How Alemán stole the election
Sympathizers of the Nicaraguan revolution were divided in their opinions about the politics of the 1996 election campaign. Did Daniel Ortega's campaign for presidency represent a creative response to the extremely difficult situation the Nicaraguan people face after six years of neoliberalism or did the FSLN abandon the revolutionary project in favor of a glitzy, personalistic and pro- capitalism one? Outside the context of a real discussion of what actually happened during the campaign and on the day of the October 20th election-all of which has been grossly underreported-this is a sterile debate. Dianne Feeley On November 22nd, more than a month after the Nicaraguan elections, Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) president Rosa Marina Zelaya announced after "extensive review and investigation" of charges of fraud that the October 20 elections were "perfectly valid, clean and legitimate." She acknowledged minor fraud but said it was confined to a few precincts and a few individuals.
The CSE thus rejected the demand of the Sandinista Front (FSLN) that the election be annulled in Managua as well as a second challenge by ten parties (including the FSLN) that the election in Matagalpa be invalidated. Zelaya stated that the major problem was not fraud but differing interpretations of the electoral law. The CSE then proclaimed Arnoldo Alemán, the candidate of the right-wing Liberal Alliance (AL), president elect (with 51% of the vote to Daniel Ortega's 37.7%). He will take office on January 10.
Of the 93 members elected to the National Assembly, 42 were elected on the Liberal Alliance ticket and 36 are Sandinista Front candidates. Nine other parties/ coalitions have the other 15 seats, including 4 for the Nicaraguan Christian Way Party, 3 for the Conservative Party, 2 for the National Project, and one each for the Liberal Independent Party, National Conservative Alliance, Nicaraguan Resistance Party, Sandinista Renovation Movement, Unity Alliance and UNO *96 Alliance. Since the election, however, two National Assembly members elected on the AL ticket (an alliance of three right-wing parties) have resigned from the AL. Members of the National Liberal Party, they accuse Alemán of unilateral decision- making. The CSE Organizes the Election
As defined by the 1987 Constitution, the CSE is actually a fourth branch of government, enjoying an independent and equal status with the judiciary, the legislative and the executive branches. And until now the CSE has enjoyed the reputation as the one branch most free of partisan politics and unblemished by scandals.
In February 1996 Mariano Fiallos resigned as president of the CSE, stating that he could not guarantee clean elections. He felt that the new election law opened the door to partisan influence (with political parties nominating officials for the various Departmental Electoral Councils) and he was also concerned about the inadequate funding and governmental attention given the difficult process of voter registration.
In addition to the lack of funding, there was very little time to organize the election process (registration of voters, issuing new voter identification cards, registration of candidates and electoral coalitions, organizing and staffing polling stations). For example, the CSE based its estimates for ID cards and polling stations on the most recent censuswhich, as it turns out, vastly undercounted the population. At every stage in the election process the CSE was faced with more
But since Fiallos' replacement by Zelaya, the CSE has come under suspicion:
Nicaragua • Presidencies of the departmental regions seemed to be unjustly awarded. Last August the FSLN protested that the Liberal Alliance ended up with being awarded the lion's share. The AL was appointed Departmental Electoral Council presidencies in areas such as Managua, Jinotega and Matagalpawhere 42% of the population lives- -while the FSLN was awarded presidencies in regions representing only 14% of the • The company that submitted the highest bid received by the CSE to print the ballots was given the job. (The rumor is that Zelaya's husband Jorge Samper owned stock in that • In the October 20 election the Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) won one seat in the National Assembly from Carazo. However, in its November 22nd statement on the elections, the CSE claimed an irregularity in that race—without providing any evidenceand took the seat from the winner, MRS member Adolfo Arguello, and without explaining why, assigned it to Jorge Samper, an MRS member and Zelaya's husband. • The CSE's"fraud-proof" system was contaminated. After the polls were closed and before proceeding to the count, officials in each polling station were to reconcile the unused and used ballot papers. Each step was to be documented. When the final figures were ready, the figures were to be sent to the local CSE by telegram, phone or fax so that the overall results could be compiled. The original documents were then to be taken to the local CSE for verification.
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The main mechanism for fraud was through the officials using their authority to doctor the provisional results sent to the CSE. Interestingly enough, the CSE instructed international observers not to remain at the polling stations for the counting of the votes or the delivery of the tallies to the departmental CSE offices.
But when the FSLN began to detect discrepancies between the provisional figures and what their poll watches reported, Ortega urged the CSE to use the official tally sheets rather than the provisional figures. However the CSE continued to release provisional figures and the right wing proclaimed quick victory. Yet the provisional figures were obviously wrong. For example, one polling place in Jinotega reported that the Liberal Alliance received 1,085 votes. The electoral law states that no more than 400 can vote at any polling place. When the provisional figure is compared with the vote tally, there were 233 valid votes cast! According to a Nov. 4 FSLN statement, 853 provisional "telegrams" were altered in this way.
Poll watchers for eight parties, including the FSLN. submitted a request to annul the elections in Matagalpa, reporting that there were no final tallies for 132 polling places. 314 tallies were written in pencil and showed signs of erasure, 137 tallies showed a larger number of votes than registered voters, 593 tallies had altered data, 88 polling places were not in authorized locations and 280 polling places were not legally constituted. 72% of the departmental polling places registered some irregularity.
A report submitted by the majority of the Managua Departmental Electoral Council describes the election as "chaotic," and outlines a wide variety of irregularities. It cites that the results from over 200 electoral booths, representing more than 50,000 votes, have disappeared, points out that thousands of tally sheets were lost or calculated incorrectly, and documents that security codes and verification signatures on the ballot papers where not identical to those on the tally sheets for the same polling booth. The FSLN has calculated that 84% of the Managua polling stations had "grave irregularities."
The Sandinista Assembly pointed out that the greatest number of irregularities occurred in those departments where the Liberal Alliance was in charge: Managua, Matagalpa and Jinotega. In both Matagalpa and Jinotega armed bands have campaigned in favor of the Liberal Alliance and prevented other parties from campaigning. At least seven members of the FSLN were brutally killed in these regions during October and November: On November 8th, the twentieth anniversary of FLN founder Carlos Fonseca's murder, thirty thousand Nicaraguans gathered at his tomb to protest the electoral fraud
Was the fraud significant enough to alter 10 International Viewpoint the results? Clearly it was enough to hand victories to the Liberal Alliance in races for mayor of Managua and Matagalpa as well as some National Assembly seats. It also may have been enough to give Alemán a victory on the first round (a candidate had to win more than 45% of the vote on the first round to avoid a runoff). Why Was It Necessary for Alemán to Steal the Elections?
At the beginning of the 1996 electoral campaign thirty-two political parties, some grouped into coalitions, registered presidential candidates. By August nine had withdrawn or been declared ineligible. (The CSE ruled Antonio Lacayo off the ballot on the basis of a constitutional article barring relatives of the incumbent president from running, while Eden Pastora and Alvaro Robelo were barred because both had given up their Nicaraguan citizenship at one time.) No "center" force had been hobbled together to compete with Alemán and Ortega.
More importantly, by August opinion polls revealed that Ortega's FSLN ticket was gaining while Alemán's support was stagnating. CID- Gallup poll's June survey pinpointed Ortega's support at 26%, but by early August it had risen to 30%. By the end of August Alemán and Ortega were running neck-and-neck. In Managua, for example, the difference between Ortega (33.8%) and Alemán (34.4%) was 0.6%. Carlos Denton, a director of CID-Gallup, commented that "the
Summary of the
Minimum Agenda
• A national agreement to ensure
•An all-out fight against corruption, and a commitment to integrity, openness, and the responsible execution of duties by public
• Guarantees of personal safety; legal measures to reduce people's desperation and detenselessness and promote democratic development, regardless of ideologies or parties.
•Stimulation of production through the promotion of coherent and efficient policies which encourage production. A fair solution to the property problem, guaranteeing future security.
•A better standard of living for all
Nicaraguans.
• An emphasis on training, science and
• The preservation of the environment and improved management of natural
• A national emergency program to fight against poverty, generate productive jobs, and provide relief for children.
• A guarantee of citizens' participation.
pro- FSLN vote is highest among people who feel that they are in a worse economic situation now than in the past."
I would suggest that as the polls revealed Alemán's majority beginning to fall, Aleman felt it was necessary to do what was necessary to win in the first round. The extent to which the U.S. government and members of the CSE were involved in the fraud is not clear, but it will be impossible to sweep the evidence under the rug no matter what the CSE has declared.
On August 13 several political analysts declared that "Alemán lost the elections yesterday." Why did they come to such a
On the afternoon of August 12 every presidential candidate except Alemán signed a document entitled the "Commitment of Nicaragua to a Minimum National Agenda" in the presence of representatives from all four branches of state, including Vice President Julia Mena. The document is an assessment of the country's situation and sets general priorities and solutions. It represents a months' long discussion by over 150 organizations (unions, producers' associations, religious and women's organizations, etc.) and attempts to press political leaders into drawing up their governmental plans within the context of this assessment.
Alemán's justified his conspicuous absence by saying "I already have my own agenda. I'm not a lamb that travels in a flock... That's a Sandinista document since its creator is [former economic minister Alejandro] Martínez Cuenca, who destroyed this country's economy and should be brought to justice for it." And "no one should come dictating to any serious party what procedure it should follow in its government plan." Deprecating the minimum agenda, Alemán changed the tone of his campaign, becoming, in the words of envio, "both more aggressive and more defensive. Alemán's speeches have become a mix of challenging triumphalism and desperate warnings not to trust Sandinismo." The Liberal Alliance's Constituency
Alemán's electoral base was composed of three separate, even contradictory, elements: • The visceral anti-Sandinista forces who want to wipe out all vestiges of the revolution-from its land reform, organizations, institutions and laws to names, people, dates, murals. • The small and medium rural and urban producers, middle-class merchants, technicians and professionals who have been made poorer over the last six years and sidelined by the Chamorro-Lacayo economic policies and their cronyism and corruption. • The marginalized urban and rural poor who see Alemán as someone who gets things done, who guarantees heavy-handed law and order, who is hard-working and always out there hustling. His crudeness also works for him: he seems to have some passion and therefore represents the polar extreme from the neoliberal technocrats.
Of these three elements, the anti-Sandinista component is the strongest, and therefore can work to undermine his appeal to the others. The large capital that supported the Liberal Alliance reinforces this element: the Somocista and Cuban exiles living in Miami along with some non-Somocista capitalists whose property was confiscated during the revolution. The best known and most representative figure of the latter is Alemán's vice presidential mate, Enrique "Churruco" Bolanos. While all of these elements are heavily anti-Sandinista, those who stayed in Nicaragua during the "80s have investments in the agricultural sector while the other, larger force is speculative capital. Obviously small producers are left out. In fact, although Alemán has portrayed himself as an opponent of the Chamorro economic policies, an Alemán government will represent a continuity of neoliberal policies. The FSLN Builds Alliances
The Sandinista Assembly had stipulated that the vice-presidential slot was to be reserved for an alliance with a political sector outside the party. Yet when Juan Manuel Caldera accepted that slot, it was a surprise. Caldera is a large-scale cattle rancher whose land had been confiscated in the '80s and has long been a member of the High Council for Private Enterprise (COSEP), a group of big businessmen who opposed the Sandinista government.
Caldera explained to reporters that he accepted the FLN vice- presidential slot because "we believe that if we can get this country to start producing again, we can save it," and stated that the Alemán forces "don't believe in production."
The FSLN's fifteen-point electoral program outlined how to rebuild the economy "with social justice." It also emphasized prioritizing health, education, housing and developing a program to provide electricity to rural communities and urban squatter neighborhoods. The platform represents a radical, producer-centered alternative to the neoliberal agenda that has been implemented under the Chamorro government. The platform recognizes the particular need for women's rights, labor rights and the continued development of autonomy for the Caribbean coast communities. The FSLN also pledged that there would be no reinstatement of military conscription, that they would work to solve the property problem by legalizing all urban and rural properties legitimately redistributed during the '80s with compensation and no further confiscations. The platform advocates pan-Americanism and demands that Cuba be included in continental affairs. The full program, in English and Spanish, is available at http://spin.com.mx./hvelarde/nicaragua/fsin/ the FSLN Internet site.
Throughout the campaign the FSLN canNicaragua at a glance Population: 4.2 million, 50% under 18 years old • life expectancy: 66.7 years • infant mortality 52o • Illiteracy 34.3% • secondary school attendance 54.5% • doctors: 0.56 doctors per 1,000 people. Development: 117th among the 174 countries on the UNDP Human Development index • 22% of the urban population and 62% of rural people lack access to running water. Economy: GDP per capita $ 1,850 • inflation 11% (11,000% in 1990) • unemployment 53% (44% in 1990) • Imports (1995) $949 m., exports: $525 m. (50% less than in 1987) • Source of imports (1994): Latin America 51%, USA 25%, EU 7% • Destination of exports (1994): USA 26%, EU 24%. Latin America 18% • Major imports: consumer goods, machinery, petrochemicals • Major exports: coffee, cotton, sugar, bananas, meat, seafood, gold Foreign debt $8 bn. including $3 m. of Russian debt which may be cancelled • Between 1990 and 1995, $1.45 bn, of a total $3.9 bn. of foreign aid was used for debt repayments. Source: La Croix, 18 October 1996
Nicaragua * didates saw the need to reach out beyond its activist base. It sought to do that by actively seeking unity with other political forces, particularly in attempting to pose an economic alternative to neoliberalism. That was the basis of the FSLN signing onto the minimum agenda August 12. On August 28 the FSLN signed an agreement with representatives of youth organizations (50,000 productive jobs created for youth, to establish a 25% quota for hiring young people in municipal and national government structures, to have young people head vice ministries of education, social action, environment and the Institute of Culture and Women, no reinstitution of a draft).
On September 18 the FSLN even signed an agreement with former contra leaders "El Indio" and "Mack," in front of 5,000 former contras, who then added their individual signatures. While Arnoldo Alemán's forces attempted to play down this alliance, MRS's Sergio Ramírez denounced the pact for including "Mack," who was noted for his particularly brutal killing of FSLN soldiers and supporters. But the point is that you don't need to make pacts with your friends, only
The September 18th agreement formulates a plan to disband existing armed groups, pledges to honor the 1990 agreements that the Chamorro government never carried out and guarantees stable property ownership by issuing land titles and access to credit under conditions that permit the recipients active incorporation into production. Landowners whose properties were unjustly confiscated will be appropriately compensated." Had the FSLN won, this section of the Nicaraguan Resistance, in supporting the FSLN slate, would have received three ministries (Ministries of Government, of Agrarian Reform, of Natural Resources and the Environment) and would have had "ample participation in all governmental institutions and autonomous organizations at all levels (national, regional and departmental), as guarantors and proponents of the country's economic development."
It was the building of this triple alliance-the FSLN, agricultural producers and the former contras-that made the FSLN so dynamic a political force in the 1996 elections. Their closing electoral rally brought out 300,000 people-far more than anticipated. Conclusion
There are three conclusions to draw from the elections, electoral challenges and response from the Supreme Electoral Council:
1. The widespread accusations of fraud, documented by official reports and a number of the country's political parties, were not seriously reviewed and resolved by the CSE. This damages the reputation of the CSE, which, until recently, was unblemished. It is thus a big blow to representative democracy in Nicaragua.
2. The FSLN played an exemplary role in challenging the elections, reinforcing their
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