government an initial vote of confidence - though future support would depend on the government's actions.
The Olive Tree emerged as the strongest force in the new parliament, and Prodi was invited to form a government. Since the PRC held the balance of power in the Chamber of Deputies, its votes would be more than a statement of protest.
Faced with this pressure, the majority of the PRC began to modify its positions. In June, they declared that the party was an "integral part" of Prodi's parliamentary majority. [influential former party leader] Cossuta, said that he hoped this would remain so until the end of the legislative period. The policy was ratified at the party congress in December 1996.
This new phase lasted until October 1997, when the PRC provoked a parliamentary crisis by threatening not to vote for the Prodi government's budget bill.
In happier days: Communist Refoundation leaders Cossuta and Bertinotti
The threat was almost immediately withbefore the split Cossuta joins the centre-left government Rifondazione splits A rightward split has debilitated Italy's Party of Communist Refoundation (PRC), one of Europe's largest anti-capitalist forces Livio Maitan Founded in 1991, Rifondazione communista described itself as the party of all those who refuse to see capitalism as inevitable. Despite the defeats of the workers' movement, and the failure of the Eastern European "socialist" societies, the party reaffirmed its "class struggle" tradition. In the first few years, the party was able to organise its presence in most parts of the country.
The PRC's natural venue was in the opposition, from where it could begin to articulate its alternative project. The party successfully avoided being typecast as a party of nostalgics, or a purely propagandistic organisation. It won the profile of a political formation with a mass audience, defending the interests and advancing the demands of the most downtrodden sections of Italian society. It also won a respectable level of electoral support.
In January 1994, Fausto Bertinotti became secretary and effective leader of the party. In March that year, the party participated in the "progressive" electoral bloc, which was dominated by the [ex-Communist, now social-democratic] PDS. When this bloc lost the election, the parties moved further apart. PDS 2 International Viewpoint #306 December 1998 leaders argued that they should have opened more to the political centre, and
Within the PRC, Bertinotti radicalised the communist orientation. The party became increasingly active in its opposition, first to Silvio Berlusconi's government, then to the Dini government. That government had the support of the PDS.
This was the most productive phase in the life of the PRC. It grew in membership, and in organising capacity. On several occasions it launched demonstrations that attracted more than 100,000 participants. It survived, without great difficulty, the departure of several parliamentarians and members of the party leadership (Garavini, Magri, Castellina and others) who supported the
New elections were held in Spring 1996. The party signed a "non-aggression" pact with the Olive Tree coalition, dominated by the PDS, but led by Romano Prodi, a member of one of the fragments of the former Christian Democratic party. The PRC campaign emphasised the "class struggle" alternative. It was different from the Olive Tree programme on all key questions: economic orientation, institutional reform, foreign policy, and reform of the
The PRC made no commitment to participate in a left government, or even to use its vote to ensure a centre-left parliamentary majority. But it promised that, if necessary, it would give a Prodi drawn. In exchange, Prodi hurriedly promised to introduce legislation for a 35-hour work week. The PRC began to sit alongside the deputies of the government bloc, though without formal participation in the government. Far from being solved, the tension between participation and independence would continually grow, forcing the party into an impasse. Bertinotti's turn
The party's two main leaders had different reactions to the government crisis. Cossuta was clearly overjoyed by the new agreement with Prodi. Bertinotti, on the other hand, was increasingly critical.
At first, he restricted his critical comments to meetings of the central leadership. But after a while he spoke frankly in the National Political Leadership (CPN). With somewhat twisted logic, he argued that a party like the PRC could support a centre-left government like Prodi's, but also be in opposition to it.
At the end of 1997, Cossuta opposed Bertinotti in a CPN meeting for the first time. A few months later, the two leaders clashed again. Although both had approved the party's critical judgment of Prodi's economic and financial programme, Bertinotti was determined to organise an open opposition to the legislation when it was presented to parliament in September.
In June and July 1998, the conflict deepened. Bertinotti declared that unless the Prodi government changed direction, particularly in its socioeconomic orientation, the PRC would have to seriously consider breaking its de facto alliance with the government. Cossuta tried to calm the debate, but did not oppose Bertinotti's stark choice: change of policy. or withdrawal of support. [During this period, a minority of 48 CPN members, including the author of this article.
argued that the party should immediately withdraw its support of Prodi and pass
It now seems that Cossuta was already playing for time while he assembled support for his future split. Although he continued to vote in favour of Bertinotti's ultimatum, his supporters launched a virulent debate in the mainstream media, arguing that the PRC should not leave the government bloc.
Cossuta admitted that Prodi's new finance law did not represent any new socioeconomic orientation, and that, in principle, a Communist party like the PRC ought to pass over into the opposition. But, he argued, to do so might mean that Prodi would be replaced by a right-wing government, possibly even a return of Berlusconi.
Although Cossuta reiterated the communist principle that all members of the parliamentary fraction should vote according to the decision of the party leadership, he redoubled his efforts to spit the party before the vote came.
The consequences of the split are still unclear. Very few ordinary members of the party have followed Cossuta. Most of those who have left are members of the local and regional leadership. According to the 15 October edition of the PRC newspaper Liberazione, only a "small minority" of the 117 provincial secretaries have followed Cossuta, along with four of the 20 regional secretaries.
The greatest loss was in the regional parliaments: 36 of the party's 62 deputies joined the split. In Rome, only five of the 66 secretaries of party circles have left. Even in Florence, long thought to be Cossuta's stronghold, three quarters of the members of the regional committee have remained loyal to the
The danger is, obviously, that voters will turn away from the party, and that militants will be de-motivated by the whole affair.
At the root of Cossuta's motivation is a simple philosophy: the masses are not mobilising. All we can do is to put pressure on the government to shift its policies somewhat. This we can do if we are part of the government. If we go into opposition, the Olive Tree parties will attack us. Our impact on public affairs will be less, we will have less publicity, and our support will shrink. We will be marginalised, even excluded, from the various institutions of political life.
This kind of thinking was particularly strong among elected representatives in the regional and national parliaments. Classic institutionalist and parliamentarian cretinism, combined with short-term opportunism.
Too many of the party's leading cadre were afraid of losing the exorbitant material and social privileges of their lifestyle. There has been a resurgence of the "lesser of two evils" philosophy and practice, a way of thinking that has done so much damage to the workers' movement over the years, ideological
It is no coincidence that Cossuta's supporters have increasingly associated themselves with the old Italian Communist Party (PCI), particularly the methodological and strategic approach of Palmiro Togliatti. They reproach Bertinotti, and particularly the Trotskyists in the PRC, for being outside the tradition
Cossuta has spoken a great deal about the alliance - which he claims now controls the PRC - between Bertinotti and Livio Maitan, leader of the Trotskyist current around Bandiera Rossa magazine.
Cossuta's new party calls itself the Party of Italian Communists. This allows them to use the same PCI initials as the former Italian Communist Party.
So far, Cossuta has managed to blame the Trotskyists for the split without explicitly returning to the old Stalinist discourse. He has spoken respectfully of those most directly affected by his polemic. On 15 October he told the country's leading newspaper, Corriere della Sera, that "I have justified the presence of Trotskyist comrades in our party to all those Communist Parties that considered this unacceptable. So it has nothing to do with Stalinism [when I note that] these opposite positions to ours during each of the congresses [since the PRC was formed]. And finally, even although there are only a few dozen of them, they have played a decisive role in bringing down the government."
Of course, the incurable Stalinist nostalgics in the PRC can only be comforted by his comments, and will draw their own conclusions. This may contribute to a degradation of the climate within the left in various sectors.
On the other hand, a number of nonTrotskyist comrades, including Bertinotti, have reacted to these attacks by reiterating their support and appreciation for the presence of the Trotskyist current in the PRC.
The PRC is paying a heavy price for its past weaknesses, ambiguities and contradictions. The process of renovation and refoundation of the Italian communist movement actually bogged down quite quickly.
contents europe
2 Italy: Rifondazione splits
• Livio Maitan
Finland: new party
4
France: joint far left election list
5
• Rafael Duffleux asia
Australia:The devils of Jabiluka
6
• John Tully americas
8 Colombia
• FARC and ELN representatives discuss the "peace process"
12
USA: Ecological racism
• Charles Crey and Monique Harden poverty profiles
14 A special report on the causes of poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa, and a critique of poverty theories
• Antonio Hercules russia's revolutions
22 A comparative analysis of orking class consciousness during the overthrow of capitalism in 1917, and its restoration under
Gorbachev and Yeltsin
• David Mandel
Index for 1998
28 A full list of articles, classified by country, subject and author
International Viewpoint #306 December 1998 3
* Italy