Europe's social
democrats
The expulsion of Oskar Lafon- stumbled against the political interventaine from the German tion of the high German bourgeoisie. government was a key They threatened to disinvest, unless moment for the European Chancellor Schroeder dismissed his radical-talking Finance Minister. Union, and for its Social mu
The battle to break with the neoDemocratic parties. liberal adjustment policies is now more François Vercammen squarely placed on the terrain of the correlation of social forces, of political power, of the mastery of economic The crisis says a lot about the evolution instruments. The cost of opposing the of the European Union (EU), and the high-and-mighty is a warning against all international economic environment. In the "alternative" impulses of those who the principal country of the EU, big govern or wish to govern in modern capital has used powerful extra-parlia- Europe. mentary pressure to alter the political composition of a government which No socialist internationalism... "continues to enjoy the support of the Until February 1999, Lafontaine's great majority of the German electorate. policies were the official policy of the
The festive coalition which expressed German government. But none of itself in the aftermath of Lafontaine's Europe's other social democratic parties departure-bankers, industrialists, have called for a continuation of powerful journalists, courtesans of the Lafontaine's policies. This is surprising, Stock Exchange-has a true "class since Lafontaine shared the general odour." Their brutal reaction to Lafon- social democratic policy of support for taine is a precise indication of the limited the capitalist project of European tolerance of the German bourgeoisie, and integration, coupled with half-hearted the nature of their counteroffensive. demands for a "social Europe" (harmoni-
Long before Lafontaine had the sation of standards and co-ordination of opportunity to collide with the rules of economic policies). the European Monetary Union or the No-one is surprised that Britain's "spontaneous" reaction of the markets Tony Blair was not attracted to assuming that he wanted to do so—he Lafontaine. But even the French Socialist 8 International Viewpoint #313 July 1999 shoc
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The end of neo-Keynesianism?
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German industrialists boast that, with sti
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"orthodox macrone economic ideas are dead once and for all?" 2 The French daily Le Monde came ex ho to the same conclusion-"the definitive tal abandonment of keynesianism." 3
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So why did Lafontaine, a man from of the mainstream, launch a policy which broke with the neoliberal alignment. He claimed his radical policies were necessary because "supply-side policies go had failed, and had to be replaced." 4 m
The correlation of forces became
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1998 legislative elections. There were th significant workers' mobilisations in
January and February 1999. Lafontaine tu argued that, facing the risk of deflation pe and a possible recession, "not to do m anything threatens to be even costlier."
than neo-keynsianism. S ev
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Lafontaine is gone. But sooner or later another economic, political or social
shock may revive the left reformist perspective. The question is whether Europe's social democrats will argue for, and win support for, such neo-Keynesian policies.
The chance of another battle like Lafontaine's depends on the vitality and resources preserved inside the Socialist parties. We don't see any other "Lafontaines" in the leaderships of the Europe's socialist parties. This reflects the mutation of social democracy in terms ot militant force, ideological conviction and social composition. So why does all this matter?
Lafontaine's policies were certainly insufficient from a radical left point of view. They left intact the entire package of flexibility and privatisations, and did not advance any anti-capitalist "structural reforms." But the high bourgeoisie certainly saw him as a threat. Why?
First of all, because the labour movement is in a calamitous state, all round the world. There is no mass political force which can serve as support or as a relay for social needs and the demands of the struggle. The more this dynamic persists, the more the "social fabric" is weakened. From a truly radical point of view, anything that can in practice put a brake or a stop to this crushing roller will help. Nothing should be ruled out just because, like Lafontaine, it doesn't go far
Secondly, an important sector of the social movements continues to follow the social democrats, for lack of a better alternative. The only way for radicals to relaunch social mobilisations is to engage with the ideas of these people..
Finally, struggles like Lafontaine's can stimulate consciousness. The multiplication of frictions, the spectacular although mediated contradictions, of limited but public conflicts can have an impact which stimulates trust and consciousness. Short of a broad social explosion, it is hard to see otherwise how a relaunching of the struggles can take place. In this sense, the departure of Lafontaine is a victory for the right wing of social democracy. The impact in Germany
The character of the Schroeder government has changed. The prime minister, who trade unionists now call "the comrade of the bosses," holds the reins of power, without having to share them.
This will not result in a spectacular turn to the right. German society does not permit it. But Schroeder will govern more squarely in favour of the bosses, even if he does not tread the same path as Blair.
The left of the social democratic
Margaret Thatcher is the role model for Social Democrats like Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis party (SPD) has been beheaded. Will it be able to reorganise the left wing potential which Lafontaine abandoned?
In Europe, the departure of Lafonreinforces the established leaderships of the social democratic parties, and their neoliberal policies. In a symbolic recent move, German and British party leaders made a joint declaration on "The New Centre-die neuer Mitte"
The spectacular victory of Schroeder reunifies social democracy neoliberal politics. The rapprochement with Blair was immediate.
The drift to the right at the ideological level will overtake all the
European Socialist Parties, except the French. The naming of Prodi, the Christian Democratic technocrat, as president of the European ters who dominate all symbolic value in more than one sense. In September, 1998, Clinton and Blair tried to launch a new "Democratic International" in New York. Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil was there, but Leonel Jospin was not invited. Italian leader Massimo D' Alema did not bother to go. Six months later, the constellation has changed. The social democrats are reunited-but it is Blair who sets the tone. Blair to lead Europe?
Blair wants to bring Britain into Europe, by taking the lead within the EU. This is a struggle which has not been won in advance. It is still playing out in Great Britain.
Blair has put three aces on the table. He has accelerated the speed of British integration to the Euro. He has proposed a truly autonomous European army within NATO These policies imply a historical repositioning of Great Britain: taken to their logical conclusion, they mean the end of the "Airstrip One" link to the United States.
Blair also has a reform plan for the European institutions. Aimed above all towards the Euro-sceptics of his island, it supports Blair's activist intervention in the crisis of the European Commission. It has propelled the Italian Christian Democrat Romano Prodi to the leadership of the European Commission, as the joint candidate of Social Democracy and Christian Democracy. Blair now presents himself as the unifier of Europe, as the training force of the "third way," in which he is the centre of gravity. Blair's Eurovision contested
If Blair wins his battle at home, the consequences will be felt on the continent. A new stage will be reached in the sense of stronger centralisation between national states, between the institutions of the EU and a more coherent and hardened politics of austerity and "modernisation.
This will not be achieved without trouble.
The first difficulty will be the probable collision with the trade union movements, in each country and at the European level. Can the social democratic parties, in government almost everywhere, afford the electoral cost of such a social blood letting, while a hardened right, wearing its extreme-right hat, is crystallising, and on its left, an awakening social movement and a radicalised electorate are reaching out to the radical left?
In taking the lead of the governments of their countries, the social democratic have in their hands the machineries of the state. This underlies their essential choices, the profound sense of their politics.
All of a sudden, they find themselves administering inter-imperialist contradictions, of which the principal one, which is becoming more acute, is that between the EU and the United States. But also, within the EU, the social democrats are obliged to administer contradictions between states which are major players on the world stage.
The German government rallied to Blair over economic policy. Blair has rallied to the EU. These two elements reinforce a weighty trend. We are in a transition to a new stage in the EU. Should this transition succeed, it will affect all the social and political relations on the continent... * Notes 1. According to observers as expert as those of the bank Goldmann Sachs, cited in the Corriere della Sera, March 6, 1999 2. According t H. O. Heckel, president of the DIV, the Association of German Industrialists, cited on March 12, 1999) 3. Le Monde, March 13, 1999. 4. Le Monde, September 15, 1998. 5. Suddeutsche Zeitung, November 25, 1998.
International Viewpoint #313 July 1999 9