About 1,000 people attended the nation-wide shop-stewards meeting the A Europe of the regions? day after parliament declared the strike illegal. The atmosphere was agitated, but while most participants condemned the intervention, very few actually represented workplaces willing to continue the struggle despite the new legislation.
The co-ordination committee didn't want to initiate more activities. But representatives of two of the largest and most active trade unions in Copenhagen wanted to plan a large demonstration for May 11. But this proposal was easily dismissed, since it was clear that such a protest would not represent a perspective of continued struggle against the government intervention. What next?
At present, no plans are afloat to continue the struggle through a collective fight against the government-imposed deal. But this does not mean the strike was completely defeated. The struggle created and strengthened the seeds of the future reconstruction of a left wing in the labour
Søren Sondergaard explains: "Among the strikers the government intervention has been met with big dissatisfaction. Many see it as a fundamental attack on the right to strike.
"But there won't be a united protest strike against the government intervention. Partly because some feel that they actually have gained something from the conflict, but first and foremost because there is not any credible leadership for a united fight for a better outcome. The trade union leaders have objected to the intervention but will not lead any extra-parliamentary fight against a law adopted by a social democratic government.
"Since the big strikes in 1985, the trade union left has been weakened at the workplaces and among shop-stewards. More
The poor and peripheral nation of Wales is the scene for the latest European Union summit. Led by Tony Blair, Europe's leaders will discuss huge cuts in regional aid. Ceri Evans* explains. The regional policy of the European Union (EU), was grandly designated in the Maastricht Treaty as a commitment to "economic and social cohesion and solidarity among the member states". The two main mechanisms proposed to facilitate this cohesion were structural funds, directed at poor regions across the whole of the EU, and cohesion funds, specifically targeted at the four poorest members -Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece.
Despite many years of such funding, the EU's own figures show that enormous inequalities still exist.' The German port of Hamburg has a per capita GDP nearly twice the EU average, four times higher than that of the poorest regions in Greece, Spain, Italy and eastern Germany. The poorest regions in Britain are Merseyside and South Yorkshire, with GDP of 70% of
Across Europe, wealth remains concentrated in and around state capitals. Greater London's GDP per head is 139% of the EU average. There is a "golden banana" of wealthy regions, stretching from London, Brussels and Paris down through the Rhinelands of western Germany and into northern Italy.
EURO DEMONSTRATION
CARDIFF JUNE 13 '98
EWRO WRTHDYSTIAD CAERDYDD 13 MEHEFIN '98
Of the four poorest states, only Ireland has made significant progress. The relative position of Spain and Portugal has only slightly improved, while Greece has actually fallen further behind the EU average
Nationalists in many smaller nations point to the Irish experience as a model for existing [and new] small nations in Europe. But, while Ireland has enjoyed a mini-boom in recent years, there are a number of structural problems. EU grants are only awarded if the local government provides matching funds. In Ireland and elsewhere, this has meant cuts in many other areas of government spending, in order to attract subsidies in those areas Brussels considers important.
The benefits of the cohesion fund bonanza have been very unevenly distributed, contributing to a deepening of inequa lity within the country. Most EU money has been spent on infrastructure, and outrageous corporate tax breaks to attract
* European Union foreign investment. This is hardly a model of equitable and sustainable development which other small nations should try to emulate.
EU regional policy is a failure. There has been no fundamental change in the pattern of regional inequalities since the early 1970's, when regional funds were first established. In fact, the situation has deteriorated. And the concentration of wealth and investment in the core regions of Europe will probably be accelerated by the free movement of capital and labour enshrined in the Single European Act, and the destruction of less profitable enterprises and industries when the single currency is introduced.
More far-sighted observers warned of these trends when the Maastricht treaty was first signed.* Even some supporters of Maastricht, such as Wayne David, leader of the British Labour group in the European Parliament, have acknowledged that such trends are "inevitable." 5
Social democrats like David say that the Maastricht project contained two trends. The first was a move towards concentration of ownership and the centralisation of production in a few core regions, driven by economic and monetary union. But they said there would also be a counter-tendency towards regional decentralisation, facilitated by regional funds, the principle of subsidiarity, according to which decision-making would be decentralised wherever this brought benefits to the citizens, and the creation of the Com-
Established by the Maastricht Treaty, the Committee of the Regions first met in 1994. It is composed of 222 delegates from regional and local authorities across the EU. The European Council (heads of
EU Regional spending 2000-2006
Cohesion Funds of which pre-Accession Aid
* (in Euro 10 billion)
Under the new proposals, the present five categories of regional assistance will be reduced to three:
• Objective 1: The poorest regions, with
GDP less than 75% of the EU average.
• Objective 2: Areas with unemployment above the EU average.
• Objective 3: aiming to tackle high unemployment, combat poverty, anticipate economic change and promote opportunities for women. Replaces the
European Social Fund,
Funding at pre-Agenda 2000 levels will only be automatic for Objective 1 areas.
Areas which lose Objective 1 status will have their funding phased out over six years; those that lose Objective 2 status over four years. * national government), the Commission and the European Parliament are supposed to consult the Committee on certain questions where regional interests are deemed to be involved. The Committee can also deliver opinions on its own initiative. It has no powers beyond this.
But the powerlessness of the Committee is not the only problem. It represents such wide, and sometimes contradictory, interests that it is difficult to see what role
This confusion stems from the tremendous diversity of Europe's smaller nations, national struggles and regional politics. Nationalism in poorer small nations, like Wales, Scotland and Euskadi (the Basque Country) is most often to the left. In many cases progressive nationalists in smaller nations are in direct competition for working class votes with a more centralist social democratic party.
But the ascendant nationalism of more prosperous small nations, such as Catalonia (in North-West Spain) and Flanders (Dutchspeaking Belgium) is predominantly, though not exclusively to the right. The relatively new phenomenon of right-wing regionalism is most spectacularly illustrated by the growth of Italy's Northern League, but also by significant votes for the Republican Party in the German Land (state) of Baden-Wurttemberg in the early 1990s.
It is hard to see how right-wing politicians from Europe's richest regions, which benefit from the current inequalities, will find common cause with those from the poorest regions, who are obliged to support a more redistributive approach. Such are the dilemmas and contradictions of EU regional policy.
The current meagre resources allocated to regional assistance have failed to address the problem. Since centralist economic tendencies will be accelerated by monetary union, it might be expected that an increase in regional funds would be in order. In fact, the opposite is the case. EU leaders are determined to reduce regional funds, in order to finance EU enlargement to the East. [and to stop new member states like Poland claiming similar subsidies to Greece and Portugal] Agenda 2000
These proposals are contained in a European Commission document entitled Agenda 2000.° As well as cutting regional funds, the proposals include opening EU agriculture to the "free" market, and reducing the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). While there are many real problems with the CAP, the alternative proposed by the Commission will be detrimental to small farmers, rural workers and the environment.?
As the EU expands into East-Central Europe, Polish, Czech and Slovenian workers and farmers will face similar problems to the existing poorer regions. The terms of enlargement are likely to be detrimental to the workers and poor of the new member states. Existing Association Agreements between the EU and most East and Central European countries are designed to boost EU exports to those countries, while restricting the import of textiles, coal and steel into the EU. These are the main, sometimes the only sectors in which the former Stalinist countries can compete effectively with the EU heartlands.
The continued imposition of austerity measures is also a precondition for EU membership. This will cause further erosions in social provision and an increase in unemployment.
Despite this, the new elites in Eastern Europe express an almost desperate desire to join the club. In the words of Igor Bavcar, Slovenia's minister for European affairs "I'm afraid that there will be a new line drawn in Europe. It will be the Schengen line, [common police and immigration policies] and there is no line harder. But that's life."
The Council of Ministers has fixed the Agenda 2000 budget for 1999-2006 at 1.27% of EU GDP. Even pro-Maastricht commentators admit that this is "woefully inadequate." Since no significant increase in cash will be available after the year 2000, the money for enlargement has to come from the existing programmes.
The document is committed to promoting labour flexibility, in line with the decisions of the Luxembourg Summit last November, stating that "a key task of structural policy will be to underpin the reform of labour market policies and practices". The convergence criteria are also invoked, in that control over the allocation of cohesion funds will be "strengthened to prevent excessive public deficits in the context of the stability and growth Pact."
The effects of Agenda 2000 can be understood looking at Wales, which is hosting the current summit.
Under the current system, most of Wales is covered by either Objective 2 or Objective 5b status. This has resulted in annual funding of around 100 million Ecu (£150 million). This is a very small amount of money, compared to the £7 billion budget of the Welsh Office, through which the British state channels most Welsh spending.
Most of this E100m. will disappear by the year 2003, since Wales no longer qualifies for Objective 1 status and only small parts of the country will qualify for Objective 2. The situation of other poorer regions of Europe is similar.
These proposals have predictably raised a storm of protest from governments and politicians across the European Union, worried about the effect that such drastic cutbacks will have on their electorates."
The response in Wales, which mirrors that in Britain as a whole, has been threefold:
Lobbyists have correctly argued that using unemployment levels to establish Objective 2 status does not take account of the real poverty of a nation or region. After all, the unemployment rate in Wales is below the EU average, while the
average household income is the lowest in
There have been frantic efforts to redraw the "poverty maps" prepared by the EU statistics agency Eurostat, so that smaller sub-regions can qualify for Objective 1 status, or at least be guaranteed Objective 2 status.
And there has been an intensification of the long-standing argument that Wales must become more efficient and effective in its lobbying and bidding operations," through improved professional support, better co-ordination between local authorities and an enhanced role in Europe for the new National Assembly for Wales.'
Each of these approaches misses the point, which is that regional funds were inadequate to begin with, and the pot of money has suddenly shrunk. Attempts to redefine criteria or redraw maps will only result in some poorer regions securing funds at the expense of others. And Poor regions already spend far too much money and effort in competing for scant EU funds. To intensify this scramble is des-
The funds involved are indeed small, in financial terms, but their real importance lies in the ideological gloss and justification which they provide for social democratic and left politicians to support the Maastricht process. Hence, the visible outrage (and thinly disguised panic) which has followed the Agenda 2000 proposals.
The left needs a wide ranging discussion on how to respond to Agenda 2000. Some things are already clear: • The left should not oppose EU enlargement to the East. We must stand for an inclusive Europe, and mount a struggle over the social and economic basis on which it is constituted. • We should, however, oppose Agenda 2000 as a basis for enlargement. We should demand that all social democratic and left parties vote against this proposal in the European Parliament and the Committee of the Regions. • Pro-Maastricht politicians of the left have traditionally hidden behind the excuse that the EU is dominated by rightwing governments. But there are now social democratic governments in
France and Britain, with the prospect of a third in Germany. The time for excuses is over, we should demand that they formulate a Europe-wide plan to tackle unemployment. • There should be a massive increase in regional aid, both from state governments and the European Union, to fund regional development and enlargement.
Regional spending should not be restricted to infrastructure projects and promoting small and medium sized enterprises but predominantly aimed at directly creating jobs through a programme of public works. Any moves towards further privatisation or erosion of the welfare state must be opposed
• These measures should be paid for by direct progressive taxation across the
EU, and a EU-wide tax on speculative foreign exchange transactions.
concerted effort. It is time that the leaders of our trade unions and the left parties gave some real content to their talk of a social Europe, by mounting active campaigns on demands such as those above. It is also vital that we continue to develop the existing Europe-wide campaigns on these issues, such as those which have successfully mobilised for the Summits in Amsterdam, Luxembourg and Cardiff
The Single European Act, the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam and the Dublin Stability Pact were, each in their own way, blows against the workers and poor of Europe. Agenda 2000 threatens to further reinforce a "Europe of the core regions" at the expense of an impoverished periphery to its south, west and east. It must be opposed. * *The author is active in Cardiff West Labour Party and is secretary of the Cardiff Euro Demonstration Committee. He can be contacted by E-mail via the committee at <full.employment@cableol.co.uk> Notes 1. GDP in the Regions, Eurostat Report, April 1998. Available from: http://europa.eu.int/eurostat.html/ 2. Gross domestic product (GDP) is a measure of the total goods and services produced in a given region. 3. For a more detailed discussion of uneven development in Europe, see Brendan Young. "Wales in Europe: the poor relation?", Conference Papers, Socialists and a Welsh Assembly. Cardiff, July 1997 4. Ash Amin and John Tomaney, "EC policy muddle will fail the poorer regions", The Guardian, 13 July 1992. 5. Wayne David, Building on Maastricht: a left agenda for Europe, Tribune Group of Euro MP's, March 1993. 6. Agenda 2000: the legislative proposals, The European Commission, Document IP/98/258, March 1998. 7. "The common agricultural policy", International Viewpoint, Special Issue on the EU, #290, 1997. 8. Catherine Samary, "Can the EU absorb the east?" International Viewpoint, #278, June 1996. Also, "The EU's eastward expansion", International Viewpoint, #290, 1997. 9. Marc Champion and Tim King, "Long road ahead to the EU for eastern supplicants", The European, 1-12 April 1998. 10. One Ecu = £0.65, £IRL 0.79, or SUS1.00. 11. Martin Walker and David Gow, "Poorer UK regions face 'colossal Europe aid cut", The Guardian, 19 March 1998. Also, "Agenda 2000 - protests at regional reform plans", European Parliament News, April 1998, 12. See, for example, Victoria Winkler, "Strategic partnerships and a communitaire spirit", Agenda, Institute of Welsh Affairs, Summer 1996. 13. The National Assembly provides a limited measure of autonomy for Wales, though its powers fall far short of those granted to the Scottish Parliament or regional governments in Catalonia and the Basque Country.
perate lunacy.
Most politicians in the poorer regions of Europe have accepted the logic of taking part in an enormous competition
International Youth Camp '98 amongst the poor for a shrinking pot of
EU assistance. For the moment, this is a competition within the existing member states. In an enlarged EU, there will be
None of these demands will be won, or even forced onto the agenda, without a
14. A notable, and interesting, exception is the article by
Claude Gabriel, "The crisis of citizenship and the future of Europe", International Viewpoint, #228, May 1992.
The 15th European camp of youth organisations in solidarity with the Fourth even more competitors. And the potential
International will take place in Jutland, Denmark, on 25-31 July.
new members in Central and East Europe
Participation costs US$100-200, depending on your country of have pockets of poverty deeper than anywhere inside the EU's current frontiers.
For more details see April issue of International
The starting point for any truly alternative approach is rejection of this whole approach and, in particular, rejection of
Agenda 2000 as a basis for enlargement of the EU and reform of structural and residence.
Viewpoint.
cohesion funding.
INTERNATIONAL
The Marxist left, particularly in
SOCIALISTISK
Britain, has generally given insufficient attention to the regional dimension of EU politics. This probably reflects the far left's concentration in the metropolitan centres, where regional aid is less of an issue. But 51% of the EU population lives im areas covered by regional programmes.
For more information contact your International Viewpoint distributor or write to
SAP, Box 547
Nørre Allé 11 A
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Copenhagen N.
fax +45-35373217.
E-mail <socinf@inet.uni2.dk>
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