A dirty little war in Southern Mexico
Braulio Moro explains the "low intensity war" behind the recent massacres of Indians in Chiapas state. On 22 December, in the northern Chiapas municipality of Chenalhó, Acetal, 45 Tzotzil Indians, mainly women and children, were massacred by members of a paramilitary group promoted by govern-
This provoked a huge wave of protest in Mexico and abroad. On their television screens, people saw the ghosts of the death squads that stalked several Central American countries in the 1980s. For those abroad, the photos of dismembered bodies exposed the real nature of Mexico's decomposing regime, which is willing to lead the country to the brink of war.
This massacre was an escalation of the military strategy President Ernesto Zedillo has been implementing since 1994 to exterminate the Zapatistas (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional - EZLN) and the indigenous communities of the southeastern state of Chiapas. This was a state crime, not some "confrontation between communities" 1 The "Chiapas '94" campaign
The weekly magazine Proceso? recently published a text prepared in late 1994 by the Defence Ministry, giving instructions to the Seventh Military Region, based in the Chiapas state capital of Tuxtla Gutiérrez. The Army's central aim was to "break the relationship of support that exists between the population and the outlaws." To do this, the army "should continue with offensive tactical operations, with the aim of eliminating the tactical forces of the outlaws, and their bases of support." This is the real strategy the government has been applying for the past four vears, independently of its repeated calls for "dialogue" and against Zapatista "intransigence.
In December 1994, several days after President Ernesto Zedillo took office, and in the face of growing military pressure, the EZLN launched its campaign "Peace with Justice and Dignity for the Indian Peoples." They broke through the army's siege, and took possession of 38 municipalities, where new authorities were installed, declaring the creation of new rebel territories and municipalities. Including Palenque, Tila, Sabanilla, Pantelhó Chenalhó and Las Margaritas — the towns where these paramilitary groups have recently emerged, and where there has been an incredible growth in the presence of the Mexican army.
On 9 February 1995, President Zedillo 22 International Viewpoint #297 broke the year-old truce between the government and the EZLN, and sent over 10.000 soldiers to Chiapas. These troops had two specific aims: occupying most of the communities that provided a social base for the EZLN, and assassinating Subcomandante Marcos and members of the Zapatista military leadership, the Indigenous Clandestine Revolutionary Committee (Comité Clandestino Revolucionario Indígena — CCRI).
The ambush of EZLN leaders almost succeeded, and as the army advanced, more than 5.000 Indians were forced to abandon their villages and seek refuge near the Guatemalan border.
Only the pressure of Mexican civil society, and international solidarity, finally forced the Mexican government to stop the offensive and order a partial withdrawl of its troops. As time passed, the displaced Indians returned to their homes. But the federal troops did not leave these villages. Instead, they followed orders: "to eliminate the urban commandos, and take control, or cause the disintegration of the mass organisations." According to the Campaign Plan, the "friendly population" should be encouraged and helped "to defend its own property, (this is) particularly valid for the ranches and small landowners" - the local power brokers known
The failed ambush on 9 February, 1995 and the EZLN's solid determination to achieve "Peace with Justice and Dignity" led to a series of alternative moves on the chessboard of Mexican politics. The Interior Minister and the Governor of Chiapas were replaced. The Chamber of Deputies approved the "Law for Dialogue, Reconciliation and Peace with Dignity in Chiapas". * The Legislative Peace Commission (COCOPA) was created, and the EZLN organised its "National and International Consultation for Peace". In October 1995, negotiations on "Indigenous Culture and Rights" began. Four months later, these culminated in the famous San Andrés Accords, signed by a government delegation and the EZLN (but which the government refused to implement). Low Intensity War?
Not surprisingly, the authorities reject the EZLN claim that this latest massacre
La "government plan." According to the new Interior Minister, Francisco Labastida. the Zapatistas are "trying to profit politically" from the massacre. which is "morally unacceptable." Labastida claims that the conflict between the EZLN's indigenous communities and the government is only confined to "four municipalities in Chiapas." 5.
Most observers consider the Chiapas conflict to be a "low intensity war." But how does one measure the intensity of a war? By the number of deaths? By the number of refugees? Or by the daily suffering of the forgotten victims of injustice and repression?. However one measures the conflict, it affects a much wider area than the Interior Minister claims. Hence the chain of events that led to the Acteal massacre on 22 December 1997.
In 1994-95, the war was concentrated in the Tzeltal region (the Lacondona rain forest), the main bastion of the EZLN. This region includes the municipalities of Ocosingo, Altamirano and Las Margaritas. In 1996 the conflict shifted to northern Chiapas, inhabited mainly by Chol indigenous communities. This region includes the municipalities of Tila, Tumbalá, Sabanilla and Salto del Agua. It was here that paramilitary groups and the Chiapas state Public Security Police appeared for the first time as actors in the conflict, according to the CIACH.
In 1997 the conflict shifted to Los Altos, a mainly Tzotzil region of Chiapas, encompassing 20 of the state's 111 municipalities, including Chanal, Chenalhó, Pantelhó, and San Cristobal de las Casas.
To understand the government's strategy, it should be pointed out that the Chol, Tzotzil y Tzletal communities are the social base of the EZLN. And the municipalities mentioned are precisely those that the EZLN occupied in 1994.
Most of the deaths in the Mexican government's war against the indigenous peoples have been in these three regions According to the National Intermediation Commission (CONAD and human rights groups, more than 500 Indians were killed between 1995 and 1997. And, according to ex-Interior Minister Chuayffet, at least 15,000 people have displaced.
This level of violence is the result of the concentration of 30,000-40,000 soldiers in Chiapas, a state with under 2.3 million inhabitants. This Rainbow Task Force is the best-equipped part of the Mexican armed forces, and under the direct control of the Army Information Centre in Mexico City. The government can hardly pretend that this massive force has been unable to prevent the anti-Zapatista paramilitary groups from acquiring weapons and operating in the region.
These paramilitary groups are closely linked to, and supported by, the armed forces. They are an integral part of government strategy. Their role is to counter the Zapatistas' growing influence, and sabotage the functioning of the dozens of communities that demand autonomy (but not separatism) for the indigenous peoples. The state hopes that the proliferation of
groups will be able to block this power from the grassroots. With this strategy, the government is seeking to gain time. let the war run its course in terms of dividing and disintegrating local society and provoking a war between the poor.
Six main paramilitary groups operate in Chiapas, all controlled by members of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which has ruled Mexico since 1929. Most of their members are young men from the indigenous communities, as well as policemen, soldiers and non-Indian peasants." These groups all benefit from the support and tolerance of the local and federal authorities.
Five days before the Acteal massacre, the press reported that the Governor of Chiapas had given more than half a million US dollars to the "Peace and Justice" (Paz y Justicia) paramilitary group, to "support and encourage agricultural production." The "witness of at this ceremony was General Mario Renán, Commander of the Seventh Military Region at the time the "Chiapas *94 Plan" was drafted.
In Chiapas today, all political, social, and economic developments and decisions are discussed by the federal government's State Security Council, which includes representatives of the state and national authorities, and the intelligence forces of the Defence and Interior ministries." Why now?
Plenty of warning signs gave advance notice of the Acteal massacre. The first reports about the worsening situation in the Chenalhó municipality date from August 1997. The victims were not memknown as "The Bees" (Las Abejas). In the bers of the EZLN, but a community government's logic, whoever is not with them is an enemy. including the progressive sections of the Catholic Church (the main religion in Chiapas and Mexico), which demand that the government respect the San Andrés Agreements. Through its terror, the regime wants to create panic, and a psychosis that will paralyse the growing Zapatista presence in the region. Fresh in the generals' memories is the image of 1,111 Zapatista Indian representatives arriving in Mexico City last September: "one for each of the communities where we are present," according to Subcomandante Marcos.
Ironically, the massacre was used by the regime to justify dispatching a further 5,000 troops to Chiapas, in a "saturation" operation, supposedly "to protect communities, persons and property." is
The military siege has extended like a spider's web throughout the zones controlled or influenced by the EZLN, without laying a hand on members of the paramilitary groups. One week after the Acteal massacre, the President's office announced that one AK-47 assault rifle had been found.
There are now 136 army bases in Chiapas, a state with slightly more than two million inhabitants, as well as 40 Public Security Police posts, 10 Judicial Police posts, 20 National Migration Institute (border guards) posts and three Special Forces bases. '
The logic is one of open war. Not surprisingly, before his visit to Europe in October 1997, President Zedillo declared that he did not see any "short term solution in Chiapas." ' The way the government seeks to "resolve" the Chiapas conflict will take its time. Unmasking this strategy of open and covert warfare is an essential task for the solidarity movement. The only way to prevent another massacre is to stop the Mexican government from pursuing its criminal policies. * 1. See the declarations by Mexico's Federal Attorney General, La Jornada, 24, 25 and 26 December 1997. 2. Proceso #1105, 4 January 1998.
Mexico *
3. "Los Partes de Guerra del EZLN," 11, 19 and 20
December 1994, in EZLN, Documentos y comunicados, vol. 2, published by ERA, 1995, pp.167 and appendix.
4. Official Decree. 9 March 1995.
5. La Jornada, 9 January 1998.
6. Centro de Información y Análisis de Chiapas, La
Opinión #74, 1 October 1997.
7. La Jornada, 31 December 1997. As high as 1,500, according to Proceso #1184, 30 December 1997.
8. La Jornada, 30 December 1997.
9. La Jornada, 11 August 1997.
"Paz y Justicia" and "Chinchulines"
10. These groups are
"Máscara Roja", Movimiento Indíin northen Chiapas, gena Revolucionario Antizapatista" (MIRA) and "Tomás
Munzer" in the Altos region, and "Alianza Fray Bartolomé de los Llanos" in the central valleys. See "Chiapas, mapa de la contraisurgencia," La Jornada, 23 November
1997. El Tiempo, 27 October 1997, and Proceso #1104.
28 December 1997.
11. A. Aubry y A. Inda, "¿Quiénes son los
"paramilitares"?"
, La Jornada, 23 December 1997.
12. La Jornada, 17 December 1997.
13. La Jornada, 28 December 1997.
14. This is the sense of last November's assassination attempt against Bishop Samuel Ruiz and his assistant.
No-one has been detained for this crime.
15. According to the Defence Minister, La Jornada, 29
December 1997.
16. La Jornada, 30 December 1997.
17. Le Monde, 2 October 1997.
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