Kurdish fratricidal war
Interview with Iraqi Communist leader Raid Fahmi
Armed conflict between rival factions of the
Kurdish guerrilla movement in the north of
Iraq flared up again in July this year.
The Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein profited from the confusion to attack the exile bases of various factions of the Iranian opposition, including the Democratic Party of Iranian
Turkey too seemed to be on the point of
But on 31 August Saddam Hussein made an unprecedented move. He sent troops into the region to support one of the Kurdish factions, the Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) of Massud Barzani, which was retreating under the attacks of the rival Kur-
Kurdistan (DPIK).
intervening across the border.
distan Patriotic Union (KPU) of Jalal Talabani. Salah Jaber discusses the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan with Raid Fahmi, a member of the exile leadership of the Communist Party of Iraq. Raid Fahmi: The fratricidal war between Kurdish groups had already made it possible for all the regional powers to intervene in the region, through their local agents. Iraqi Kurdistan has been subjected to a wave of sabotage actions: car bombs, assassinations, assaults, and so on. The general climate is one of mistrust, and internal struggles.
Nevertheless, there was until recently a thin red line" which could not be crossed: the nation as a whole recognised the Iraqi dictatorship as its main enemy, and refused any idea of direct co-operation with Saddam
Obviously, various fractions have had relations with the Baghdad regime over the ars, for obvious commercial and adminisative reasons. But this latest intervention warks a new step. • What happened, exactly?
On August 31st, Massud Barzani's KDP forces, together with military units under Saddam Hussein's control, advanced towards Erbil, the main town in Iraqi Kurdistan. In the first days after occupying Erbil, Iraqi troops targeted the offices of opposition organisations for search, confiscation and destruction.
Meanwhile, the Iraqi secret services started arresting militants, on the basis of a list they had already drawn up. They set up their headquarters in the Kurdish Parliament building in Erbil.
Sections of the ruling Baas party were also re-established, with members recruited locally. Local Baas members had mostly left the region during the 1991 Kurdish revolt (following the Gulf War), after which Kurdistan was established as an autonomous zone, with Erbil as its capital.
During this latest intervention, Iraqi forces were particularly determined to expel all the Arab Turkmen population from Kurdistan, since, for Baghdad, any Arab living in Kurdistan must be an opponent of the
After a few days, the Baghdad army withdrew from Erbil, but remained further north than their initial position on the 36th parallel. Saddam's secret services left behind them a functioning network, in Kurdish uniforms.
The Iraqi army didn't intervene in the conflict between the two Kurdish factions for control of Suleimaniyeh, the largest urban settlement in Iraqi Kurdistan, with about 800,000 inhabitants. But they continued to provide Barzani's KDP with logistic support. • What about the civil population?
Talabani's retreat from Suleimaniyeh provoked a massive exodus in the direction of the Iranian frontier. About 50,000 people left the town. Many of them thought that the town would be occupied by the Tragi army.
Iraq/Kurdistan *
When they realised that only Barzani's troops would enter Suleimaniyeh, some of them turned back. Although those who had crossed into Iran were prevented from returning
The KPU radio deliberately spread panic among the population, with talk of a blood bath in Suleimaniyeh. In fact, Barzani quickly announced an amnesty for KPU supporters in the town, and began to re-build contacts with the other factions. • What was the Communist Party response?
Our strategy was to resist the Iraqi forces, without entering into direct combat with Barzani's men. We withdrew from Erbil, but not from Suleimaniyeh.
In the days between the KPU retreat, and the arrival of Barzani's troops, peshmergas (soldiers) tried to prevent our looting, and maintain control over the hospitals, essential buildings and the Dokan dam, which provides water for Erbil. • And the rest of the Iraqi opposition?
The other parties have now withdrawn from Iraqi Kurdistan, apart from ourselves, and the Union of Islamists. This is a local Kurdish party which co-operated with Barzani in the re-integration of the displaced population in Suleimaniyeh, but did not par ticipate in the military occupation. It does not have the same policies as the pro-Irania Daawa party.
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* Iraq/Kurdistan • What is Barzani doing with his new dominant position?
He is trying to re-animate what we used to call the "Kurdish government," on the basis of an agreement with other political forces outside his own KDP. We expect that he will contact us, and the Union of Islamists. Barzani also wants to re-establish the Kurdish parliament, and incorporate deputies from the KPU. The old parliament was divided 50:50 between the KDP and the KPU, with a few co-opted representatives of smaller groups. The Communist Party wasn't represented. For the moment, Talabani refuses to recognise either this new parliament, or the legitimacy of those remained in the areas now under Barzani's
He is apparently preparing a counter-offensive.
The situation in Erbil is different from the rest of Iraqi Kurdistan, in that all the infrastructure of the opposition has been destroyed. Saddam's secret services are well established there, whereas they are still in the phase of constructing their networks in the other regions. Most of their networks fell apart during the "internal blockade" which Saddam imposed on Kurdistan after the Gulf
Saddam has lifted the internal blockade, which has certainly improved the living conditions of the population, by facilitating the provision of food, petrol, and other essential products. But Saddam is not just trying to respond to popular unrest. He also recognises that only by ending the blockade could he reintroduce his agents, and re-build his satellite organisations. • According to the international press, some Kurds would not oppose a return to rule from Baghdad, if this could end the fratricidal war between Kurds.
Maybe. Just like some Iraqis say they would accept an Israeli invasion, if it would get rid of Saddam. People in Kurdistan are tired. The conflict between the factions has partitioned the country. Moving from one zone to another is a challenge. The militias are bloated with young men, who have no other source of income. They make their own laws. Economic life is paralysed.
Most of all, people recognise that this bloody conflict between Barzani and Talabani has nothing to do with the national cause. It is a factional struggle for the narrow interests of each party. • There is no real political difference between them?
No. It's all about zones of influence, not conflicting political projects. The Communist Party has consistently opposed this conflict, and attempted to create forums for 18 International Viewpoint mediation. Unfortunately, they don't listen to us. Both factions think they can impose a military solution. This testifies to their shortsightedness.
The population is not massively attached to either faction. In 1991, over one million civilians left their homes rather than come under the control of advancing Iraqi troops. During the recent transfer of Suleimaniyeh, most people stayed where they were. • What does the USA want to see?
President Clinton is clearly frustrated by this conflict between the Kurds. US interests have repeatedly offered to mediate between the warring factions. At the same time, the USA is not seriously pursuing a political solution, since any "normalisation" of the situation in Kurdistan would enable the "Kurdish experience" to develop and innovate. Washington and Western Europe would then have to take a firmer position concerning political rights and economic interests in Iraqi Kurdistan. And they don't want to have to answer these questions.
The Americans don't particularly want to see an autonomous political entity in Kurdistan, or even a federal relationship with Iraq. They were only drawn into the region in 1991 by the combination of the Gulf War, and the resulting Iraqi intervention into Kurdistan, and massive refugee movements.
Washington would prefer it if Iraqi Kurdistan had a status inferior to that of independence, since sovereignty in Iraqi Kurdistan would affect the other states which currently lay claim to parts of the Kurdish homeland. The problem for Clinton is that the conflict between the Kurdish factions in Iraq has provoked the displeasure of the neighbouring states, including Turkey, linchpin of US strategy in the region, and Iran, which also hopes to benefit from the new situation. Saddam Hussein has also demonstrated his ability to profit from the division between Kurdish groups. All this is pushing the USA to reconsider its position on Kurdish issues.
Washington knew all about Saddam's preparations for his intervention in Kurdistan on August 31st. The US has agents in place here, and regularly over-flies the region. Their military response was concentrated in the south of the country, and, even when they demanded that Saddam withdrew, they did not insist that he retreat behind the 36th parallel. SO it seems that the extension of the tentacles of Iraqi central power into Iraqi Kurdistan is no longer unthinkable and un-* acceptable to the Americans. Clinton clearly stated that the aim of his missile retaliation was to "reduce Iraq's capacity to menace its neighbours [Kuwait and Saudi Arabia] and United States interests." No mention of Kurdistan's national interest here.
For Bill Clinton, Kurdistan is a "humanitarian" issue, and a political embarrassment. In my opinion, the US is working towards some kind of disengagement from Kurdistan. But who will replace them? What deals have or will be made? It is too early to say. But it is interesting that Iran chose not to make a provocative reaction to the Iraqi intervention. Some say that Talabani's sudden retreat before Barzani's troops was provoked by a lack of Iranian support for him. Even the Baghdad government seems to be involved in this new re-organisation of Kurdistan. And all the regional powers have their card to play. • What new set-up can we expect?
Who can say? Either the empty autonomy" we had before, with Barzani as the top man, or some new structure. Barzani seems willing to negotiate with the Iraqi authorities, but still insists on international support while he does so. To establish his guarantees, Barzani is re-contacting Washington, in the hope of persuading the big NGOs to come back to Kurdistan.
Talabani might counter-attack, or he might accept to negotiate, recognising the international pressure. Some kind of agreement with the Baghdad regime seems likely, in a formula which will be acceptable to Turkey. Iran will be tacitly involved. although publicly that country is still the boggy-man.
One thing is clear. Kurdistan is no longer a secure zone for the Iraqi opposition. • These events have enabled Saddam Hussein to consolidate his power. Though there are rumours of trouble even within the state structures.
That's right. The gulf between the regime and the people has deepened even further recently. Discontentment has even spread to members of the political structures, and other regime employees. There are signs of an emerging conflict at the core of the regime, even within the ruling family. Saddam Hussein's son in law Hussein Kamel fled to Jordan, then returned to Iraq, where he was assassinated. We haven't heard the end of this story. There are rumours of conflicts within the armed forces, mutual vendettas, and so on. Two of Saddam's brothers are cur-
rently under house arrest. There is even a dispute between Saddam and his son, Uday.
This latest conflict in Kurdistan enabled
Saddam Hussein to regroup his forces, and dampen the internal conflicts. The morale of the troops has improved. But the causes of the crisis are just below the surface.
UN Resolution 986 [permitting Iraq to resume limited oil exports] is now frozen.
This was a big blow for the enormous majority of Iraqis, who placed so much hope in this partial lifting of the embargo. Nevertheless, the regime has made a few breaches in the US-led encirclement of the country.
Will we see a lifting of the embargo? Will the "international community" accept the idea of Saddam remaining in power?
One thing is clear. The USA didn't intend to topple Saddam Hussein, either in 1991 [the Gulf War] or afterwards. Analysing US policies and initiatives, one realises that they have never targeted the Iraqi regime as such. but only that regime's regional potential, and the possible menace a Baghdad regime could pose for Washington's allies in the region.
Recent events show that the "external factor" has lost importance. The internal factor, the importance of which we have always stressed, is now decisive. But the opposition is divided, and the nation is exhausted, particularly because of the blockade.
The situation in Kurdistan is an unpredictable element. Will the new context be a factor strengthening the regime, or will it open a new period of instability? One effect of the exclusion zone was to isolate the Kurdish question from the rest of the country. What now! Will the Kurdish struggle become part of the national, democratic struggle of Iraq? The next few months will • What is your position on the embargo?
Lifting the embargo has been a central demand of the Communist Party ever since it was imposed. This blockade is a punishment inflicted on the people of Iraq, not on the regime. Our party has argued in favour of using the possibilities for at least a partial loosening of the embargo which have been expressed in successive UN resolutions (#/06, #712, and now #986), without accepting these concessions as an alternative to the lifting of the embargo.
It was a crime for the Iraqi regime to reject resolution #986 a year and a half ago. This rejection increased the suffering of the people. Our party is in favour of accepting, and complying with resolution #986. Of course, this is not sufficient for re-animating the economy and re-building the country. All it can do is reduce the human suffering. We also call for the de-freezing of Iraqi assets abroad, and an end to the levies imposed on
In the early days, we were one of the few forces in the Iraqi opposition which was firmly opposed to the embargo. We had some problems with other opposition groups, which felt that lifting the embargo would benefit the regime, which would be against the interests of the opposition. This might be true, but you shouldn't try to weaken Saddam Hussein by making ordinary Iraqis die of hunger. • Outside Kurdistan, what form does opposition take?
There are a range of non-organised opposition activities. These vary from the rumoured plots by groups of soldiers to the groups of young people who write slogans on the wall, or distribute leaflets. Overall. though, the forces of opposition in the centre and south of the country are too weak to confront the regime's repressive machinery. Each new independent local organisation is menaced by repression. The opposition is constantly threatened. And weak.
The regime's position might be weak, but this hasn't affected the repressive apparatus, which has a long experience, and a budget which hasn't been affected by the generalised austerity measures of recent years.
The embargo and the economic crisis have made it even more difficult to organise the masses. People are pre-occupied with survival. • What about the organised opposition?
There are four major currents in the Iraqi opposition: Kurdish, nationalist, and democratic Communist. This summer's events in Kurdistan were a severe blow. Efforts to unify the struggle were turned back. There is less room for manoeuvre than before. On the other hand, maybe these events will permit a certain clarification of issues, within the opposition.
Might we see a lasting division within the Kurdish current? Will part of the Kurdish movement abandon its opposition to the Baghdad regime? It is too early to be sure.
The opposition inside Iraq faces new tasks. The recent events confirm the central importance of internal factors, rather than external factors like the USA. Once again we have been shown that the USA does not want to overthrow the Saddam regime.
Realising this truth should enable us to work for a new convergence of opposition forces, on the basis of a clearer, more solid national platform, and with a better
Iraq/Kurdistan * appreciation of the problems of external interference in the Iragi opposition.
We recognise that the internationalisation of the Iraqi question imposes the necessity of co-ordination with forces across the region. Geography obliges. Nevertheless, the opposition should have a national programme, and national priorities, shaping our attitude towards any and all forces we must deal with in order to overthrow the dictatorship. Unfortunately, in certain cases the Iraqi opposition has put its struggle in the service of a regional force, or an international project. Let us hope that these latest events will put a question mark against this kind of • If the regime falls, what is your programme?
Our short term action programme includes the promotion of democratic liberties, and the establishment of a provisional government integrating all the currents, including the Islamists. The main task of this government would be to prepare free general elections. Our party has no veto over any political force. Nor would we accept any interference in our own affairs.
As for our long term strategy, we need to deepen our consideration of a number of questions, about which we have so far only defined some basic principles. For us, socialism remains an option, but we do not think that it is on the agenda, given Irag's current situation. We need to re-organise the economy, but we are against the dominance of the private sector. We want to keep the fundamental economic resources, like oil, in the public sector.
The democratic question is at the heart of our project. We are no longer willing to sacrifice democracy in order to protect a social measure which we would consider progressive. Life has taught us an important lesson: all social gains are fragile, unless they are backed by popular mobilisation. So we shouldn't under-estimate democracy. It is through democracy that we can achieve, and protect, social advances. * *Moustafa Salam and Sonia Leith also contributed to this interview
December 1996 #283 19