Snatching I
The recent defeat of workers locked out by the Staley corn sweetner company of Decatur, Illinois follows a three year battle, combining loca militancy with inventive solidarity networking and public outreach. Union leadership bears a heavy responsibility for this defeat, which has discouraged labor militants accross the country. by C.J. Hawking THREE DAYS BEFORE CHRISTMAS, THE US labor movement suffered a terrible blow. The lockedout Staley workers
THANKS TO GLOBALIZATION, MY OFFICE
The daily attempt of the ruling class elite
IS IN NEW YORK, MY FACTORIES ARE IN MEXICO and its controlled media, to portray
American politics as a vibrant and democratic arena for a debate over essential differences and ideologies, is absolutely of Decatur, Illinois brought their more than three-year battle against the multinational
AND WHERE DO YOUR essential for the functioning of capitalism. It is needed to convince as many as possible that their interests are being considered by at least one of the two capitalist parties.
This 'three shell game' is not limited by any means to the arena of politics. Literally every government institution of this country operates to advance the interest of the capitalist class. A January 3 headline in the Business Section of the New York Times makes this point quite well. It reads, "G.M. Reports Record Profits, Party Because of Tax Gains." The article begins: "General Motor Corporation's core business suffered several reversals last year, but nimble work by the company's tax accountants sent its net income soaring to another record in the fourth quarter and for the year."
G.M., the nation's largest auto maker, reported that a series of problems combined "to reduce its pretax profits for the automotive operations by 42 percent in the last quarter."
"But the conclusion of several tax disputes," the Times notes, "some of which dated to 1982, allowed G.M. to post a gain of 19% in net income to about $1.87 b. in the fourth quarter." How many billions the government's tax courts had to pay G.M. to turn a 42% loss into a 19% gain would not be too difficult a math problem to solve!
Profits are increased by a host of techniques from the most obvious, on site union-busting efforts, lower wages and health care benefits, to the seemingly 28 International Viewpoint April 1996
WORKERS LIVE? IN HELL largely excluded from the Congressional debate.
When big money is involved, the matter is never left to chance. The entire capitalist system, from the construction of the budget, to every tax law, to interest rates, to what country will be invaded, etc., is decided a ruling elite, a tiny number of ruling class families that sit on the top of the ruling class structure, perhaps 1% of the 1% that already owns 40% of the nation's wealth and controls significant portions of the rest.* conglomerate,
Staley/Tate and
Lyle, to a close;
56% of strikers voted to accept the company's latest contract.
This contract virtually eliminates safety, seniority, and the grievance and procedure demands the harsh of conditions twelve-hour rotating shifts every thirty days. The same offer had been rejected by 96% of the membership in October 1992. Members also voted down by 56%, in July 1995, a similar offer, which demanded twelve-hour rotating shifts every six days.
SO WHAT WENT WRONG?
In early November 1995, John Sweeney, the newly-elected president of the AFL-
CIO, promised forty staff members for the
Staley campaign, including twelve full timers for the nationwide campaign to pressure Pepsi, which accounts for 30% of Staley's corn sweetener sales. Tens of thousands of callers from across the country complained to Pepsi about their ties to Staley. Sweeney vowed to make the Pepsi campaign the "number one
'at from the Jaws of Victory?
priority" of his new office. But the United Paperworkers International Union insisted that they were in control of the campaign. Sweeney, reluctant to challenge a union president so soon after his close election, bowed to UPIU President Wayne Glenn and apparently ordered his staff to back off. A reliable source inside Pepsi-Co sent word to the Decatur workers that Pepsi would find another supplier if Staley did not end the dispute by January 1, 1996, the expiration date of their Pepsi contract Despite this strong situation, the UPIU imposed a third vote on the striking workers. An assistant to UPIU president Wayne Glenn told a Decatur radio station he would "hate to even think" about the contract being rejected. The International blatantly undermined the local union leadership, while stating its position was "neutral" on the contract vote. The UPIU International was quick to cite the $2 million in picket pay provided to the local as a sign of its loyalty. It has also been quick to take credit for the campaign which convinced Miller beer to stop buying Staley product in November 1994. In fact, this victory was the result of tireless efforts by the Decatur local spreading its message against Miller across the country, rather than any efforts from the International Likewise, efforts of the UPIU International on the Pepsi campaign were mediocre at best, relying heavily on the solidarity committees already established by the local. Twice it efforts for effective demonstrations at the Pepsi headquarters in Purchase, New York. Consistently, it and his supporters were going to the picket lines and organizing disgruntled workers into surrendering. Preaching surrender, hefty severance packages, enhanced pensions, and flagrant lies about Road Warriors stealing money, Shinall found a tired and demoralized THE BETRAYAL The day after Shinall's election, the company announced its new contract offer. The company sweetened the severance, offering workers with over twenty years in the plant a $30,000 severance. The company, however, was deceptive about the pension plan, which Shinall also endorsed. THE LONG WAY BACK Of the 760 locked-out workers, only 181 will return to the plant. Most of those returning are in their late 40's and early 50's - too young to retire, too "old" to be hired elsewhere and accumulate a decent pension. After undergoing drug and alcohol testing and a week of "orientation" during which supervisors have already predicted there will be firings, workers will be "trained" by scabs for four months. The contract's unlimited subcontracting, twelve-hour rotating shifts, loss of seniority, grievance and safety conditions have, in effect, snuffed out fifty years of collective bargaining. SPARKING A NATIONAL SHIFT Although the surrender by the 56% majority of Staley workers is a major and tragic defeat, their fight will have a lasting
USA * withstand the pressure brought to bear by the Staley workers and their nationwide network of supporters. In the subsequent October election, Kirkland's appointed successor Tom Donahue was defeated by John Sweeney, who ran on a vow that "I'd rather block bridges than build bridges," referring to the futility of labormanagement cooperation and the need for "a new voice" from labor. The newly elected Sweeney invited locked-out Staley worker Dan Lane, who was fifty-seven days into his hunger strike, to address the convention delegates, marking a rare moment indeed that a rank-and-file member addressed the AFL-CIO assembly. BUILDING NATIONAL SOLIDARITY Close to 100 people attended the founding meeting of the Chicago Staley Workers Solidarity Committee just three short weeks into the lockout. The local welcomed these supporters, union and non-union alike. Solidarity committees were formed shortly thereafter in other key cities. As the local designed its strategy, key leaders from Chicago and other cities were invited to participate and advise. Solidarity committees were then able to mobilize hundreds of people to Decatur rallies and to pressure Miller and Pepsi. Soon committees were holding their own local rallies in support of the Staley workers. The local welcomed unpaid, fulltime organizers from Detroit, St. Louis and Chicago into their Campaign For Justice Office, further strengthening the ties to the solidarity committees In contrast, when the unions from Decatur's Caterpillar and Firestone plants went out on strike in June and July 1994 the UAW and United Rubber Workers (URW) Internationals became fierce gatekeepers of their fights, relying on traditional strategies which discouraged cautioned workers and supporters in impact with significant lessons for the actions against Pepsi, in fear it would be sued for promoting secondary boycotts. LOCAL HARDSHIP In addition to the International's sell-out and blatant undermining of the local's campaign, sustained internal organizing within the local became problematic. The local became splintered as demands for national organizing grew. The local's activists were invigorated by the support of unionists across the country and the success of the Miller campaign, but attention to the less militant members waned. The split in the union became more pronounced when in early December, 1995 Jim Shinall became the Local president-elect. While militant "Road Warriors" were out of town, Shinall future. Not only did they educate and inspire unionists across the globe, their battle changed the leadership within the In February, 1995 seventy union members from Decatur went to Bal Harbor, Florida to confront the AFL-CIO leadership at their annual meeting. The "New York Times" carried this front-page story as the red-t-shirted unionists questioned AFL-CIO officials in the hallways on their way to meetings. The question was posed with urgency: "What are you doing about the union people in Decatur?" For the first time in history an AFL-CIO President, Lane Kirkland, stepped down from his position shortly thereafter. Several Washington insiders have revealed that Kirkland could not involvement from outside supporters and lacked creativity. Instead, the UAW opted to hire a public relations firm to design a campaign to draw support. This top-down approach was also used in their in-plant strategy, where the International would turn the work-to- rule campaign on and off like a faucet, leaving workers baffled and disempowered. Although the UAW and URW workers faced egregious union-busting working conditions similar to the Staley workers, the Internationals halted grassroots organizing that could have invigorated Before the lockout, the Staley workers went door-to-door in Decatur explaining the principles of the local's stance. Most Decatur residents were sympathetic and,
International Viewpoint n° 276 29
recent decision to equip the 1998
Camaro and Firebird with Robert efforts than it was two years ago, it
Bosch antilock break systems. This had more cash to sustain a strike, would cost Dayton workers 128 and it showed it was willing to