We are very interested in the experience of those Brazilian revolutionaries who helped build the Workers Party (PT), particularly their experience in local and state government in Rio Grande do Sul state.
Old habits die hard. There is still a feeling that new ideas must be discussed by the leadership first, so that they can help orient the membership! Particularly since we are trying so hard to establish demands.
But I think the RWP-P has moved much further than some other groups which left the CPP at the same time. Popoy Lagman's BMP [the main ManilaRizal split from the CPP] sees the "workers' movement" as not much more than the trade unions. You get the impression that they don't see poor peasants as 'real' workers. Our own conception of the working class includes the industrial workers, service workers, the semiproletarian and urban poor layers, poor peasants, and the various semiproletarian groups in the countryside • Debates among former CPP comrades often seem rather dogmatic...
Unfortunately, some comrades are a bit too obsessed with theory, theory and more theory, with putting everything into neat categories. So we've had a frustrating argument about whether the peasant category is disintegrating into fragments with differing class positions, and hence whether we should maintain a single peasant organisation.
My own view is that the land question still unites the peasant class, whether the particular manifestation is land reform, irrigation disputes, or non-payment of wages on the plantations. The Moro national question is also a peasant question. The Lumad [tribal minorities] of struggle for their ancestral lands is also a peasant question...
Comrades should realise that quoting Lenin isn't the only way to orient ourselves! We can learn a great deal by careful study of our 30 years of revolutionary experience.
Only history will tell which of the various strategic, tactical and organisational options will be the most appropriate. So we should be a bit less dogmatic, and concentrate on practice, rather than endless debate.
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* Philippines The new
Building the party • It is one year since the founding conference of the RWP-P. Are you happy with the progress so far
The founding congress was a great achievement. In May 1998 we did not simply established a new party. That congress was also the largest and most thorough democratic debate between Philippine revolutionaries for a long time-the CPP hasn't held a congress nationwide.
We recognise that the precise dynamics of the class struggle vary from region to region. Panay island is characterised by the landlord-peasant relationWomen ship. In Negros island the plantation workers have a wage labour relationship to the capitalist plantation owners.
Mindanao has the Moro liberation stuggle, and so on.
Pro-choice, Philippine style since 1968!
We are still consolidating the new party. There is a lot of organisational work to be done. But building a party is essentially an ideological and political problem, not an organisational one. b i • You have had to build a new party apparatus almost from scratch
The party is supposed to be a tool for building socialism. But people can see that the party is so poor that it lacks the resources for the most basic of tasks. • The CPP was very undemocratic. How about the new party?
Our new constitution includes the right to form factions à la Ernest Mandel. Personally, I was opposed to this, because forming a faction should be a last resort, and the current formulation would allow factions to form whenever there is a minor disagreement.
Some European revolutionary parties distinguish between tendencies and factions. Perhaps we should have allowed tendencies rather than factions. Of course, until a concrete situation arises, it's very hard to say. We don't yet have the critical mass of new experiences that will confirm our break from the past. But, in my personal opinion, moving away from Maoism didn't automatically have to include enshrining the right to form factions.
The central leadership task is to consolidate the organisation. To do that, we have to really lead. And I think we are doing so. But the leadership bodies have inherited all kinds of structural and financial problems. Unity in diversity • The RWP-P was formed as a fusion of several different splits from the CPP. Each presumably has its own specific characteristics
The specific situation in each region, and the specific development of what is now the RWP-P in each region, means that each regional leadership has a slightly different appreciation of the local and national situation. We aren't always convinced by the analysis and practice of the comrades in other regions. But we agree on all the central points. We don't want to say 'let each region do whatever they want, but we are convinced that it is still too early to adopt the model of any one region, and try to apply it
Maria Busuanga explains the work of the Panay island women's desk at the BPNP peasant federation During the 1980s, Panay had a specific organisation for peasant women. But we had no separate orientation or programme. The separate women's organisation just served to organise as many people as possible, under the absolute leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines.
The new BPNP peasant organisation doesn't have a separate women's organisation, because of lack of resources. But the organisation takes gender issues very seriously. The women's desk has direct input into the overall work of the organisation. And we do gender sensitivity education for the male members, as well as the women.
Peasant women in Panay insist that they form an equal partnership with their husbands. Both do similar work, for similar pay. In fact, there are many more opportunities for women to work outside the agricultural sector, and it is not uncommon for the husband to take responsibility for child care while the wife leaves the village to work as a livein servant for richer families (14 year old maids in Manila can earn P1,000/month).
This non-agricultural work is particularly widespread in nonirrigated areas, where the long dry season restricts the amount of agricultural work available. s
The sharing of child care responsibilities is a concrete result of the long tradition of progressive organising.
But at our gender sensitivity workshops, we ask people to describe the average day of a husband and wife team. And then they can see-as if for the first time-that the wife gets up earlier, and goes to bed later.
We also have an advocacy service for women members. Domestic violence is not perceived as a widespread phenomena. But if parents discover that their daughter is having sexual relations, they put her under enormous pressure to get married. In some villages there are still some arranged marriages. So part of our work is a "pro-choice" campaign, saying that women should make their own choice aval or in the Pamp about when, and who, to marry.
Although birth control is widely available in the Philippines, legal abortion is very expensive. Most rural women have a conservative, Catholic attitude about abortion, and even progressive church groups try to block discussion on this issue. There is widespread recourse to non-medical methods of abortion, leading to much private pain, shame and sickness. ai Day care centres are a popular project that would encourage a collective approach to community problems, and bring an immediate improvement to women's lives. But even the P50 (US$1.50) monthly fee dissuades most women from using the existing rural daycare centres.
Peasant women are still victims of the patriarchal system. They need to develop initiatives, and become more independent of their husbands. Most want to make a bigger contribution to the family income, and learn about their rights as peasants and as women.
Many rural women became politicised during the 30 years of military confrontation in the countryside. When the men were arrested, a crowd of women would rush to the police station-by making the arrest public knowledge, they prevented many "salvagings" (summary executions). But when the women were arrested, their husbands were often away from home, and so they suffered in isolation. Either way, resisting the militarisation of the countryside helped many women become more courageous and self-confident.
In the urban areas, men and women do mostly different types of work, and the sense of partnership is weaker. There is more alcoholism and drug abuse, and more violence between family members. [MJ] *
International Viewpoint #313 July 1999 31
* Philippines • Has the new party stabilised its
6V6 financial affairs? ›inods
The old party had a strong central apparatus, but the funding mechanism depended far too much on external agencies and links to politicians.
To put it crudely, the Kosovo crisis will make it much harder to raise money through the NGO sector. And in any case, we should rely on our own forces for our funds. But it's very difficult. In this transitional period it's hard to find money for leadership meetings.
The lack of resources is a major problem. Over 30 years the CPP built up a huge network of supporters, and accessed all kinds of outside funding through "revolutionary taxation" of the capitalist sector, and control of NGOs. Because the centre controlled and distributed the resources for local organisers, the centre was all-powerful.
Not only does the RWP-P reject this hyper-centralised model, but in any case it lacks the resources of the old Most organisers noes are tucky if they can get their travel expenses refunded. Many full timers go long periods without being paid. Again, the situation varies from province to province. • In the Maoist period, the armed wing was a major source of income, as well as the main area of spending.
The RPA has ruled out any kıdnapping and ransom operations. "We'd like to stop 'taxation' too, but we don't have any alternative sources of income. But now we try to convince people to give us money, rather than just threatening them.
The guerrilla units have also made time to put their skills at the disposition of the local population. This makes it easier to ask the peasants to feed the guerrillas. It also improves the peasant's income-generation, which can't be a bad thing. "It will take several years to thoroughly reform the guerrilla units, and overcome the negative features of our 32 International Viewpoint #313 July 1999 for the armed struggle as we move closer to the overthrow of the capitalist system.
So we will be reforming our guerrilla units, not disbanding them!
• The rebel units were also affected by the splits in the CPP
In my own region the CPP's armed wing has maintained only four of the
100+ areas with a tradition of guerrilla activity. Almost half of the remaining areas have a consolidated presence of our own armed wing, the RPA-ABB.
In the others, the support network was severely disrupted by the split. The
RPA could go back to those areas. The local people know that the rebel presence can defend them against landlords, drug gangs and the police-in some areas, the peasants have asked the RPA to reestablish itself-but we ourselves are still unsure what kind of military presence we should rebuild
We rejected our former, Maoist stra-
Maoist period. But most of the guerrillas tegy of Protracted People's War. We are from peasant families, and they are place our trust in the mass movement. In quite enthusiastic about the new opporturural areas where the class structure rests nities to put their building and medical on the landlord-tenant opposition, we skills into practice for local people.In the organise the peasants in a struggle for
RPA today, the biggest criticism that can land rights, combining legal and extrabe made of a comrade is to say that he or legal means. If the landlord starts to use she doesn't actively help the local violence, making a legal resolution of the people?
conflict impossible, then the RPA will
• How many members do you have?
We are trying to reorient many
There is no easy way to count.
members of the guerrillas urban support
Members of the guerrilla support netnetwork towards open, legal work in the works don't show up in any statistics, because they don't want to draw attention mass movements.
We were eventually able to agree on a to themselves, even by joining a communew military strategy. We decided to cool nity group. And poverty prevents many down the conflict in the most militarised people from paying any kind of memberareas, and try to rebuild the open political ship fee.
organisations there. Torture, hamleting
But low membership also reflects and "salvaging' had taken a terrible toll.
people's reluctance to attract trouble
Far from contributing to the protracted from the authorities. The military only stopped bombing rebel areas in 1992, and people's war," the high level of confronassassinations of peasant leaders still tation had probably weakened the progressive movement as a whole.
occur from time to time. "The only way
It was difficult to restructure the to recruit people is to convince them that military units. Finally, we split them into the party has a new orientation, towards small teams, which we dispersed to mass legal work. But then we have to support for the legal deal with people's suspicion about all provide organisations, and do education about the
"legal" forms of struggle-suspicion we ourselves encouraged when we were still new party's strategy.
Some comrades left the NPA with us,
Maoists!"
but have since asked to be demobilised
As a general rule, RWP-influenced
Many others wanted to be transferred to organisations can mobilise about three legal work.
times their formal membership. Each cadre would be responsible for 4-5
• What is the new relationship betmembers, each of whom would try to ween military and political struggle?
educate and develop 6 or 7 activists in
In both urban and rural areas, the the mass organisation.
struggles are led by the party, with the
RPA playing a secondary, defensive,
The armed struggle support role. This is quite different from the Maoist model. Until the early '90s,
• Your new party has also absorbed some sections of the CPP's guerrilla most of our political work focused on building better conditions for the "proarmy tracted people's war" in the countryside.
We have rejected the old strategy of
The party structures at the lower level
"protracted people's war" in favour of a have been demilitarised. A regional mainly political struggle, with the armed wing in reserve as a kind of shield for the leadership still determines the priorities for the RPA-ABB, but is much more mass movements. But we still see a role sep: than strol of d lega as try so a cont wor (vill pro gov gove can • Th mor vInc our diff lead polit elect elec refus the C as a day con elec that exac foun we'l •WI of p effor guel mou part unti orga oper герг are prop the the
separated from operational command than was the case in the CPP.
In rural areas where the RPA is strong, we are searching for a new model of dual power. Rather than rejecting all legal work and seeing all local officials as "the enemy," (like the Maoists do), we try to combine our legal and armed work so as to maximise the population's direct control over their own affairs.
This means developing electoral work, particularly at the Barangay (village) level. And cooperating with progressives and allies in the local government structures. The central government is still our enemy. But we can find allies at the local level. • That will presumably mean much more attention to electoral politics
The leadership of the RWP-P is convinced of this. But it is hard to reorient our supporters, after 30 years of quite different tactics. Also, we have no eading comrades who are public political personalities, able to lead such electoral work.
If the party asked me to stand for election as provincial governor, I'd refuse. The chance of being killed during the campaign is very high! And my skills as a leader are rooted in the underground struggle. In small group discussions. In strategy. In "tax collection".
In some areas we tried to participate in the May 1998 elections. We lost decisively. It was a great surprise for us that people would listen to us enthusiastically, but then vote for whichever bourgeois candidate offered the biggest incentives. We thought guns equalled otes. But it isn't so simple. In the old days we could organise boycotts, even confiscate the ballot box. But what electoral tactics should we now adopt?
But I should say, in our own defence, that the 1998 election campaign came at exactly the same time as our own founding congress. Next time round, we'll be much better prepared! • What about the rest of the left?
The Maoists continue their strategy of protracted peoples war, where all efforts are directed towards expanding guerrilla operations, moving from the mountains towards the towns. We participated in that struggle for 30 years, ntil the early 90s. So we know the mitations. They can't build strong rural rganisations, because they neglect mass, pen work. They provoke the regime into epression of rural organisers. And they use their urban base mainly as an inderground support network for the uerrillas, rather than building campaigns that can mobilise the urban poor.
For the moment, the other left groups are better at media relations and ropaganda. The CPP has kept many of e media contacts, and some of the other left splits from the party focus most of heir energy on propaganda. We don't want to change our focus on building a base within stronger mass organisations, but we do need to improve our propaganda work. • Isn't the continued existence of the rebel army a handicap for open political work?
Not at all. The existence of the "illegals' ensures that we have some democratic space to work in. It makes it much more difficult for the regime to repress our legal organisers. Once we build a strong mass base, things might be different. But for the moment, without the armed wing, we would be nothing. Why would anyone negotiate with us?
The NPA here was never parasitical, in the sense that it lived off the peasants without really defending them. But the obsession with a large guerrilla army meant that our recruitment efforts completely neglected other areas of struggle. You simply don't need full time guerrillas for most of the activities we carry out. We pulled priests and teachers out of their urban context, and sent them into the mountains as political officers. It would have been better to encourage them in their original communitybuilding and educational work.
Neither the RA nor the Maoists have any problem attracting new recruits, but the RPA would prefer to remain small, and direct militant activities towards
FOR
Turnalional A Marxist and feminist analysis of the European Union. From taxation to transport policy, the International Viewpoint team analyse and explain the process of capitalist integration of Europe, and the costs involved for working people, women and youth. We ask what alternative policies the left can put forward, and make a few modest suggestions of our own. * orders of - copies, orest remour focal orders of 1-4 copies.
directly from International viewpoint
O Box 27410, London SW9 9NQ, Britair <international_Viewpoint@compuserve.com> mass struggles. Many of those the RPA does recruit are actually allocated to intelligence work, and the development of unarmed self-defence structures within the popular organisations. In the long run, we think this will be a lot more insurrectionary than the Maoists ever • Do you mean a shift from a guerilla army to 'arming the people"?
Not yet. Police functions are still reserved for the partisan and guerrilla units. Not all military commanders are convinced of the need for popular militias and self-defence units alongside or instead of the party-led guerrilla army.
The party is still developing a national policy on the armed struggle. Some provincial leaderships are in no hurry to build RPA structures. One other region was always proud of its large, regular guerrilla units. But this was based on their unusually large income from commercial activities. These have now collapsed, which presents a huge financial crisis for the RPA there. * Transformation and regroupment Regroupments of forces determined to learn the lessons of the historical abomination that was Stalinism and to continue, against the winds and the tides, to fight against capitalism are being realised in a number of countries. In all the countries where such possibilities exist, the organisations of the Fourth International are ready to be part of the re-groupment process. We consider this as an important step towards the recomposition of the anti-capitalist left on a world scale. At the international level, the Fourth International is an active participant in regroupment, bringing with it the advantages of a long tradition of combat against capitalism and Stalinism. * Price: f5/S10. International Viewpoint, PO Box 27410, London SW9 9WQ, Britain.
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International Viewpoint #313 July 1999 33
* South Africa
The ANC after
Mandela
South Africa's new president the disorientation of the radical Left, Thabo Mbeki has all the whose tactics in the immediate preelection period displayed little grasp credentials to sell the eclectic of the pitfalls of electoralism. blend of left rhetoric and right However much the Left may deplore politics that has come to this shift to the centre there is no denying characterise the ANC in the electoral achievement of the ANC
Almost winning a two-thirds majority government. (66.4%) nationally, the Congress-led Carl T Brecker alliance swept the board with between
65% and 88% of the vote in seven of the In the wake of the country s second country's nine provinces. multi-racial elections, the ANC holds Only in Kwazulu-Natal did the ANC sway over the national and provincial (39.3%) come (a very close) second to assemblies and looks set to consolidate Mangosuthu o Buthelezi's | Inkatha its hold on local government. Freedom Party (41.9%). In the Western
The ANC's electoral victory marks Cape, the last bastion of the 'New the end of an unstable interregnum that National Party, the AN emerged as the began with South Africa's first post- most popular party with 42% of votes apartheid elections in 1994 and ends now cast but failed to win a majority in the with the consolidation of a new demo- provincial legislature. In these two cratic state under a new ruling bloc. provinces the ANC faces the prospect of
There is no doubt that Mandela coalition government with parties to the himself was central to the success of this right of centre. transition. But incoming president Thabo The Democratic Party-the voice of Mbeki is the new man of the moment. liberal capital and, increasingly, of the
The new circumstances call for an conservative white minority-is now the astute balancing of class forces. Thabo official opposition with 9.55% of the Mbeki is a bourgeois politician with national vote. This represents a signifistruggle credentials. As such, he is cant advance on their performance in eminently suited to the task of 'building a 1994 but gives a hollow ring to their nation' and promoting his much-vaunted claim to be the only real alternative to the 'African renaissance'
Mbeki is much more intellectual than Any assessment of Mandela. More importantly, he has un- happened to politics in South Africa over challenged control over the structures of the past five years must look beyond the unique combination of 'Mandela magic'
Having run the country for the last and the considerable achievement of the two years of Mandela's presidency, ANC leadership in adapting from Mbeki is widely credited with the 'freedom fighters' to parliamentary formulation of GEAR, the ANC's neoliberal macro-economic policy. If the Among the ANC's immediate goals bourgeoisie need to be wooed, Mbeki has in 1994 were the consolidation of a reliable track record to rely on. democracy in South Africa and the
At the same time, Mbeki's impec- construction of national unity. Above all cable 'struggle' credentials, his intimate else loomed the huge task of overcoming knowledge of radical politics gives him the heritage of apartheid. the credibility to coax into line any The ANC government has accompwould-be malcontents in the ranks of the lished more than a little of what they set organised working class and among the out to achieve-as a party without any representatives of the rural poor. (Mbeki previous parliamentary experience is a graduate of Moscow's Marxist- working against the grain of a civil Leninist Institute and an former leader of service steeped in apartheid practice. the South African Communist Party). Their most important achievements
Mbeki's task is made easier by the include the construction of a viable fact that this election witnessed a system of government with a new dramatic shift to the political centre. This constitution and a comprehensive bill of shattered the far Right. But it also battery of progressive shattered the electoral hopes of ex- legislation has been passed on a wide liberation organisations like the PAC and range of issues and compromise rather AZAPO. Despite their long histories of than confrontation has led to a dramatic armed and unarmed anti-apartheid reduction in the level of right wingstruggle, neither could muster more than inspired violence that wracked the 1% of the popular vote. country during the negotiation period
This shift also adds immeasurably to leading up to the 1994 elections. 34 International Viewpoint #313 July 1999
They have set the country on the path to national unity with a new sense of national identity and common purpose.
They have begun to deliver much-needed social services--housing, education, health services, water, electricity-and the removed many of the most hated tOI symbols of white minority rule.
do
But services delivery remains some way below the levels the ANC's core oth constituency might have expected. And ger the systems used to provide housing, pol schooling and basis utilities to the rural tive and urban poor all too often prove
Ne unsustainable in the long term. And little by has been done to transform the apartheid dor city with its sprawling ghettos.
eth
That there has been change is beyond
AN question. What is in doubt is its extent, the and the price that has been paid by the lacl
ANC in reaching the compromises it has
The ANC not only retained the sup support of the black majority, but par increased it, despite their failure to alli deliver on the promises the made in the heady days of 1994.
SWE abo
This is a clear indication that the majority of South Africans still believe tor
AN that, given the circumstances under late which the ANC came to power, no other party could have done better. For the most part the black majority seems to have accepted the ANC's contention that, despite their best intentions, the terrible legacy of apartheid could not be overcome in five short years.
But the question remains: how much more could have been achieved over the last five years if the ANC had not been so willing to appease local capital, foreign investors and those who grew fat on critique of the ANC government has centred on the sharp rightward shift in government policy away from the radical policies of the liberation movement and the Reconstruction and Development Programme on which the party won the 1994 election.
no more rand Mond it:
aga approved, macro-economic policy mOV
Known by the acronym GEAR, this тер
AN strategy endorses a depressingly familiar range of neo-liberal policies including
"sound money, export-oriented growth, the privatisation of public services, government austerity (cutbacks in social expenditure), a refusal to resist the effects of globalisation (on the basis that
'there is no alternative') and an overreliance on (some say obeisance to)
foreign investment as the key to future prosperity.
GEAR has been accompanied by an extremely cautious approach to land redistribution, a labour reform programme that equates strikes with lockouts, a taxation policy that favours capital and burdens the workers, the lack of a radical industrialisation policy based on internal need, and an unwillingness to
attempt any significant redistribution of wealth. Not surprisingly, the Left has been highly critical of the government's
But the government shrugs off criticism, claiming that it is helpless in the face of globalisation and the international financial crisis. Mbeki promises to do more when circumstances permit.
The election results show that no other party was able to launch a coherent, generalised, criticism of government policy, or realisable aspects of an alternative strategy. The Democratic Party and New National Party were seen as tainted by the apartheid past. The Inkatha Free-
Party was perceived as an ethnically-based group at war with the ANC. The PAC and AZAPO-despite their 'struggle' credentials-simply unions and other mass structures be explained? Why does COSATU, the most representative and combative of formations representing the working class continue to support the ANC despite their sharp disagreements with many aspect of government policy?
The radical left will only gain ground if it can develop an explanation that goes beyond conspiracy theory, beyond cynical claims about the duping of the masses, beyond the historical role of the ANC in struggle, and beyond the 'magic of Mandela'
The left has argued that the revolution has been deflected. But that begs a whole series of questions about how—in a period of consolidated democratic transformation and electoral politics-the struggle for socialism and the revolutionary transformation of society can be put back on the political agenda.
What difference would a revolution, as against a negotiated settlement based on class compromise, have made? And how shall the left proceed to build a mass presence capable of taking on and defeating the ANC? Through electoral challenge or on the streets? What, in other words, are the politics of a way forward? * Comments to <brecker@new.co.za>
ANC in government lacked credibility as mass parties.
The ANC also had the considerable support of the COSATU trade union
Pupils of the World Bank federation, and the Communist Party, its partners in the governing tripartite alliance. Both COSATU and the SACP swallowed their preelection misgivings about GEAR and the impact of globalisation, and give uncritical support to the ANC. They provided an army of articulate political canvassers for the electoral
The overwhelming electoral victory of the AN poses crucial questions for the Left. Although the South African left is well versed in the politics of anti-imperialism, and has a long experience as radical opponents of capitalism and apartheid, the left has failed to respond to
In a historical period when calls for revolutionary change no resound—despite the urgent need to put socialism back on the agenda-the country's many small left groups have become increasingly marginalised. They display a persistent inability to present viable alternatives to the pervading pro-capitalist consensus.
The big battalions' of the struggles gainst apartheid-the unions and the mass democratic movement-have all moved into the dominant political camp represented by the Tripartite Alliance (ANC, COSATU and SACP).
The left, with strategies and tactics trom a bygone political period, has failed o translate its radical anti-capitalist, ocialist critiques of the negotiated ettlement, of consensus politics, of eoliberalism and of globalisation into able mass based campaigns on which o build an electoral intervention.
Left groups need to go beyond their ritiques of ANC politics. For example, ow do they explain the growing, almost otal, hegemony which the ANC has chieved? If the two-stage theories of the SACP, and its belief that post-apartheid outh Africa has entered the national emocratic stage of the struggle for ocialism, are bankrupt how can the arty's continued influence in the trade
Patrick Bond
ANC and Communist party leaders have claimed that that local and international power relations are not optimal for a serious challenge to corporate prerogatives. But they have rarely tried to explore South Africa's room to manoeuvre. Instead, government since 1994 has repeatedly endorsed and implemented neo-liberal economic strategies. Social policy consultants have advised that market-oriented solutions will fix problems caused by the failure of the market.
Black farmers' associations and rural social movements accuse ANC Land Affairs and Agriculture minister Derek Hanekom of failing to redirect agricultural subsidies, allowing the privatisation of marketing boards, redistributing only a tiny amount of commercial farmland (much of which was stolen by whites within living memory), and failing to support large communal farming projects The World Bank lent key policy advisors to Hanekom in 1992-94. Mthembi-Mahanyele and predecessor, the late Communist Party leader Joe Slovo relied on bank-driven processes. Closed-door agreements were been immediately impunity, defaulters and their communities have been dealt with harshly. The result has been tiny housing subsidies, sufficient to build a tiny hut, often without internal water and sanitation, and continuation of the apartheid policy of black housing developments located long distances away from urban opportunities. There is a nearly complete lack of new rural housing and an insensitivity to women's design needs.
Welfare minister Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi attempted to cut the child maintenance grant by 40% and for failing to empower local community organisations and social workers.
Minister of constitutional development Valli Moosa oversaw a frightening local government fiscal squeeze, intensifying municipal water and electricity cutoffs, the increasing privatisation of local services and low infrastructure standards such as mass pit latrines in urban areas. A World Bank mission wrote the first draft of infrastructure policy in late 1994
The depressing record of ineffectual, conservative social policies is similar to many other countries that have fallen under the influence of Washington technocrats.
But the ANC performed admirably in a number of areas: it has ended most formal racial discrimiand diminished Africa's notorious sexism and homophobia; the 1996 constitution includes (so far untested) socioeconomic rights; it has provided free primary health care (first for pregnant women and children under six years, and in future for all), legalised legislated to improve workers' rights and health and safety laws. In the June elections, a majority of voters decided that the party was the best bet for the future.*
International Viewpoint #313 July 1999 35
Booknotes