Occupied territory
Three years after the Oslo accords, two years after the creation of the Palestinian Authority, and nine months after the first Palestinian elections, the situation in the occupied territories is more desperate than it has been for a long time. Walid Salem reports The Netanyahu government has transformed the concept of re-deployment in Jericho from a Zone A solution (transfer of control to the Palestinian Authority) to a Zone B solution (total Israeli control, with some civil matters delegated to the Palestinian Authority). Even this limited concession has a price: the Palestinian Authority must itself close down three Palestinian institution in East Jerusalem: the Geography Centre, the Topographical Centre, and the Youth and
Re-deployment has been frozen in Zone C, which covers 72% of the West Bank, representing territory effectively annexed by
The Palestinian Authority controls about 9% of the West Bank, essentially the territory covered by six towns. These towns are effectively prisons. Although even the Palestinian guards cannot circulate from one site to another in uniform. Israel can and does erect barriers at the exits from each of the towns, and control entry and exit.
The colonisation of Jerusalem has accelerated. The previous, Labour government managed to create a Jewish majority in the city of Jerusalem, including East Jerusalem (160,000 Jews and 155,000 Palestinians). The current administration plans to boost the Jewish population to 48% of the population of Greater Jerusalem (as far south as Gush Atsayun, as far north as Al Bira, as far west as Beit Shimish and as far east as Ma ali Adumin) by 2010.
By extending the colonisation of Ma'ali Adumin towards the West, Infrastructure Minister Ariel Sharon hopes to create a band of continuous Jewish settlement from Jerusalem to the Jordanian border.
Interior Minister Ely Suissa plans to annexe adjacent West Bank urbanisations to Jerusalem proper.
This new band of settlement will receive financial and infrastructure support to develop industrial zones servicing Tel Aviv and the Jordanian capital Amman.
The elections of January 20th have not changed the nature of the Palestinian Authority. All power remains in the hands of the top leadership, which publicly ignores the decisions of the supposedly sovereign
Over 90 Council decisions have been ignored or contradicted by the Authority. Arafat's power is guaranteed by the "peace"
accords, in which Israel gives the President the right to veto Council decisions. As consolation, Council members, most of whom come from Arafat's Fatah branch of the PLO, receive a monthly salary of $2,500, a car (with driver) and a portable telephone.
Palestinians might have a representative body, but this hasn't stopped Arafat's campaigns of repression. Armed police have invaded the campuses of Birzeit and ElNajah universities to disrupt student organising. Physical mistreatment and even torture are common in Palestinian police stations and prisons.
Arafat is not only President of the Palestinian Authority, of course. He is still the President of the PLO, which in April of this year deleted those parts of its charter to
The Palestinian Authority has little room for manoeuvre. Either it reinforces its control over Gaza and the West Bank towns, and strives to develop political and economic institutions, and to generate relations with potential investors and foreign diplomats, or it must opt for confrontation with Israel. This option can only be followed if Israel gives the go-ahead. Netanyahu continues to hinder the development of Gaza airport.
The other option would mean breaking with the current strategy of the Palestinian leadership. It implies breaking police cooperation, stopping the Israeli-orchestrated hunt for Hamas militants, and taking steps to advance the interests of the masses.
The goal of such a strategy would be to create a new balance of forces o the ground, so as to be able, in a second phase, to suspend the negotiations with Israel.
Instead of leading the struggle, Fatah has transformed itself into a party-state. Fatah full-timers have become faithful civil servants. Those who remained faithful to their militant convictions were isolated and
The Islamic resistance movement Hamas faces the combined repression of Israel and the Palestinian Authority. There is a growing divergence between the movement's Gaza wing, which would like to become a legal political party, and West Bank militants who reject such a transformation. There is tension between the military and political wings, and between the emigre leadership and the leadership in the occupied territories.
In reality, Hamas has frozen its military operations. Part of the leadership wants to announce this publicly, part wants to overturn this unilateral ceasefire.
The Palestinian left (both the "Popular" and the "Democratic" Front for the Liberation of Palestine) is in deep crisis. Neither has democratised itself. The leadership is the same as before, and so is the mechanism of decision-making
The Palestinian Peoples Party (exCommunist) has rallied to the Palestinian Authority, and been rewarded with the post of Minister of Economy.
Fortunately, there are signs of popular mobilisation. A first conference of refugees in the Bethlehem region was held on 12 September, at the initiative of the West Bank Youth Union. The self-organisation of refugees is spreading, and will soon culminate in a conference to be attended by representatives of refugees from across the West Bank.
Within Israel itself, the Palestinian Committee for the Defence of Refugees now has over 600,000 members. And land defence committees have sprung up in many parts of the occupied territories, improving Palestinians' capacity to defend themselves in the regular confrontations with Zionist colonists.
As Likud increases the pressure, and Arafat follows his own interests, this independent popular mobilisation is likely to grow. Refugees in particular are likely to develop independent representative organisations. Unless, of course, Arafat can co-opt their leaders, as he has tried to do in Gaza. *
November 1996 #282 7