Morocco: Absolute manipulation
Abdel Baki Yussi and Mdebhi Aziz of the Casablanca-based radical left weekly Annahj Demokrati (Democratic Way) discuss King Hassan's latest "democratisation" moves. Abdel Baki Yussi: this latest constitutional reform comes at a moment when the balance of power is particularly favourable to the regime. The new Cooperation Agreement with the European Union has consolidated Hassan's internal power, and external support. Hassan's visit to France last year confirmed his "special relationship" with the former colonial power' At the beginning of 1996, the regime even launched a "clean-up campaign, supposedly targeting smugglers, the Mafia, the drugs trade and corruption.
Meanwhile, the opposition parties have been weakened by internal conflicts, and the quality and level of their public activity has declined. The new left is very weak, and the trade unions recently made an agreement with the Ministry of the Interior which might lead to three years of social peace' and reduced rights for the working population.
In other words, the context is one of a strengthened regime, and weakness of the democratic and progressive camp.
This reform only incorporates two, quite minor points from the memorandum of the Democratic Bloc from March 1996, reducing the period of each parliament from six to five years, and placing the High Council for Accounts within the constitutional ambit.
The regime organised a referendum on this new constitution as a result of external pressures, and also because of the economic, social and political blockage in Morocco. The only way out seems to be the "democratisation" of the regime.
Of course, the new constitution doesn't stipulate a real separation of powers. And parliament remains a formal institution. The parties of the democratic bloc had demanded that parliament be elected directly, and that the King no longer have the right to appoint one third of deputies. Under this reform, parliament will have a directly elected Chamber of Representatives, and an indirectly elected Chamber of Counsellors. Both chambers will have the same prerogatives. So even if we had democratic elections, even if the democratic opposition wins a majority, and even if we are allowed to form a government, the Chamber of Counsellors will be able to dissolve the government! Mnebi Aziz: The regime is trying to rearrange the nature of the monarchical rule. with one eye on the day when Hassan II will 28 International Viewpoint no longer be king. The monarch is determined to reinforce the institutions of monarchy, to protect the system against challenges when he departs.
The new constitution has no juridical value, and represents nothing new. It is yet another measure which concentrates legislative, executive and administrative power in the hands of the monarchy. The king remains the centre of political power in Morocco. Neither the parliament, nor even the Chamber of Counsellors will have any real power to take decisions. Both chambers in the new parliament will just be sounding boards for the choices and policies which Hassan Il chooses to put forward. The opposition response Abdel Baki Yussi: This was the first time since 1962 that the parties of the democratic bloc voted in favour of one of the monarchy's constitutional re-shuffles. This made the referendum a kind of plebiscite in favour of the regime. This will provoke a crisis for the radical left, which was convinced that the democratic bloc could hardly approve a constitution which did not respond at all to the memorandum on constitutional reform which the democratic parties had proposed in March 1997, to the obvious dis-interest of
The radical left boycotted the referendum. This is a step forward, towards the construction of an alliance, or some kind of framework where the various radical forces can struggle together for a constituent assembly, for a new dynamism in the trade unions, and in the human rights movement, women's associations, and unemployed groups.
We organised a common declaration calling for the boycott, supported by common meetings and common leaflets. The regime claims an 83% participation rate, with 99.56% of voters approving the new constitution. But we know that the abstention rate was significant in the larger towns, like Tangiers, Fes and Casablanca. Mnebi Aziz: The real participation rate cannot have been higher than the 60% of registered voters who participated in the 1993
The dilemma for the regime is that it needs the support of the democratic bloc in order to legitimise its reforms. But the parliamentary opposition is so weak that it cannot even defend the interests of the regime in the face of popular frustration. This makes the opposition unsuitable as a guardian of social peace for Hassan II.
At the same time, the opposition can hardly stop supporting the regime, and "go over" to the people. This would mean calling into question their policies and practice since the mid 1960s!
Some leaders of the democratic forces have material interests which prevent them from breaking from the regime bloc. Nevertheless, a part of the base of these parties is clearly opposed to their leaders' policies.
The role of revolutionary and radical democratic forces is to win over this base, by offering perspectives for action which are not just "political", but have something to say about the social, trade union, feminist and cultural aspects of struggle. The challenge is to build a unified democratic movement which will be able to create links between the various fields of action. Abdel Baki Yussi: Before the referendum campaign started, our current, Democratic Way, was present in the various associations. the trade unions, the Amazigh (Berber cultural) movement, the women's and unemployed movements. The boycott campaign was not an isolated incident, but the crowning element in a longer process. The important thing about the referendum campaign is that it created two currents, across and within the political parties: for or against participation in the referendum. For example, the youth section of the USFP called on the party to vote against the new constitution. The divergence between these two currents even led to a split in the OAS, with a majority of comrades opposed to participation.
• The fact that the larger parties were
polarised over this question made it possible to organise, in Tangiers and Casablanca, meetings between the USFP, PAGS, the Moroccan Human Rights Association (AMDH), the Amazigh (Berber) Association, the unemployed movement, and ourselves, Democratic Way. These meetings produced a common declaration calling for a boycott, which was distributed in the streets in large numbers.
The campaign for a boycott was short— from August 20th until the vote on 13th September. But we will have more time to prepare the boycott of the next municipal and parliamentary elections.
Not that we should limit ourselves to electoral politics. The goal is the construction of a wide front, which can integrate all the radical forces, and be able to struggle against the regime, taking up the struggles of the exploited classes, the workers, the poor and the unemployed, with the perspective of creating a modern, democratic state. Mnebi Aziz: We also need to consolidate the work of the radical democratic militants in the trade unions. How to unify the working class? One way is to reinforce the trade union struggles of the two major confederations, the Democratic Labour Confederation (CDT) and the General Union of Workers of Morocco (UGTM), and even in the confederation linked to the nationalist, democratic party, Istiqlal.
We need to take up the most basic demands of the Moroccan people. More than 11 million people live below the poverty threshold. This is unacceptable. We need to mobilise alongside these people to bring them out of poverty, to put an end to their humiliation by a regime which has approprated the best land, oppresses the people who have the right to that land, and deprives them of all forms of dignity and sovereignty.
Today, the regime is weak, which allows the democratic movement to put forward more radical slogans than in the past. The manoeuvre round the referendum is proof of this weakness. The role of the radical democratic current is to take up the various struggle which exist. The radical democratic current is the central element in the democratic struggle today. We need to consolidate and reinforce trade union work, and try to make this work converge with the other social movements, like the feminist, Berber and unemployed movements. This is the only way towards the building of a revolutionary party. Fundamentalists Mnebi Aziz: The fundamentalists are a real danger nowadays. Particularly because the radical democratic movement is unable to occupy the centre-stage of social unrest, in a context where suffering and drama is the daily lot of the population. Having said this. the history and the positions of the Moroccan Islamic fundamentalist movement shows that this current is only a puppet in the hands of the regime, Arab reactionaries abroad, and imperialism, particularly the USA.
These currents aren't struggling against the regime. Their main contradiction is not with the regime, but with the democratic movement. Just look at their position on essential questions like democracy and women. One day, these fundamentalist movements could pay a role of breaking up the democratic movement. That is how they tried to develop at the beginning of the 1990s, until the strength of the countermobilisation pushed them back.
The only way to fight this current is through a philosophical, cultural and political struggle, particularly aimed at the poorer quarters where the fundamentalist current is strongest. At the same time, we have to support their right to express themselves, including the liberation of their political prisoners, even those who we suspect of having organised violent attacks against democratic militants. Abdel Baki Yussi: It is the poverty here in Morocco which has helped the fundamentalist movement to grow. Poverty caused an increase in prostitution, and in the number of homeless people. This is a fertile context for the propagation of fundamentalist ideas, particularly when these currents have financial support from Saudi Arabia and dodgy business ventures here in Morocco.
The radical left has always denounced the obscurantist ideas of the fundamentalists as a matter of principle. But the larger political parties, the USFP, Istiglal and OAS, have tended to make conciliatory statements. Although the USFP took a different line when the fundamentalists physically prevented them from holding public meetings at Casablanca University.
What is worse, these parties keep on making solemn declarations about the need for the regime to lift the restrictions on Sheik Abdelsallem Yassin [a fundamentalist leader under house arrest]. This is a man who campaigns actively against democracy. In his book An interview with eminent democrats, Yassin explicitly rejects democracy as an option for Morocco. When his house-arrest was last lifted (for two days), he used his liberty to make a public statement that all the democratic parties are only opportunist groups, in the pay of the regime, and, therefore, they should be fought against.
We have a range of fundamentalist currents in Morocco, but they share the most reactionary ideas, and seem to want to take the country back in time 14 centuries, beyond the renaissance.
The fundamentalists didn't take a position on the constitutional referendum. Their policy is to avoid taking positions concerning the regime. Instead, they concentrate on building up their organisations. They are present in the universities, and some of the trade unions. They also do charity work in the poorer districts. This obviously brings them popularity, and a certain credibility. * Notes Interviewed by Sonia Leith For more information about the radical left current which animates Democratic Way newspaper, see international Viewpoint #270 and #271 1. France's Moroccan possessions became independent in 1956. A Spanish-occupied zone in the north of the country was attached later. Ceuta and Melilla, two towns on Morocco's Mediterranean coast, are still under Spanish occupation. 2. This is true for the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), the Progress and Socialism Party (PPS, ex-Communist and the Organisation of Democratic and Popular Action (OADP) 3. Including Democratic Way, Socialist Avant-Guard Party (PAGS), and the opposition current in the OADP (formed when part of the ex-Maoist 23 March group became legal). 4. From an electoral register of 12.3 million voters.
January 1997 #284 29