Diplomacy clashes with reality
* Ireland
The latest IRA cease-fire in
Ireland was the result of secret diplomacy by the new Blair administration in London, writes John McAnulty.
The Sinn Fein leadership explains the failure of the peace process on the dependence of Britain's former Prime Minister John Major on unionist votes, and an unsympathetic regime in Dublin. Gerry Adams "dream ticket" was a strong Labour government in London, a Fianna Fail administration in Dublin, and an increase in Sinn Fein's own vote. In June all three elements came into play in a series of elections.
Unfortunately for the "peace process", this happy state of affairs also coincided with the annual British and Loyalist humiliation of the nationalist population, when Loyalists march through Catholic areas to remind them of their second-class status. The future is Orange
On the 6th July British forces moved in at dawn to attack the civilian population of the Gervaghy Road in Portadown in order to support the "right" of local bigots in the sectarian Orange order to assert their supremacy over the minority population by staging their annual march through the nationalist area.
A leaked official document showed that the British had decided weeks before that this would be their policy, and that the "meet the people" policy of Labour's new Northern Ireland secretary Mo Mowlem had simply been a PR exercise. It seems that the new Labour administration has brought new energy to the peace process, but left no doubt about where Britain is taking the peace train, nor the price of a ticket. A test for Sinn Fein
Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams called the latest Loyalist marches "a test" for the British. But they were also a test for Sinn Fein. And they revealed a seriously disoriented movement. Adams briefly broke from the peace process, criticising the establishment parties and the trade unions for their silence and calling an open meeting to discuss mass action.
But by the time the meeting was held the republican leadership had closed ranks. A bizarre session was held where the audience was asked to make tactical suggestions without being allowed to discuss strategy or policy.' The strategy that finally emerged was one where the leadership held firm control over the nationalist "family," maintained their interpretation of the peace process, and continued to hoist the middle-class Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) onto their platforms. 6 International Viewpoint #293
The vehicle for opposition to the reactionary "marching season" are the local resicommittees. These are confined to areas directly under attack, with no attempt to build broader solidarity. They are the local expression of the "nationalist consensus" with concessions made to the Catholic church and the SDLP.
By their nature these are Catholic committees. This allows organisations like the trade unions to avoid involvement. Though obviously, the answer to Orange sectarianism is not a Catholic counter-organisation, but organisation of the workers' movement.?
Nevertheless, the nationalist demonstrations did try to broaden and generalise mass action. In the end this proved decisive. forcing the British and the Orange leadership into retreat and the cancellation of a number of marches through nationalist areas. Political decommissioning
Within days a new cease-fire was announced by the IRA. They say that the roadblock of "prior decommissioning," the British demand that the IRA surrender its weapons had been overcome.
What the republican leadership did not explain was that they had made a further political retreat around the question of the Mitchell principles.
These principles are Washington's contribution to the peace process. They call for the surrender of arms during negotiations and for the disbandment of the IRA.
Whatever assurances the republicans received about the question of arms, there is no doubt about the political aspects of the demands made by Mitchell.
The report demanded a commitment to exclusively peaceful means, but it made it clear that this commitment did not extend to the state forces. It also made the demand that those participating accept in advance the outcome of the talks. For the Republicans, this is effectively a demand for political surrender.
The day before the cease-fire, Gerry Adams published an extensive document setting out the Sinn Fein programme. It lists a number of reforms in tackling discrimination and repressive legislation and calls for a renegotiation of the union.
Following criticism, Adams claimed he had been "miscontextualised". Emergency rallies were held in Belfast and Derry to reassure supporters that the primary aim of the movement remained a united Ireland.
What the speakers did not say was that the "primary aim" would not - and could not be - realised through the peace process, and that the drift to reformism meant that the more radical elements of their programme were being moved to a long and indefinite future.
So the cease-fire returned, but without the fanfare and support that existed at the base of republicanism in the past: The Unionists now have the initiative. * Reprinted from Socialist Outlook. John McAnulty writes on behalf of Socialist Democracy, the Irish supporters of the Fourth International. Notes 1. It was clearly indicated from the platform that Socialist Democracy were not welcome at the meeting. 2. The Irish National Liberation Army (INLĂ) contribution was to announce that it would kill Orangemen if they marched through disputed areas.
"Rise To The Challenge"