Our party should be different
* Brazil Last year's municipal and state election results were a mixed bag for the Workers Party (PT). Joaquim Soriano and Carlos Henrique Arabe explain why. Last November the PT fought second-round contests in eleven important mayoral elections. We won in Belem and Caixas. Elsewhere we lost by 3-7%' Except in São Paulo, where the right-wing candidate won by 20%.
The PT won 3.15 million votes in these 11 run-offs, attracting more city-dwellers votes than any other party. Paulo Maluf's
Brazilian Peoples Party (PPB) won 4.65 m. votes, 3.17 m. just in São Paulo. The Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) of President Cardoso was third, with 2.8 m. votes. Despite a good score in Rio de Janeiro and Belo Horizonte, the party did not make it into the second round. In São Paulo, the PT candidate spent her whole campaign distancing herself from the PT (see p. 9) and trying to build an alliance with President Cardoso's party.? In other words, in Brazil's three largest cities, the ones with most influence on national political behaviour, the PT was in a bad position from the start. The victories
We won the southern city of Porto Alegre in the first round (see page 9). This helped the PT win the nearby city of Caixas in a second round campaign centred on the record of the federal government and the state governor, a former leader of the parliamentary group of President Cardoso's party.
In Belem, capital of the northern state of Pará, the PT maintained its lead from the first round. PT candidate Emilson Rodrigues' victory was the result of a long involvement of the left of the PT in the local social movements, and a local tradition of opposition to the dominant classes and their political representatives. Former PT leader Lula da Silva won the municipal elections here back in 1994. Gains and losses
Even where the PT lost, some local campaigns nevertheless strengthened the party. In São Paulo, the opposite is true. The resounding defeat of a right-wing PT candidate is the culmination of a series of political and organisational defeats for the party. There will be no solution to the crisis in the local party until they re-think their strategy for building the party, and end their exclusive / 12 International Viewpoint orientation to electoral politics.
In some towns, our defeat was mainly due to the lack of local PT structures, weak leadership, and the lack of real national coordination of these election campaigns. An obsession with maximising our vote distracts the party from the main task of nurturing a social and political bloc which can accumulate force and experience though its daily struggle with the ruling classes, and win hegemony, in the struggle for power.
In many cities, the mere presence of the PT in the second round was a victory. The narrow margin which separated us from final victory proves the potential for the party in
Unfortunately, in many areas where the PT lacked the force to attract new voters, and present the party as a global alternative, support from sections of the right wing had a dangerously large influence. This support does not represent a genuine coalition, where the partners make commitments to a common programme. The essential dynamic in these elections was the deep division of the ruling class in the regions mentioned.
When they were asked to intervene in a local campaign (as in São Paulo) the PT's National Executive either evaded taking any responsibility, or supported mistaken local strategies. Particularly where the local party is dominated by supporters of the majority current in the National Executive.
We aren't saying that if only we had a leadership with real political capacities, and which could unite the party, we could solve all our problems. Nevertheless, the PT's factionalised National Executive clearly had limitted ability to organise a united campaign, and resist the attacks on the party.
The current leadership has permitted the formation of completely perverse electoral alliances, where the PT has effectively abandoned the struggle, and accepted the post of deputy-mayor to representatives of the PSDB, PMDB or PFL. Between the two rounds
The first round demonstrated the potential for an opposition to neo-liberalism in Brazil. The second round should have encouraged and continued this spirit of resistance. Our limited success shows that we failed to respond to the opposition potential of large sections of the population.
Little campaigns on local issues, or downplaying the PT's opposition to neoliberalism, reduce the potential for polarisation and politicisation to the absolute minimum. Publicity stunts, and the transformation of the local party into an electoral machine mean rocketing campaign costs. Our electoral practices are becoming more and more like those of the other parties.
These elections have shown, once again, that such a strategy cannot work for the PT. For us, it is the road to failure.
Between the first and second rounds, the old arguments in favour of a centre-left alliance (with President Cardoso's PSDB*) emerged.The results, particularly in São Paulo, speak for themselves.
Some PT members think that increasing the list of personalities and party leaders associated with a campaign is the same as increasing the number of votes for the candidate concerned. Under the influence of this illusion, the PT candidate in São Paulo was willing to pay almost any price, including renouncing the PT identity of the campaign.
The real issue, of course, is our party's capacity to reach out and attract the supporters of the other parties, not their leaders. The key to this is mobilising our own militants, and maximising the social and political polarisation during the campaign.
Not detaching oneself from the party, and adopting the programme of those who lost in the first round, in the hope of attracting their voters in round two. This demobilises our own supporters, without winning new voters! Those who argue for a centre-left coalition pay lip-service to the struggle against neoliberalism. But their real strategy is to make "constructive" criticism, in the hope of contributing to a correction of the worse excesses of the government's policies.
How can we oppose neo-liberalism in an alliance with the main instrument by which those policies are implemented, President Cardoso's own party?
For us, opposing neo-liberalism means blocking the political instrument of neoliberal strategy, the PSDB. Opposing neoliberalism means building an alternative, which keeps on its agenda the socialist perspective, and the political participation of the working people. It's a long process, and each step we take should be coherent with our long term goals. * Notes 1. 3% in Campo Grande, Maceio, Natal, Ribeirao Preto, Santos and Pelotas, and 7% in Aracaju and Florianopolis. 2. Replacing the PT red flag with the blue and yellow campaign colours used in the first round by PSB candidate José Serra, and including pictures of State Governor Covas (PSDB) and even President Cardoso in her TV publicity. The dissolution of the PT identity of her campaign was such that, after the results were announced, she blamed the weakness of the PSDB campaign as the main reason for her failure! 3. Natal, Maceio, Aracaju, Florianopolis, Campo Grande and Pelotas. 4. The PT was in favour of such an alliance, until the 8th National Meeting in 1993 reversed it, and Lula da Silva was selected as the party's candidate for the presidential elections.
US labor- review of 1996