Three Jerusalems?
the population's reaction to Hamas' suicide operations against Israel, and the repression of Islamic fundamentalists by Jasser Arafat's 'security services'.
Walid Salem describes
Following the Hamas suicide attacks, the Israeli occupation forces erected barricades around each Pale-stinian town, and forbid our movement from rural zones into the towns. This closure was similar to the one imposed from 1948-1967, when Palestinians needed the permission of the Israeli military authorities to travel from one village to another. The total closure has been lifted, but it can be re-imposed at any time. The Taba Accords are making day-to-day life in Gaza and the West Bank more and more difficult.
The re-liberalisation of movement does not, of course, include our move-ment between the West Bank towns and Jerusalem. Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza have been forbidden from entering Jerusalem since 29 March 1993. Since then, Israel alternates between a partial and a total closure of Jerusalem. The partial closure allows a small number of Palestinians to enter Jerusalem, providing that they have a special permit issued by the Israeli military authority. Total closure bars even these Palestinians from Jerusalem. Israel considers Jerusalem to be the unified capital of Israel, and intends to isolate it from the West Bank, so as to facilitate its annexation.
The number of Jewish residents in East Jerusalem grew to 160,000 in 1995, compared to 155,000 Palestinians. In other words, a majority. Not to mention the 140.000 colonists in the West Bank, and 55,500 in Gaza.
The situation in Gaza is catastrophic since the latest shutdown. Fifty-five percent of the working population is unemployed. The 900.000 Palestinians are crowded onto 60% of the territory, while 55,500 Jewish colonists occupy the remaining 40%. Gaza (360 km2) has the highest population density in the world. There is not enough industry and agriculture to satisfy the elementary needs of the people. The only solution is to go work in Israel. So the closure means increasing famine.
This latest closure cost Gaza residents over $6 million every day. Seven patients died after their transfer to Israeli hospitals was refused. One woman had to give birth in the queue at the Iriz security gate: after four hours of labour, her baby was born dead.
As for the economic ("Paris") agreement, signed after the Oslo accords, Israel still refuses to respect its conditions, notably concerning the exportation of Palestinian products to Israel, Egypt and Jordan.
• Israel has demanded that the Palestinian authority smash Hamas
After these latest Hamas attacks, the Palestinian Authority (PA) negotiated with Israel to establish a list of people who would be arrested. The PA wanted to arrest Hamas' military leadership, but leave the political leadership intact. But Israel insisted on the arrest of all the movement's political activists too. They told Arafat that if he did not satisfy them, Israeli troops would enter Zone A (see article below) and do it themselves. The PA negotiated for a while, to save face, and in the hope of reaching an agreement with Hamas' political leadership. But, several days later, the PA found a way out. They "discovered" that a new secret Hamas organisation was attempting to de-stabilise the PA, and assassinate leading personalities. Their hunt for Hamas militants was therefore presented as a response to Hamas' hostility to the PA,
Palestine rather than a response to Israeli pressure.
Israel also demanded that the PA arrest 13 militants of other currents, including Ahmed Saadat, a Ramallah-based member of the Political Bureau of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Arafat did as requested, though the PA announced publicly that the 13 were arrested to protect them from the risk of Israeli-sponsored assassination."
If he keeps obeying these Israeli diktats, Arafat risks being transformed into a simple state prosecutor acting under instruction from the Israeli Minister of the Interior. We can now see that Israel does not want to see an independent authority in the
West Bank, but a second Antoine Lahd (chief of the pro-Israeli militia in southern Lebanon). • How has the Palestinian population reacted to these latest arrests?
There have been a few protests. Detainees' families have organised several sit-ins in front of the prisons and offices of the Red Cross in towns controlled by the PA. Demonstrations against the detentions at the university faculty at Naplus-Najah were brutally repressed by the Palestinian police. • Have these arrests paralysed Hamas?
They have certainly dealt the movement a hard blow. The PA has uncovered arms caches, arrested militants, and collected a lot of information about the movement. But Hamas has already been politically weakened by the four splits which the PA has engineered over the last six months. Some
International Viewpoint #277 5
being able to put pressure on the civilian
* Palestine members split off to form three small parties
(Islamic Front, Islamic Struggle Organisation, Islamic National Salvation Party), in each case after negotiations with Arafat.
And, of course, there have been splits provoked by the internal divergences of the movement. The Gaza leadership of Hamas has adopted a "pacifist" line as far as the PA is concerned. But the West Bank leadership is divided between a group which is opposed to the PA as such, and a group which would welcome reconciliation with the PA. The in external leadership,
Jordan, is very opposed not only to Israel but also to the
PA.
One new development is the split in the Hamas military leadership between the Izdin Al Quassam brigades and the Followers of
Yehya Ayash. After the second attack, Izdin Al
Quassam that announced these actions represented the reaction to the assassination of
Yehya Ayash. The next day, the
Followers of Yehya Ayash announced that Izdin Al Quassam had no right to announce an end to operations, and said that they would continue.
So this is a difficult moment for Hamas.
Are these arrests a temporary measure, or is real attempt to eradicate the this movement? The PA clearly won't release the military wing of Hamas, nor a part of the political wing. But the rest?
This still isn't clear. The Palestinian
Authority doesn't respect any law. The various repressive bodies have total liberty to arrest whoever they wish, there is no legal limit on preventative detention, the courts and the judges hold night-time sessions, and
"judges"
both and
"lawyers"
are military officers, with no connection to the legal world.
The Council which was elected on 20 January
1996 has not modified this situation. It has not adopted legal rules of conduct which would be binding the on
Palestinian Authority.
• How has the
Palestinian
Human Rights
League reacted to these arrests.
This is an organisation founded by the
Palestinian regime. But the presence of real jurists has brought it into partial conflict with the Palestinian Authority concerning the application and respect of the laws. The League challenges certain arrests, and monitors a number of cases. Like the Palestinian Human Rights Information Centre in Jerusalem, the Human Rights Centre in Gaza, and the Gaza Institute for Rights and Justice.
There are initiatives for the creation of a human rights defence body which would include representatives of the various human rights bodies, and certain reformist personalities in the Council: those who are willing to say yes to democracy and no to repression. Bodies of this type have been established in Bethlehem and Jerusalem. • How has the Palestinian left reacted to the suicide attacks?
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) supported these latest operations, considering them to be a form of intensification of the anti-colonial struggle. The left's recent activities have centred on two axes, organisation of meetings to protest the closure, and mobilisations and press conferences to demand the liberation of the latest detainees.
The two fronts are also trying to bring together all nationalists, including those in Fatah, to establish an "honour charter" fixing the conditions governing arrest, and
• The Wrath of the Generals Michel Warshawsky explains why the war in southern Lebanon has flared up. Hizbullah is a resis- accord did not forbid tance movement in Hizbullah and the other southern Lebanon. It is Lebanese res-istance essentially shiite, and, organisations to unlike Hamas, has continue their guerrilla close links to Iran. activities in the Israeli Hizbullah is the stron- security zone in sougest, best armed, and thern Lebanon, which militarily speaking, the they justly consider to most efficient element be Lebanese territory in the struggle against subject to Israeli aggthe Israeli occupation ression. of southern Lebanon. So the accord obliged The Israeli army has the Israeli generals to been ill at ease ever live with this guerrilla since Israel signed its activity, without being accord with Hizbullah able to take the meatwo years ago. This sures they considered accord forbid both necessary to combat sides from bombing the Hizbullah and the civilian population, in Lebanese resistance. Israel and in Lebanon. In other words, without This put Israel in a difficult position, since the 6 International Viewpoint #277 population in Beirut and northern Lebanon. The resistance in southern Lebanon has been very effective these last 12 months, so the Israeli army began to feel that they had been put into an impossible position by the politicians. Israel was on the defensive, they felt, and there was a constant trickle of victims. Of course, the Hezbollah offensive is the result of Israeli provocation and flagrant violations of the accord. * Michel Warshawsky works with the Alternative Information Center in Jerusalem eliminating violence and counter-violence in society.
In January the left boycotted the elections to the Council. But it does not exclude the possibility of contacts with members of the new council, where there is a joint interest in protecting democracy. The general goals remain the maintenance of the struggle against occupation, and for the consolidation of democracy.
In organisational terms, the PFLP has grown stronger these last three months, organising a new section in Gaza, starting to work on the question of detainees in Israeli prisons, and on issues of democracy. Recent regional conferences in Gaza and the West Bank have re-dynamised the organisation somewhat. The PFLP is stronger than the DFLP, though the second organisation is more homogeneous in organisational terms. • What is the future of the Palestinian Authority?
In the coming months we will have the negotiations on the final status of the occupied territories. Talks are supposed to start on May 4th, but they will probably be
delayed until after the Israeli elections on 26 May 1996. These final status negotiations will deal with the issues of refugees, Jerusalem, the Israeli colonies and the Palestinian prisoners.
Israel will allow (selectively) family regroupment, but refuses totally the return of the four million Palestinian refugees. Only 1,500 refugees were allowed to return in 1995, out of the 6,000 which Israel pledged to accept under the Oslo accords.
Israel continues to claim the "unified and indivisible" city as its capital. All they are willing to negotiate is the joint management of the city's holy places (Christian, Moslem and Jewish) by a commission with Israeli, Palestinian, Jordanian, Saudi, Moroccan and Vatican representatives. Arabs in East Jerusalem may have some cultural autonomy, and the Arab language would be taught in the attempt to create a new balance of forces on the ground. This also means mobilising the population. It means working together as two peoples who live on the same territory, and must create a bi-national state. • The next step of Arafat's contract with Israel is the modification of the Palestinian National Charter
The Palestinian Authority is trying hard to keep its promise to Israel in this matter. The Taba Accords specify that the Charter separate state with secure borders: Ed.] within two months of the first meeting of the
Palestine * Council of the Palestinian Authority. The Charter can only be amended by a 2/3 majority in the Palestinian National Council (PNC) [exile parliament: Ed.].
Arafat can get his majority: he has co-opted the members of the Council of the Palestinian Authority into the PNC with precisely this aim in mind. But, if he doesn't get his 2/3 majority to amend the existing Charter when the PNC meets in Gaza, Arafat will simply propose a new Charter or similar document. You can be sure that this new text will include no mention of armed struggle. * Walid Salem was interviewed for IV by Sonia Leith separate Palestinian schools. They would
The Contribution of Ernest also have the right to a municipal
Mandel to Marxist Theory government, linked the
Israeli to municipality.
Israel has, however, indicated that the
Seminar organized by the Ernest Mandel Study Centre
Palestinians are welcome to build a new
Jerusalem, outside the current city limits. The
Amsterdam, July 4-6, 1996 origin of this tasteless joke is Jordanian King
Hassan's recent statement that "we need
Speakers: • Jesús Albarracin and Pedro Montes (Economists, Bank three towns named
Jerusalem:
an of Spain): The theory of late capitalism as a Marxist interpretation of postinternational Jerusalem incorporating the
WW2 capitalism • Robin Blackburn (Editor, New Left Review, London):
holy places, an Israeli Jerusalem, and a
The place of Ernest Mandel in the history of Marxist political thought • Alan
Palestinian Jerusalem."
Freeman (Economist, University of Greenwich): Economic dynamics:
A Likud (conservative party) victory in the upcoming Israeli elections will not
Mandel's legacy • Michael Löwy (Sociologist, CNRS, Paris): Ernest Mandel as a revolutionary humanist • Francisco Louça (Economist, IESGchange the current situation. And Labour proposes annexing 11% of the West Bank
University of Lisbon): Ernest Mandel's contribution to the theory of long
(along the Green Line separating "Israel"
waves of capitalist development • Charles Post (Historian, City University from the "occupied territories"). Over 70% of of New York): The theory of bureaucracy • Catherine Samary the settlers live in this 11%. Labour suggests
(Economist, University of Paris XI): The conception of the transition to that the rest of the West Bank be attached to socialism • Enzo Traverso (Political Scientist, University of Amiens): Ernest
Jordan in a kind of confederation. In other
Mandel's vision of the relation between capitalism and barbarism.
words, the Palestinian entity will have purely symbolic sovereignty. Any such Palestino-
All introductions and discussions in English.
Jordanian political confederation would be linked in an economic confederation with
For information about inexpensive accomodation and entrance fees and for
Israel, registration forms (reservations necessary: due to space limitations only a
The situation is fairly black. The only limited number of people can attend): contact EMSC c/o IIRE, Postbus way out is to stop the Oslo process, and to
53290, 1007 RG Amsterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: IIRE@Antenna.nl choose a strategy which has some chance of enabling the Palestinian people to establish their national rights. The first such option on
Fax: (31 20) 6732106. 0 6717263
For financial support to the Ernest Mandel Study Centre send your cheques offer is the military, Hamas strategy. A to the IIRE, or make a bank transfer to account negative plan, which blocks any Palestinian campaign to persuade Israeli public opinion to accept a bi-national Palestino-Israeli state:
which, after all, is the only just solution to the conflict.
The second strategy is the refusal of the
Oslo accords through the non-violent mobilisation of the Palestinian masses, in an
630-0113884-65 at Caisse Privée
Banque, Brussels, Belgium.
International Viewpoint #277 7