. And it has paid a much lower price for the recent corruption and state terrorism scandles than many commentators expected. Felipe González has reinforced his position at the head of the party, since most analysts see the socialists' respectable score as a result of the Felipe factor. All this means that there is little reason to expect substantial modifications in PSOE policies, beyond the obvious changes that come with the transition into opposition after 14 years in government.
For most people, the PSOE is the political expression of left sentiments. The party clearly benefited from the votes of many people who were concerned about the result which a right wing victory would have on large sectors of society - not just the senior citizens, but the workers, and the middle classes. In Andalusia (where regional elections were also held on March 3rd), the PSOE benefited from a popular desire for stability. In general, the PSOE appeared to many workers to be the defender of some minimal welfare state, and of the generalisation of social security programmes. Corruption and the GAL state terrorism scandal passed into second place among the priorities of many such voters. Which also indicates a growing moral cynicism among some sectors of the left.
The PSOE's electoral results allow it to behave now as a majority opposition, and to prepare for its eventual return to government, with the support of those minor forces which are currently being invited to collaborate with the PP.
The popular perception of a left-right polarisation, media pressure, and enthusiasm from certain sectors of PSOE is pushing the [Communist-Party led] United Left (IU) to begin considering offering its support to a future Socialist government, or at least adopting a neutral attitude to such a government. And, in any case, in the meantime, to accept a stable common front of the left opposition. Led and dominated, of course, by Felipe González.
The crucial role now played by the minor right-wing nationalist parties, the good results achieved by the left-nationalist Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG), and developments inside the Catalan Socialist Party (PSC, the Catalan wing of PSOE), have put the question of reallocation of competencies and power-sharing between the central and regional governments in the centre of the debate. There is growing pressure for the recognition of the plurinational reality of the Spanish state. The general dynamic is towards the remodelling of the state in a more federal direction.
The electorate didn't shift as far to the right as some commentators predicted. But March 3rd did confirm that the current period is one of the extension of
International Viewpoint n°276 9
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Spain *
* Spain conservative values. The claim of New Left (NI), the most moderate part of the United Left (IU), that 'the social majority is to the left', is open to debate.
United Left's results
The score this time was slightly better than in the 1995 municipal elections, which everyone considered to be a forerunner to these elections. United Left's vote increased from 2.59 million votes to 2.63 million (10.6% of total votes cast). The March 3rd score is about 400,000 votes higher than in the 1993 general election.
While this slow rise is respectable, it is less that what it was objectively possible to have won. And objectively necessary to have won. Nor does it meet the expectations that were created and proclaimed by the leaders of IU, and by the media.
United Left co-ordinator Julio Anguita failed in his attempt to convert IU into a decisive electoral force. He cannot now do what he wanted to be able to do after the elections: to propose as a credible goal the regeneration of the left as a whole. Nor can he use an impressive IU electoral result to establish hegemony over his immediate political neighbours. All of this was the real meaning behind his pronouncements about "overtaking" and "outstripping" the PSOE. The central theme of the IU electoral campaign was "IU will be making the decisions [which count]".
While this goal is no longer reachable, IU can still pursue a related strategy: having a real influence on the policy adopted by the socialist party, and by the parliament. Pulling the centre of debate over towards
The post-election debate inside IU has a very 'internal' and "settling of scores' character. Neither the organisation, nor its leaders, have yet emerged from their perplexity at the moral slap in the face the coalition received in these elections. IU has still not taken the necessary first step: recognising that the coalition did not connect itself to the conscience of one important sector of the left-wing electorate, which could have been won to IU rather than PSOE: the large number of young people voting for the first time. Or win over a segment of traditional PSOE voters. Or some of those who 'voted white' fin some electoral systems called spoiling their ballot
The social left is profoundly attached to the anti-right strand in popular culture. Many people's 'fear' of a PP victory was not some exaggerated worry, but a healthy lack of confidence in a country which was run as a dictatorship by the fathers of those who now dominate the PP. Some leaders of IU were somehow tempted to prettity the 10 International Viewpoint April 1996
PP, and downplay its heritage. There were some ambiguous moves which enabled the media to speculate about a 'tacit pact' between Anguita and Aznar against the PSOE government of Felipe González. In reality, of course, there was no such pact. In reality, IU was alone in the parliamentary opposition, whenever it came to reactionary laws, particularly the savage reform and deregulation of
IU failed to send out a opposition both to the PSOE government and to the ascendant right, as represented by the PP. IU was unable to differentiate the treatment it should reserve for the PSOE leadership and for the socialists social base. At times, the socialist party electorate perceived IU's policy and messages as sectarian.
Having said all this, we should also recognise that these elections confirmed the existence of a stable voter base for IU, which continues to spread to new areas of the country, and to younger age groups. This solid base is the capital we can use to build the organisation. And to bridge the distance between the coalition's 70,000 members and the 2.6 million people who voted for us.
There are many barriers to electoral progression for a left wing formation. The general cultural, social and political context is characterised by the ascendance of the right. There is deep, deep demobilisation and passivity. Which means that a force like IU cannot conceive its work and measure its results in exclusively institutional terms. The only way a force like IU can grow rapidly in electoral terms is during the heat of a social mobilisation, during and after a long struggle for political and cultural hegemony in society, around the arguments for a new, transformationist social block. Not that we should turn our noses up at any slower, more gradual growth that we can realise in the meantime!
One main factor contributing to the sectarian image which IU has among some sections of the wider social and political left is the coalition's behaviour in municipal governments. In many localities, a strong vote for IU denied the rightist PP an outright majority over the left-wing parties. But in many municipalities, IU's policy of opposition to the PSOE enabled the PP to take control. In Andalucia, IU's strongest region, the coalition refused to approve the budget presented by the Socialist party regional government, even when we knew this policy would force the holding of fresh regional elections at the same time as the general elections. The result has been very negative for IU. Key sectors of the Andalucian left did not understand what IU was doing.
Another problem, of course, are the images of internal division and tension within IU which the media consistently presents. This coverage is intimately linked to the question of the role of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) within the United Left.
For months now, the media have been stressing the confrontation between a Communist Party with pretensions to "hegemony" inside IU, and the "moderate" New Left (NI) current, which already operates simultaneously inside and outside the coalition. This theme of coverage and concern has also affected the public's understanding of the conflictive relationship between IU and the trade unions, particularly the Workers Commissions (CC.OO). IU is neither exclusively nor mainly responsible for this head-to-head. But the coalition's lack of comprehension of the type of political relations which we should strive to maintain with the social organisations has been a real electoral handicap. Many activists in the social movements, to the left and to the right of IU, are repelled by the hegemonistic hunger of some sections of the Communist Party.
But nevertheless, after all criticisms have been made, IU does today regroup the basic nucleas of voters to the left of the socialist party. A large proportion of the country's left activists are members of the coalition. IU is the only organised state-wide force on the anti-capitalist left. The main challenge facing us is to resist both the temptation towards a "swing to the right" to come closer to the socialist party (as New Left would like), and any defensive and sectarian reflex of reaffirmation, as some Communist Party leaders would like. The way forward is through a deepened committment to strengthening the social movements, reinforcing our work in social mobilisation, and deepening our work on the anti-capitalist, feminist, anti-militarist and ecological alternatives. *