Refounded Communists fumble
Italy Italy's Communist Party has retreated from opposition to the 1998 Finance Law. Livio Maitan, a member of the National Leadership, warns that, until it elaborates a strategic alternative, the party will be unable to effectively oppose the centre-left Prodi government The Refounded Communist Party (PRC) and the centre-left Olive Tree coalition agreed not to attack each other during the 1996 election campaign. The Communists promised that their MPs would not vote against the creation of an Olive Treeled government, but that their subsequent voting would depend on the government's proposals and behaviour.
But from June 1996 onwards, the Communists started to consider themselves part of the government majority.
This was not conflict-free. The PRC finally accepted a Ministry of Labour plan to legalise temporary work agencies (which the party had always opposed). In return, the Minister promised to finance 100.000 6-12 month contracts for young people, at a monthly salary of 800,000 lira (US$ 450). Over 2,000 of the PRC's 2 International Viewpoint #294 middle cadre signed a petition demanding that the Communist MPs reject the proposal. In another conflict, the PRC group voted against the government decision to send a military force to Albania. The expedition was only approved thanks to the votes of the centre-right coalition.
But the real trouble started with the debate on the Finance Law for 1998. Before the summer recess, the PRC clearly signalled their dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Prodi's proposals. Though they would not vote against the draft proposals until there was a full debate in parliament.
At the beginning of September, Prodi told PRC leader Fausto Bertinotti that the government would not make the same compromises to the left as in the 1997 Finance Law. Determined to respect the conditions of the Maastricht Treaty on inflation and public sector debt, and join the new European monetary union, the Prodi government wanted to make further budget cuts, including in the pension system. Last year, pensions were removed from the cuts list at the insistence of the
PRC leaders reacted angrily to the Prime Minister's intransigence. Prodi's refusal to negotiate made matters worse His real concern was to consolidate his own coalition, and make separate agreements with the trade union confederations.
He hoped that this would leave the PRC without any option but to continue suppor ting him. Prodi even convinced the unions to worsen pension rights for those who had started work as children, and therefore made sufficient pension contributions before reaching retirement age.
The final Finance Law presented to parliament was less severe than last year. But still unacceptably harsh. And it contained none of the concessions the Prodi falls and rises
This caused a dramatic debate between government representatives and PRC MPs PRC parliamentary group leader Diliberto said the government had become the instrument of the employers' organisation Confindustria and the banks, and was "surrendering to the will of the markets."
The centre-right opposition made signs that they would consider voting for finance legislation in order to prevent any delay to Italy's convergence with France and Germany, and adoption of the single European currency
With all negotiations blocked, the PRC confirmed that they would vote against the proposed law. On 9 October, Prime Minister Prodi announced his resignation.
This unleashed an unprecedented wave of attacks against the PRC. Politicians,
mayors, and representatives of employers groups accused the Communists of provoking a political crisis and preventing Italy from integrating with the other EU countries, just when the economy was starting to work properly. The trade unions joined in the witch-hunt.
The PDS daily L'Unita became hysterica. Even El Manifesto, the newspaper closest to the PRC, urged Bertinotti to withdraw his threat. The party's fax machines and telephones were overwhelmed by threats and insults from people describing themselves as "ordinary citizens" and "workers."
Not since the darkest years of the cold war had Italian Communists faced such a climate. Beyond the manipulation of the PDS and the trade union leaderships, wider factors were at play. Many Italians could not accept that a political force affirm positions which contradict "the consensus" and the supposed imperatives of the market economy, the Maastricht criteria, budget austerity, flexibility, and so on. Other citizens chose the PRC as a scapegoat for their frustrations with the failure of 'their centre-left government to carry out better policies than their conservative predecessors.
Within 24 hours, the PRC leadership seemed to retreat. On October 10, the Secretariat stated that the party was willing to make a pact with the government for one year, in exchange for modifications in the finance law, and a pledge to reduce the working week from 40 to 35 hours by the year 2000.
After frantic negotiations, agreement was reached. The PRC rejoined the parliamentary majority, and promised to vote for the finance law. Prodi withdrew his resig nation, demanding and winning a vote of confidence from the parliament.
With seven of the 47 seats in the PRC National Leadership, the far left played an important role during the crisis, despite the usual disagreements on tactical questions. On 12 October 500 militants attended a Rome meeting where Marco Ferrando and Livio Maitan discussed the crisis in the country and the party. At the 14 October National Leadership meeting, five of the far-left members voted against the Bertinotti-Prodi agreement. Two, Bicciardi and Mazzei, announced their resignation from the Party.
The Olive Tree needed this agreement with the Communists. They had no other choice. New elections might not return them to power. And the PRC could even have gained votes, since the centre-left government had not made any of the reforms demanded by working people.
Prodi comes out of the crisis with his coalition strengthened, and with a guarantee that his finance law will be approved by parliament. He can continue his European integration policies, without major opposition. Since the centre-right opposition block is in crisis. Prodi can even expect to do well in municipal elections later this month.
None of this guarantees stability. Despite favourable short term developments, the socio-economic situation is still dellcate. Conflicts are possible at any time.
And Prodi has only at the beginning of his constitutional reform project. Over the next year or two he will have to overcome very deep divisions between the political parties, and in society, to establish any kind of consensus. And the separatist Northern League continues to provoke instability and tension.
In general, however, the Olive Tree coalition has benefited from the crisis. Not so the Refounded Communists. The party's difficulties in defining a strategy towards the centre-left government have again been displayed. There is a clear disagreement within the Party leadership.
At the last National Congress I said that the PRC should not have joined the parliamentary majority and supported Prodi. The government's decisions on socio-economic questions and foreign policy have confirmed what those of us on the left of the PRC had warned.
The Olive Tree components, especially the PRD, have even begun institutional cooperation with the centre-right, through their project to reform Italy's constitution in the direction of a semi-presidential system. And, in deliance ot the current constitution, they have agreed to give equal treatment (and state funds) to private and public education.
The Prodi government has stressed that its top priority is to meet the Maastricht criteria and adopt the single European currency.
In this latest confrontation, the PRC has won no significant concessions. We have even accepted the "reform" pensions, something we used to oppose
In exchange, we have not won any serious promise for public sector programmes to attack the terrible unemployment (25-30%) in the poorer Mezzogiorno of southern Italy. This was supposedly a precondition of any agreement with Prodi.
Apart from some cosmetic budget adjustments, PRC leader Bertinotti is presenting Prodi's promise to cut the working week as a great victory for the party. It isn't. Prodi has promised to organise negotiations between employers and unions. There is no mention of protecting salaries during any reduction in hours worked, something the PRC has always seen as essential. The reduction is announced for the year 2001, but by then the EU Stability Pact will be in position, making it almost impossible for countries which have adopted the Euro to change their macro-economic policies. And there is no guarantee that the current government will be in place in four years time anyway!
Without an alternative strategy, and an alternative project, Communist Refoundation is clearly unable to sustain any confrontation with the centre-left majority in the Italian parliament. Seven years after
"refoundation," develop such an alternative. * contents europe
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