• Fundamentalist fall?
Despite their persistent illusions in Fino's government,' to which they have ceded some powers, the insurrectionary committees continue to prove their strength by resisting Berisha's repeated incursions into their territory. It is not impossible that the insurrection will enter a new, radical phase. Particularly if Berisha decides to attempt a generalised attack against the south. The right rediscovers Berisha
While the internal balance of forces has changed little, the international forces supporting Berisha are much more consolidated than in the early weeks of the revolt. The president is no longer isolated internationally. And while US president Bill Clinton still considers him an obstacle to the "normalisation" of Albania, the dictator again has the (virtually unconditional) support of Europe's right wing parties.
Berisha's first success was in exploiting the hesitation and inexperience of the insurgents to gain time. His second exploit was to exploit the contradictory interests of the imperialist powers, so as to present himself as the only force capable of re-establishing capitalist order in Albania.
This solid international support has had an important influence on the role of the Multinational military force in Albania. Formally introduced to protect the distributior of humanitarian aid." "forgot" their supposed neutrality, and recog nised the "legal authorities" — ie Berisha. Contacts with the insurgents have been reduced to the absolute minimum. And western generals and politicians continue to present the "anarchy in the south" as the main obstacle to the restoration of democracy.
There is no doubt: the multinational force is not in Albania to protect the distribution of humanitarian aid. Western troops look on calmly while "humanitarian aid" is openly sold, to finance the reconstruction of the police force and the Albanian army. Nor are western troops on the scene to protect lives. Many more people have died since they arrived than in the "chaos" beforehand.
In reality, the western forces in Albania are helping reconstruct the Berisha regime. In particular, they are preparing the ground tor the final "neutralisation" of the insurgents.
Irrespective of the election results, the balance of forces in Albania prevents any short-term stabilisation of the system. Berisha is preparing a blood-bath, with western support. But there is still hope. As long as the people continue to demand the removal of Berisha and the dissolution of the secret police. And as long as the insurrectionary committees refuse to surrender their arms. * 6 International Viewpoint #291
The military, and public opinion, have forced Turkey's fundamentalist and nationalist coalition government to resign. Conservative opposition leader Mesut Yilmaz has formed a new government - a 'non-clerical' coalition with the social democratic opposition. Erdal Tan Military and public pressure in recent weeks de-stabilised former Prime Minister Tançu Çiller's conservative True Path party (DYP) to the point where fifteen deputies switched their allegiance to the opposition. But the governing coalition between the DYP and the larger, Islamic fundamentalist Prosperity Party (Refah) survived a vote of confidence, by four votes.
Many wavering deputies were won back to the government benches by Ciller's husband, who's shady role between government and business circles has earned him the nickname "Mr Ten Percent." Some deputies were tempted back by fat commissions, others blackmailed with threats of exposure
Nevertheless, Çiller and Refah leader Necmettin Erbakan had less and less room for manoeuvre, in the face of the opposition of Turkey's powerful generals to the fundamentalist's continued presence in government. Recognising the precariousness of their situation, they called a new general election. Erbakan even promised to surrender the post of prime minister to Çiller, whose DYP was the junior party in the government.
By inviting Mesut Yilmaz to form a new government, Turkey's president Suleyman Demirel has blocked this plan. A conservative opposition leader, Yilmaz has the agreement of both social democratic parties, and dissidents from Çiller's party, to form a new, non-clerical coalition, which can count with the support of the army, the bourgeoisie and The generals v Refah
The crisis is far from over. What is certain, however, is that the army, which represents the general interests of the regime, has gone too far in its struggle against the government to be able to pull back.
The army recently convinced the Public Prosecutor to request that the Constitutional Court dissolve Refah, which he accuses of "wanting to provoke a civil war" and "install an Islamic regime," in contradiction to the non-clerical framework installed by modern Turkey's founding fathers after the first
This is the first time in history that a Constitutional Court will consider the dissolution as anti-constitutional of a party which is in government, on the basis of 21% of votes in the last general election. A party which includes both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice. At least this proves that the Turkish judicial system is independent of some parts of the executive!
The army has also accused the government of "cutting off funds," by refusing to finance the recent intervention into Northern Iraq to combat the separatist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). [Official Turkish sources report 2,000 PKK deaths]
As in any other self-respecting bourgeois state, denying the army the resources they need to defend the motherland is equivalent to treason. If the current crisis ends in another military coup d'état, this could be a pretext for the imprisonment or even execution of Erbakan and Çiller. But the short term objective was more modest - to spread panic among deputies from Çiller's DYP party, and encourage them to support the opposition against their former colleagues.
A merciless struggle is underway between the generals and the Çiller-Erbakan grouping. In the short and medium term, the balance of forces seems more favourable to the generals. So the main question is whether they will be able to remove the current government by "democratic parliamentary" means, or at least by manoeuvres which will protect the democratic facade of the regime, without threatening the major capitalists jects for closer integration with the European Union. Or whether there will be another coup d'état, which in the current situation could degenerate into a semi-civil-war.
In the long term, everything depends on the capacity of the bourgeoisie and its political personnel to reform the political and institutional system to the point where they can present a new bourgeois alternative, suf ficiently credible to win the passivity of the
In the immediate, all depends on how many of Çiller's deputies can be frightened into voting against their own party, even if this means loosing their place at the trough. and having their past misdeeds publicised by "Mr Ten Percent. The "enemy within"
As the recent military alliance with Israel shows, the Turkish general staff has-modified its global strategy in recent years. After 50 years of strategy designed to contain a principle threat" defined as "the external communist danger, with a Fifth Column inside the country, " the new preoccupation of the armed forces is the "threat posed by the internal enemy and its external supporters."
frightening them with the spectre of Islamic fundamentalism. By offering "democratisation," they hope to win the left's support for privatisation and re-structuring. The process has certain parallels to Spain's "Moncloa Pact" which ensured a stable transition from dictatorship to bourgeois democracy.
The second force in this triangular struggle is the Islamic fundamentalist sector
Moslem heads of state met in Ankara on June 15 (from left to right) Nigeria's industry minister Lt-Gen Mohammed
Haladu; Bangladesh PM Sheikh Hassina; (then) Turkish PM Necmettin Erkaban; Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani;
Turkish president Suleyman Demirel; Indonesian president Suharto; Egypt PM Kamal Ganzouri; Pakistan PM Nawaz
Sharif; and Malaysia PM Mahathir. They inaugurated the Developing Eight Group (D-8). This was an initiative of (then)
Turkish PM Necmettin Erkaban to increase co-operation between Moslem countries.
This threat has been openly described by top generals as "Kurdish separatist terrorism and the fundamentalist threat."
The entire "security" apparatus (police, judiciary, defence forces, secret services and diplomatic corps) has been instructed to adapt itself to this new overall strategy. The ideological propaganda machine is toning down the anti-communism, and stressing unitary nationalism and the non-clerical principles of "the father of modern Turkey,'
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.
In foreign policy, the new "enemies" are those who support the PKK and the Islamic fundamentalists: Syria and Iran. The Turkish state intends to impose this global strategy on each and every bourgeois government which the country may elect, whatever the nuances of programme and outlook between the political parties concerned! Ruling class divided
The current crisis reveals a triangular struggle within the bourgeoisie. The main actor is the large, traditional industrial bourgeoisie, and its allies in the small business sector, the army, the media and the parliamentary opposition (including the social democrats). The political project of this fraction of the bourgeoisie is the integration of Turkey with the European Union, and a bourgeois democratic set-up more or less comparable with those of the European countries. This fraction of the ruling class seeks to gain the support of the working class and the progressive intelligentsia for this project, by of the bourgeoisie, which is particularly strong among middle-size companies in central Turkey. This current, politically represented by the Retah (Prosperity) party, is trying to win the support of the pauperised and semi-proletarian layers of urban society, and the Kurdish peasantry, in the name of an elusive "religious fraternity and solidarity" The fundamentalist wing of capital hopes to break the power of the grand, classical bourgeoisie, by creating a reserved "Islamic economy." based on "the specific consumption patterns and lifestyles of the Islamic gheitos." Internationally, Refah would like Turkey to distance itself from the European Union, and adopt a neo-protectionist economic system. The middle east and south-east Asia would become Turkey's preferred markets. The Islamic bourgeoisie probably controls a turnover of US$2 billion, with $800m. of exports, mainly to the Middle East.
The third sector of the bourgeoisie exists in the "parallel" or Mafia economy. This sector grew rapidly in the Kurdish region
ODP • HADEP • DISK • KESK
"No to the fundamentalists!"
"No to the generals!"
thanks to the "dirty war" [against the PKK], and all over Turkey during the neo-liberal "miracle" of the late 1980s and early 90s, under President Turgut Ozal. This sector looks for support to lumpenised (depressed) sectors of the proletariat and intelligentsia. appealing to them on a "nationalist' basis. The police force and landowner layers are
Over 35,000 people attended a rally in demands at a time when some Istanbul on 26 May, opposing both the fundamentalist-conservative block and the growing military threat.
The event was organised by the Liberty and Solidarity Party (ODP), a regroupment party which includes most currents of the 1970s far left, including the Fourth International current, Yeniyol.
The event was also supported by the left-wing trade unions Disk and KESK, and the Kurdish nationalist party HADEP, which mobilised some 3,000 sympathisers. A number of famous intellectuals, artists and journalists also
At a moment when Turkish politics seemed polarised between pro-military and fundamentalist-nationalist poles, this audacious initiative is widely considered as the high point of the ÖDP's one-year existence.
It demonstrated the legitimacy of the "third way," and stressed democratic
"democrats" are increasingly sympathetic to a coup d'état. It was the largèst autonomous far-left inspired demonstration since the 1970s.
demonstration took place in Sultanahmet square, scene of an earlier demonstration of 100,000 Refah supporters, protesting the army's intention to close most of the religious secondary
The ODP subsequently called a "press conference" in downtown Ankara, which attracted 25,000 people. A similar number had joined the ODP contingent at Ankara's May Day parade earlier this year. Party leaders talk of "a rise in the movement, these last several months
The ODP is not yet seen as a credible alternative to the big parties. But thanks to initiatives like this demonstration, it is increasingly perceived as a serious, legitimate pole to the left of social democracy. [ET] * also a fertile base of support for this current.
Tançu Çiller's DYP used to be allied to the grand bourgeoisie. But under the growing threat of investigation for corruption, Çiller switched alliances, and formed a coalition with the fundamentalists. Much of her party's support now comes from this "parallel" sector. Çiller's switch is at the origin of the current political confusion. Even the fascist Grey Wolves (MHP) have been thrown into a crisis of orientation, deepened by the death of their historic "führer" Türkes.
The working people of Turkey, and the Kurds, stand to pay the costs of this internal, confused battle between bourgeois factions. Unless, of course, they can develop a pragmatic, intelligent strategy to compensate for the unfavourable balance of forces.
Without a clear orientation of class independence and the defence of democratic and social rights, the working class may be side-tracked into one of several possible false, catastrophic alliances, or slumber in criminal passivity. *
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