International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

Guatemala: Post-conflict Violence

· International Viewpoint No. 278, June 1996 · pp 19-20 · 2,048 words

Armed forces and soldiers Repression and political prisoners United States

Post-conflict violence in Guatemala

"Democratization" is under way. But, as Dianne Feeley explains, state violence is still a pillar of the regime

ALTHOUGH ALVARO ARZÚ OF THE PARTY OF National Advancement (PAN) won the presidency of Guatemala in the second round of elections on January 7, 1996, fully 65% of the population abstained. The choice had been between Arzú, a neoliberal whose campaign was bankrolled by the Chambers of Agriculture, Commerce, Industry and Commerce (CACIF), and Alfonso Portillo, a right-wing populist and a stand-in candidate for General Ríos Montt. PAN also won 43 out of 80 seats in Congress and controls one-third of all local governments.

But while in the second round both parties represented a continuation of rule by the economic elite, the New Guatemala Democratic Front (FDNG) succeeded in establishing itself in the first round as a political force in the country, winning six seats in the legislature. Those elected on the FDNG slate include human rights activists and indigenous organizers such as Nineth Montenegro (Mutual Support Group GAM) and Rosalina Tuyic (Confederation of Guatemalan Widows-CONAVIGUA). In addition, the FDNG, by itself or in partnership with local committees, won 19 of the 68 municipal governments it contested, including three provincial capitals. Of particular importance was winning Quetzaltenango, the country's second largest city.

The FDNG emerged as an electoral expression of the popular movement only last summer. Its platform was based on respect for human rights, promotion of gender equality, respect for multicultural practices, demilitarization, efforts to address the roots of poverty, environmental protection, support for the process of the peace negotiations and the devolution of state power to local governments. For its part, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) openly advocated participation in the elections and called a unilateral two-week truce leading up to the vote. Army sources affirmed that the truce was strictly observed by the guerrillas.

The FDNG had to overcome a number of obstacles - ranging from dealing with a severe shortage of funds to death threats. Manuel Saquic, an FDNG activist from Chimaltenango, was assassinated in late June. But the October 5 army massacre of 11 members of a returned refugee community in Xaman, Alta Verapaz and the wounding of 30

La far more direct message, designed to intimidate other returned refugee communities.

The Peace Process

With the installation of the Arzú administration it seemed that the peace talks with the URNG would remain stalled. And even when they resumed, would negotiations begin where they had been left, or would a number of points already agreed upon have to be renegotiated? On February 12 Foreign Minister Eduardo Stein revealed that Arzú and his advisors recently held five secret meetings with the URNG general command. Arzú agreed "to continue the dialogue under the previously established terms."

On February 25 President Arzú met with four members of the URNG's general command in Mexico. This marks the first time that a president has met openly with leaders of the insurgency, and indicates the priority Arzú places on the negotiations. While Arzú's immediate concern is economic to attract investment and increase exports, particularly to the United States — he recognizes that central to that is continuing the peace process and improving Guatemala's human rights image.

Arzú signaled determination to maintain control over the negotiations by appointing only one army official to the governmental Peace Commission (COPAZ), thus reducing the army's role in those issues not directly related to the future of the army. He has appointed three civilian members: • Gustavo Porras, Arzú's childhood friend, who studied sociology in Paris in the late *60s and joined the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) urban struggle until the army disrupted the urban fronts in 1980-81. Porras began to question the EP's strategy and spent most of the '80s living in Mexico. When he returned to Guatemala in 1990, he worked for the new daily newspaper, Siglo XXI, and as a researcher for the Association of Economic and Social Investigations (ASIES). He worked on Arzú's campaign, building bridges between the right-wing PAN and more progressive sectors. • Richard Aitkenhead, Minister of Finance

Guatemala during the government of President Jorge Serrano Elías, and one of the functionaries least tainted by the Serrano's self-coup in May 1993. During the past two years Aitkenhead has been a consultant with the Interamerican Development Bank. • Raquel Zelaya, President Serrano's first Minister of Finance and an enthusiastic neoliberal. She left the post after receiving death threats, supposedly related to her investigations into "ghost" positions in the state bureaucracy. Replaced by Aitkenhead, she returned to her post as ASIES director.

By placing two trusted members of the private business sector on COPAZ, Arzú was able to diminish the business' initial objections to Porras. For his part, Porras has insisted that although it is unrealistic to establish deadlines for reaching accords, both the government and the URNG have agreed not to leave a single round of negotiations without having achieved some concrete advance.

Just before the round of talks began at the end of March the URNG declared an indefinite unilateral ceasefire while the government has reportedly agreed to refrain from offensive military action.

Pending peace discussions include socioeconomic aspects and the agrarian situation, the role of the army in a democratic society, the constitutional reforms necessary to implement the fundamental accords, and, finally, mechanisms for the demobilization and reinsertion of the guerrilla combatants to the society.

Considering the presence of two ASIES members in COPAZ, studies prepared last fall by ASIES may offer a rough outline of the Arzú administration's proposals in the upcoming talks. ASIES recommended constitutional changes that put into place "regulations on ownership of land that is not currently being utilized," modernization and decentralization of the outmoded Land Reg-

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* guatemala istry and creation of a land bank. To resolve the land crisis, ASIES considered that a minimum of 400,000 hectares would have to be awarded to 50,000 families.

ASIES also recommended an increase in direct taxes, a modernization of the system of tax collection and a study of a program of privatizing some state assets. The Guatemalan Army

Alvaro Arzú is following the same approach to the army that former President Vinicio Cerezo used a decade ago: to carry out a limited purge of army and police ranks. In January Arzú dismissed 118 agents and officials of the National Police allegedly involved in corruption and criminal activities. And, according to Ronald Ochaeta, director of the Archbishop's Human Rights Office, 53 army officials were suspended for their links with corruption or human rights violations.

During February two documents were leaked to the press. One gave the names and ranks of 84 army officers who occupied the highest posts as of January 22. The other is a list of the almost 1,300 officers who graduated between 1956 and 1971.

An analysis of the documents shows that while the four highest posts are divided between the four distinct graduating classes, the commands of the seven most strategically important bases are in the hands of the officers of the class of 1966, also known as "the Syndicate." The most notable alumnus of that class is General Otto Pérez Molina, currently Inspector General of the army and the sole military representative in the peace talks.

More than 60 of the 84 officials in powerful positions would be subject to retirement by the end of the year, if pending legislation in Congress to cut the period of service to 31 years for generals and 30 for

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• Russian left demonstrates against Chechnya war • Salvador's FMLN becomes a single party • Indian feminists debate the UN Conference on Women •1 million African Americans march in Washington DC The bound collection of International Viewpoint costs only £5/$ US 10 per year (1982-1995), plus 20% postage charge for orders of less than 5 volumes. 20 International Viewpoint other officers is passed.

Preemptive moves by the Arzú administration to get rid of the army and National Police's most corrupt or criminal elements is also a way of deflecting pressures for more thoroughgoing changes. The government's decision to put the army on the streets of the capital to help control crime continues past governmental policies of further militarization to deal with the effects of past militarization.

The popular movement and human rights organizations do not anticipate improvement of the situation under Arzú. He may have a little more autonomy from the army than previous presidents, but the army is still the backbone of power, enjoying autonomy in strategic matters including human rights. For instance, it will send its own delegation to the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, despite the fact that the Minister of Foreign Affairs disliked the idea, and it will continue to obstruct investigation of human rights violations. Human Rights Violations

The latest annual report of the Archbishop's Human Rights Office noted that Guatemalans are already seeing a "post-conflict" period of violence, such currently occurring in El Salvador.

In 1995 there were 1,782 cases of violations of the right to life, including 215 extrajudicial executions, 1,067 murders, 249 attempted killings, 236 threats, 10 forced disappearances and 5 cases of torture. This does not reveal any important variation in comparison with 1994, and indicates the army's continued impunity.

Attacks against labor leaders have continued without interruption. The most recent case is that of Reynaldo González, General Secretary of the Federation of Bank and Insurance Employee's Unions, who has received death threats ever since he testified before the U.S. Trade Representative in Washington in 1993. The death threats intensified after he met with a U.S. government trade delegation to Guatemala in November 1995. He has also been key in uniting the Guatemalan labor movement in opposition to neoliberal, anti-union policies.

On March 8 González's nephew was abducted by armed men. This attack followed the abduction of González's sister, who was forced into a black van, on February 27. She was drugged, repeatedly raped and tortured. Before her release the men told that her brother was a guerrilla and that if both of their families did not leave the country, they

Yet the government did not initiate an investigation of the kidnapping, rape and torture of Vilma Cristina González, thus preventing her from obtaining a forensic examination from medical authorities. The

González families prepared to leave the country, but were prevented when the government announced on March 8 that it had run out of passport covers! The Case of Comandante Everardo

Jennifer Harbury — a U.S. citizen and widow of the Guatemalan guerrilla known as Comandante Everardo who was captured, secretly interrogated, tortured and executed by the army in 1992 — has mounted a campaign to uncover the truth about her husband's capture and execution. Recently declassified U.S. documents prove that the CIA knew of Bámaca's capture shortly after it happened, and may have paid for information obtained through his torture. The documents also indicate that the White House and U.S State Department were also informed, and deliberately misled Harbury.

Harbury believes that her husband is buried at the Las Cabanas military base, along with hundreds of others. (Estimates range from 500-2,000 and the Mutual Support Group has filed a separate petition for exhumation.) However though the Guatemalan Attorney General appointed a special prosecutor to investigate the case and various court orders have been issued, the army has blocked her entry. The special prosecutor resigned after receiving death threats.

On March 7 Jennifer Harbury filed a $25 million lawsuit against CIA officials for knowingly giving her false information about her husband's disappearance. In a recent interview she insisted that there be a declassification of all U.S. government files on human rights cases in Guatemala since 1954, stating "We have to find out what our government has done in our names, with our tax dollars and without our permission. And Guatemalans have the right to know what was done to their family members." * Sources: Report on Guatemala, published quarterly by the Guatemala News & Information Bureau, P.O. Box 28594, Oakland, CA 94604 (subscription: U.S. $15, foreign $20) and envío, a monthly published (English & Spanish versions) by the Jesuit Central American University, (subscription: Revista envio, Apartado A-194, Managua, Nicaragua, U.S./Canada $32, Latin America $30, Europe, etc. $40)

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