The new New Order
* Indonesia The Chinese character for 'crisis' has two meanings: danger and opportunity. The pro-democracy movement in Indonesia today is confronted by both of these possibilities. The regime has accepted a reconfiguration of power between the different components of the dominant coalition, without altering the existing relations of inequality and injustice. But they have not yet defeated or co-opted the democracy movement, or quietened the masses. B. Skanthakumar The announcement of Suharto's resignation on May 21st caused an outpouring of uncontrollable tears and laughter from the students in occupation of the Parliament complex in Jakarta who had led the struggle against the despised dictator. They were rightly celebrating the end of a 32 year era which had lasted longer than their entire lives. For many of them Suharto's removal is the necessary first step to rehabilitate the economy and introduce genuine multi-party democracy.
Yet on the streets of the capital and in other major cities and towns the elation was muted, as disappointment mounted over the anointing of heir-apparent B. J. Habibie in Suharto's place, in a transparent bid by the New Order regime to sacrifice Suharto to save itself. The radical left Peoples Democratic Party (PRD) noted, "the resignation of Suharto is for minimising the damage of the people's resistance and curbing the resistance itself."
Pramoedya Ananta Toer, the celebrated author of the Buru Quartet (still banned, along with his other books), and jailed for fourteen years, cautioned, "If the young are satisfied with the resignation of Suharto and their own brief appearance on the political stage, then they are fooling themselves. The objective of the reform movement, I hope, is not simply to reshuffle members of Suharto's 'New Order', but to replace the "New Order' itself" (Washington Post, 7th June 1998).
As long as Habibie is in office he will protect his patron and the former First Family from trial for their crimes against the people and embezzlement of Indonesia's wealth. That was part of the deal with Suharto and Habibie knows too well that he would be next in line for investigation and prosecution. However he had been left in no doubt as to the strength of popular feeling and pronounced in his 16 International Viewpoint #302 maiden address to the nation "have grasped the people's aspirations for a government which is clean and free of inefficiency, corruption, collusion and nepotism.".
In fact, the Habibie clan has commercial interests in chemicals, construction, real estate, transport and communications and more. At the centre of their vast holdings is the Timsco Group, a conglomerate controlling more than 80 companies. The new president cannot afford any serious crackdown on corruption.
What ABRI (the Armed Forces) and others in the regime now hope is that the mass movement and its rallying cry for reformasi (reformation) will lose momentum and fragment, as its unifying objective of the removal of the ex-President has been achieved.
Limitted reforms
Meanwhile the reforming measures announced by the new administration have been too few and not substantial enough. Each can be reversed with little effort. Habibie has released some political prisoners such as Muchtar Pakpahan of the independent SBSI (Indonesian Prosperity Workers Union) and Sri Bintang Pamungkas of the PUDI (Indonesian United Democratic Party). The SBSI is to be legalised. So, presumably, will other independent trade unions. International Labour Organisation Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association has been ratified though it remains to be translated into domestic law nor will it automatically influence state policy. The critical newsmagazines, Editor and Tempo and tabloid
Detik which were banned in 1994 have been unbanned and can now freely circulate again. The Alliance of Independent
Journalists (AJI), a free media union, has also been assured recognition.
Many new political parties have been formed. These include parties with roots in the pre-New Order political system which were disbanded or forced to merge into the two state tolerated opposition parties, the
PPP (United Development Party) and the
PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party).
Even the ruling GOLKAR party, created by the regime, has announced that its affiliates or factions will be free to form separate parties. Two such splits have
Meanwhile new interest groups which were not directly represented in the old system have also announced their intention to form parties including an ethnic
Chinese Party seeking fair treatment and an end to cultural and political discrimination. The Chinese, mainly Christian minority has at the receiving end of popular anger against the regime in recent months.
Muchtar Pakpahan has proposed a
National Workers Party "based on workers, small business people, intellectuals and progressive NGOs." He has invited PDI leader Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of Indonesia's first post-independence president Sukarno, to be its Chairperson.
The regime is unlikely to release East Timorese leader Xanana Gusmao, PRD Chairperson Budiman Sudjatmiko and his jailed comrades, West Papuan resistance leader Jacob Rumbiak, or the remaining 200 ex-PKI (Communist Party) prisoners, including 72 year old Colonel Abdul Latief, jailed 32 years ago. The release of the remaining political prisoners remains a focus for international solidarity campaigns.
There are limits to the new free political competition. The PKI will not be unbanned, it has been announced, and there is no mention of unbanning the PRD. New parties must adhere to the state ideology of Pancasila (consensus and moderation) and respect the 1945 Constitution.
Habibie's new Cabinet was a disappointment even to moderate opposition leaders like Amien Rais who had joined with the military and others in appealing aRe 26ve himent a breathing space and the opportunity to fulfil its commitment to retorm.
While removing the most obnoxious members of the previous Cabinet, Suharto's daughter "Tutut' and his billionaire chum 'Bob' Hasan, Habibie has retained some of the unsavoury figures from the past.
For the first time representatives of the other two legal parties the PPP and the PDI (the Suryadi faction, not Megawati supporters) have been drawn in. As have Habibie's acolytes in the Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI). And the usual phalanx from the state sponsored GOLKAR party and the Armed Forces (ABRI).
The key figures in the new cabinet are Defence Minister and ABRI Commanderin-Chief General Wiranto, and Coordinating Minister for Finance and the
Economy, Ginanjar Kartasasmita. Apparently feelers were put out to some opposition figures notably Amien Rais to join the
Cabinet but the latter recognised that this would in effect co-opt and compromise him and intelligently refused.
Habibie hasn't had it all his way. He began by stating that he would complete his predecessor's term in office. In other words that the first free elections would not be before 2003. Quite soon he realised the depth of feeling against him and was forced to backtrack. The present timetable promises general elections to the Peoples Consultative Assembly (MPR) by the middle of
1999, which will then convene between
November 1999 and January 2000 and elect a new President and Vice-President.
Habibie has also promised a limit of two five year spells in Presidential office. Suharto was "re-elected" this March for his seventh consecutive Presidential term, and assured the assembled gathering that God
Willing' he would see them again in 2003!
For many people, the promised transition period is too long. The longer Habibie and his crew are in office, the more difficult it will be to remove them!
The Presidency will remain the most powerful branch of government, and it will not be directly elected by the people. The 1945 Constitution and the office of the President were imposed by President Sukarno to strengthen himself and weaken competing centres of power. Under Suharto the dictatorial features of this system became clearer. Liberal bourgeois democratic reforms would aim to weaken the Presidential office, strengthen the legislature and entrench safeguards on judicial independence as well as introduce the direct election by universal suffrage of the President. Saving the system
In a period when the present government lacks legitimacy and is perceived as hostage to Suharto's clique and the military, many doubt its sincerity and ability to prepare the country for the transition from dictatorship to democracy. There is talk of replacing the Habibie administration with
Indonesia * a 'caretaker' government which will be charged with overseeing general elections in 1999 and running the country until then.
Emil Salim, a recent anti-Suharto convert and formerly his Environment
Minister, has supported the idea of summoning an extraordinary session of the
MPR which would have the authority to nominate individuals to form this interim administration. Needless to say, the MPR is packed with Suharto's appointees and those who have benefited the most from his regime.
By-passing the MPR altogether but with even more frightening consequences is the proposal by the left-wing academic and former student activist Arief Budiman for a Presidium drawn from the military, technocracy and civilians (in that order).
The presence of the military "is needed to guard political stability"; economists and technocrats "respected by international financial institutions" must be present to restore the confidence of our businessmen" and civilians from the reform movement too who "showed their skill in leading and gaining trust from the masses" (SiaR, May 25th 1998).
Budiman makes no mention of any form of participation in it or of its accoun tability to the working class, peasantry and poor: the overwhelming majority of the
Indonesian people. Thus an unelected, undemocratic, unaccountable and unrepresentative body would be charged with preparing for free elections when "everything is in order" '. An indeterminate moment left to the benevolence of the Presidium or its most powerful actors.
The outlawed Peoples Democratic Party has condemned the elitist nature of this institution, calling instead for a Council "which works based on the aspiration from below" (see International Viewpoint #301 June 1998).
Democracy, PRD leaders reminded Budiman "depends on the system, not on the individuals, nor does it depend on the personnel who will lead the government. A democratic system can lead an authoritarian person to bow before democratic norms. While an authoritarian system can allow opportunities for a democratic leader to deviate and become an autocrat"
17
Indonesia
PRD President Budiman Sujatmiko is in the second year of his 13 year conviction for "subversion." The new regime has made no promise to release him, or the other radical left political prisoners. (PRD statement, 27th May 1998).
The PRD have recommended instead that an Independent Peoples Council be formed which is based on Peoples Councils established all the way from village, campus, work-place level, through regional and up to national level. Such a body would be far more representative of Indonesian society and its ideologies and aspirations and better able to lead the transitional process. Illusions in the IMF
The pro-democracy movement is also divided in its analysis of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 'bail-out' of the economy. The IMF has a rigid set of neoclassical textbook prescriptions it applies whenever it intervenes regardless of the specificity's of an economy and external (world market) considerations, Among these are deflationary budgets including slashing of subsidies and social spending, high interest rates, dismantling of state monopolies, removal of exchange controls and price ceilings, ease of entry (and exit)
FRELITIN representative Mari Alkatiri is still in exile, struggling for the independence of East Timor, occupied by Indonesia since 1975
18 International Viewpoint #302 for foreign investment capital and privatisation. In October 1997 the Indonesian government entered into discussions with the IMF for loans to salvage the sinking economy. The IMF's conditions would have forced the Suharto regime to dismantle the dirigiste economy and threaten the vested interests which have profited by it, including Suharto's own family and close friends.
Most people were unaware of the precise details of the confrontations between Suharto and the IMF, as the international bankers tried to impose their discipline on the economy and the old dictator squirmed his way out of it. As a result, many Indonesians concluded that, since the IMF was openly contemptuous of Suharto's economic policies, it must be an opponent of Suharto, who was an opponent of the pro-democracy movement. According to the theory that "my enemy's enemy is my friend," this made the IMF into an ally for the popular movement! Or so they thought.
With Suharto above control and censure from the people, and when the pro-democracy movement was numerically weak, politically fragmented and ranged against the repressive armoury of the state, many oppositionists thought that only an external agency like the IMF would have the power to remove Suharto or at least pave the conditions for his
Few worried that these international financial institutions, these new found *friends of the people' had spent the last thirty-two years financing and enriching Suharto, his family and cronies and collaborating in the 'New Order' regime's repression and brutality against the people
Some oppositionists argued that the implementation of IMF conditions would loosen, if not sever, the grip of crony capitalists over the economy. Goenawan Mohamad, editor of Tempo and long time thorn in the side of the regime, admitted that the effects of the structural adjustment package would be painful on the poor, but argued that "from the hardship it entails, the people will have a better argument to urgently demand more symmetry of sacrifice fum the powers that be. In short, the IMF deal is a sad, is nor 'evil' necessity" (Jakarta Post, 25th January
1998).
He gave little evidence that the regime could be compelled to "sacrifice" along with its subjects, or be compelled to clean up its act when it could so easily pass on mismanagement and greed of the ruling class!
Now that Suharto has finally gone, middle class elements still advocate the embrace of the IMF plan, theorising naively that economic liberalisation and political liberalisation are as inseparable as
Siamese twins: a 'free market' economy providing the best condition for a plural, competitive electoral system. Never mind that the IMF plan, supposedly designed to relieve Indonesia's debt burden, will actually increase it by a further US$43 billion!
Latin American and recent Asian experience shows, beyond any shadow of a doubt, that it is the working class, peasantry and the poor - and not the capitalist class - which bear the burden of debt and the cost of its servicing. The IMF will be bailing-out international banks and the Indonesian rich, not the people.
While many in the pro-democracy movement were pressing for Habibie's immediate resignation, some East Timorese activists disagreed. They argued that a weak leader in Jakarta, eager to gain some international support, might concede to a referendum on self-determination - even if the timetable stretched to ten years. These hopes have been shattered in recent weeks as Habibie confirmed that all he will offer is "special status" for East Timor, meaning official sanction for customary laws but no real autonomy. Habibie even made the ridiculous proposal to trade the freedom of FRETILIN leader Xanana Gusmao against international recognition of Indonesia's claim to East Timor, which it has illegally occupied since 1975
Gusmao himself has repeatedly said that his liberty is secondary to that of the Maubere people. While there could be negotiation over the duration of the transition from colonial outpost to independent statehood, a referendum on self-determination is non-negotiable the resistance insists. The struggle for East Timorese independence and the struggle for democratisation and social transformation in Indonesia is an indivisible, dual struggle.
The victories of the pro-democracy movement across Indonesia have obviously inspired the East Timorese people too. In their capital, Dili, there have been daily protests, demonstrations and speakouts calling for an end to Indonesian rule, for a referendum and the freedom of their political prisoners. There is a new optmism and courage as banners are openly unfurled with pro-independence slogans and as people take to the streets protesting the killing of an unarmed boy by the not have taken just awk theywoul
In small towns across Indonesia there are daily protests, occupations and strikes.
Issues range from specific demands like the removal and investigation of corrupt and nepotistic local officials, to protests against rising food prices and unemployment, demands for higher wages and free unions and for further reforms from the
In the second largest industrial city
Surabaya, there have been clashes between workers and the police, and a bitter strike by dockworkers. In Jakarta, emp loyees of the state airlines, Garuda, have taken to the streets demanding an investi gation of corruption within their compar
Everywhere there is a ferment of deba and activity as people pore over the late
West Malaysia or across the border into bringing the final toll to 39. [BS] * revelations of the extent of the Suharto family wealth in the newspapers and magazines, and as more searching questions are asked of the meaning of these new times: their parameters, limitations and vulnerabilities. Unnatural alliances
Within the pro-democracy movement a differentiation is taking place as pillars of the old regime regroup with the ascendant personalities of the pro-democracy movement. None of the new currents are internally homogenous, but it is possible to say that there are broadly two tendencies within the pro-democracy camp (excluding the so-called liberals who were until recently supporters of Suharto and retain roots in and loyalties to different constituents of
"moderate" opposition which believes in 'constructive engagement' with the Habibie government, which supports the revision rather than repeal of the five repressive laws of 1985, which hasn't been vocal in demanding the release of political prisoners and which is more willing to give Habibie the opportunity to implement his programme. They would be content with an accommodation with the New Order' regime rather than its overthrow.
Where Megawati Sukarnoputri, leader of the PDI and inheritor of her father Sukarno's populist mantle, places herself remains to be seen. She has yet to formally commit herself to anything beyond an alliance with Abdurrahman Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia's largest Muslim organisation. Yet she commands the support and affections of the masses as witnessed in the unexpected size of the crowds at recent commemorations of Sukarno's death.
There is also a "militant" opposition, including many students, progressive
NGOs, Muchtar Pakpahan's SBSI and the still-banned PRD. These currents favour an earlier timetable for elections, the trial of Suharto, his family and cronies, and release of all remaining political prisoners
Their goal can be summed up in the "total reformation" slogan popularised by the
Muchtar Pakpahan cites Lech Walesa in the sdaggin Poland as his role models believes that a Western European system of industrial relations, with tri-partite mechanisms linking employers, workers and government would be best for Indonesia. A brave and honourable man, he nevertheless swears allegiance to Pancasila principles and the 1945 Constitution.