The Basque conflict after the ETA ceasefire
Euskadi under a new star
It's official (almost). The Basque country has a real peace process. Former ETA leader José "Troglo" Castaños discusses the future of the pro-independence left. ETA has declared an unconditional and unilateral cease-fire. Politicians from all Spain's "historic nationalities" - Catalan, Basque and Galician - have united to campaign for a reform of Spain's constitution. And, with a majority of Basque political
BUSKAL HERRİRA parties, trade unions and social movements now sharing some common reference points in the debate on the country's future, a watershed seems to have been passed.
The depth of the changes represent a second democratic transition, as significant as that which followed the death of the dictator, General Franco, in 1975. The constitution which emerged from that first transition no longer fits the needs of the "historic nationalities" of the Spanish state, and, in particular, the people of Euskadi (the Basque country).
Spain is a centralised state, with a complex series of devolved powers for each of the "Autonomous Regions." The powers Madrid is willing to surrender are no longer enough for the "historic nationalities. " Basque and Catalan politicians are demanding greater powers -sovereignty over most of their own affairs.
Businessmen in the Basque country and Catalunia are willing to accept these new models of "shared sovereignty." As Spain integrates into the European Union, they recognise that a strong regional government can offer them important protection and incentives.
Having said this, most businessmen want to keep Spain together as one state. And they certainly don't want any "shared sovereignty" to reduce the force of the neo-liberal policies currently applied
Applied by Catalan and Basque politicians, in fact. Both regions are governed by right-wing, moderate nationalist parties. The Catalan nationalists are an essential part of Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar's conservative coalition in Spain's parliament. 10 International Viewpoint #305 November 1998
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It seems that businessmen will have little objection to a renegotation of the autonomy statutes of the Basque country and Catalonia, carried out by the conservative politicians in each region, together with the Madrid government. They do not anticipate any change in the social order, nor in the stability of
But stability is threatened by two powerful forces. First is the growing power of Spanish (castillian) nationalism, expressed by the far-right parties, and by the Socialist Party which governed Spain for most of the period after the first transition. Leaders of the Party agree with the editorialists of the right-wing daily ABC, that the proposed reforms threaten to disintegrate Spain, and destroy the Spanish national idea.
This is pushing Catalan and Basque politicians towards greater radicalisation. Something accepted, so far, by the moderate leaders in both
The second big obstacle to the second democratic transition is the determination of the Basque left. It demands political sovereignty, and has been able to accumulate considerable social force behind its social and political demands.
So far, the moderate nationalists, Spanish chauvinists, and left/radical nationalists have about equal weight in the Basque political spectrum. But pro-sovereignty thinking is steadily increasing. The Spanish national idea is less and less popular. Even the desperate and cynical attempts of the Socialist Party to separate its Basque militants of Spanish origin from the 'indigenous' population cannot stop this.
A growing, social majority of society is represented in the Lizarra Accord on the principles for a democratic transition. This new agreement represents a wide range of political and social forces.
Within the "Lizarra bloc", there is a struggle for leadership. On the one side is the moderate nationalism of the Basque National Party (PNV), the christian-democratic party which has dominated the region for decades. On the other side is the Basque left, represented by the highly politicised trade unions, the social movements, the main radical nationalist party Herri Batasuna, and smaller far-left parties like Zutik, a regroupment of Trotskyist, exMaoist and former ETA militants.
This pluralist and dynamic left has come together in a new electoral front - Euskal Herritarrok (Citizens of Euskadi). Created immediately after the ETA cease-fire, Euskal Herritarrok is the first step towards the articulation of all Basque left currents within a common, nationalist project.
The basic lines of the Euskal Herritarrok programme reflect a concrete combination of national democratic
and social demands. Not abstract nationalist concepts and dreams, nor general schemes for the future socialist society, but the kind of social and political demands that a majority of Basque residents would support, even be willing to fight for.
And this ability to bring people together in action is the most exciting thing about the new coalition. Euskal Herritarrok has been able to create itself as the political-institutional expression of the broad sociopolitical progressive movement which characterises the Basque country, with its strong and political trade unions, massive social movements, and high level of political consciousness and participation.
This is not a party that seeks to administer public institutions, or make partisan propaganda from the privileged positions of parliamentary power. The attractiveness, force and impact of Euskal Herritarrok is in its capacity to be something else, some-
Euskal Herritarrok is a new formation, but the signs so far are very encouraging. The strategy of armed struggle has been replaced by the strategy of civil disobedience. This is surely the basis of any project for renovation and refoundation of the
And the nationalist discourse is being modified too. Rather than the problems of Basque identity, Euskal Herritarrok is concentrating on the integration of a Basque civic consciousness. They want a Basqueness where diversity of origin is normal and accepted. And where pluralism is a normal, positive part of life. Including in political organisations...
Not all the sectarian inertia of the recent past has disappeared. And there may be a moment of crisis, when the new coalition has to decide, definitively, to embrace the new road and abandon the old.
Euskal Herritarrok faces a difficult struggle - a struggle for rupture with the central state, and a struggle of competition with the moderate Basque nationalist bloc.
But this apparent complication could be an opportunity. It could force all the components of the left to reinforce the ties of unity, and put common political action and civic mobilisation at the centre of everything they do. * RC/AN)
The Stormont agreements for peace in Ireland have opened the doors of hope for a similar solution to the Basque
Ireland has always been a reference point for the Basque country, and with the opening of the negotiated peace process this is even more the case.
The Basque people previously viewed its struggle in the mirror of the Central America and Palestine peace processes. But in the 1980s people lost hope, particularly after the failure of the Algiers talks between the armed independentists of ETA and Spain's socialist
But hope is returning. Partly in response to the Irish "peace process." And partly because of the obvious failure of Spain's double strategy: autonomy and repression. A negotiation forum
The radical independence movement Herri Batasuna has convinced a wide range of forces to support a negotiated settlement. They have been joined by moderate nationalist forces, the Basque far left (Batzarre and Zutik), most of the labor movement, the social pacifist movements, the most active nuclei in the Basque Church, the Communist-led United Left, the centre-right Democratic Convergence of Navarra and a minority in the Basque section of Spain's Socialist Party (PSOE). Street fighting years
Many Basque left youth groups have a strategy of sabotage. This
"kale borroka" is not "indiscriminate violence," as the media inevitably claim. Their targets are public buildings, urban installations, banks, and the private employment agencies hated by young people across Spain (half of the young are unemployed).
"Kale borroka" aims to reproduce the "culture of the armed resistance", and expose its counterpart,
"the repressive culture to impose order where none exists."
The Basque bishops have issued multiple public appeals calling on the political parties to embark on the road of a dialogued peace based on the respect for the collective rights of the Basque people. The latest such appeal, issued by Bishop Setien of San Sebastian, who functions as a spokesperson for the Basque church, even insisted on opening such talks even though ETA's actions continue.
This is the same line expressed by the minority in the Socialist Party. But United Left leader Julio Anguita is opposed to participation in the talks unless ETA first lays down its arms. Two national fronts
Herri Batasuna's (and through them, ETA's) collaboration in the quest for a collective commitment for peace is no surprise. For some time now HB has been aware that the correlation of political forces makes achieving national independence through armed struggle impossible.
But the gathering together of the three main nationalist forces, in the demand for a negotiated solution, has been greatly facilitated by the determined action of the Basque labor movement (see separate article) and the social pacifist movement.
The United Left's decision to become part of this process is a new element. Some parts of the communist-led
Police say there have been 1,410 acts of "Kale borroka" sabotage in the past four years. Over 1,100 activists have faced trial for such offences.
The "kale borroka" groups are mainly below 21 years of age. Their supporters represent a more radical part of the movement for conscientious objectors, civil disobedience, and refusal to obey orders in the Army. The number of Basque youth refusing to obey army orders is 12,000, 80% of the total in the Spanish State. *
International Viewpoint #305 November 1998 11
* The Basque country and Spain movement have been extremely hostile to "separatists" and those who challenge Spain's constitutional order.
Of course, not everyone wants a negotiated settlement. The Basque country is racked by a long and ferocious struggle between two opposing ideas of the nation and the state.
Negotiation and dialogue is anathema to the pro-Spanish bloc. This includes the parties of the pro-Spanish right (the Basque wing of Spain's ruling Popular Party and the Navarrese People's Unity), the Basque wing of the Socialist Party, the socialist-dominated UGT trade union and, regrettably, the majority in the communist dominated CCOO trade union.
The commitment of all the participants to maintain the forum open until achieving some common political bases demonstrates the firm disposition to provide leadership to the majority feeling in Basque society in favor of a negotiated peace. It also demonstrates the will to do so even though weapons continue to be fired and ETA's attacks continue.
This disposition on the part of the political forces responds to a series of circumstances that in coming together have given rise to a new political cycle in the Basque country.
• A recognition that there are no police-repressive solutions to politically inspired violence that has already lasted 35 years.
• The Basque country's Statute of Autonomy within Spain, and ETA's armed struggle have simultaneously run their course.
• Spain's whole model of decentralised autonomous regions is called into question by the new framework of European monetary union.
• These factors have led to a crisis of Spanish national identity.
National leadership
The Autonomy Statutes of the Basque Country and Navarra were born 20 years ago. They reflect the impossible gap between the maximum that the Spanish state was willing to grant (formal recognition of Basque historical rights, but the constitutional affirmation of Spain's unity, and the least degree of sovereignty that the nationalist majority of the Basque people was willing to accept (the right to self-determination and territorial unity).
The Statute was considered a "centralist imposition" by most of the Basque people. The deep feeling of national frustration that emerged explains the political radicalisation of Basque nationalism and the social support for the armed resistance of the Basque
It is difficult for outsiders to appreciate the depth of Basque rejection of the "settlement" that followed the death of Spain's dictator, General Franco. Only 31% of Basque voters approved Spain's new constitution. About 56% boycotted the referendum, at the request of all the nationalist parties. The Statute of Autonomies was approved by only 53%, with 41% abstaining (as urged by radical nationalist forces). This radicalism is not limited to purely Basque questions. In the referendum on Spanish entry to NATO, only 21% of Basques voted in favour. Socialist state-builders...
The Spanish Constitution explicitly rejected the right to national self-determination. It divided the Basque territory into two independent autonomous communities: the Basque country and Navarra. It deprived the nationalities of legislative sovereignty. Each self-government function delegated to an autonomous region was subject to Madrid's case-by-case approval.
The Basque Socialist Party accepted these new constitutional limits, ending its historic alliance with the Basque National Party (PNV), the dominant political party in the Basque country.
The two parties had been allies during the civil war and during the resistance to Francoism. 40 years of collaboration in the Basque government-in-exile had pushed the Basque Socialist Party to accept the demands of national self-determination and the territorial unity of the Basque country (divided into the Basque Country Autonomous Region Navarra Autonomous Region, and a region incorporated into France).
The Socialists' subsequent renunciation of these positions has destroyed the possibility of bringing together the entire Basque people in a national project jointly shared by Basque nationalism and pro-autonomy socialism. This has given rise to a deep crisis of national leadership. ...and bourgeois pragmatists
The Basque bourgeoisie is inherently pragmatic. It reluctantly accepted the Statute, rather than assume the risk of
Madrid's left takes a position Solidarity with the Basque struggle is increasingly rare in Spain. One welcome exception is the Manifesto recently circulated at the initiative of Left Alternative in Madrid
It has been signed by over 100 intellectuals, some local leaders of United Left, and some Socialist Party politicians who worked in the Ministry of Justice during the past socialist government, including Margarita Robles, and others who uncovered the participation of some top officers of the Civil Guard in the organization of the rightwing terror group GAL.
The Manifesto is based on four very simple ideas: • Police-repressive solutions do not resolve a question that is political in nature. 12 International Viewpoint #305 November 1998
• The Spanish State should accept the demands for peace and democratic coexistence, which have majority support in society. It should assume the responsibility for a dialogued solution to the violence. • To put an end to the suffering and restriction of human rights, it is not necessary to wait for ETA to decide to put down its weapons.
Rather, we need gestures that will relax the situation, such as relocating Basque prisoners near their places of origin, and opening the way to dialogue and negotiation without conditions. • ETA should accept a military truce that would facilitate the beginning of these talks for a dialogued end the conflict. * leading a political confrontation with Spain's post-Franco state apparatus. But it denied the radical nationalist's accusation that this was a "national betrayal." For the PNV, the Statute of Autonomy was a tool with which it aspired to conquer new spaces within the context of national sovereignty. It placed moderate nationalism in a position of constantly raising national demands.
The Basque country is a divided society. There are two opposing national projects: that of constructing a Basque nation different from that of Spain, and the project of affirming the Spanish national ideal above the interests of the Basque people.
This national division has been criss-crossed, in turn, by other two superimposed divisions: class differences, or to put it another way, the social content of Basque autonomy (what type of nation is to be built), and differences on methods of political action (ETA's armed struggle).
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This criss-crossing of projects and the relatively equal division of the political forces present, has given the struggle between the contending leaderships the "appearance of a labyrinth". , because the political alliances have always been very intertwined. There has been, for example, a democratic alliance of all forces against terrorism, but each participant has its own way of understanding how to resolve the problem of violence. The Popular Party and the Socialists have supported repressive police solutions. while Basque nationalists, and the United Left, have tended to support negotiated political solutions.
But differences on some political questions do not prevent a de-facto agreement from functioning within the Basque nationalist movement as a whole. After all, a majority in Basque society support the idea of a unified and independent Basque nation.
Similarly, political differences between the pro-Spanish political forces (the conservative Popular Party and UPN, and the Socialists) do not prevent them forming a de facto bloc. This grouping represents a broad social minority in Basque society, which identifies with the Spanish national idea, and supports the current constitutional arrangement (a unified state comprised of regions with varying degrees of auto-
On social problems, of course, the alliances are rather different. The social and political left (United Left, Herri Batasuna tends to link up with both the nationalist trade union bloc and the proSpanish trade unions CCOO and UGT. As well as opposing the neo-liberal social policies of successive Spanish governments dominated by the Socialist Party or the Popular Party, the left has not hesitated to challenge the same policies when they are implemented by the Basque National Party (PNV), which dominates the Basque assembly.
The electoral line-up has been very stable during the 20 years since the Statute of Autonomy was introduced. The moderate nationalist vote (essentially PNV) represents 40% of the electorate; radical nationalism and the left represents 25% of the voting public; the Spanish right 17%, and the PSOE 16%.
One cannot make a mechanical relation between these electoral percentages and the composition of the Basque population by place of origin, but it should be noted that the combined vote of the PP and the PSOE (33%) is very similar to the percentage of Basque citizens born in other parts of the Spanish state (28%). Their descendants, the second generation, are blended in with the population of Basque origin, and their political choices are generally different than those of their elders.
The electoral tendencies in Navarra are quite different. A stable majority support pro-Spanish political parties. The Basque-Navarrese options represent only 30% of the voting public. Degrees of Autonomy
Basque self-government has had contradictory results. But after 20 years, the evidence confirms the failure of strategy of "working within the statute." There is still an acute crisis of political leadership in the Basque country.
The PNV were partly right. The Statute has served to consolidate a certain degree of Basque nation building, by establishing the bases for a solid, autonomous, national administration for the Basque Country autonomous region, even within the framework of the central government's "guided sovereignty". The powers which Madrid has surrendered to the Basque capital, Bilbao, include some key competencies, like fiscal policy, economic development, and public order.
The Basque government collects all taxes, based on its own criteria, which do not always coincide with those of the central government. It has absolute independence in administering its own budget, and pays Madrid for services provided by the central administration This system is very close to that of shared sovereignty, and has allowed the Basque government to carry out a wide programme of nation building efforts that should not be underestimated Industrial re-conversion has had a very high social cost but less so in comparison with other regions of the Spanish State. The unemployment rate is high (17% of the economically active population), but the social benefits accompanying industrial re-conversion have also been appreciable (early retirement with 100% of wages paid, considerable economic compensations, etc).
The Basque bourgeoisie has thus been able to modernise the productive apparatus so as to make it competitive in the world market (the average industrial growth rate of the past two years has been 9%). In doing so, it has transferred the social responsibilities involved in the re-conversion effort to the central government, which in the end has paid the political cost of unemployment and uncertainty in the workplace.
Another area of nation building is education and culture. In this field as well, the Basque government has exclusive control, which has allowed it to consolidate the Basque Public University, incorporate teaching of the Basque language (Euskera) in all levels of public education, and build a complex system of support for recovering the native language and expanding Basque national identity (the region's own radio and television stations, publishing policies in Euskera, and construction of a Basque as opposed to a Spanish historiography.
Thanks to these efforts, the children of immigrants from other parts of the Spanish state have been largely integrated into Basque society (sharing the national consciousness, voting patterns and aspirations of the "base' population). And the development of specific media, textbooks and other cultural products specific to the Basque country have ensured that national consciousness is increasingly differentiated from that of
The transfer of public order duties from Madrid to the autonomous Basque government is more controversial. The Basque police (Ertzantza) has replaced all Spanish police units in the Basque country. The only exception covers anti-terrorist activities. This is a shared responsibility, though the Ertzantza and the Spanish police carry out their work with different criteria. Although they cooperate with the Spanish police in some areas, the ethos and management of the Ertzantza also brings them into conflict with their Spanish counterparts.
The transfer of public order duties to the Basque government is linked to the preservation of democratic liberties threatened by the central government, which uses the excuse of fighting terrorism to try to outlaw HB, close down the Basque media, declare states of emergency, militarise the entire Basque territory, and carry out state terrorist activities against the Basque national
Despite these advances, the Autonomy Statute period has left a number of deep wounds in Basque society. Democratic deficit
The constitutional barriers to freely deciding the country's destiny (self-determination) lead to a constant democratic deficit. This was expanded during the years of Socialist Party government, through anti-terrorist legislation, the confinement of Basque prisoners thousands of kilometres from the Basque country, the organization of the GAL state terrorist group, the habitual practice of torture in police interrogations, and the manipulation of the court (anti-terrorist courts make decisions solely based on police reports gathered from interrogations, without a lawyer's presence.)
International Viewpoint #305 November 1998 13
* The Basque country and Spain
Herri Batasuna supporters often exaggerate this democratic deficit, however. Yes, there are central government impositions. Yes, the Autonomy Statute faces a crisis of social legitimacy. But the Basque country does not suffer blanket indiscriminate repression, as ETA argues. Nor does the Autonomous government lack any social support (as it did during the early years of Spain's democratic transition.) Political repression has not been directed collectively against the Basque people, but selectively against ETA. Inevitably, of course, this has meant abuse of the most elementary norms of the rule of law" and the Statute of Autonomy.
Even though such measures have been strongly questioned by the Basque people, they have received social support among the pro-Spanish parties: the Popular Party, the Socialist Party and the Navarra People's Union. The combined support for these parties accounts for 40% of the electorate in the Basque Country and Navarra autonomous regions. This bloc has a non-mobilized social base (compared with the level of politicisation that characterises the Basque nationalist bloc). But the proSpanish bloc is still able to resist the process of integration of Spanish immig-
But whether they see themselves as Basque, Spanish, or both, a clear social majority (73% according to the opinion The labour movement
The nationalist trade unions ELA, LAB, ESK, STEE, and Ezker Sindikala, represent 61% of all union delegates in the entire Basque territory (including Navarra). The proSpanish unions (UGT and CCOO), represent 37%.
The ELA was established by the Basque National Party (PNV) as a counterweight to class struggle trade unionism (Socialist, Communist, and Anarchist). Of Christian
Democratic orientation, the ELA was a "yellow" union in the 1930s. The anti-Franco resistance pushed it slowly toward left positions, although without ever breaking with
The institutionalization of Basque autonomy after Franco's death led the ELA to distant itself from the PNV. It abandoned its inter-class theses. The new cycle of neoliberal policies has pushed the ELA to definitively incorporate the class struggle into its pro-independence outlook. It is one of the best organized union confederations of
Europe. It has 90,000 members (more than those of the UGT and 14 International Viewpoint #305 November 1998 polls) questions the legitimacy of both ETA and police violence. Unlike the leadership of the Basque Socialist party. many of their voters share the solidity of the democratic culture of the Basque
Of course, the clash between these two violence forces adds a dose of intolerance to political life, and makes civic coexistence difficult. Over 1,200 people have died in the 35 years of armed struggle. There are 600 Basque prisoners in Spanish jails and more than 500 refugees. A people divided
Navarra could have been peacefully reunited with the Basque Country resolved at the beginning of the post-Franco transition, in the long years in which the Socialist Party governed simultaneously CCOO combined), a strike fund of 1,200 billion pesetas (US$900m), and a membership dues system that represents 87% of income. It is the only major trade union in the Spanish state that does not depend on government financing. This gives ELA absolute political independence in its relations with the public administration.
In the past two years, ELA has established a strategic alliance with LAB, the Herri Batasuna-led labor confederation, which represents 15% of all union delegates.
This alliance is based on the demand for a Basque framework for labor relations (legislative sovereignty), in an action plan against unemployment and poverty (sharing work and wealth redistribution), and in combining national demands (self-determination and political sovereignty) with social demands (building an Euskadi based on equality). On the basis of this labor alliance, the participants are attempting to build support for a negotiated problem of political violence. * in Madrid, Navarra, and (with the PNV)
Instead, the Socialist Party allied itself with the anti-Basque right-wing and froze Navarra's secession, blocking the institutional relations between the two autonomous communities, and constructing a Navarrist and Spanish identity that attempts to differentiate itself from Basque identity through a discourse opposing supposed Basque interference
The strength of this discourse has received support from the majority Spanish speaking population of Navarra. Their regional consciousness draws on the rotten, privileged tradition of a territory that was a social base of the Francoist right wing in the civil war. It is based on secular fears of Basque assimilation, and responds to the historical errors of Basque nationalism, which has shown an inability to construct a national discourse adapted to the historical peculiarities of Navarra. The result has been to prolong separate institutions over time that lead to a greater distancing between the two communities as mutual distrust grows between them, and the construction of a Navarrist identity that includes in its ranks the ambivalence of two opposing national reference points: the Basque and the Spanish. Us and them
The surge of national hatreds has been one unavoidable consequence of the socialists' blunders in their treatment of the Basque question. They have taken 20 years to transfer the prerogatives of self-government recognized in the Statute of Autonomy, and each transfer has had to be forced out of the central government at the price of an increase in national tensions.
Every aspect of self-government that has been transferred from the federal government to the Basque country has always been presented as a concession to "nationalist voracity." At each moment, the Basque government has been challenged to publicly declare their commitment to repression against ETA.
Spanish public opinion has been encouraged to feel wounded by the "national egoism of the Basques." An infernal dialectic of national offences has been set off, because this nationalist discourse has provoked a reaffirmation of anti-Spanish feelings among the Basque people. This has been exploited by the pro-Spanish parties to hinder the integration of Spanish immigrants into Basque society.
Leaders of the Basque Socialist Party theorised the division of the Basque people into two national communities: a bourgeois and racist Basque community, and a Spanish community which, due to its emigrant origin, was considered to be worker, socialist and universalistic in character, and thereby exempt from "national prejudices".
Thus, all the progress made in national integration in solidarity with the antiFranco struggle was interrupted. These same Socialist leaders later initiated and ran the GAL state terrorist group, which kidnapped and murdered people suspected of support for the national movement.
They also ensured the division of the Basque labor movement in two trade union fronts differentiated by their attitude toward the national question.
Nationalist frustration with the autonomous solution has not ceased growing, and the clash of national identities between the Basque social majority and the vast minority of Basque or Navarra citizens who feel both Basque and Spanish at the same time or just Spanish and antiBasque, has not disappeared as a result of assimilation or a modification of identity behavior. When we add the enormous distortion introduced by ETA's armed actions, we find ample explanation for the deterioration of the political situation and the demand for constitutional reforms. As a result of the failure of the Statute of Autonomy, such demands are today being formulated by most of the Basque political, trade union, and The exhaustion of the armed
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The PNV realised that the backlash against ETA could weaken all nationalist forces, particularly if the armed struggle continued. The convergence of these two bns ytinuos supzed st circumstances have created the necessary conditions for a general modification of all the contending political strategies. Labour provides the leadership
The alliance of unions originating in the PNV (ELA), and those initially organized by ETA itself (LAB), have taken the initiative of offering a way out of the crisis. The initiative has been made possible by the opening of spaces created by the social movement for negotiations (ELKARRI), and in the maturing of a majority current of opinion that doesn't want either the violence of ETA nor the centralist, repressive straight-jacket. The virtue of the proposals coming from the labour movement are the clarity of the formulation of this civic sentiment, and the legitimacy conferred by the organisers' trade union identity and their majority influence on the organized labor
The general secretary of the ELA, José Elorrieta, formulates the key ideas of this 'alliance to provide leadership for the new political solution' as follows:
• The Statute of Autonomy has run its course, and a new pro-sovereignty initiative is necessary to conclude the process of nation building.
struggle strategy
ETAs decision to assassinate Popular Party politicians was a key moment in the political deterioration of the Basque The Basque government Peace Plan conflict. The entire Basque society, right and the left, nationalists and non-nationalists, took to the streets in an unprecedented general mobilisation against ETA, following the assassination of a PP municipal council member in the village of Ermua in June 1997. Unlike previous mobilizations, this time there was a general perception that ETA had surpassed the limits of what is acceptable.
ETA's strategy of "socialising the pain" felt by its own supporters provoked a massive backlash. Political slogans used in the fight against the Francoist dictatorship were turned around, and the unanimous demand of the Basque people to do away with the repressive forces of Francoism, has now been turned against ETA.
The enormous open contradiction between the discourse of an organization that justifies its political violence under the pretence of liberating its people from national oppression, and its receiving a unanimous condemnation of its violent methods from this same people, even led the majority of Herri Batasuna's electorate to question the usefulness of armed struggle. Such a political display is the equivalent of a slap in the face, like being thrown out of the house by your own family. For the most lucid leaders of radical nationalism, the need to implement a change in the general strategy of the national liberation movement became clear.
• It is not possible to think of the possibility of a police victory over terrorism, and it is not reasonable to think that ETA will voluntarily renounce the armed struggle, nor that HB will cease supporting ETA and instead become involved in the democratic system.
Therefore, a dialogued end to the violence is necessary. • No democratic government will ever negotiate with terrorists. Negotiations, therefore, should be among the political parties. ETA should delegate their political representation to Herri Batasuna, and ронка рата decree a an indefinite cease fire following the agreement among the • The political bases for a negotiated solution should have the Statute of Autonomy as its jumping off point for resolving its deficiencies: transferring all self-government powers, including those referring to social security and the organization of a Basque national bank, recognition of the right of the Basque people to freely decide its national destiny, and initiating a process of territorial unity with
Navarra, under forms of institutional coordination freely agreed to by all sides. • The Spanish Constitution should be flexibly interpreted in order to be able to encompass these necessary reforms, which will be adopted by the central government after having been submitted to and accepted by the majority of the Basque people. • ETA's armed struggle is an obstacle to forging this new national consensus. ETA should facilitate the political agreement by announcing a unilateral military truce. It should not be asked to lay down its arms, but rather should adopt distention measures that facilitate this consensus.
The Basque Nationalist Party should assume the responsibility for initiating the political talks with Herri Batasuna and the other political parties, even though ETA'S armed struggle continues. "Political realism" is to be placed above discourse criticizing violence, and the political talks should shielded from the changing fortunes of the political violence. *
International Viewpoint #305 November 1998 15
* The Basque country and Spain
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• ETA is an obstacle because it creates more problems than it solves, because it perverts the ethics of the Basque national liberation movement, and because it blocks the capacity of political initiative on the part of the social majority.
• But since ETA is a roadblock for the centralist Constitution, the national question and the problem of political violence are situated on different yet interrelated planes. The pretence of putting an end to the violence by police methods, besides being useless, is antidemocratic. A solution arrived at through a dialogue is necessary to build a new national consensus concerning the historical rights of the Basque people, because it will allow for simultaneously resolving the national question and the problem of political violence.
These ideas reflect the current balance of forces in the Basque country. An implicit recognition that Basque nation building cannot at present be carried out with the revolutionary methods involved in a break with the central government.
They nonetheless reflect the majority opinion of the Basque people and the possibility of moving forward in the framework of a pro-sovereignty perspective of constitutional reforms. This willingness to prioritise political considerations to promote citizen participation, in turn raises the need to articulate new political alliances (constructing a new national consensus) in which the Basque bourgeoisie can aspire to consolidate its political leadership over The Basque country through the active involvement of the PNV in its political life. The national alliance
The national alliance proposed by the Basque trade unions does not imply renouncing the class struggle and the goal of a "sovereign and socialist Basque nation", because it will be precisely such forces that lead the struggle against the Basque Government's neoliberal policies.
The political struggle against the Basque bourgeoisie through raising social demands against unemployment and poverty (sharing work and a general redistribution of wealth) is more a possibility today that ever before. Fortunately, it does not represent an obstacle for the PNV to actively participate in the national consensus for a negotiated settlement of the Basque question.
The peace plan presented by the president of the Basque government closely resembles the proposal raised by the Basque trade unions, and although his "political bases for peace" are debatable, the initiative demonstrates the political savvy of a social class deeply concerned about its country and its businesses. The government proposal well summarises the evolution of a Basque bourgeoisie that tends to unify its forces nationally in a shared project. The political violence and the Statute of Autonomy do not allow for the construction of an integrated nation, which needs both a climate marked by political normalization as well as a greater degree of economic cohesion between the different
Basque nation building also needs the emergence of infrastructure that facilitates its integration in the European markets, and a system of shared sovereignty in the Spanish State's relations with the European Union.
After all, 40% of Basque-Navarra industrial production is earmarked for the European export market. Whereas, in the past, the perspective of the Spanish national market pushed the Basque bourgeoisie to break the domestic tariff barriers, the Basque financial and industrial markets are now tending to shift from the rest of Spain to Europe and Latin America.
The Basque Government has opened commercial offices in the main European and Latin American countries. The Basque bank, Banco Bilbao Vizkaya, is one of the most active Spanish multinationals in Latin America, and is cooperating with the government to open up new markets for the Basque manufacturing industry. Basque emigration to the capital cities of many Latin American countries has also played an important role in this expansion of Basque business
These tendencies encourage moves toward Basque-Navarra economic integration (shared economic interests), mixed formulas of collaboration on the political-institutional level (Council or Basque-Navarra congress such as was recently held between both autonomous governments), the creation of a Basque National Bank (a demand already formulated by the PNV), and the opening of commercial representation offices abroad to consolidate or increase the Basque country's presence in international markets.
The political alliance that has begun to take shape between the PNV and the Democratic Convergence of Navarra points in the same direction, but its consolidation requires formulas for the Basque country's territorial unity based on respect for Navarra's specificity. The political bases of the Basque government's plan appears to be considered in the framework of building that new national alliance in the new constellatioo of "'states and regions" of the Europear Union. The spirit of intolerance
The difficulties in building this new national consensus are not negligible.
Spanish nationalism is the most obvious problem. The "Spirit of Ermua" seems to be the banner around which it revolves. The anti-ETA mobilizations of 1997 have given a new impetus to Spanish nationalism. The forces adhering to it include most of the Spanish political parties (PP, Socialists, some leaders of the United Let), the UGT and CCOO trade unions, the state media, and most cultural workers or pseudo-intellectuals that feed from its trough.
The key idea of what they call "the spirit of Ermua" are terrifying for any democrat. Here are a few sample arguments from the Spanish press.
*There is no Basque national question; there is only a terrorist problem that should be resolved through the unity of all the democratic forces in backing police-repressive solutions".
"The Basque left is a fascist movement that puts democratic freedoms in Spain in danger, and if the moderate nationalism of the PNV represents a democratic political option like it says it does, it is obligated to defend the autonomous policies of the state against the totalitarianism of ETA..?"
"The nationalist identity of the PNV leads it to adopt ambiguous positions that give cover to terrorism, and its support for Basque nation building leads it to ideological fundamentalism, to exclude those who are not nationalists, and to interference in Navarra..."
Anti-Basque feeling has thus become an official ideology of the state, a type of
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH AND EDUCATION by José Iriarte "Bikila"
16 International Viewpoint #305 November 1998 sublime act of democracy that identifies what is democratic with what is Spanish and what is terrorist with what is Basque. This is a gross manipulation of collective feelings - feelings as diffuse as the idea of "national solidarity among
the peoples of Spain" and "let's stop the violence."
Most European nationalisms seem to feed off the fear of the loss of cultural identity, and they have found a scapegoat in African and Eastern European immigration to justify their expansion. But end-of-century Spanish nationalism is different. It feeds off the frenzy spurred by the loss of sovereignty "from above"(Europe), and the fear of the national disintegration of the state "from below" (differentiated nation building projects in The Basque country and Catalunya). The "spirit of Ermua" is being evoked in order to promote a movement that compensates for the loss of Spanish sovereignty in the foreign policy sphere with the reaffirmation of domestic unity. A new kind of nationalism
The discourse of Basque nationalism, or the way it responds to the ideology of Spanish national resistance, will be decisive in the process that is now unfolding. We must introduce some important changes in the national project. To ensure that we have an integrative approach to the different national identities present in the Basque country. This means replacing the ideology of national affirmation with a policy of civic integration.
To take firm steps toward territorial unity, it will be necessary to deactivate the ideology of Navarra anti-Basque resistance. This implies recognizing Navarra's specificity, in a formula for an institutional alliance between the two territories. It means constructing a new national identity for the Basque-Navarra
A similar phenomenon occurs with society's problems of national identity and the exercise of the right to national self-determination. As we all know, the recognition of this right is one thing and its practical implementation another. It is easy to construct a consensus backed by a wide majority around the constitutional recognition of the right to self-determination (which is the "sine qua non" condition for finding the solution to the Basque question), but it is equally foreseeable that its practical implementation would in today's conditions produce an enormous political division among the Basque people.
All the opinion polls confirm that none of these possible options put to a popular plebiscite would obtain a majority. Basque society is not sufficiently cohesive for definitive solutions concerning the future of the nation to obtain majority consensus support. Therefore, a period of transition is needed in which other complementary formulas of sovereignty (which would enjoy a majority consensus) can be applied.
Practical experience convincingly demonstrates that many people who would possibly vote against national independence, are also opposed to interference by the central government in decisions that could be taken by Basque institutions. They could be persuaded to support measures of Basque political sovereignty (the unilateral adoption of political decisions, exercising the right to veto centralist policies, etc.). This would allow us to push aside the conflict of national identities and the collective fears of national assimilation on all sides: the Basque fear of Spanish assimilation, the Navarrese fear of Basque assimilation, and Spanish immigrants fear of losing their original ethnic
These formulas for a deeper level of sovereignty, without independence, thus appear as the only way that the Basque people can be unified behind a Truce and negotiation
Everything seems to indicate that Basque nationalism is today in the process of accommodating its national project to the existence of divisions that currently prevail in Basque society. From this can be expected a proposal of a common political basis for a dialogued
It can also be supposed that the majorities presently adhering to the Basque Socialist Party could change their stance. Even so, there are no guarantees that the Spanish parties in The Basque country (or a part of them), would abandon their full-blown resistance to Basque nationalism.
The negotiation strategy that the nationalist movement is currently following is both audacious and unpredictable. There are two possible outcomes. First is the offer of an indefinite military truce by ETA, but without any "decommissioning" (surrender of arms.) The second possibility is the organization of a popular plebiscite on the general principles of the negotiated settlement (the ELKARRI proposal). Both these developments would unanimously mobilize a society that wants an end to the political violence. They would isolate all types of resistance that currently stand in the way of the dialogue. It would also put the central government in a difficult situation, leaving it without any other argument than pure force.
However, there is a problem in the medium term, namely the continuation of ETA's armed struggle and the police repression against it. So far, the peace talks between PNV and Herri Batasuna have been "shielded" from the cycle of violence. One Basque government Minister of the Interior paraphrased the words of Isaac Rabin in explaining that " ..one must negotiate while they are killing and pursue them as if we were not negotiating...
The desire of peace is so strong that all sides accept these ground-rules. But if the talks are prolonged beyond the point that Basque society is willing to tolerate, the implicit spiral of violence could devour the dialogue process. Where is the Spanish left?
responsible engagement by the Spanish left is another factor that could tip the balance in favour of a negotiated settlement. But the tendencies and sentiments prevailing on the left are not exactly encouraging
The prosecution of the Socialist Party for its responsibility in organizing "state terrorism" (GAL), shows that Spanish public opinion was and is in favor of "persecuting terrorists by any means necessary," although it is not willing to forgive the PSOE's lying
To swim against the stream of the majority opinion is to run the risk of becoming an electoral minority, and if to this panorama we add that the solution to the Basque question demands constitutional modifications, it is easy to understand Basque scepticism in the Spanish
The very configuration of the Spanish state is at play in the Basque country. Any modification of the Spanish constitution will have a domino effect on the other nationalities (Catalunya, Galicia, Canary Islands).
It will also spark Jacobin reactions in Spanish nationalism, such as in the case of the leaders of the United Left, who will not hesitate to accuse all the movements breaking from the central government of "lack of national solidarity". In doing so, they are digging the grave of their own freedoms.
Those who have signing the Madrid manifesto for a negotiated political solution to the Basque conflict (see box) are aware of this. Today they are still a small drop of water in a desert of incomprehension, but they have the incalculable value of representing an ethical commitment to democracy and freedom.
If progressive forces in the Basque country are able to achieve a military truce, and win a social majority of Basque society for a negotiated settlement, the seed of the Madrid manifesto may be able to germinate in Spanish lett
International Viewpoint #305 November 1998 17
Coalition for a Political Alternative (RAP)