Hebron The disastrous settlement Why can't Israel and the Palestinian Authority agree on a redeployment of the Israeli troops occupying Hebron? After all, Arafat accepts that Israel will intervene whenever it wants. Tikva Honig-Parnass The main disputed point between Netanyahu and Arafat concerns the right of Israeli troops to enter the area of Hebron under Palestinian rule - both to chase and arrest those suspected of committing military operations, and carryimg-out preventitive arrests.
Israel insisted on an explicit, written acknowledgement of this right of so-called hot pursuit and 'cold pursuit' from Arafat, and he agreed. However, in order to maintain the facade of steadfastness he needs to present his people, he asked that the written document state that the entry of Israeli troops into Arab Hebron be permitted only in 'excep-
In practice, this would not prevent the entry of Israeli troops in even a single instance, because it is understood that Israel will be the sole judge of what is to be considered "exceptional'. In addition, the Palestinians demanded that Netanyahu state in writing the target dates for the three additional redeployments in the West Bank mandated under the Taba Interim Agreement (the first of which should have been carried out this September) and the freeing of about 20 women political prisoners (but not the 5,000 male political prisoners that are still being held in Israeli Likud support for Hebron agreement
The return to the original Hebron agreement is also a return to the good old Oslo Accords', which are so ideal for Israel. The claim by the Palestinians and of the Labor Party that Israel's right to enter Arab Hebron and indeed all the cities under Palestinian rule is fully inherent in the Oslo Accords was finally confirmed by Netanyahu. Thus, when he suddenly discovered it in the last week of November, he agreed that instead of mentioning this right explicitly in the new agreement, there would be a reference to the provisions of the Interim Agreement which place the over-all responsibility for the security of Israelis living in the occupied territories in the hands of Israel, and explicitly gives it all the authority needed to fulfill this responsibility, including the right to enter the autonomy areas and to arrest people suspected of committing or planning military operations.?
Of course, the Palestinians are inclined to accept the Israeli proposal. The Prime Minister's office announced that at the 26 November negotiating session, the Pales-
La won sis "butil erd le NETANYAHU'S PATENT PEACE PROCESSOR tinians stated that they would consent to give the Israeli army freedom of action in Hebron on condition that this not be explicitly mentioned in the agreement in order "not to make problems [for us] with our public."
The long months in which Netanyahu dragged out the Hebron negotiations allowed him to present himself to the far right-wing of the governing coalition, and the extremists among the settlers, as a man determined not only to provide for the settlers' security, but also to save the State of Israel and the entire Jewish people. He needed these months of delay in order to paint the redeployment in the colors of national security, as if he had achieved more in this regard than Peres.
In this way he hoped to soften the opposition to the redeployment from Hebron, and to guarantee the necessary majority within his own government to implement the Hebron agreement. For this purpose, Netanyahu repeatedly promised to thicken settlements, repeatedly attacked the Oslo Accords for their 'neglect of Israel's security needs, and even paralyzed the whole country for two whole days in the first week of November, because of intelligence service warnings about an Islamic Jihad plan to explode a carbomb in one of Israel's cities. Because of the many roadblocks, central Israel's highways became the site of one tremendous traffic jam, work-days were squandered and the economy suffered huge losses.
And indeed, Netanyahu managed to accomplish what he set out to do. The moderate camp of the National Religious Party is growing stronger and stronger. On 24 November, that party's political bureau, including a number of leaders known for their hawkishness and close affiliation to the most extreme settlers accepted the 'moderates"
ai doids notizag dostl sil si baskel set ban vodel dace feas proposal decision: to support the Hebron agreement, while seemingly conditioning their acceptance on "preserving the security of the Jewish community in Hebron, allowing the conditions to develop it and keeping responsibility for security in all of Hebron in the hands of the IDF
Even Rabbi Moshe Levinger, the first Jewish settler in Hebron, self-confessed murderer of a Palestinian merchant and inciter to pogroms against Palestinians, expressed his support for a Hebron agreement, on the grounds of "preserving the unity of the [Jewish] people, and prohibition of fighting against the majority of the people". And it is indeed true that 80% of Israelis support this agreement - almost all of the 50% who voted for Peres, plus about 60% of the 50% who voted for Netanyahu.
Many of the supporters of the Hebron Agreement are mislead to believe that it will lead to a solution of co-existance between the 400 violent settlers - who have been left in the heart of the town - and the 120,000 Hebronites. Only few military commanders have dared to say the truth, namely that it is a 'time-bomb' solution. Beilin-Abu Mazen Plan
Broad support for the Hebron agreement reflects broad support for the Oslo Accords, and signals that in the future a considerable portion of Likud voters will support Netanyahu in whatever agreements he signs with the Palestinians, including an agreement allowing for the establishment of some kind of Palestinian entity with symbolic tokens of sovereignty.
This magazine has repeatedly explained the nature of the final settlement which is becoming more and more acceptable to the
January 1997#284 25
"Israel agreed to give up the demand for hot and cold pursuit after Yoel Zinger, the previous government's legal adviser to the negotiations, explained that... the stronger partner in the negotiations [Israel] precisely should prefer vague statements, and then in cases of contradictory interpretation, the stronger partner will implement his interpretations on the ground' " - D. Rubenstein, Ha'aretz, 2 December 1996
* Israel majority of the leadership of the Likud; the cynicism in the Israeli position, which is shared by both Labor and the Likud, and the readiness of most "peace-seekers' in Israel and the international community to accept the planned final settlement. Amir Oren, writing in Ha'aretz (22 Nov. 1996) reported Netanyahu saying that he rejects the opinion of those who think that it would be best to be content with that part of Oslo which has already been carried out. On the contrary, he is striving for the solution according to which 80% of the 67 occupied territories will remain under Israeli sovereignty or at least under its control'. Netanyahu's aide, Dori Gold, revealed a few of the methods by which Israel plans to keep control of these territories in its own hands: "the term "military areas" [which Israel will hold on to throughout the interim period, and presumably in the final settlement as well] can be given a broad interpretation. Israel, for example, can define all the highways and traffic arteries leading to the settlements as military areas; it stands also to reason that somebody has to protect the flow of traffic along these roads, and it is obvious that only the IDF can do that. And what about the hills to the sides of the roads? And what about the air space between them?*s
It is not surprising, then, that the "80% plan" is acceptable to the harder Right forces in the government, like Justice Minister Tzahi Hanegbi, as well. This Hanegbi is the same man who not so long ago shut off the microphones when Rabin spoke before a mass rally organized by the Labor Party; this is the man who that same year said: *I would have put Jericho under curfew - no one could get in and no one could get out. Not a pregnant woman and not a child who needs chemotherapy". This person, who is quite close to Netanyahu, declared at the beginning of this month: "1 am certainly ready to learn from the experience of 1994-96, and not bury my head in the sand like an ostrich in the presence of the new developments... I am prepared to restrain my emotional reaction to the PLO and to give an arrangement a chance to emerge". He even addressed the Palestinians in front of the Knesset and assured them: "there is much to talk about" including "symbols of sovereignty such as passports, stamps and coins".
The force which paved the way for this 'moderation' were the Labor Party 'doves' who spawned the Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement, which permitted around 80% of the territories of the occupied territories and the majority of the settlers to remain under Israeli sovereigny, and which provides that the village of Abu-Dis will be the capital of the Palestinian state-to-be. This plan, which, ac26 International Viewpoint cording to press reports, "all the top leaders of the Likud' are now studying', can indeed serve as a basis for the establishment of a national unity government with the Labor Party. Likud leaders are now talking with Beilin and other Labor leaders about an alliance, with Netanyahu's blessing. Most of the top Likud leaders would seem to be interested in such a prospect - including Justice Minister Meridor and MK Uzi Landau, (Chair of the Knesset's Foreign Relations and Security Committee, and have publicly stated their support for a national unity government. In Netanyahu's own words, he needs the support of the Labor Party, in both *foreign policy and in dealing with the economic situation' - against the extreme rightwing of his own government, as well as against the far Right forces outside it. Otherwise he will not be able to implement the Beilin-Abu Mazen version of the final settlement. Similarly, he needs the support of the Labor Party in order to push through budget cuts totalling seven billion dollars, which will utterly destroy the vestiges of the welfare state. He plans to slash allocations for education and housing, as well as subsidies to children and the elderly. These proposed cuts violate the proclaimed coalition guidelines, and could bring the government down. Two parties who profess to represent distressed sectors, the Russian immigrants' party, Yisrael b'Aliya, and David Levy's Gesher, with pretentions to speak for the under-privileged Mizrahi neighborhoods, could leave the coalition over economic The 'unholy alliance'
Netanyahu might distance himself from
'legitimize' himself and win the cooperation of the Labor Party in jointly implementing the Oslo plan. One should not forget that Peres would not have been able to carry out the plan without rightwing support. Thus, it is possible that the wide consensus around the Hebron agreement reflects a broad new Israeli consensus that has recently crystallized in favor of the Palestinian surrender agreement concerning the final settlement, ending with an apartheid state in all of historic Palestine. The journalist Haim Baram is correct in pronouncing this growing national unity "an alliance between the bourgeoisie, clericalism, and militarism, somewhat reminiscent of the coalition which brought Franco to power in
A decision handed down by the High Court in the last week of November, is like writing on the wall, reflecting this alliance so necessary to the establishment of the full apartheid state, including in Israel proper itself. On 25 November, the Court approved the law, passed by a majority of the Knesset, prohibiting the import of non-kosher meat. With crocodile tears, the court proclaimed that it was forced to give priority to the principle of majority rule over the right of free enterprise. According to the well-known progressive jurist Moshe Negbi: "the constitutional revolution in Israel [the reference is to two basic laws passed by the Knesset in recent years, the Law for the Protection of Human Dignity and Freedom and the Law for the Protection of Free Enterprise - both intended to serve as a quasi-constitutional 'bill of rights'] was defeated today; this judgment put the nail in its coffin and dealt a blow to democracy here". Moreover, Supreme Court President Barak himself once wrote: "a regime in which the majority can deprive the minority of its basic rights is not a democracy". But this decision, Negbi believes, "gives a green light to the Knesset to pass laws humiliating Arabs - if at least 61 Knesset Members vote for it"
The continuation of the discussion revealed the real internal contradictions which beset even a democratic jurist as Negbi. In answer to the question of another panelist: "Isn't this a Jewish state according to our Declaration of Independence?" Negbi the Zionist did not challenge the Jewishness of the state, only the religious concept of what is Jewish, and added: [True, this is a Jewish state], "but the question is, in what sense: national or religious?"
Given their ideological blinders, even for Zionists who genuinely believe in a Jewish secular and democratic society, it is difficult to offer any real opposition to this unholy alliance between clericalism, militarism and the bourgeoisie - which is leading to not only further repression of Palestinians, but of Jews 1 Within the territory under the security responsibility of the [Palestinian] Council, in places where Israeli authorities exercise their security functions in accordance with this Annex and in their immediate vicinities, the Israeli authorities may carry out engagement steps in cases where an act or incidence requires such action. In such cases, the Israeli authorities will take any measures necessary to bring to an end such an act or incident with a view to transferring, at the earliest opportunity, the continued handling of the incident falling within the Palestinian responsibility to the Palestinian Police. The Palestinian Police will immediately be notified, through the relevant DCO, of such engagement steps.' (September 1995 Interim Agreement, Annex 1, Article 11(3)(b) The Agreement defines engagement as an immediate response to an act or an incident constituting a danger to life or property that is aimed at preventing or terminating such an act or incident, or apprehending its perpetrators." 2. Akiva Eldar, Yediot Aharanot 21 November 1996. 4. Yediot Aharanot, 22 November 1996. 5. Akiva Eldar, Yediot Aharanot, 31 October 1996. 6. Kol Ha'ir, 22 November 1996.