International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

Special Report on Brazil: Democratic and Popular Government in Rio Grande do Sul State

· International Viewpoint No. 312, June 1999 · pp 18-19 · 1,222 words

Latin America

Democratic and priorities. The reallocated R$466m.

Ac

(US$300m.) represents 31,000 new ex houses, 36,000 classrooms, or 5,200

G basic health centres. It would also pay for go popular government The vicious electoral campaign in 1998 polarised Rio Grande's population into two opposing blocks. But the right wing parties are divided and confused after losing control of "their" state. This gives a certain breathing space to the new institutions. Mark Johnson After the most polarised electoral campaign in Brazilian history, 51% of votors in Brazil's southernmost state elected Olivio Dutra as governor at the end of last year. 18 International Viewpoint #312 June 1999 the rehousing of 11,650 peasant families pu on small plots of land, (the government thi plans to rehouse 10,000 this year, and

When he entered the presidential 100,000 by the end of Dutra's four-year tir palace, he found the administration in mandate. ruins. Despite a huge privatisation Mainstream politicians have a strong M programme, public debt had tripled under base of support in business circles and the previous conservative state govern- the media. But the PT in Rio Grande do es ment And a string of dubious contracts Sul only has its electoral base and the th had transferred resources and power to a trade unions. This support could Str clique of construction, manufacturing evaporate if the Dutra administration ta and agricultural companies. fails to overcome the obstacles ahead, or In

The new Popular Front administra- fails to maintain a high level of popular to tion faced terrible obstacles, even before mobilisation in support of its programme га the financial crisis which halved the So far, however, the government VE value of the Brazilian real and pushed team is full of confidence. According to many of Brazil's states to the edge of PT Organisational Secretary Ignacio

Fritzen, the government's suspension of

The opposition parties seized this investment incentives for GM and Ford opportunity to accuse the Workers Party was "extremely positive. It was a specific (PT) of making rash promises, which it promise in our electoral programme, and

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* Brazil

it shows, beyond a doubt, what the priorities of this government are, compared to those of the previous administration. Like the election campaign, it has again polarised the state. Two models of development, of modernisation, are again

The problem with the GM and Ford deals was not just the enormous cost of state subsidies (R$4.7bn. in infrastructure projects, and R$5bn. in tax exemptions). The reality is that investment in auto production generates fewer jobs than in most other areas of the local economy.

According to the state finance ministry, each R$1m. of new demand for auto products generates 139 full time jobs. By using the same sum to stimulate demand in other sectors, the state could generate 298 jobs in the agriculture and fishing sectors, 273 in the clothing sector, 253 jobs in the livestock sector, 247 in the coffee industry or 241 in the milk production sector. (BNDES/FEE, cited in Informe Direto March 1999)

The main issue is one of priorities. According to a government statement exposing the secret deal with Ford and

"over four years, the previous government invested only R$20m. in the public health system. The amount that the state would have to pay to Ford and General Motors this year alone is 20 times higher!" Mobilisation

"Many foreign commentators underestimate the level of popular support for this government." says Nelson. "Ât every step of the election campaign, and since taking power, the population has been informed and consulted. The Participatory Budget [a system of direct democracy at the municipal level] gives us a very solid base. So, while it is obviously true that our support could decline, we have some time to build new elements of popular mobilisation."

According to Ignacio Fritzen, "The PT's fundamental role is to ensure that the government's project advances. This means mobilising considerable social forces in support of out electoral demands. It will take considerable effort and time to implement our reforms. We need to explain, educate and mobilise.

"Every government measure that opposes 'them up there' will cause conflict, media attacks, and confusion. So we need a constant dialogue with the population. The PT needs to be on every street corner, putting the argument for our alternative

"The party must organise so as to ensure that the government governs for the people. That hasn't been the case in other states where the PT has won power. It was a major mistake there. We will do Communications Secretary Lúcio Costa, this means "doing the opposite of what the Chilean left did under Allende in the early 70s. Back then, the Communist Party in particular tried to limit popular mobilisation, "to let the government get on with its job.'

"The challenge facing us is the exact opposite. We need to mobilise the population around the participative budget, and build the participative budget process across the state of Rio Grande do Sul. This means organising, in each town, a coalition of the left parties, the trade unions, the churches and the resident's associations. In the rural interior of the state, where the party is weakest, this represents a major financial, organisational and political challenge.

"It is this popular participation which gives us the capacity to intensify the conflict with the central government. Otherwise, we will be defeated." Division of labour

Brazil's political system gives the state president considerable powers, but the right's majority in the State Assembly places considerable limits on the Popular Front's power. There are some possibilities of negotiation with dissident factions within the bourgeois block, but the main strategy for ensuring governability will be articulating the social movements to put pressure on the state

Local PT leaders inside and outside the government stress that it is the PT and the other left parties which must mobilise the social movements to maintain support for the government. The government itself will concentrating on the implementation of its programme, and building links to other forces that oppose the federal government.

This division of labour reflects the PT's conception of the role of the party, the trade unions, and government. According to Nelson, "Just as a left party should not control the trade unions, but should encourage the self-organisation and autonomy of the social movements, a left party in power must distinguish between the role of the party and the role of the government.

"The government must divide resources between different social groups, and intermediate between them. How can a party control that process? The PT here is at the head of the government, the trade unions and the social movements. We have to maintain clarity and separation between the roles Clean government

In a country where corruption and clientelism are central to the political process, the PT in Rio Grande do Sul is determined to run a 'clean hands' government. "The previous administration created huge numbers of jobs for its supporters, used government contracts to reward its supporters, and used the state machinery to mobilise its supporters in their unsuccessful bid to retain power. We have to govern differently," explains Nelson.

That doesn't just mean cutting the Government's refreshments bill from R$30,000 to R$3,000 reals/month by making civil servants buy their own coffee. Nor is it confined to gestures like

International Viewpoint #312 June 1999 19

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