Javier Solana's "new NATO"
* Europe
NATO's pro-U.S., "realist" leader started his career as a firebrand Spanish socialist. Javier Solana's rise in the Atlantic Alliance is a metaphor for the transformation of Spain's Socialists into a true party of the establishment. G. Buster NATO had been without an effective leader since 1991.' This was a decisive period, in which differences emerged between the United States and EU members of NATO concerning the strategy the Alliance should take in the Yugoslav conflict, towards the Russian Federation, and on the possible expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe.
After a period of uncertainty, this new division of Europe was settled at the end of 1995, with the signing of the Dayton Accords on Bosnia, and the realisation by the Western powers that Boris Yeltsin might loose the 1996 presidential elections in Russia. With the re-division of the continent recognised, broadening the Alliance to include at least Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic became increasingly urgent. The goal once again, was to "contain" the Russian bear.
In this new context, Solana (Spanish) was the "least problematic" candidate. The Ruud Lubbers (Dutch) had already been presented in 1994, but had failed to win support from the European members of the Alliance. Elleman-Jensen (Danish) was vetoed by France, after he condemned Paris' nuclear tests in Mururoa. In such a vacuum, Solana quickly became the preferred candidate of the Clinton administration. He also had the support of Germany, the EU's economic powerhouse, and France, which, like Spain, wanted to negotiate a return to the Alliance's unified military command structure.
U.S. President Bill Clinton wanted the successful candidate to project the new image of NATO, which is still the central tool of U.S. hegemony in the neo-liberal new world order: The Alliance is no longer obsessed with nuclear defence, and the static territorial confrontation of the cold war. The new NATO is supposed to intervene rapidly in the peripheral countries, where ethnic, religious or ideological conflict between the losers in the globalisation of the capitalist market economy threaten international "public order. Politically, NATO must ensure the consensus between the imperialist powers, and shift more of the cost of the structure onto the European countries.
Solana spent the Vietnam war years studying in the United States (on one of the Fulbright scholarships awarded after General Franco agreed to the establishment of U.S. bases on Spanish territory.) He opposed the 8 International Viewpoint #293 war on the same lines as Clinton (and current CIA leader James Woolsey). Like Clinton, Solana is "a pacifist who has realised how to evolve with time," according to El Pais. Who better to represent the post-Cold War Alliance? A socialist defence policy?
In 1988 Spain's Socialist Party (PSOE) government signed a new defence agreement reducing the U.S. military presence, but committing Spain to supporting Washington's diplomatic and defence priorities. In opposition to the 1986 referendum that finally allowed Spain to join NATO, the government never asked if U.S. warships visiting the country were carrying nuclear
FOR
Hope the Europe of Maastricht and the multinationals For a different Europe! Against the Europe of Maastricht and the multinationals! A Marxist and feminist analysis of the European Union. From taxation to transport policy, the International Viewpoint team analyse and explain the process of capitalist integration of Europe, and the costs involved for working people, women and youth. We ask what alternative policies the left can put forward, and make a few modest suggestions of our own. * Price: E1/$2 plus 10% postage charge fo copies. Order from vour loca Viewpoint, nternationa weapons. spain also gave active logistical support in the Gulf War, and to NATO ait strikes in Bosnia. One of the high points of the Spanish presidency of the European
Union was the signing of a new Transatlantic
Declaration. Socialist Party Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez convinced European leaders to accept a new definition of the relationship between the United States and the EU.
Solana has no clear position on foreign policy questions. His only priority seems to be to combine personal advancement with an increased Spanish presence in international affairs. When 35 U.S. Congressmen opposed his appointment because of his socialist and "pacifist" roots, Solana pointed to his party's role in the campaign for a "yes" vote in the 1986 referendum on joining NATO, and Spanish airforce participation in NATO's Bosnian bombing raids. Spain's failure to join NATO's unified command structure was explained as a "hangover from the past." "Speaking as an individual," Solana told the U.S. media he wanted to "overcome" this problem. And, to avoid any remaining doubts, Spain suddenly abandoned its cam- paign in the EU for a new dialogue with Cuba. With Clinton's backing, Solana was all set to become one of Europe's most imporBeing in is the main thing
Solana's "personal" enthusiasm for Spain's full integration into the NATO command structure was a specific guarantee demanded by the Clinton administration. Within Spain, PSOE leader Gonzalez reassured Socialist voters that no change was planned. After all, such integration is in explicit contradiction with the results of the 1986 referendum, in which the PSOE rank and file took a different position from that of their leaders.?
Gradually, however, Spain's political, military and media bosses have begun a sustained campaign on the need to end Spain's "exceptional" position in the Alliance. This campaign was reinforced when, in December 1996. Paris' ailing conservative government announced that France too wished to become part of the unified command system. Spain's 1986 decision not to join the unified command was the result of the last massive mobilisation in the country's transition from fascism to parliamentary democracy. France left the integrated command in 1966, when General de Gaulle decided that the country would instead develop its independent nuclear capacity, cornerstone of his "Great Power" ambitions.
French President Jacques Chirac claimed that, under Solana, NATO was a new, post cold-war Alliance, open to former enemies like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. France, he said, "must be present" in this "de-ideologised" Alliance. Fine words,
if one forgets the context: France was in the middle of the largest strike since 1968, a massive international campaign was underway against French nuclear testing in the South Pacific, and the Bosnian government in Sarajevo was demanding the withdrawl of UN troops accused of corruption and failing to protect the civilian population against
Spain's "experts" picked up the French idea of a "new NATO." They claim that the historic circumstances referendum no longer applied. And that the referendum debate had "unnecessarily polarised" the country.?
Historical circumstances have indeed changed. So why not call a new referendum? This would be less easy to manipulate than the current opinion-poll politics on the question. A February 1997 poll reported that, of the 71% of adults expressing an opinion, 43% were in favour of remaining in NATO on the basis of the conditions set in 1986, and 27% were against NATO
The issue in 1986 was to determine whether there was a popular consensus -expressed through parliamentary vote- on any decision that implied military obligations, the dispatching of Spanish troops (as in Bosnia and more recently Albania) and the loss of life. Staying outside NATO's Military Committee meant that the Spanish government had to discuss and adopt any decision made by NATO (i.e. U.S.) commanders before it became applicable to Spanish troops and territory. The historical situation may have changed, but why should this mean abandoning this last guarantee of political
The terms of the current debate reflect the negative shift in the balance of forces since 1986. The progressive forces that came together in the campaign for a "no" vote on joining NATO are much weaker todav. This is partly the result of the general crisis of the left and a decline in mass movement activity and partly the result of the growing right wing spin that successive governments, left and right, have put on foreign policy questions.* A right-wing interpretation of "national interest" has been re-established. * 1. Manfred Woerner died after a long illness, and Willy Claes was unable to shake off corruption accusations 2. The socialist Government based its "new" support for NATO on non-participation in the integrated military structure: a ban on installation, storage or introduction of nuclear weapons on Spanish territory; and reduction of the military presence of U.S. troops in Spain. 3. Despite the "betrayal" of the PSOE, the heritage of the anti-Franco struggle sparked a massive peace movement, which finally persuaded 39.8% of voters to cast their ballots against NATO. The "Yes" proposition won with 525%. The referendum only succeeded when then Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez said the Socialist Party could not govern on behalf of "No" voters, threatening a governmental crisis, possibly opening the door to a rightwing government. Confronted with the "objective force" of the post-Franco state, the left realised it was defeated. This impotence contributed to the process that led to the formation of the Izquierda Unida (United Left) coalition around the Communist Party. People recognised the need for a force that could articulate the electoral response to radical social struggles, without again becoming a victim of right-wing threats, as happened with the PSOE 4. Although the government has begun negotiations on Spain's full integration into NATO command structures, three of Spain's strategic interests provoke tension in the Alliance, and between the conservative government (which has failed to impose its priorities on NATO) and certain traditional sectors of the right. While Spain shares most of NATO's goals, its particular concern is the capacity to defend its peripheral territories — the Balearic islands in the Mediterranean, the southern tip of the country, which faces Morocco across the Straits of Gibraltar, and the Canary Islands, a Spanish possession off the coast of Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. This "strategic axis" includes Spain's two colonial trading posts on Moroccan soil, Sebta and Melilla (Ceuta and Melilla in Spanish). Until now, this whole region has been split between two NATO subcommands, based in Naples, Italy, and Lisbon. Portugal. Spain would like to re-draw the command lines, establishing Spanish control over a NATO subcommand covering the whole "strategic axis." Spain also demands control over the NATO base in Gibraltar, a British colony on Spanish soil, controling access to the Mediterranean.
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