Pouring oil on troubled heads
On 25 May Ecuadorians voted in a 14 question referendum. The formal purpose was to ratify the removal from office of President Abdalá Bucaram in February, after massive demonstrations, and a parliamentary vote that the President was mentally unfit to hold office. But the country's elite also used the referendum campaign to re-legitimise the traditional institutions, and reduce the "constitutional" importance of the massive popular mobilisation which brought down the Bucaram regime. President Fabian Alarcón is the winner, but the results show that the crisis has not been resolved. The spirit of the popular mobilisation is still tangible, even if the democratic movement is on the defensive. Jean Dupont* The radical democratic mood in the population following the February victory revealed the existence of two proposals for solving the country's crisis: the traditional, conservative strategy of little reforms which do not threaten the status quo, and a popular strategy of demands, most clearly expressed in those heady days of February.
But while the country's dominant sectors began actively re-building a wide bourgeois coalition, the popular masses, and the democratic currents, seemed to loose all orientation. The conservative strategy came centre-stage.
In early February, more than three million citizens participated in public demonstrations demanding the departure of President Bucaram. Two weeks later, a large majority of parliamentarians voted to approve the establishment candidate, Heinz Moeller, as President of the National Congress.
Only three deputies swam against the tide.' Rosendo Rojas, of Democracia Socialista rejected the claim that Moeller's election "represented the culmination of the popular mandate."
This vote made it more difficult to maintain the independent popular mobilisation, and increased the dynamic towards a conservative solution to the crisis.
The parliamentary re-shuffle was more than the selection of a new establishment candidate. For the first time, the main forces of the social and political left entered into a system of co-government with the country's right-wing forces. In doing so, they disarmed
The May referendum was an important confirmation of the institutional solution to the political crisis opened when mass protest toppled Bucaram. As Hoy newspaper commented the morning after the referendum, "This result consolidates the authority of the current government, and converts the transformation which took place in February into an exceptional series of events, which cannot be taken as a precedent for any type of political manoeuvres [in the future], because those events have been co-validated in the ballot-box — the main source of democratic
In fact, most voters voted against their own interests, becoming the victims of left leaders who saw in the events of February nothing more than a great opportunity to win minor, ephemeral positions in the power hierarchy. All "types of political manoeuvres" will indeed take place, but the referendum has reserved this privilege for the dominant classes, giving them the right to interpret the events of February as they see fit.
The day after the referendum, Ecuador Radio reported the demands of "the business community" that Alarcón react firmly to the strikes in the health sector and elsewhere. With the referendum over, "Alarcón should govern. Nothing should stop him now. The country cannot continue to be paralysed." Twenty-four hours later Ecuavisa television news hardened its own tone in reports on the health strike. The following day, most media reported favourably to Alarcón's tough economic measures to reduce the public
Painting over the cracks
Faced with an upsurge in popular self-management, and self-representation, the elite is searching desperately to close all cracks in the system from above. The masses must not be allowed to participate in power in anything other than a subordinate role. Closing ranks, Ecuador's elite has taken a range of measures to reform, and re-assert, traditional authority. • Attacking parliamentary corruption, by targeting 17 deputies, (though not the most important) and beginning corruption investigations against Bucaram and some of his closest collaborators (most of whom have disappeared). • Consolidating control of the key func tions of the state. No changes to the
Armed Forces and Police leadership. • Consolidation of a new, pro-government majority in parliament, led by the Social
Christian Party. Elimination of obstacles to the presentation of a united right-wing front. In the next elections presenting a single candidate of the right, as moderate as possible, "in the spirit of February 5th".
• Constitutional reforms, but from the top down only. Heinz Moeller wants no kind of constituent assembly, and nor does the government majority in parliament.
• Co-option of most of the political and social left. Most of the opposition (and many former Bucaram supporters) have effectively pledged subordinate allegiance to this majority.
• Re-starting the privatisation programme, and promising a range of neo-liberal economic "adjustments." Bucaram is not the root of the problem
The crisis in the political system didn't
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start with Abdalá Bucaram, even though Alarcón and other of the former President's former associates would like to re-write history that way. The leprosy of Ecuadorian politics began in 1995, when vice-President Alberto Dahik fled to avoid corruption charges. Ever since then, the traditional system of authoritarian government, and an almost non-existent popular opposition was threatened. Bucaram's populist, corrupt politics was one response to this crisis. But during his brief rule, the economy did not recover from the shock it suffered under privatisation programme ran in to objections rom within the elite, which combined with resistance from below, to block the programme. Stability
For the elite, the "problem" with Bucaram and his government was that its excesses threatened the continued hegemony of the bourgeoisie. To restore "governability," the ruling class now wants those on the bottom to join an active consensus with those in power. The popular opposition is condemned to return to its previous virtual non-existence.
The massive Popular Consultation (referendum) was a skilful mix of questions. First came the ratification of the removal of Bucaram by the Congress, under popular pressure. Question two ratified the election of Alarcón as President, again by Congress. These questions are two sides of the same coin - Media hammered home the message that a yes vote on both questions was the only way to ensure stability, and prevent