Balkan balancesheet
The International Executive Committee of the Fourth International adopted this document in September. The war that the NATO governments unleashed against Serbia is at the same time a new stage of the crisis that has torn apart former Yugoslavia, and of the geostrategic recompositions that have been affecting relations among the big powers, in particular the European Union and the United States, as well as their institutions (the UN, NATO, etc.) since the fall of the Berlin Wall.
This is why it has elicited two main types of one-sided reactions from left milieus: 1) reactions arising primarily from rejection of the repression carried out by the Serbian regime in Kosovo since 1989 and more broadly from rejection of the policies of ethnic cleansing that have ravaged
Croatia and Bosnia since 1991-it is from this current that NATO's war has drawn its popular support as a "moral" war, abusing inappropriate historical analogies; and 2) reactions from another current that has primarily seen the war as a
NATO war like earlier ones, in the context of the "new world order" its hypocrisy and its international, geostrategic stakes.
Even if rejecting NATO and rejecting the Milosevic regime obviously cannot be put on the same level, rejecting both enables us to break with the false dilemma of having to choose one reactionary "camp".
Far from undermining resistance to imperialist policies, a critical approach to the Serbian regime made it possible to get a response from people who saw the difficulty and the counterproductive character of this war standpoint of its own declared goals (stopping ethnic cleansing).
Finally, the fact that Milosevic leads a party that calls itself "socialist" required us, more explicitly than in the case of Iraq, to express our criticism of his policies very clearly at the same time that we condemned NATO's war.
This is why these two critical axes, along with the defence of the Kosovars right to self-determination, served as progressive reference points.
They did not however tell the Kosovars how to defend their right to self-determination aggressive violence of the Serbian state.
Rather than sliding into a "pacifist" position that would be indifferent to the suffering of the Kosovar people, we supported their legitimate right of self
We don't accept a symmetrical analysis of Serbian state terrorism and the armed struggle of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).
But the KLA's political orientation after Adem Demaci was removed from its leadership, and the group's organisational weakness, impossible for us to consider the KLA the necessary base for the double struggle against ethnic cleansing and against the NATO war.
So we were reduced to the position of struggling for a halt to the bombings and in favour of an agreement which prioritise the return of the expelled population-protected by a
The end to the war, and the return of the refugees, was achieved through a compromise which reintroduced Russia and the UN into the Balkan procedure, and allowed NATO troops to occupy Kosovo. Such an agreement-between the Belgrade regime and the major powers, and excluding the Kosovar
La conflictual and reactionary content, which we must analyse and fight against, supporting the right of the Yugoslav and Kosovar peoples to take charge of their The consequences of the war and our tasks
The agreement which stopped NATO's attacks and made possible the withdrawal of the Serbian army and police has resulted in a military occupation of Kosovo mainly by NATO troops and the establishment of a big power protectorate under a UN mandate.
The massive and rapid return of the Albanian-speaking Kosovo expellees gave an initial legitimacy to the presence of the international interposition force-although this is the least reparation that could be made for a war that was a catalyst for (not an obstacle to) the worst ethnic cleansing committed by the Serbian forces. Of course
Document * from the Kosovo Albanians' point of view the protectorate breaks the Serbian yoke, but it is at the antipodes of what the peace accords claim to be establishing: "a multi-ethnic and tolerant Kosovo". There is no plan to recognise the right of the Kosovar population to express their views about their own
KFOR (the multinational interposition force in Kosovo says it is incapable of protecting the non-Albanian minorities that are massively fleeing from the province. All this can encourage the growing doubts in public opinion about the real goals (or at least about their "effectiveness" in reaching their supposed goals) of the war and protectorate.
This is in conflict with both Belgrade and the Kosovar proindependence forces. On the one hand it is formally maintaining Serbian sovereignty over the province and the external frontier of Yugoslavia-which suggests the theoretical possibility of the return of Belgrade troops. But in practice it is making the Deutschmark the official currency of Kosovo at the expense of the Yugoslav dinar.
On the other hand the power of the big powers is coming into conflict with the aspirations of the KLA for independence and with its will to control the province's institutions.
Just as in the old colonial days, an "administrator" of Kosovo has been appointed. The "administrator's" troops will be present for years, maybe decades. For the moment, this Protectorate excludes the option of ethnic partition. But the reorganisation of Serb paramilitaries, and their entry into the (French-controlled) northern part of Mitrovica could lead to a new spiral of ethnic cleansing.
The various political forces of the Kosovar resistance are demanding the establishment of an army and police force based on the Kosovars decision-making. This is a legitimate demand. So is the demand for democratic self-administration, in place of a UN Protectorate.
The lasting presence of foreign troops and organisations will be a source, as in Bosnia, of very great inequality, corruption dependence-along with the acceleration of privatisation, which is a source of the same mafia-type disasters as in neighbouring Bosnia. Our objective is to help Kosovar civil society and in particular its young people and its workersmen and women-to take control of their own future, their defence and their institutions as quickly as possible in a International Viewpoint #316 November 1999 27
* Balkan document democratic framework. The development of international links, particularly on the trade-union level through a continuation of International Workers Aid for Bosnia will be essential in this The right of self-determination for the Kosovars; respect for minorities; and solidarity among the peoples of the
Hesitations about defending this right derive from the fear that it will only lead to growing fragmentation and the building of ethnically pure states. But a selective approach to the right of self-determination its rejection necessarily imply accepting that might makes right and accepting the Big Powers' arbitrary choices.
Our intransigent defence of peoples' right to self-determination does not mean that we support a universal solution of "one people one state". But it means that the people themselves have to decide in a given, changing, context. The defence of this right is inseparable from a struggle for political and ethnic pluralism, policies of ethnic cleansing and for equal treatment for all communities.
Albanians constituted 80% of the population of Kosovo. After Tito died, Milosevic's first act, in 1989, was to abolish the Statute of Autonomy which Kosovo had enjoyed within the Yugoslav Federation. It was replaced by an apartheid regime, with a system of 'national preference installed for the
The only democratic and political solution is through the self-determination of the people of Kosovo. Through a democratic consultative process, they must decide on their future. If they want independence, they should have it.
Self determination means that the Kosovo people should freely decide on their own political regime, their relations with other peoples, the status of Kosovo, its future, and its relations with the Belgrade government. This should all be done by a free choice, through a democratic consultation. Federation can only work if it is freely accepted by each of the components.
It is for the people of Kosovo to decide, though while respecting the rights of Kosovo's minorities (Serbs, Roma, Turks).
Such a process is the only guarantee that all the communities will define the rules and the institutions necessary for cohabitation and equality. On the other hand, increasing tension, and any desire to impose things on the minority will 28 International Viewpoint #316 November 1999 surely lead to war and ethnic cleansing.
September underground authorities organised a referendum, in which 87% of the population participated, of which 99% voted for a sovereign republic-leaving open the question of this republic's relationship to the neighbouring states.
This choice has been confirmed in all the subsequent elections organised by Kosovo's parallel' society. The elected 'president,' Ibrahim Rugova, was in favour of independence, but Kosovars disagreed as to how this independence should be achieved.
After the mass deportation Albanians from Kosovo-organised by Milosevic-it is clear that a large majority of Kosovars are sympathetic to the call for an independent Kosovo. We support this legitimate aspiration. No-one has the right to force the Kosovars to remain in a Yugoslav federation led by the regime which organised the
Equitable solutions and reciprocal rights can be realised for all the peoples concerned only on the Balkan level. This is why we defend both the Kosovars" right to self-determination along with respect for all minorities and the necessity of links between the peoples and workers of this region, so as to build regional relationships of cooperation, and social, cultural and political equality. NATO's war has solved nothing; rather it has increased the main danger that it was meant to ward off, the risk of further Balkan explosions.
Far from facilitating the overthrow of Milosevic on the basis of a political clarification and progressive critique of his politics, the NATO war has confused things more than ever and made it still more difficult for a coherent, progressive opposition to emerge.
Milosevic has consolidated his power by playing every card: appealing mobilisations which made it possible for him to consolidate his power against his rivals in the first place-and relying on bureaucratic and clientelist mechanisms to control the enterprises; references to the Titoist, anti-fascist, Yugoslav past - and a radical break with this past through an alliance with Serb nationalist currents with anti-communist traditions; support for the secessionist aspirations and policies of the Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia relying on extremeultra-nationalism paramilitary militias -and then support for "peace plans" which meant breaking with his former allies. He thus appeared socially more protective than his neoliberal opponents and more moderate than his extreme right - while he borrowed part of the extreme-right programme.
Milosevic is neither Hitler nor an anti-fascist. His political and programmatic alliance with Seselj's Radical Party and its militias is criminal. Just as criminal is the incorporation of extreme-right currents and orientations into the Tudjman regime in Croatia.
On this level, the lack of symmetry in the media's and politicians treatment of Milosevic and Tudjman comes down very largely to a soft spot for those who identify with neo-liberalism and with anti-communism. To turn this hypocritical asymmetry upside down and support Milosevic as a "progressive" does not make any more sense.
Alone and unarmed, the Kosovo people were the victims of real ethnic cleansing, carried out by the ultranationalist Serb militias which became so infamous in Bosnia.
1998 Serb forces pushed about 200,000 Kosovars out of their homes. In the first week of the NATO intervention, a further 400,000 Kosovars were pushed to the borders. Just before the NATO intervention, Milosevic increased his aggression against the Kosovo Albanians. No-one can say that they did not know what was happening, that the nature of the Milosevic regime was not clear, after the years of war in Croatia and Bosnia, and after the Srebrenica massacres.
The Milosevic regime opposed. Its barbarian practices and its ideology based on ethnic separation or ethnic domination are just as dangerous as any other racist and xenophobic
To stay in power, the Milosevic embraced a great-Serbian nationalism, which promised to bring all Serbs together in one state, through ethnic cleansing of a range of territories. These are crimes against humanity and war crimes. Those responsible should be prosecuted by the International Penal Tribunal in the Hague.
It is up to the Yugoslav population and particularly the Serbs-and not NATO-to draw up the final balance sheet of the tragedies to Milosevic's policies have led.
The indictment of Milosevic and the conditions made for economic aid push a good number of the former supporters of "Greater Serbia" to "launder" themselves in "radical" campaigns for the resignation of Milosevic, a demand which replaces any real programme.
They can base themselves on the aspiration to peace and to receive Western loans in order to rebuild a ruined country-as well as on the accumulated disillusionment with Milosevic's regime. But the bitterness at NATO's policies also goes very deep, which makes the outcome of elections uncertain. The great majority of Serb refugees from Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia may provide an electoral base for the extreme-right Radical Party.
We denounce the way in which the Serbian people has been taken hostage twice, first by the war, then by economic strangulation (the population of Montenegro for its part was subjected to strangulation by Belgrade).
We also have to fighw against the selective - and thus political - character
International War Crimes Tribunal (IWCT)'s actions. Not that we reject the ICT nor its indictment of Milosevic but we demand the prosecution of all the criminals and the extension of action under international law to the NATO leaderships, ie the imperialist governments. The overall mechanisms of priva tisation that accelerated the break-up of the Titoist federation, as well as the maintenance in power of a strong coalition between Milosevic's party and Seselj's Radical Party, will continue to have disintegrative effects, particularly in Montenegro. The loss of Kosovo is reinforcing a political offensive by Milosevic, in alliance with Sesell, around Bosnia. This could lead to a relaunching of military action with the goal of partitioning Bosnia-Herzegovina - gaining territory there, while definitively abandoning any claim on Kosovo.
At the same time, the risks of a break-up of Macedonia still exist, since it has not responded in a satisfactory way to the demands of its Albanian population. We therefore need to develop solidarity and trade-union, grassrootso and feminist links on a Balkan scaleb against the predominant reactionary policies in order to prepare from below a progressive recomposition of the links among peoples.
The growing awareness of the risks, of the (un-admitted) disasters of the war and of the overlapping national questions in the whole of Balkan Europe is the source of the proposal for a "Stability Pact", which was signed in Sarajevo on 31 July 1999 by all the region's governments - except Serbia's. The NATO governments will offer their multinationals the chance to rebuild the infrastructure destroyed by their war. As in Bosnia and elsewhere in the neoliberal universe, bribes in order to win privatisation contracts will accomwith its goal "stabilisation", which will be contradicted by the socially disintegrative logic and social austerity policies involved in building neoliberal Europe.
This is the logic that we must oppose on the scale of the whole The dimension of the "world order"
Expansion of NATO, of "humanitarian" neo-colonialism and of militarism: this is the disastrous balance sheet of this war. Nonetheless, even if on a limited scale so far, we may see the emergence as well of an anti-militarist, anti-imperialist "civic consciousness" based on demands for control over government policies and for equal power and respect for all peoples. Claiming to uphold the rule of law, NATO's war has meant a flagrant violation of democratic rights, even the most limited ones, of the countries
Parliaments have confronted with fait accomplis. In some cases the constitution has even been violated (this is the case of Italy whose constitution explicitly forbids recourse to war). This has been a real trauma in evasion of procedures for parliamentary control, as well as those of the UN, obviously do not mean that the same decisions to go to war taken by parliaments or by the UN or the specific content of the peace agreements are defensible in our eyes. But the demands for public control and radical contestation of an imperialist order are at stake.
It is not an innocent thing for decisions to go to war (which are particularly serious 92 forms intervention) to be taken by people who claim to act in the name of the "international community" without most of the countries of the world or public opinion having anything to say about it. Although they are all obviously part of a world order dominated by the imperialist powers, the UN, the OSCE and NATO are not identical institutions on this level. On the occasion of its 50th anniversary NATO has redefined its reason for existence, its strategic goals and its rules of behaviour, although the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact should have
(and should still) put its dissolution on the agenda. Relaunching arms spending is once more on the agenda in every region of the world, with all the inevitable consequences for national budgets and social policies. The United States are themselves "profiting" from the Kosovo experience by planning improvements and a supplementary research effort in order to supply itself with still more sophisticated and powerful means of destruction.
Japan and Germany have also experienced a radical change in the "peaceful" attitude that they adopted after their defeat in the Second World
Taken as a whole, the countries of the European Union are at a turning point. If they do not want to be outclassed by their ally/rival, the US, they have to make a maximum effort to reduce the yawning chasm that currently exists between them at the military level. After monetary convergence it is military convergence and an increase in military spending that are on the agenda - even while the restrictive logic of the EU's budget continues in
The mergers among arms multinationals, as in other fields, are also at stake in the political decisions made by the Big Powers, which will lead to growing disquiet and an arms race in the rest of the world, particularly in China. At the same time, suspicion of NATO has also revived in the public opinion of most countries of Eastern Europe and the European Union, in contradiction to the unconditional support given by their governments. The balance sheet of this war in terms of of ecological, material, human and political disasters will help to delegitimate it.
Our condemnation of this war is both moral and political. It flows from our opposition both to the political and economic interests of the big powers and to the overall strategy that they have concretely deployed in pursuit of its supposed immediate goals: pacifying Kosovo and defending human rights.
The pseudo-negotiations, bombing to compel signature of an "agreement", using civilian populations as hostages, establishing a protectorate to block peoples' right to self-determination - all this is characteristic of the intrinsic arrogance of big powers.
The fact that a country like Turkey-where human rights and the rights of a national minority are trodden International Viewpoint #316 November 1999 29
* Balkans underfoot-took part directly in NATO's bombing by opening its air bases to it is in itself sufficient to demonstrate the completely hypocritical character of the propaganda about humanitarian intervention.
A discussion and systematic balance sheets of this war in the different European parliaments should lead to challenges to a European "security" policy and to an international campaign for dissolution of NATO. In the short term the European Union still has a considerable power of attraction in Eastern European and Balkan countries. Projects for Balkan regroupments are often perceived (or presented by the dominant parties) as diversions slow down to counterpoise rapprochements among Balkan peoples in a community of states and the links that they seek to the European Union. We must oppose the logic of building the European Union as a neoliberal fortress of rich countries.
In the face of the destruction caused by the war, declarations about openings towards the East and the Balkans have been multiplying. But they contradict the current austerity budgets and are oriented towards militarist priorities that will cut social programmes more
A different Europe must redefine itself through a co-operative approach that respects the rights of peoples to decide for themselves.
We must push this perspective forwards by developing European links, region, with the political, trade-union, feminist and youth forces that resist every form of reactionary policies.
But from this moment on we must be in favour of any policy of aid for reconstruction of the countries devastated by this war - while demanding that they not be condition on "structural adjustment" policies and that they be subject to public, pluralist control. *