south-western Cholla Provinces from South Korea's long economic boom. Terry Lawless A comprehension of Korean regional loyalties and antagonisms is central to any attempt to understanding this election result.
Under the rule of President Park Chung-hee (1961-79), there emerged a strategic pole of military, political and economic power whose centre of gravity was the Taegu/North Kyongsang Province in the south-east of the country. President Park, who himself came from this region, channelled project after project into the cities of the two Kyongsang provinces and systematically rewarded and promoted those from his home region. The corollary of the "Yushin" economic policy, modelled on the Japan that Park had militarily served and admired, was the economic exclusion of the south-west of the country from his plans.
Shaken by the enormous popularity of Kim Dae-jung, who emerged as a youthful candidate from Cholla province in the 1970 presidential election, Park drew two conclusions. The first was the declaration of martial law in 1972 to ensure the indefinite continuation of his rule. The second was the forbidding of the hiring of anyone from the Cholla region in the state bureaucracy. These people were "too intelligent and cun-
, according to the peasant-General.
One consequence the prolonged martial law was Park's own assassination in 1979. And the systematic exclusion of the south-west from development projects led to the 1980 massacre in Kwangju, capital of Cholla. That military intervention followed local refusal to yield to a second suspension of democracy by another South-Easterner alliance of Army generals (Chun Doo-hwan and Rho Taewoo) in May 1980.
Regional tensions were deliberately inflamed in a country in which Confucian ties to family, school and region, were already strong.
The voting pattern in the 1997 presidential election shows that this regional antagonısm remains very strong. Kim Dae-jung received an astounding 97% in Kwangju itself; 95% in South Cholla and 92% in North Cholla Province. In contrast, he received just 12% in Taegu; 14% in North Kyongsang; 11% in South Kyongsang Province; 15% in Pusan and 15% in Ulsan.
The votes for Lee Hoi-chang, de facto representative of the South-Eastern alliance, were almost exactly reversed: 73% in Taegu, and 3% in South Cholla.
Only in cities like Seoul and Inchon, and the provinces of Kyonggi, and Cheju Island, regions removed from this regional antagonism, did the local election result resemble the nation-wide vote:
As Kim Dae-jung's victory became
The labour candidate
Trade union leader Kwon Young-gil's People's Victory 21 campaign knew that they were building for the future, and did not expect their candidate to win. But they must have been disappointed with the election result. The leader of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions took only 1.2% of the vote (306,026 ballots), finishing fourth in the
Kwon, who was the only candidate from the Kyongsang region, was also affected by the regional factor. His vote was more or less consistent except for the Cholla region where it fell sharply, ranging between 0.4% in N. Cholla and 0.2% in Kwangju and S. Cholla. It soared to 6% in Ulsan, the home of many Hyundai factories as well as the largest shipbuilding yard and steel mill
The biggest problems faced by the campaign were lack of money and the monopoly of media attention by the three bourgeois candidates.
Another significant factor is the nature of Korean union membership which is concentrated in large and heavy industrial concerns. The overall union rate in Korea, as Kwon pointed out to the Mal readership, has fallen 6 International Viewpoint #297 from a high of 18% in 1987 to 12.6% today. Factories with work forces of less than twenty persons usually experience difficulty in organising a union. There are further restrictions on teachers and civil servants forming unions in their workplaces. There are also still legal restrictions on union officials' electioneering activity. Two union leaders were arrested for supporting Kwon in front of their members
The fact that this was a national presidential election and not an election of local party candidates to the National Assembly surely also played a role. The next National Assembly elections will not take place until the year 2000. The election was also cynically timed for final exams week. It is possible that this limited the student vote to some extent, even though polling day itself was a national holiday.
The biggest reason, however, is undoubtedly the lack of awareness of the difference between a bourgeois dissident and a labour candidate. The majority of progressive students surely voted for Kim Dae-jung in order not to "waste" their vote. It seems that political education is therefore a priority for the new labour party. [TL] * clear, tens of thousands in Kwangju took to the streets to celebrate, occupying the central plaza where the Army massacred between 1,000 and 2,000 people in May 1980. The victory of Kim Dae-jung was seen as a satisfaction of the lingering han (bitterness, grudge) from the Kwangju massacre and the rule of the military juntas of Park and Chun. This was the first time in fifty years that the presidential nominee of the party in power had failed Kim Dae-jung's plans
Overall, however, this victory does not herald major progressive change. Presidentelect Kim Dae-jung is a very corrupt man - as much a product of Korean bourgeois politics as he is its supposed nemesis. One of his first moves was to outline plans for a law outlawing criminal investigations motivated by political revenge, in the knowledge that he continues to be a prime target for such investigation.
More significantly, the conditions laid down by the IMF, which Kim Dae-jung has vowed to follow, ensure that his room for manoeuvre is incredibly small.
His basic goal is to pay back the loan as soon as possible in order to resume an independent Korean economic policy. The chances of his being able to do this in the new time frame of two years which he has set himself seem virtually non-existent.
There is talk that some continuing police-state practices will be curtailed: movie censorship, the domestic activities of the Agency for National Security Planning and the release of some, but not all,
But the political compromises that Kim Dae-jung has made since he came out of retirement means that there will be little to distinguish his rule from that of his predecessor Kim Young-sam.
To secure a majority voting block, Kim Dae-jung joined forces a month before the election with the United Liberal Democrats of Kim Jong-pil. Kim Jong-pil was for many years the central figure of Korean repressive politics.
He was the co-author of the Park Chung-hee coup d'état in 1961 and the long time chief of the Korean CIA. It is unfortunate but true that his support was crucial to Kim Dae-jung's victory, particularly in Kim Jong-pil's home region, the two Chungchong provinces.
According to labour candidate Kwon Young-gil, who scored 1.2% nationwide, this alliance with Kim Jong-pil stripped Kim Dae-jung of whatever lingering progressive content he might otherwise have
Kim Dae-jung has spent a good deal of his time since his return to politics in courting the right wing. He has systematically taken his distance from the student movement, praised highly the achievements of President Park, and even addressed a gathering of geriatric communists - something he would have
As official leader of the National Assembly last year, he sat firmly on the
During the actual campaign, he was torced to backtrack somewhat by the Grand National Party's attacks on him as a closet Communist and the Justice Ministry's denial that Korea has any prisoners of conscience, despite the evidence put forward by Amnesty International. Kim pardoned some criminals at Christmas; it would appear that no political prisoners were set free at the same time.
Nevertheless, the election was a further sign of Korea's relative democratisation, For the first time in Korean history, the public saw three televised presidential debates (and one minor candidate debate featuring trade union leader Kwon Young-gil).
These mediatised debates replaced the mass public rallies which dominated previous election campaigns. Those campaigns were notorious for the large sums of money which were handed out to participants by rally organisers. In contrast, the money distributed this time around appears to have gone almost entirely to What now?
The Grand National Party now looks set for a batch of defections to Kim Dae-jung's National Congress for New Politics. The futher decline of this highly opportunist regional grouping of career politicians should be welcomed. Rhee In-je is threatened with a similar fate overtaking his organisation, especially given its lack of funds.
The Washington Post suggested in a recent editorial that Kim Dae-jung will have to preside over a National Assembly majority hostile to his interests, but this view results from the mistaken application of western party political norms to the different Korean situation.
Kwon Young-gil suggested in a recent interview with the Korean language prog ressive monthly Mal that organisations like the Grand National Party should not be honoured with the title "party" in the
These organisations lack the most elementary of programs; and never outlast the defeat, defection or imprisonment of a leading personality. This explains why figures seemingly from the right and left of the Korean political spectrum can unite with a minimum of ideological fuss.