Mariela Guerrero interviews Manuel Marulanda Velez, alias
Tirofijo, leader of the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Paramilitaries
Progress in the peace talks has alarmed the thugs, profiteers and fundamentalists who control the country's myriad paramilitary groups. They are demanding a place at the negotiating table, intensifying their violence at the
Their main leader, Carlos Castaño, openly says that the war will be won in the field, and that his offensive is aimed at the social base of the FARC among the peasants. Attacks like the recent massacre of 150 civilians in Antioquia are designed to convince the USA to convince Pastrama to admit the paramilitaries to the
The paramilitaries are active over about four million hectares, including some 400 municipalities. These are the zones dominated by the country's major landholders, and the heavily armed drug-smuggling
The paramilitaries receive financial support, recruitment help and intelligence from the armed forces. Soldiers and policemen are seconded to work with them on a regular basis.
Paramilitary groups also control much of the private security industry, which has developed thanks to the increasingly violent conflicts between the main cattleranchers, landholders and druglords.
The paramilitaries carry out the "dirty work" which the army cannot do directly, because of pressure from human rights groups or their minimal respect for legality. The goal of the paramilitaries is clear: eliminate the guerrillas by destroying their social base among the peasants. Nothing is resolved
While the talks intensify, so does the war. President Pastrama faces trouble on three sides. Civil society demands the pacification of the continent's most violent country. Part of the army thinks that, with a little more time and money, they can exhaust and destroy the guerrillas. And the FARC and ELN are strong enough to deny Pastrama the power to make decisions that will hold.
The negotiations between FARC and Pastrama open a window towards the end of this cruel, long war. But no-one can guarantee that.
The writer Arturo Alape says Colombia is a country "which counts, among its many qualities and characteristics, a particular talent to cause deaths in all imaginable ways." * Source: Rouge, 21 January 1999
Colombia). • The current negotiations on prisoner exchange have attracted a lot of media attention. How important is this for the FARC?
We are experiencing an internal confrontation. This is nothing new it has been going on for many years. In every action, when a hamlet is occupied, during an inspection, whatever kind of action it may be, soldiers are captured. For years now we have been capturing policemen and soldiers. Whenever a soldier or a policeman was captured we would talk to them and later let them go asking them to report to the police. However, our situation has now changed and we can now retain those we capture and ensure their wellbeing. • What are you suggesting in this
The country has no law that covers the exchange issue because this is an internal, rather than international conflict. We suggest that the parliament conduct a study, that it be analysed, and that a law, to be called the exchange law, be
There are two reasons for this: if we do not achieve a political solution through the talks, then we need something that will provide an opening because the confrontation will continue. Which means that more soldiers will be captured. We need an opening for both parties: for those they capture and for those we capture. We cannot have prisoners being held for 30 years on this side, and prisoners held for 30 years on the other. The situation must be defined between the two sides and this must be done by means of a law of the republic. • But why does it have to be a law?
True, the other side proposes an ad hoc exchange. But we want a law. We believe a law is needed because we do not know - they speak of peace, but who can ensure that, after the dialogue begins and four or five meetings are held in three months, there will be peace followed by the exchange of prisoners? No. Let us draft a law independently of • In the meantime what will happen to the soldiers you have captured?
We can hold them for as long as we need to. We have more than 300 of them and that is not a small number. This is why we are suggesting a law. If they do not have the appropriate instruments, then find them. In the meantime, and as long as there is no law, we will continue
• What will happen if there are delays in the process?
We have already told them: the longer you take to draft the law and make it into something important, the more people will be detained. They are constantly detaining eight or 10 civilians and reporting: "We captured 20 guerrillas and among them a very important commander." In another region they detain another 15 or 20 civilians and again they report: "We captured 30 very important that is happening in the country. they are really detaining civilians. They have captured very few of our guerrillas. Not more than 100.
We gave them the list of officers, noncommissioned officers, and ordinary soldiers. The idea behind this is that when the time comes, the government will set aside the 100 guerrillas of ours they are holding and we will do the same with their soldiers. • But the list you submitted has approximately 500 names
The others are people who the state wants to prosecute as guerrillas because a law has put an end to the term political crimes. These are now considered criminal offences. Dialogue with the government • What is the real reason why you did not attend the meeting with President Pastrana?
Some military command agents were sent to check out the area and find adequate places to position snipers. They selected some high places, the sides of the church, across from the plaza. They were not very lucky because one of their men gave us the details, showed us maps and told us how the plan was drafted. If they could "drop" Pastrana and me there would be no problem. That would solve • Do you really think someone could have killed you in San Vicente, surrounded by thousands of your men?
It is always good to be careful. One never knows. They could always find themselves a gunman to carry out the action on behalf of Carlos Castano [leader of the Colombian United Self-Defence Groups, AUC]. It is very difficult to spot a gunman in the midst of the townspeople. It is very difficult to know who is earning a salary and willing to die as well. They killed Carlos Pizarro Leongomez and Carlos Toledo Plata of the 19 April Movement, M-19. They
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* Colombia killed the liberal Guadalupe Salcedo. They killed EPL leader Oscar William Calvo. So, it is better to be cautious. • When will you get down to the really important matters at the dialogue table?
A political front has been opened for the search of solutions to a social crisis. We will work based on this. We will hold meetings, and we will talk and talk, and see what comes from the table. If nothing happens, if we do not reach an agreement, surely the chapter will be closed.
We believe that the three-month time limit we established is more than enough time to see if we are really going to get somewhere. After agreeing on a working agenda, we will begin to discuss the 10 points. But before we do that we must decide on an agenda and the participation of the people. • Surely the negotiations are between the guerrillas and the government!
The former and current governments have always wanted the talks to be held between the two parties: guerrillas and government. They do not want anyone else to know what is being discussed. We want to talk facing the people.
The political parties, the various power sectors, the civilian society and all those interested in finding a political solution to the conflict should be represented at the dialogue.
The workers are the ones who must say what their problems are and how they believe these should be solved. Same thing for the peasants and the land issue. The students must be represented at the talks because they know the problems they confront and how they should be solved. And so on with each issue. The talks must be held facing the people and not behind their backs. Agenda for talks • Isn't the negotiating agenda too broad?
No. It is an agenda that covers all the problems that need solving. For example, at the table we are going to bring up the problem of the national and international moneylenders and the control of the dollar, an extremely complicated issue.
That is going to create big problems because we will be discussing economic power and the handling of the dollar. We cannot continue to tolerate the fact that interest rates for a worker who requests a loan is 25, 30 and sometimes 40 per cent. It is impossible to live like that. We cannot continue to tolerate an exchange rate of more than 1,500 pesos to the dollar. • Can the establishment give in on 8 International Viewpoint #309 March 1999
MAL all those points?
Well, we know that the fight will be a hard one when we broach those issues. They are all smiles about the 10 points. However, when we expand on them, when we begin to discuss each issue, they can be pretty broad. Then who are we going to challenge? The large capital groups and families, those that must be curbed. We cannot allow our people to continue dying of hunger, without a home, without a car, without a roof over their heads, without education, without health, while others have huge buildings filled with dollars. No. That must be changed. It will not be easy because the confrontation will be with a state that has given nothing and wants to give nothing. • How does the issue of paramilitarism work its way into the agenda?
That is one of the future issues to be discussed at the table. We will discuss it when we come to it. We must wait and see how the government is going to broach the subject because paramilitarism is the state.
They like to blame others. Every time the police or the army commits a crime or a massacre they blame it on [paramilitary leader] Carlos Castano.
Members of the Cazadores Battalion travel to a place, arrive in uniform and set up camp. Next day they dress as civilians, and head for a nearby hamlet. When they arrive, they look like paramilitaries. That is the way it is all over the country. Demilitarization • Why did the start of dialogue take so long?
When presidential candidates Horacio] Serpa and Pastrana were campaigning we informed the people that we were interested in initiating talks. We said that there were two conditions. We said that we were willing to talk with whomever won the elections and that the basis for the talks would be the demilitarization of five municipalities and the dismantling of paramilitarism.
We cannot accept their condition of talking in the midst of war. We had to get them to agree on the demilitarization of the five municipalities because it is impossible to talk with planes flying above and bombs falling. The first conclusion we reached in our analysis was on the need for demilitarization and an agreement that there would be no armed conflict within the area. The chances for peace • There are many Colombians who feel that you are not interested in making peace -
We are the most interested in making peace. Wouldn't it be nice if the International Bank, the church, the whole world, were to come here and see us working and see what it is we need? Unfortunately, the government refused to listen and today the conflict is much bigger. • Would you be willing to submit to a reintegration process?
We are not fighting so that they will give us a scholarship, a little house or for a little car. That is not what this is all about. We want changes made for the good of a people that has been suttering for many years. These people understand what we are doing. The fact that the number of guerrillas around the country keeps growing is proof of this. And this is one way those changes can be made. • What will happen if the process fails?
We are open. If they close this chapter on us, we will continue. If it is opened, we will be there. If we make progress with our 10 points — or even with eight of the 10 points, then we could begin considering the possibility of a cease-fire. But in the meantime there is nothing that would allow a cease-fire. • Why does the FARC aspire to be considered a military force?
As a matter of fact, we are the authority throughout a vast area of the country. You can see this along our fronts. You can walk into a police station and see two guerrillas arrive and hear the police inspector tell them: I have a problem and need your help to solve it. The guerrillas are the authorities in those areas. The mayors cannot work unless they ask the guerrillas what it is they should do. In practice, we are the other government within the government. This is why we
are seeking recognition as a military force. Solutions to the drug problem • FARC recently met with US government representatives to discuss drugs. Has the FARC's position regarding US policy changed?
This is a very recent change, and we are just beginning to discuss it. There are rumours spread by the media and by the narrow-minded people who think: "They met the gringos; does this mean they no longer want power? Have they renounced their commitment to struggle for socialism?" It is only normal that some people should think this way. Many times they are not aware of the commitment the FARC has to the Colombian people.
The FAR wants to show the world, including the United States, that we not involved in drug trafficking, do not grow drugs, and do not live off the drug
The FARC is willing to invite them to come to Colombia and see for themselves the reasons why peasants plant these drugs; to see, first hand, the problems these people confront and why there is nothing else they can do. We have invited them not only to visit the demilitarized areas but the whole country. They should visit the Middle Magdalena area, [paramilitary leader Carlos] Castano's territory, Cordoba, all those regions where there are plantations, not only coca plantations, but poppy plantations as well. The media only mentions the plantations in the southern areas of the country, but there are other huge areas where raw material for the production of drugs is produced. • Can you really help solve the coca
We believe that if the government wants to eradicate the drug problem then it must first draft a development plan for the peasants. That is all we want. Thousands of peasants need to produce and grow drugs to live because they are not protected by the state.
This is why we come before the government to say: Mr President, draft plans that will allow the eradication of coca on the basis of alternative crops. I told our international affairs chief Comrade Raul Reyes: Go out there and approach the international organizations. Tell them that if they trust us, to go ahead and deposit some money, which we promise will be used to eradicate the coca crops in, say, one municipality. • How can you put an end to those plantations?
We can get a group of agronomists, good agronomists, to tell us what other crops can be grown in those areas. It could be rice, cacao, corn or cotton. On this basis, and depending on what the agronomists have to say, we could use the money to begin destroying the drug crop and planting something else - by the time we finish destroying the drug crops, the new crops will be beginning to
- but not on the basis of shooting the people, dropping bombs on them, dusting their sown land, killing their birds and leaving their land sterile. That is how we would fight against the coca plantations. A new crop must group before we can destroy the drug crops.
If we do not do this, then we are going to continue the way we are. They want to convince us that we are the ones who must eradicate those plantations. No. That is something the government must do. We are not the government, yet. Once we are the government, we will do • In the meantime will you profit from the illegal crops?
Ah yes. They say we live off that. Even the government's policy claims that destroying the illegal crops will be the end of us. As if that is our source of money. All the government documents state that putting an end to the coca plantations will be the end of the revolutionary movement. It so happens that coca is not the roots of the guerrilla movement, but rather the country's social, political and economic problems. • What interest does the United States have in the process?
The responsibility for the drug trafficking phenomenon does not fall solely on the producing countries Colombia. It is also the responsibility of the countries that consume the drug, like the United States. It is also the responsibility of those who produce the raw materials, and the chemical precursors.
We believe that once the United States understands this, it will then have to decide if it will continue to give the Colombian military, army and police money, which is not used in the struggle against drug trafficking, but which could be seen as meddling in Colombia's
We also want to keep Colombia from becoming a new Vietnam. Colombia must be allowed to develop its own social and economic plan and that the international organizations must let the Colombians solve their own problems. • Do you think socialism failed? What kind of socialism would you want for Colombia?
First of all, we do not know when we will triumph and reach power and we do not know what changes will have taken place in the world when this does happen.
The socialism we want for the Colombian people is one that will select from the various socialist experiences, the Soviet socialism that no longer exists, the Chinese socialism that still exists, the Vietnamese socialism, and the Cuban socialism.
We will begin by selecting from among them their good as well as their bad experiences, never forgetting that Colombia is not like those countries, but has its own revolutionary culture and roots. We are nearing the 21st century and the FARC cannot repeat the mistakes others have made. • The US Congress strongly criticized the meeting between President Clinton's representatives and the FARC. It was a pretty unusual
In a way, yes. They themselves stressed that it is unusual for their government to meet with rebel organizations like ours, especially when we had not begun talks with the government. They must have their reasons for thinking like that and we know that decision was not easy.
This decision made us realize that there is a group within the State Department that feels it is necessary to really look at what is happening in Colombia
The decision to meet with representatives of the empire that has kept our people subjugated and that continues to impose subjugating policies on our people did not come easily for us either. But we did it and we are glad we talked with them. We want to continue that New political group • You plan to create a new political group called the Bolivarian Movement for the New Colombia. What kind of a group will it be?
The idea of the Bolivarian Movement is the result of what happened to the Patriotic Union [UP]. We suggested a policy for the UP while the appropriate national, departmental and municipal mechanisms were being created. Once the mechanisms had been created, this policy would become a new political movement born from an armed organization through agreements reached
It was a policy capable of developing a broad political movement, a third force different to the traditional political parties, capable of confronting the policies of the oligarchy. That was what we wanted. But the UP was riddled with bullets. Later, at the Eighth Conference we agreed to go at it seriously and create the Bolivarian Movement for the New
This is a movement that is being created in hamlets, cities, villages,
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* Colombia wherever there are people to hear our platform. Once we achieve truly positive agreements in this country, we will have to show that we are a force that can gather a large number of followers at the public plaza. • Will you participate openly in an election?
The Bolivarian Movement will have to be a clandestine movement, until the appropriate conditions are achieved for it to act legally. Using the UP experience, many of our people will be elected to support the process and ensure that the past will not be repeated. The people did not understand that changes had to be made. We do not want to make that mistake again.
• Is there anything left of the Simon
Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating