Slight openings to the left
Elections Local and bi-elections earlier this year suggest a slight strengthening of President Kim Dae-jung's power; widespread voter apathy; and a slight opening to the left at the local level. Lee Oh-wol and Terry Lawless President Kim Dae-jung's National Congress for New Politics, mostly bolstered by the international media attention his victory garnered, has increased, although not absolutely, its grip on power.
In the elections for control of the Seoul city government in June, NCNP candidate Koh Kun was elected mayor, and the NCNP took 19 out of the 25 ward office positions. In voting for the Seoul Metropolitan Council, the NCNP obtained 78 out of the 94 popularly elected seats.
In the parliamentary by-elections in July, the results were more skewed. The NCNP obtained just two seats, its coalition partner, the United Liberal Democrats took one seat and the Grand National Party won four seats. Regionalism
The limits to the NCNP's power is the result of the continuing strong regionalism of Korean politics, which has remained basically unchanged since Kim's election victory. It is virtually impossible for him to win seats anywhere in North or South Kyongsang provinces in the south-eastern part of the country. This region was the power base of the successive military regimes from Park Chung-hee's coup d'etat in 1961 until the defeat of Rho Taewoo in 1992. The result of this is that President Kim only has the support of a slim majority of Koreans, albeit in a heavily skewed regional distribution of votes.
Nevertheless, the de facto party of the army and state bureaucracy, the Grand National Party (GNP), continues to lose ground. The voting majority of the GNP in the National Assembly has been seriously cut by a
The general trend in favour of President Kim is the result of three factors: the strong power of the President; a majority of Koreans still holding the GNP responsible for the economic crisis; and many Koreans wishing to give a clearer mandate to the NCNP.
This means that among those sectors of Korean society that have not lost faith in the political process, the hope that Kim can deliver on his promises remains high. This obviously includes many workers and small business people, especially in the two Cholla Provinces and Seoul.
Because of the long legacy of dictatorship and corruption, most Koreans have an instinctive and basically healthy distrust of politi-
The extremely narrow electoral margin between the GNP and the NCNP-ULD alliance in the National Assembly has led to virtual paralysis since Kim Dae-jung's inauguration. Some of the voter apathy is a reflection of healthy disgust at the often child-like antics of politicians.
However, the major element is undoubtedly the "IMF factor". Since the economic crisis began, Korean workers have been made painfully aware that the government's control over bankruptcies, non-payment of wages, lay-otts and currency levels is virtually nonPassivity
Workers, in both non-unionised industry and highly organised plants, are now being faced concretely with the threat or actuality of lay-offs. In many cases, the belief that politicians can do nothing to change the immediate circumstances of an individual's life is unfortunately true. But apathy often leads to passivity about politics of all varieties, including radical alterna-
For different reasons, both older workers who have strongly believed in the value of work and young workers and students who have yet to experience work for any period of time may both end up in this
In the local elections, voter turnout was 52.6%, far below the 80.7% of Koreans who voted in the Presidential election in December; in the by-elections held a day before the General Strike was called by the KCTU, only 40% bothered to cast ballots, the lowest level since the by-elections in November 1965 - when Korea was a de facto military dictatorship
Nevertheless, the local elections witnessed a slight opening to the forces of the labour-identified and independent labour left. This is something remarkable for Korean politics, which has long been dominated by corruption, croneyism and anti-communism.
People's Victory 21, fielding joint candidates with the KCTU, elected 22 out of 49 candidates. Its support was particularly strong in the Hyundai company town of Ulsan in south-eastern Korea. In the municipal elections, People's Victory 21 also elected three independent candidates, one of whom was recently arrested, a form of intimidation of leftists common in Korea. The FKTU, some of whose candidates ran under the banner of Kim Dae-jung's party, elected 41 out of 78 candi-
Particularly striking was the election of Kim Yoon-joo, a regional chapter leader of the FKTU, under the banner of the NCNP, as mayor of Kunpo.
Another important development is that the Korean Youth Progressive Party (KYPP), which originated in the People's Candidates Election Campaign Centre in 1992, is about to formally launch itself as a political party.
The PYPP may well end up being more active than People's Victory 21. Until now, the links between the KCTU and People's Victory 21 have been mostly organisational. The union membership has not been broadly supportive of the party.
On incident that was widely reported in the Korean media indicates the reason for this turn to the left at the level of local government. Koh Kun, fresh from his victory as the new mayor of Seoul, decided to "meet the people" on his first day on the job. He got on a subway, and attempted to engage a women in conversation.
Incredibly, the woman showed virtually no interest in his first two questions, which deeply embarrassed the new mayor as he stood there with the various news media.
Finally, he decided to ask the women who she was and where she was going. It turned out she had been an employee of one of the five banks that had just been shut down and was on her way to Myongdong Cathedral in order to take part in a demonstration. The new mayor has his work cut out for him. *
International Viewpoint #305 November 1998 25
* China China