Barak's dilema
Israel
Michel Warshawski looks at the prospects for Israel's new
Prime Minister Ehud Barak
The and the spectacular rise of the religious oriental party Shass. But on what majority will he lean and what policy will he take ahead?
He replaces right wing Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu, who took power in 1996 with a 1% majority, and proceeded to alienate the entire Israeli political class, push out Likud's more respected leaders, provoke the animosity of all his ministers, and infuriate media and intellectuals. Time and time again, he showed himself to be out of step with all the security apparatus, including the army. Polarisation.
But until this last election, "Bibi" Netanyahu never lost the massive support of his popular electoral basis. The ideological right wing (essentially religious); and the Jewish religious groups stayed loyal. These groups influence the immense majority of "oriental" working class Jews those who trace their origins to Arab countries).
Barak's 12% majority is the result of a massive transfer of votes among non-religious middle class Jews of European origin. Particularly among Russian immigrants (who make up 20% of the population). Russian Israelis massively supported Netanyahu in 1996. Three years later, only half of them identify with the populist and religious camp.
Most leaders of the centre party have also deserted Netanyahu. They are scared by his anti-institutional populism and his concessions to religious leaders over personal and civic legislation.
In other words, Barak's camp is a large regroupment of those afraid of "fundamentalisation" and "orientalisation" "Anything but Shass" [the religious party] was the most popular slogans during the massive victory rallies in Tel Aviv's central square.
For those tens of thousands of young people from the better residential neighbourhoods of Tel Aviv and from the kibbutz (middle class cooperatives), the Shass party, and its oriental religious and popular electorate, is the main
In contrast, they don't have any objection to their candidate heading a coalition including the
National Religious Party, the far- right organisation of Israeli colonists in Gaza and the West Bank.
This shows the size of the fracture in Israeli society, as well as the limits of Barak's progressive credentials. To put it simply, the Labour leader prefer blond Fascists with blue eyes to working class people whose culture is "too oriental". The Shass phenomenon
Shass is not only a political phenomenon. It reflects the hope of about one million Israelis. The big surprise of these elections was Shass' growth from 10 to 17 elected members, becoming the third largest party in parliament. (Likud has only 19 seats.)
This unprecedented success reflects a new phase of the process of self-determination of the "Oriental" (ie Arab culture) majority of Jews. In previous years these Jews expressed themselves through Likud, which was for a long time the party of the excluded in Israel (except the Arabs, of course. They
But now Arab-Jews from the popular strata are expressing themselves through their own party with leaders from their own community and culture.
The success of Shass is tied to the spectacular fall of Likud. Over the last seven years, the party has lost more than half of its deputies.
Ehud Barak understands better than his electorate and some of his allies (in particular Meretz) that the only way to reverse the completely polarised atmosphere and eliminate the fractures of Israeli society is to incorporate Shass into the political establishment. This is why he wants Shass in his government, despite the racist arrogance of his 'European'
In return, Shass wants to be part of government because its strength partly depends on its management of social institutions and schools.
One of the reasons for Barak's election was to put an end to the situation in which the former primer minister and the mob around him threatened the state of legality and the independence of Justice. But Barak cannot reinforce the rule of law and the legitimacy of the institutions of a "democratic Jewish state" and bring populist-clientelist groups like Shass into his coalition.
Strength
Although the Labour block has won a spectacular victory over the right wing bloc, both the major parties continued to lose votes.
Likud dropped from 32 to 19 deputies, Labour from 34 to 27.
Three additional Labour deputies, controlled by the trade union federation, have abandoned the party in order to better defend workers' rights.
There was a slight strengthening of all the ethnic parties. Shass was the most spectacular example, but the three Arab parties also grew (from 9 to 10 deputies). The two Russian parties grew from 8 to 11
The extreme right lost badly. In the old parliament they had 16 deputies (National Religious Party 9, Moledet 2, extreme right ex-Likud 5). In the new parliament they have only eight (five from the NRP, and three from the Nationalist Union, led by Likud dissident Beni Begin).
The election confirmed the regrouping of the religious block around less intransigent positions concerning the occupied territories. The "hard-liners" fell from 14 to 10, while the "moderates" (Shass)
These results translate into an extremely fragmented parliament. They also suggest that Barak has comfortable room for manoeuvre. He may allow a right-wing majority, or a secular a majority without the religious parties; or a centre-left majority. In fact, he can cut and shuffle all these blocks however he
Because, except for Beni Begin's three far-right deputies, and Azmi Bichara's National Democratic regrouping, all of Israel's parties are willing to take their place in government, and pay the price in terms of principles.
Barak has the chance to take a radical turn away from the policies of Netanyahu and even Yitzhak Rabin. But the large number of generals around him, and in parliament, suggests that it will be hard for Barak to achieve an acceptable political solution for the Palestinians. As he said during the election campaign, "Peace at home before peace with the Arabs!"* This article first appeared in the French weekly Rouge International Viewpoint #314 September 1999 23
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*
The Gulf War and the New World Order
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avoid the contagion.
After having, like the IMF, advised the new government of Cardoso to defend the Brazilian real at the cost of a sharp rise in interest rates of more than 40%, floating the currency was accepted. It looks like as if policies are decided much more by markets than by governments or the IMF.
Brazil's central bank, which has had three presidents in the last three months, has not been able to lower interest rates from their very high level. These rates are worsening the financial crisis, by acting to restrict credit to households and businesses while at the same time bleeding the state, which faces massive increases in the servicing of the debt. Increases in unemployment, poverty, and impoverishment are bound to follow, as is an increased activity in the already overcrowded informal sector.
The depreciation of the currency by more than 40% enabled Brazilian goods to gain market share, to the detriment of China, which is chasing more or less the same markets.
As a result, there is more and more