COSATU restates its priorities
The Confederation of South African Trade Unions Draft Programme for the Alliance. reflects labour frustration with the ANC's cavalier attitude to the slow pace of delivery of promised reforms in housing, health, education and job-creation. The COSATU proposals, published in November 1996, are an attempt to resuscitate the pre-election line of the RDP - that the ANC governance should reflect the primacy of the party's working class base - a line designed to benefit the poor and marginalised as much as organised labour.
This document is a response to Prime Minister Thabo Mbeki's State and Social Transformation, in which the ANC attempted to convince its more left-wing partners (COSATU and the SACP) of the rationale behind the government's economic prog
The business press said COSATU was "seeking an Alliance Accord with ANC to commit government to an agreed programme of action. In exchange COSATU would bind itself to collective responsibility and provide resources to rebuild ANC structures and mobilise for the 1999 elections. Such collective responsibility would not necessarily imply acceptance of wage restraint or suspension of the right to strike, but did imply the imposition of certain limits". Such an Accord, the business press noted with relief, did not imply abandonment of tripartism nor negate the negotiation of agreements with business. (Business Day 27 November 1996)
The following extracts show the tone and main arguments of the document. State of the Alliance
Since 1994 meetings of the Alliance have been ad hoc, sporadic or crises meetings, and issues agreed have not been followed through. The Alliance never sat down to formulate a strategy or programme for engagement of the masses, who have remained spectators. Although large numbers of COSATU and Alliance activists have been deployed in parliament, government, public service, parastatals and private sector, no assessment of the impact of this for organis-
There is no clear political programme or yardstıck to guide or measure success. There has been general demobilisation of our people - activists are no longer sure what our strategic objectives are; ANC structures have no visible mass mobilisation program; actions by COSATU, students and [the civic movement] SANCO are seen by some as "counter-revolutionary". Alliance structures are weak or not functioning (this differs from area to area.
Our rich history of struggle has resulted in one of the most political and conscious mass movements rooted in a strongly organised working class and a strong tradition of an active progressive civil society - giving the progressive forces strategic leverage, the potentialities of which have to be harnessed to be realised. Failure to do so would be squandering the most important resource of the national democratic revolution and would lead to increased fragmentation and demoralisation. Balance of forces
After more than two years the power of the apartheid-era ruling class remains largely entrenched in the security forces, the media, the bureaucracy, and above all the commanding heights of the economy. The ANC is in office but how far have the democratic forces taken power? The RDP has been systematically undermined, government has been subjected to intense pressures, the logic contained in the RDP has been overpowered by forces attempting to halt the transformation. Obsession with perceived constraints and problems, giving in to the blackmail of reactionary forces, gives away our ability to determine the agenda of change.
"There is no iron law which says that the governing stratum will have to sell out, will have to become bureaucratised and embourgeoised". With the power of the masses as the main driving force we have always believed that our agenda, if properly followed, will emerge as the victor. But failure to act will result in the fledgling democracy becoming captive to backward forces - this has already begun. Policy has in many instances been driven by the old bureaucracy, business advisors, economists from the Reserve Bank, World Bank etc. Instead of mass mobilisation we have reduced mass involvement to appeals for payment of rent and services, and/or pleas to understand that we face 'major constraints'
Demobilisation and demoralisation has taken place, particularly of activists and leadership. The individual struggle for selfenrichment has begun to take hold. Equating the national democratic revolution with the creation of a "patriotic (black) bourgeoisie', *as a success of black economic empowerment' while the majority of blacks remain in poverty, is tantamount to robbing the national democratic revolution of its transformational
The lack of leadership from the democratic movement has begun to lead to disillusionment, depoliticisation and alienation from 'politics' amongst ordinary people "Just as ignoring the power of the forces of reaction constitutes triumphalism, removing
South Africa * the forces for change from the equation is surrender and defeatism" . Remove the masses and the power ot reactionary forces ecomes a self-fulfillins prophecy. Already, any serious attempt in the movement to challenge the remaining centres of apartheid power become characterised as 'opportunist, "adventurist", and ultimately "counter-revolutionary' Characterising the phase of struggle
We are faced with a peculiar situation similar to "dual power" , where the new democratic government neither has its hand decisively on all the tillers of state power, nor has it been able to strategically direct the economy based on our own agenda. Government seem to have been confined to limited
This is exacerbated by the constant attempt to reduce the sovereignty of government, and the constant onslaught by the financial markets to pressurise government to adopt the economic policies desired by them (blind adherence to privatisation, reduced budget deficit for its own sake, immediate removal of exchange controls and ultimately removing the state's role in the economy).
This sense of "dual power" helps to convey the strategic moment in which we find ourselves: the existence of a popular bloc, with its representatives in government, parliament and other institutions, pitted against a minority bloc attempting to use its access to economic and other power to abort the national democratic revolution, to preserve privileges acquired during years of apartheid.
"The debate is not about whether we are in the phase of completing the struggle for socialism or national democracy. The question is whether we are able to seriously enter into the task of beginning to decisively transform our country in a manner which will ensure the success of the national democratic COSATU sounds the alarm
This moment of transition can't last indefinitely. Either of the two forces or blocs will seize the initiative to lead and direct society. This poses a challenge to take our fate into our own hands. We need a political programme which is implementable, broadly supported, and able to achieve the social hegemony required to break this deadlock (or unstable equilibrium), and the political will and organisational ability to drive this programme.
Failure to implement our programme and failure to mobilise the people in defence of that programme, can see a powerful hege-
May 1997#288 23
* South Africa monic alternative disintegrate in a relatively short time. Re-galvanising the mass movement
Concentrating exclusively on the Alliance to drive the transformation process would be a serious error. We need a broad front of mass democratic movement forces. We need, as a basic necessity, to transform our mass organisations into a different type of vehicle than that used to destroy apartheid.
The reality is that we have totally failed as an Alliance to consolidate mass democratic movement organisations as a meaningful united force in society since the (1994) elections. Mass democratic forces are needed to help direct popular mobilisation which seem to be taking place outside our leadership - for example, land and housing movements, anti-crime activities ranging from community policing forums to vigilante activity, and isolated pockets of community street committees attempting to redress the real problems confronting residents.
Continuing fragmentation of the mass democratic movement forces, apart from weakening the power of the people's bloc, will also entrench the alienation of constituencies. The ANC and SANCO appeal to the same constituencies. The Alliance should help SANCO transform from a activist based organisation to a truly mass and representative civic movement, and consider whether SANCO should join the Alliance.
We need more engagement between COSATU and the SACP. COSATU's vision needs a revolutionary working class party to spearhead a working class programme. The SACP needs to explicitly outline how it sees the relationship between our commitment to the success of the national democratic revolution within a socialist vision.
In the absence of a shared strategic vision COSATU faces the danger of becoming increasingly reactive and defensive in its approach, the danger of isolation and retreat into narrow "economism'. Any attempt by COSATU to play the role of 'permanent opposition' would see the marginalisation of unions and the fragmentation of the democratic forces. This starkly poses the need for a A new strategy
Is the RDP realisable under today's conditions? Conditions have not change so fundamentally as to entail setting up 'a much less ambitious' programme. The RDP should remain the programme of the Alliance. For socialists within the Alliance the RDP was seen as a minimum programme. Has it now become the maximum programme?
What confronts us now is the need for a strategy for its implementation based on the identification of strategic core areas which can lay the basis, particularly in the socioeconomic sphere and in the transformation of the state institutions, for a qualitative movement forward for the complete implementation of the RDP. We need to seek agreement in the Alliance on concrete measures such as social security and the social wage (health, transport, pensions, etc.); job creation 24 International Viewpoint
(especially public works and investment); intervention in the financial markets; public housing and infrastructure; training; land reform: elements of trade and industrial policy; tax reform; and wage policy (especially reducing the wage gap).
The Government has produced GEAR. Are the two reconcilable? For example, commitment to the extension of a basic welfare net is sheer rhetoric if a program of deficit management involves a cut-back in existing, limited social security provision. If GEAR is unable to accommodate the most basic elements of the Alliance agenda it would
The locus of decision-making on key political issues has not been in the Alliance structures. Rather, this has tended to take place in individual Ministries, and the Alliance only engages with the product. Other forces have sometimes occupied this space, whether in the form of business advisors in Ministries, conservative economists, or the old bureaucracy. Ministries have been saddled with policies which are not acceptable within the Alliance, or do not appear to reflect the programme agreed upon. This is a recipe for ongoing conflict
The alternative is for the Alliance to reach an Accord or National Agreement on strategic issues as well as a program to implement these - so binding the Alliance forces to actively pursue this agenda and remove the impression that government is acting as a neutral referee, sitting above the other players in society. This would ensure that by going into NEDLAC [negotiations] with a 'joint mandate' a co-operative approach between government and labour was developed. It would decisively refute the view that COSATU has embarked on the role of unofficial opposition. This joint approach involves both collective decision making and collective responsibility. Another warning
Refusal to consider the option of an Alliance Pact (or a viable alternative) would be short-sighted. It would perpetuate a crisis environment which could foster an informal accord between business and government to stabilise the situation. If government continued to play a mediating role between business and labour it would marginalise the democratic forces and reduce us to fighting defensive battles on all fronts. It would lead to the gradual disintegration of the Alliance and to increasing demoralisation and demobilisation of our people and organisations. Failure to give leadership where hard choices have to be made would force COSATU to fight offensive battles against what may seem to be an understanding between government and capital. An Alliance Accord
COSATU would prefer a joint negotiating position with government in NEDtilt the balance of economic power in favour of the popular forces, by giving the democratic state and its supporting institutions effective leverage over areas of investment, production and delivery. Events since 1994 clearly indicate that where we rely on market-driven programmes there are disastrous results. We are producing jobless (in fact jobless) growth despite positive economic growth - most companies have reported higher profits than ever before.
An Alliance Accord does not necessarily imply wage restraint or no-strike provisions. There is need to re-organise the wage structure and raise the living standards of the majority of workers, but the accord may entail restraints or cuts for the high-paid, inc luding management. It is unavoidable that if you exercise social power based on commitment to a particular agreement (the Accord), this would result in having to exercise certain responsibilities, which implies limits.
The economic role of the state would be to harness for reconstruction the significant economic muscle under its direct control (the national budget, existing parastatals; harness its potential control over new economic levers (like a housing parastatal which would give leverage over the construction industry; and harness the potential economic muscle of the trade union movement; as well as intervene in the financial sector and channel investment in job-creating industry, etc
There would be no comprehensive accord with capital, rather specific agreements within a comprehensive framework The responsibility for driving the process lies with the Alliance. Such an Alliance Accord would represent the most serious concrete challenge by the democratic forces to the relations of economic power in the country. It would win over sections of business, would create social stability and would allow people to benefit from economic participation.
The trade union commitment would be to mobilise the masses for transformation, to raising levels of productivity, to help close the wage gap and provide training, and to ensure investment in job creation. "There is nothing wrong with negotiating a national productivity agreement which links productivity improvements to not only wages, but to job creation and investment - proposals that would lead to an expansion of the economy as long as it is directly linked to an improvement in workers lives" A final warning or yet another appeal?
There exists only a limited window of opportunity to negotiate an Alliance Accord There is real danger that the current economic policy direction, and the resultant alienation of the Allance's constituency, will become so entrenched as to make the negotiation of such an Agreement impossible. * Source: edited extracts from COSATU's Draft Programme for the Alliance (November 1996), presented to all COSATU structures, and made available to the ANC and SACP. Subtitles have been added by International Viewpoint.