Middle East after Lebanon war
US imperialism fails to achieve stability
The army has been reorganized, the capital reunified, and at the beginning of March the Lebanese state regained control of the port of Beirut. Before this, the port had been in the hands of the Phalangist militia, representing one of their main sources of revenue.
On the other hand, the Lebanese National Movement (MNL) presided over by Walid Jumblat and the Lebanese workers
Livio MAITAN The April 18 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut drew attention to the fact that the United States is getting more and more deeply involved in a quagmire part of a tuan of ale tracter the ease mi tian 0.8. piemain 1s raeli allies continue to run roughshod over the country and drive the Arab population to desperation.
The moves to stabilize the region that began in September at imperialist prompting have thus far come to nought. This failure is shown clearly by the dragging on of the Israeli-Lebanese negotiations without any perspective of success in the near future, as well as by the debacle of the operation by King Hussein of Jordan, which was announced on April 10. (1) ians in the summer of 1982.
movement remain in deep crisis. For the moment, they have neither the ability nor the will to challenge the new central government. (2)
Nonetheless, the situation is far from stabilized, and the Lebanese state is still far from effectively controlling the national territory. In fact, it controls only the capital and the surrounding areas.
PROLIFERATION OF ARMED FACTIONS
In the north, bloody conflicts broke out at the end of December and the be-
The retreat of the PLO forces from Palestine and the Israeli occupation of part of Lebanon created a more favorable relationship of forces for Zionism and imper ialism, as well as for the conservative Arab regimes.
Both the Zionists and the imperialists and the right-wing Arab governments tried to exploit this shift to force the PLO to give up its struggle to establish a genuinely which would remain to be defined.
Central to these plans for bringing about a political recomposition in the region is the achievement of a "normalized" Lebanon under the control of the most reactionary forces, with the Christian Phalangists playing the dominant role.
ERÊNCIA MUNDIAL DE SOLIDAR EDA. TO POVO ARABE E A SUA CAUSA CENTR A QUESTAO PALESTINIANA
WORLD CONFERE CE IN SOLIDARITY
WITH THE ARAD PEOPLE AND THEIR
TEN CAUSE TY
ginning of January between the Alawites under Syrian influence, and Sunni Muslims who, despite their heterogeneity, are united by a common hostility to Syria.
In the Tripoli region, Rashid Karame, the traditional Sunni chief and former Lebanese premier, continues to play the predominant role. But in Zghorta, the bailiwick of former president Soleiman Frangieh, it is Maronite Christians hostile to the Phalangists who hold sway. (3)
In the Chouf region south of Beirut, the situation has not been stabilized either. Battles have raged on several occasions between the Phalangists and the Druzes represented by Walid Jumblat, chairman of the MNL and leader of the
Philip Habib, the U.S. representative and No. 1 imperialist negotiator, said on April 16 in Cairo that he "did not see an agreement soon in the talks on Lebanon" and that he "did not share the optimistic views expressed by various parties." 2. The Lebanese National Movement (MNL) embraces various left formations, including the Commist Pa Party Was suspended activites in Walid Jumblat's Progressive Socialist Party. order to carry out a reorganization.
For its part, the Communist Party has undertaken a self-criticism, which is interesting in several respects. Its general secretary. Georges Hawi, among others, has made criticisms of other forces as well as the CP. The Syrians are reproached for "their hesitations and their obvious lack of foresight." The Palestinians are criticized for getting involved in a game of upping the ante, "which led to the accumulation of fabulous amounts of arms for the sole purpose of bolstering the position of 'one another Palestinian tendency." The CP itself is said to have been "timid" in its criticisms of the abuses committed by the PLO. The latter supposedly include the setting up of an em bry onic ministate in Lebanon opposed to the legal authorities and controlling many areas of the COLLILLY. At the same time, Hawi criticized the Lebanese National Movement for its inability to organize daily life in the zones it controlled (see of Al Tarik, which appeared at the beginning of 1983 and was quoted Mo Me de om apie, 180198Y 1983
Monde diplomatique, February At the time this article was written, Frangieh's militia shut off the TV relay stations for the north when the official news broadcast and instead broadcast their own news program.
19
Resolution of Palestinian National Council
PALESTINIAN NATIONAL UNITY
"The heroic resistance in Lebanon and in Beirut was a concrete expression
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). Every source of information stresses that the Israeli army has done its best to whip up these conflicts and keep them going.
In the south, where the Shi'ite militia Amal also operates, the Zionists have extended the area consigned to their stooge, of Palestinian national unity. On the basis of this exemplary experience, the
"Commander" Saad Haddad. So far, he
Palestinian National Council stresses the need to reinforce the unity of the has refused to let either the Lebanese various revolutionary movements included in the framework of the PLO and to army or the Phalangist militias enter his develop the organizational relationships in all institutions of the PLO on the bailiwick.
Significantly, a few months basis of united action, collective leadership, and the program adopted by the ago, Haddad decided to ban activity by all political parties, including the Phalangists, in the area he controls.
INDEPENDENT DECISION-MAKING POWER
The Bekaa valley, which is close to the
Syrian border, remains under the control
"The Council reaffirms its commitment to independent Palestinian decisionof Damascus.
To complete the picture making power and its determination to defend this against all pressures, regardof the Lebanese situation, it should be mentioned that Palestinian forces are still present, both in the Bekaa valley and in
THE PALESTINIAN ARMED STRUGGLE
Morevover, the Shi'ite organizations
"The Council reaffirms the necessity of developing armed struggle against the are playing a not inconsiderable role. Be-
Zionist enemy and the right of the forces of the Palestinian revolution to launch sides the Amal contingents in the south, military operations from every Arab front. It also stresses the need for unifying elements of the faction of Amal led by the forces of the Palestinian revolution in the framework of a national liberation
Hussein Mosavi are operating in the Bekaa valley, with the agreement of the Syrians.
(There is also another Shi'ite faction in
THE BREZHNEV PLAN
Beirut, led by Nabil Behri.)
It should not be forgotten either that
The Palestinian National Council expresses its appreciation and support to there are Iranian pasdars in the Bekaa he proposals contained in the plan presented by Chairman Brezhnev on Septem valley. There are also local groups that identify with the Khomeini ideology. One
"These proposals reaffirm the inalienable national rights of our people, notsuch formation is the Islamic Jihad Orably its right to return, to self-determination, and to the establishment of an ganization, which has claimed responsibindependent state under the aegis of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative ility for several attacks on the Multinational Force (made up of U.S., French,
"The Council expresses its appreciation to the countries of the Socialist Bloc
Italian, and British troops), including for their positions with respect to the just cause of our people, positions that the recent dynamiting of the U.S. emare reiterated in the Prague Declaration of January 3, 1983, on the situation in bassy. (4)
Finally, despite the restrictions that have been imposed on them, the Phal-
THE REAGAN PLAN angist militia has largely maintained its autonomy.
The attempt to integrate it
"In its approach and substance, besides being out of line with international into the rebuilt Lebanese army has relaw, the Reagan plan does not satisfy the inalienable national rights of the Pal-
As Samir Kassir, Le estinian people. It denies the Palestinian people the right of return, the right to
Monde Diplomatique's correspondent put self-determination and to create an independent state. And it denies to the PLO it, the Phalangist organizations continue its right to be recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian to represent "para-state structures."
The Zionist leaders who are helping
"Therefore, the Palestinian Council declares its refusal to consider the Reagan directly and indirectly to prolong this sitplan as a valid basis for a just and lasting settlement of the Palestinian problem uation of "instability" in the "new" Lebanon, keep finding new pretexts to coninue their occupation. In fact, they fear that they will be unable to get the full benefits from the operation they launched last June, and which has proved very costly militarily, economically, and diplomatically, as well as in terms of their political position inside Israel.
The pretext used to justify the invasion of Lebanon, the claim that this was a means of assuring the security of Israel's frontiers, is fading away, even in official Zionist propaganda.
In reality, what Menahem Begin and his government want is to force
Syrians to get out, drive the remaining
PLO forces out of Lebanon, and force a massive exodus of the Palestinian refu-
It is no secret to anyone that the aim of the September 1982 massacres in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Chatila was to get the Palestinians
Only to the extent that the Israeli leaders can achieve these objectives
20 less of their source."
army."
ber 16, 1982.
of the Palestinian people.
the Middle East."
people.
and the Arab-Zionist confliet." will they consider withdrawing their troops.
The Israeli policy thus runs counter to stabilizing Lebanon politically but also economically. The economic aspect should not be minimized. There is no need to stress how much the war has affected Lebanese industry and agriculture. Efforts to get the country's economy moving again being seriously obstructed by the "free" circulation of goods imposed by the occupation forces.
The Zionist leaders are carrying out fullfledged dumping operations, selling the products of their food industry as well as basic agricultural products at lower prices and pushing the equivalent Lebanese products off the market. Southern Lebanese agriculture, in particular, is threatened.
At the same time, the Israeli authorities are using Lebanon as a springboard to get into other markets in the region. In the areas they control, they are repackaging Israeli goods to conceal their origin. Thus, Israel can sell these goods through Beirut to Arab countries that would not accept products openly coming from Israel. Another maneuver has been to open the Israeli port of Haifa to goods destined for Lebanon, with port charges lower than those in force in Beirut. (5)
This evolution of the situation in Lebanon cannot fail to have an impact on the attitude of the Arab states most directly concerned 4. Liberation (Paris) of April 9, 1983; E1 Pais (Madrid) of December 9, 1983. 5. See, in particular, Le Monde diplomatique of February 1983, Le Monde of February 16, 1983; the International Herald Tribune, March 15, 1983; Revue d'etudes palestiniennes, Number 7; El Pais, December 6, 1982.
In this respect, the Syrian government has to take into consideration the political situation it faces at home. spite repression and certain appearances, stability remains precarious. has to use every available means to increase its specific weight in order to gain its own objectives in the region. To accomplish these ends, it is trying to reinforce its positions by extending its influence over certain Palestinian organiza-
Thus, the Syrian regime is trying to line up those sections of the Palestinian movement that disagree with the policy of Yasser Arafat, the main leader of the
Secondly, and this aspect is the most important, the Syrian regime is trying to reorganize its armed forces and increase its military potential, turning to the Soviet Union once again for aid. An instance of this is the replacement of the Sam-6s destroyed by the Israeli attacks in June 1982 by a more effective missile force, its standpoint, the Soviet bureaucracy has every interest in accepting the requests of a government that at the moment is the only ally it can count on in the region. By this means it can hope to avoid being frozen out of the big political operations that are developing in the area. (6)
For its part, Jordan has found it necessary to get back on the front line. Since the turn made by Anwar as-Sadat in 1977, it has been one of the imperialists' avowed aims to get Jordan to follow this example. But for a whole series of reasons — among other things, the fact that 55% to 60% of the Jordanian population is Palestinian and the continuing effects of the 1967 war, such as the loss of the Left Bank of the Jordan - King Hussein has had much less maneuvering room than Sadat did. He has had to worry a lot more about the reactions of the PLO and the other Arab states. why Washington's pressures have not produced the results hoped for. (7)
The PLO's withdrawal from Beirut, the shift in the relationship of forces in
The Syrians' concerns have been expressed recently by the pro-government Tishrin, rejected the idea of a simultaneous withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli forces. It wrote, among other things: "The city of Chtaura in the Bekaa valley is closer to Damascus than any Syrian city. It is, therefore, impossible to separate the security of Lebanon from that of Syria in the context of the state of war that prevails between Syria and Israel."
In a message sent in mid-April to the Syrian president, Reagan made a small overture, inasmuch as he stressed that "Resolution 242 of the Security Council applies to the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights." Begin shot back immediately "The status of the Golan plateau is determined solely by the annexation law passed by the Knesset on December 14, 1981." (Le Monde of April 19-22, 1983.)
Le Monde's correspondent in Amman summed up as follows that arguments put forward in the debates in the leading circles in the Jordanian capital: "Jordan would have a hard time surviving the sort of isolation Egypt experienced after the concluding of the Camp David Accords, in particular, because it would lose the financial aid it gets from the oil-producing states. Moreover, in the event of a failure, the Arab world would make the Hashemite monarchy a scapegoat, which is something that the Jordanian leaders want to avoid at all costs."
favor of the most moderate Arab states, and the resolution adopted at the Fez summit in September 1982, following the in Lebanon, offered the Amman government a chance to take the initiative on the diplomatic front.
Since the beginning of the negotiations between the PLO and the leaders of the Arab states, it has been clear that Hussein was trying to reconcile the "peace plan" proposed by Reagan with the document adopted by the Fez meeting
The Jordanian king could hope for success in such an operation, inasmuch as Yasser Arafat and his closest collaborators expressed judgements on several occasions that did not clearly reject the Reagan plan. They even talked explicitly certain adjustments that could bring the two plans closer together. (8)
More concretely, these leaders tried to get the PLO to agree not to make recognition of the Palestinians' right to an independent state a precondition for dis-
They also wanted the PLO to accept a compromise with regard to its participation in negotiations, since the Israelis would not agree to any direct PLO involvement. For his part, the preconditions Hussein put forward were, besides Palestinian participation in the negotiations, the withdrawal of the Israelis from Lebanon and a freeze on Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.
For the PLO, in such a context, there is no way it can consider making any further concessions. The only ones possible would be on its part alone and without means to give presents to Israel and the United States." Yasser Arafat aptly re
This is why, at the beginning of April, the PLO leadership let Hussein know that it would not waive its precondition of acceptance of the Palestinians' right to independence, and that it was maintaining its demand to be allowed to participate directly in the negotiations. At the same time, the PLO leadership reiterated the negative judgement of the Reagan plan expressed by its National Council, which met in February in Algiers. (9) (Le Monde of March 27-28, 1983.)
See, for example, the statement of Nabil an advisor of Arafat, who said, among other things: "The PLO has not rejected the Reagan plan, but only its omissions as regards rights....We are looking for ways to bring the Reagan plan and the Arab project adopted
Fez closer together... We envisage, for exincluding in the Reagan plan the principle of a referendum in order to exercise our right to self-determination and also the setting of a multinational force in the occupied territories even before Israeli withdrawal, the right of return." (Le Monde, December 8. 1982.)
It should be recalled, moreover, that in a of the PNC, Khaled Al Fahum, the achievement of the national rights of the Palestinian people would involve "in particular the right to a state in the West and in with its capital in Jerusalem." (Liberation, February 17, 1983.)
On the basis of certain reports and certain passages in the April 10, 1983, statement of the Jordanian government, conclusion might be drawn that Arafat's point of view, favorable to further negotiation, was in
It is difficult, however, to verify this interpretation.
THE COMPOSITION
OF THE PNC
The Palestinian National Council includes 315 members and is presided over by Khaled Al Fahum, who resides in Damascus.
Le Monde of February 15, 1983, the seats are divided as follows among the various components of the Palestinian people, which is estimated at 4 million persons:
Representatives of the guerrilla movements (94 members): 33 for Al Fateh, 12 for Saika, 12 for the FPLP of Georges Habash, 12 for the FDLP of Nayef Hawatmeh, 9 for the FLA (a pro-Iraqi group), 8 for the FPLP-General Command of Ahmed Jibril (a proLibyan group), 4 for the Front of the Palestinian People's Struggle of Samir Ghosh (pro-Syrian) and 4 for the Palestinian Liberation (a splinter group
- Representatives from social and professional associations 51) memfollow Fateh: workers (18), women (8), teachers (7), students (7), writers and journalists (3), jurists (3), engineers (3), the medical and paramedical professions (5), youth (2), artists (1).
The diaspora (62) members: Jordan (17), Lebanon (9), Syria (7), Iraq (1), The Palestinians who live in the Gulf states, who are big contributors to the finances of the PLO, have
Kuwait (9), Saudi Arabia (8), Abu Dhabi (2), and Qatar (2). Palestinians living in North America have 7 seats.
- To these three categories of delegates, who are elected by their var organizations, are added 108 members coopted by the vote of these
The coopted members include 75 independent personalities, 13 representatives of the intelligentsia, and 20 notables expelled from West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
- Finally, in theory, there are 122 delegates from inside Palestine, whose identity is kept secret. In fact, they do not participate in the work of the PNC because of the risk of reprisals by
The PNC, which was designed to be a parliament in exile, meets on the average once every two years and sets the main orientations for the Palestinian central leadership. sions, it is the Central Council of the PLO (55) members) that is encharged with assuring that the PNC resolutions are properly applied and with maintaining a check over the activities of the Executive Committee of the PLO (which serves as the Palestinian government in exile).
21
Hussein decided, in rejoinder, to pull out of the game for the moment, declaring that henceforward Jordan "would leave it to the PLO and the Palestinian people to find the means to defend their territory and achieve their objectives."
Arafat was quick to make it known that he did not consider the relations between the Jordanians and Palestinians to have been broken off. There was, he
"a misunderstanding over some points." Subsequently, the Central Committee of Al-Fateh came out explicitly for the resumption of the talks (La Presse, April 26, 1983). Nonetheless the diplomatic efforts underway for months came
THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL
The meeting of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) was held in February, after somewhat turbulent preparations. Yasser Arafat was in a difficult position. . He had to demonstrate that although the Palestinian withdrawal from Beirut had weakened the PLO militarily, it could bring political and diplomatic benefits. The results he had to offer were not en-
There were, to be sure, overtures from certain European capitalist governments, notably from Britain, which moderated its former intransigence and agreed to the presence of a PLO member in the Arab countries' delegation that visited the UK in pursuance of a decision of the Fez
But on the crucial points, èspecially the Palestinians' right to self-determination, no progress was registered.
On the other hand, in the Palestinian camp, the crisis was having a series of effects. Signs of discontent and demoralization appeared among the refugees in Lebanon, who felt that they had been abandoned to their fate. Among fedayin transported to other Arab countries, Tunisia for example, open challenges to the leadership emerged
What is more, Palestinian organizations and leaders who differed with Yasser Arafat's orientation went on a full-fledged of-
For example, in December, Abu Saleh, one of the representatives of the left in the PLO, criticized the contacts Arafat established with the Jordanian as well as the trip to Egypt by Abu Zaim, one of the PLO chairman's
In making these moves, outside the Palestinian consensus." (10)
Two months earlier, an attack was launched by Syria. The Damascus minister of information, Ahmed Iskander, challenged Arafat's right to speak in the name of the PLO in his talks with Hus-
The Syrian president Hafez el-Assad himself made no secret of his differences with Yasser Arafat. On the occasion of the December meeting of the PLO Central Council, two Syrian-controlled organ-
As-Saika and the Popular Front
Struggle expressed positions critical of Arafat. The Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command headed by Ahmed Jibril took a similar
In January, the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine of Nayef Hawatmeh, the FPLP-C, Saika, the FLP, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine of George Habash expressed more outspoken opposition. In Libya, they circulated a statement rejecting not only the Reagan plan but also the decisions of the Fez sum-
So, Yasser Arafat had to try to regain control of the situation and come out of the PNC meeting with greater maneuvering room. In order to accomplish this in a situation in which all his diplomatic moves had failed to get any real results, he had to step up his tone. Among other things, he reaffirmed the necessity of armed struggle, condemned the Reagan plan, and soft-pedalled his overtures to Egypt. He took his distance from the most moderate elements, and adopted a more cautious attitude in with Israeli personalities opposed to Begin. (13)
The final resolution of the PNC reflects this stance. In particular, it includes enthusiastic support for the plan proposed by Brezhnev. responded to internal needs, above all a diplomatic importance. is why the task of hailing the role and policy of the USSR was given to the chief Palestinian diplomat, Faruk Kadon the one hand, the PLO's support for the Brezhnev plan satisfied Syria and appeased the organizations that had criticized Arafat with encouragement from the Syrians and Qadhafi. other hand, it was a warning to the imperialist powers and to the moderate
However, it cannot be forgotten that the Brezhnev plan involves recognizing the state of Israel. The game was really subtle.
Nonetheless, the framework of the PLO was maintained, and its political, social, and cultural institutions will be
At the same time, the principle was accepted that the military groups should be unified in a "Palestinian National Army." Finally, Yasser Arafat got his authority upheld. (14)
As for the resolution adopted, it is worth quoting a choice comment that 10. Le Monde, December 11, 1982 della Sera, February 13, 1983.
Le Monde, January 18, 1983.
Le Monde diplomatique of March 1983, but the article does not name them. Palestinian resistance in agreement with the Palestinian resistance and Libya (which did not participate in the Arab summit in Fez).
Arafat dropped renunciation of the Camp elation recondition for stablish although in relatively flexible terms, the need
Egyptian government to reject these regards the attitude toward the moderate wing, it should be noted that Issam Serand that following it he resigned from the one of Arafat's friends made in the corridors following the PNC meeting: erally, the resolutions adopted can be interpreted in nine different ways to satisfy all the organizations that make up the PLO, but it is the tenth interpretation, his own, that Arafat actually folorganizations that raised the Arafat mentioned above have nothing to boast about. representatives made apparently radical statements designed to keep up the morale of their troops and reinforce certain diplomatic links with regimes in the re-
This was the case notably of Hawatmeh's speech hailing Syria as the homefront of the Palestinian revolution.
But once again, on an important occasion, these currents proved incapable of offering an alternative to the orientation of Arafat and the majority in his organization, El-Fateh. In the future, they will in all probability continue to combine ringing declarations with lining up alongside the PLO moderates on the decisive questions. (15)
THE ZIONIST LEADERS' PLANS
AND U.S. POLICY
One basic observation is necessary to draw a balance sheet of the general situation in the region. None of the political forces present neither the Arab govthe various local feudalists, or the different tendencies in the Palestinian national movement - are able to ef pursue projects of their own. But all of them can seriously obstruct, if not totally block, the projects of the
This observation obviously holds only very partially for the Zionist state. can very clearly block or scuttle political and diplomatic operations that are not
But it can also make concrete progress in carrying out its shortand medium-term strategy.
We need only recall Menahem Begin's attitude at the time of the turn in relations with Egypt. time can be summed up as "three no's" to Sadat - no return to the 1967 boundaries, no return of the western part of Jerusalem, no independent Palestinian
Israel is is retongress a in ter situa
The PNC has been enlarged on notably by the election of 23 mill itary figures came from camps located in Syri or in zones controlled by the Syrians.
powers of the Executive Committe PNC have been increased, make it possible for it to make more decisio without the calling of a PNC session.
It should be remembered that George whose organization, the FPLO, sig the Declaration of Tripoli, adhered the mo summit as a basis (Le Monde,
As for Jibril of the FPLP-C
despite its foreign and domestic difficulties, to carry through its strategy for consolidating its 1967 conquests and increasing its room for maneuver.
Stepped up colonization of the occupied territories has now become essential element of this strategy. As this policy is being carried forward, the demographic makeup of the occupied territories is undergoing profound changes.
There is a plan to establish about sixty more settlements before 1987, which would represent a 50% increase number of settlements that exist today in the occupied territories. Despite everything, Begin continues to be, and will continue to be, the only credible strategic ally for imperialism in the region. Fundamentally, he has maintained his positions in the arena of world politics.
It hardly needs to be stressed that if it has been and remains possible for Begin to hope to achieve his short-and mediumthis is partly because of the attitude of the other Israeli political
The Sabra and Chatila massacres provoked a major crisis in Israel.
However, Begin was able to make a comeback because the Labor Party opposition, which remains divided, has no Peace Now movement itself was not able to bring to bear quickly enough all the potential of the mass movement it helped to build. (16)
This situation will not change very
A confirmation of this is the polls and the various assessments, all of which agree that if elections were held now, Begin would win a clearer victory
Nonetheless, the resistance that is besouthern. Lebanon and the losses that the Israeli army has already suffered (17) are a first indication of the big difficulties that lie ahead for a strategy based on the ideology of Zionism and the political needs of maintaining a Zion-
The fact remains, however, that in the present conditions, in the short- and medium-term, the Zionist leadership holds better cards than all its adversaries in the
With respect to U.S. policy, it is in Washington's interest today to continue to rely on the Zionist state as the essential support of their strategy in the region. In fact, today there is no other state in the region that can take over the role that the shah of Iran played as the bulwark of the imperialists' neocolonial strategy.
From this standpoint, not much gress has been made with Egypt since Camp David, and as for Saudi Arabia, its intrinsic social and political weakness may be dangerously increased by the drop in oil production and therefore in the income of the country. (18)
The problem for Washington is not that it fails to recognize that it is dangerous to rely on Israel alone but that today it has no concrete alternative. Moreover, no political pressure alone can induce the Zionist leadership to rectity its course.
Yasser Arafat and Hussein of Joran (DR)
If Washington were determined force the Zionist government to change its orientation, the only way to do so would be to cut off economic aid and threaten to strangle Israel. But this is a risk no U.S. leader is ready to run, pecially in a period when the elections are already in sight. (19)
In reality, U.S. economic and military aid to Israel is far from having been suspended or even substantially reduced. In various forms, it is growing. (20)
The obstacles that the Zionist leadership put in the way of any significant concessions to the Palestinians are reinforced by the refusal of the U.S. imperialists to force Israel to make any substantial change in its strategy. This is leading, then, to a situation of impasse, with all the consequences that can flow from it.
As regards the Palestinian resistance, the consequence will be that Yasser Arafat, and more generally, the PLO moderates, will not be able to follow up their options in practice.
At the same time, given the new relationship of forces, attempts to renew struggle on a revolutionary basis would face still greater difficulties.
The chances of a new stage opening up in the national liberation struggle will be affected by the strategic choices made by the Palestinian resistance. These would be improved if the resistance
"Political Crisis Deepens in Israel" by point, No. 24, February 21, p. 6. April 15 guerrilla Lebanon had resulted in wounded. (Le Monde, April 20, 1983.)
Saudi oil production has taken a major According to polls done by the Chicago ing fell to 32% after Sabra and Chatila but has climbed back up to 48%. (Le Monde, adopted a strategy based in a thoroughgoing way on mobilizing the masses in the occupied territories, on organizing and mobilizing the Palestinians in the countries where they find themselves, on an alliance with the Israeli opposition, and in general based on linking up with the exploited and oppressed masses throughout the region.
A very great responsibility falls to the workers movement, to its political and trade-union organizations, in the imperialist countries, especially in those states that are participating in the Multinational Interposition Force (the U.S., Britain, France, and Italy). (22)
INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY
We are aware of the difficulty at the moment to build real mass movements in solidarity with the Palestinians. mass reactions were limited even in the period of the Zionist aggression and the siege of Beirut. Thus, spectacular mobilizations cannot be expected now.
Nonetheless, it is the duty of revolutionists to engage in building campaigns of solidarity with the Palestinian people's struggle against Zionism and imperialism. The slogans that the Fourth International put forward in the October 10, 1982 resolution of the United Secretariat remain entirely appropriate today. (23)
It is necessary to campaign for the following demands:
- Immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Zionist and imperialist troops
- Immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territories occupied in 1967.
of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.
Solidarity with the struggle of the Palestinian resistance against the
- Freedom of action for the Palestinian resistance in all the Arab states.
Recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestin-
Solidarity with the struggles of the Palestinian population in the occupied territories and with the antiwar movement in Israel.
Solidarity with the Palestinian masses in Lebanon and with the Lebanese anti-imperialist movement.
Immediate release of all Palestinian and non-Palestinian prisoners taken by the Zionist army or by other repres
As one significant indication, quite recently Israel was authorized to buy American made parts for a new fighter plane.
The impasse was clearly recognized in a April 19 International Herald Tribune
With regard to the Multinational Interpo of the Fourth International and pubOctober 4, 1982, p. 8.
"The War in Lebanon: Turn in Middle No. 16, November 1, 1982, p. 20.