European Union
1998, a new political and institutional situation was created at the commanding heights of the EU.
Social Democracy had taken control of the whole European Union. Having rolled into office with impressive results at the polls, it now ran 11 and participated in 13 of the EU's 15 governments. As such, it had virtual monopoly control at meetings of the Council of Ministers — "meetings of the Second International," complained right-wing Spanish president José María Aznar.
The social-democrat majority at the European Commission remained. The head of the European Central Bank was one of their men. And they continued to dominate the European Parliament, in alliance with Christian Democracy.
This unprecedented political homogeneity served Europe's capitalist classes well. After the huge electoral defeats of 1996-1998, the capitalists' parties themselves could no longer be the champions of a "European" breakthrough around the Euro. On the contrary: it was the march to the Euro itself that had the right-wing parties
Is the European Union mired in identity crises of one sort or another. The question tore apart both the Gaullist RPR in France and the becoming a world power?
European Union (EU) prime ministers and heads of state will meet somewhere in France in late 2000 for yet another Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). They have set themselves a lofty goal: that of making the EU a world power. With this goal in mind, they are planning significant reforms to current EU structures. by François Vercammen* In other words, the EU saga continues. It has gone from breakthroughs to crises and back again. At times, these crises have set back plans for a supranational political structure for years and even decades: the failure and demise of the European defence Community (19531954) springs to mind. The fiasco at Amsterdam (June 1997) undermined the common sense of purpose needed to shepherd the Euro into being. But the Euro did indeed see the light of day — 2 International Viewpoint #319 February 2000 even if only "by a stroke of luck," as at least one central banker has been heard to say.
During the war in the Balkans, the USA heaped humiliation upon humiliation on the EU, threatening intra-European unity. Clearly, it was only thanks to the successful launch of the Euro in January 1999 that the institutional framework of the EU didn't come undone. The success of this Eurobacked "resistance," coupled with the EU's first collective experience of war, cemented the EU and enabled it to move forward. At the June 1999 Berlin EU summit, a new sense of institutional purpose was in evidence. For the first time in its history, the EU dared to define itself as a global power in its own right. The EU makes a comeback
The Euro is not the only reason for this. Other economic and, in particular, political factors set the stage for renewed EU confidence.
With the electoral victory of the SPD and the formation of the SchröderFischer government in the autumn of
Tories in Britain. Even a Kohl-led CDU-CSU alliance didn't dare impose the neo-liberal diktats of the Euro project on German workers.
On the other hand, true to its pro-European and neo-liberal creed, 1990s Social Democracy felt its time had finally come. Its parties had played a decisive role in ensuring a peaceful and orderly transition to the new currency.
As part and parcel of this undertaking, and with the help of the Greens in a handful of countries, they even got workers and young people to go along with the war in the Balkans without too much difficulty. Blair takes the initiative
Though little noticed at the time (autumn 1998) since everyone was getting ready for the January-June 1999 German presidency of the EU, British PM Tony Blair — and not German leader Gerhardt Schröder - took the initiative within the Second International and the EU. While editorialists noted Blair's ideological impact on all of European Social Democracy, they hugely underestimated the political sea change underway on the question of Europe. They missed the breadth, strategic implication and historical significance of the changes taking place. By committing Britain to joining monetary union in the near future, by
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promoting the idea of defence autonomy for Europe, and by referring favourably to current EU institutions,
Blair initiated a split within English society and its traditional values. He will have to wage a real political fight over the next two or three years if he hopes to carry out this historic shift.
With the Euro still in a vulnerable early phase, Blair and the whole of
European Social Democracy helped the
EU weather the storm. Two unexpected developments put them to the test from the start.
First, the Euro began as a weak currency in relation to the dollar. While this favoured European exports to the USA, it prevented the Euro from becoming an international currency for billing and reserve purposes.
Second, the pivotal SPD party leader, cabinet member and parliamentarian Oskar Lafontaine tried to make a partial break from neo-liberal doctrine - with Germany at the head of the EU. With Lafontaine out of the way and the economy slightly improved, the storm clouds retreated once again from the horizon.
Of courses, new crises broke out soon after. Three crises, in fact: EU humiliation in the Balkan war, the collapse of the Santer-led European Commission, and the unprecedented electoral setbacks for Social Democracy in the June 1999 European elections. Yet even this was not enough to throw Social Democracy and the EU off course. On the contrary, a new momentum was found to push things ahead faster still.
Social Democracy's performance makes one thing quite clear: it never lacks "courage" when it comes to beating up on working people in order to get capitalism out of a fix. Prodi: Delors I|
While all this campaign to make Romano Prodi the new Commission president drew together a viable alliance of political forces. Quite a lot happened from March 1999 onwards: the war began, Blair and Schröder joined forces (marginalizing French PM Lionel Jospin), and EU governments closed ranks to take on the unions on the questions of labour-market flexibility and pension funds.
Political gossip have it that Prodi was dislodged by Massimo d'Alema (who then went on to become prime minister of Italy), and that d'Alema had in fact "sold Prodi out" to Blair. In fact, Prodi was part of an attempt to create a "Third Way
International". The brain child of
Anthony Giddens, the baptism of this
"International" was meant to be a between US President Bill Clinton,
Brazilian President Fernando Enrique
Cardoso, Schröder and Blair. (The meeting took place, but the project went
The Prodi candidacy, pushed by
Blair, certainly did not fall unexplained from the heavens. Prodi was a smart choice for the Blair project: a Christian democrat chosen by a social democrat; a technocrat graced in the wiles of political life (and Italian political life at that!); an experienced public servant in state-run companies, but entirely won over to "free-market" economics; a neoliberal and modernist proponent of new technologies, but also a great champion of Christian-style volunteer social
We know all about the role of the individual" throughout history in highly hierarchal structures, especially (as in the case of the EU) ones that are incomplete, diverse and in permanent flux. In the wake of the lacklustre Santer, whose principal mandate was to "not make any waves" (a mandate he would have fulfilled were it not for French commissioner Edith Cresson), a "new Delors" would now take charge of
The context has changed, but the "EU building" method will be the same. On the one hand, a wide-ranging "Europeanist" ideological and historical profile, coupled with a handful of new high-profile initiatives (such as the Euro) subject to ongoing evaluation and objectives (such as the Maastricht criteria). On the other, an operating mechanism that allows for "turning in circles" - through speeches, green and white papers, commissions, endless meetings, and so on. This is the method - in concert with an impressive feel for politics -that led to the creation of the Single Market and the Euro, steering all and through uncertainty skepticism, conflicts and crises.
The context is not the same, nor is Prodis programme. After the Berlin Summit, the programme can be summed up in a simple formula: make the EU a world power.
Specifically this means: successfully crossing the next Euro hurdle (making it a strong currency and introducing it as a circulating currency for the general public); establishing military autonomy for the EU; building a "Greater Europe" from the Atlantic to the borders of Russia; and overhauling contents europe
2 sals the European Union becoming a world power?
• François Vercammen asia
Philippines: Communist
8 rebels begin peace talks
10
China: Reforming State-
Owned Enterprises
• Zhang Kai
12 Sri Lanka: No peace in sight americas
13 Argentina: Concensus and apathy • Pedro Brieger
14
USA/Canada: Inside the
"Stop the WTO" movement
• Harold Lavender
Brazil — one year of
"democratic and popular" government in Rio
Grande do Sul...
20-33• By Adam Novak, with introduction by
Carlos Henrique Arabe
34
• The debate on socialism at the PT congress
• Carlos Henrique Arabe international Viewpoint #319 February 2000 3
* European Union the EU state apparatus to make it transparent, accountable and impartial. EU rules give Prodi five years to do all this. Five years to bring labour and the social movement virtually to their knees. Five years to convince European-based multinationals that a strong state apparatus could be useful and even indispensable to them. Institutional reform
But Prodi's programme is also to help Blair upcoming "Battle of Britain". Prodi will have failed if Britain does Monetary Union. Prodi's job is to help Blair in word and deed in the difficult fight that lies ahead.
It was the "Battle of Britain" that prompted Prodi's choices for the new commission and his reform of EU
No surprise that former British PM Neil Kinnock is a vice president and the commissioner in charge of the internal reform of the Brussels administration. Kinnock immediately cut staff, and shook up the "national" monopoly of some countries in parts of the Commission administration by moving around entrenched high-level
As for the EU institutions, the report of the "three wise men" (Dehaene from Belgium, Von Weiszaker from Germany and Lord Simon from Britain) seeks to strengthen decision-making within the EU in a number of ways:
First, by eliminating the veto rights each member-country currently enjoys in the Council of Ministers. The goal is to introduce qualified majority voting in as many areas as possible, thus enabling the three main countries (Germany, France and Britain) -- who "informally" set the terms of debate under the current setup - to proceed more smoothly and
Second, by granting full powers to the president of the Commission within the Commission.
Third, by tightening the links between the common foreign and security policy (PESC in French) and the body responsible for representing and carrying out this policy. The Council would be given this role, instead of the Commission. In fact, "Mister PESC" himself, Javier Solana, would play the decisive role. He would also become Council general secretary. (The EU got Solana from NATO to strengthen Europe's military autonomy, while former British defence secretary George Robertson, a 4 0 International Viewpoint #319 great proponent of a European defence policy and industry, is now at NATO. All in the family!)
Fourth, while concentrating real political power at the top, increasing the number of areas subject to "joint decision-making" with the European
And finally, by rejigging the treaties an end to the complicated games that untold at every Summit and IGC meeting. On the there would be basic constitution-like binding treaties which would require unanimous membercountry consent to be amended. On the other would be a series of norms with more flexible implementation rules. The dynamics of the Euro
The Euro remains the cornerstone of plans to advance towards a supranational "political" Europe. Its very existence, and its growing strength and success provide an ongoing source of constraint. The Euro seeps into every nook and i cranny of the EU's institutional architecture, nurturing a centralising and authoritarian "statebuilding" dynamic.
In accordance with the agreed time currency. The first is the introduction into circulation of Euro coins and bank followed by the scrapping of national currencies by July 2002 at the latest. For the first time, the general public will have direct daily contact with the new currency. This is sure to have a huge impact on "European" consciousness and on economic behaviour (savings, spending).
The second hurdle will be the fight over British membership in Monetary Union. There are economic and monetary risks, stemming from the lag in economic cycles between Britain and other key EU members, and from a pound overvalued in relation to the Euro. And there are ideological and political risks, since the loss of the pound would be seen by a significant minority of Britons as a defeat at the hands of "the continent". It would the demise of the "special relationship" with the USA.
The commanding heights of the British bourgeoisie are determined to adopt the Euro, the sooner the better. However, they want Blair to hold a referendum — preferably risk-free.
All and sundry have been mobilized into the broadest cross-party coalition - "Britain in Europe" country has seen for nearly a century. The opposition is being organized by a Conservative Party in tatters and led by its most chauvinistic wing — with Lady Thatcher making yet another noisy return to public life. This is reactionary referendum will be held. Should he hold it before or after the next parliamentary elections, which must be called before
To sum up: if the Euro crosses both hurdles over the next two years, it will enter an entirely new phase, with wide-ranging knock-on effects. In the first place, its economic footing will have expanded qualitatively - including beyond Europe, thanks in particular to the City of London, the world's main exchange market.
Second, the Euro will exercise tremendous pull — for example, in relation to Denmark and Sweden, countries which are already members of the EU and which would be unlikely to remain outside Monetary Union for long. Pressure on Norway would be that much stronger in such a context, especially given the rate at which interScandinavian banking, insurance and
For its part, the Swiss bourgeoisie would clearly be tempted to join both the EU and Monetary Union.
Third, there will be a "Euroization" of the countries of Eastern Europe. The Euro (for the time being, the German mark) will replace national currencies or become the reference currency, irrespective of EU membership status.
Finally, if all goes well, the Euro will boost moves towards unified financial markets in Europe -- which in turn would increase capital mobility in Europe and heighten pressure for tax harmonization in the EU. The prospect of military autonomy This is undoubtedly the most difficult question. Stopped in its tracks for many years, no
progress was possible without British involvement. Blair revived hopes in the project at the October 1998 Austrian summit in Pörtschach and again in a joint solemn declaration with France at Saint-Malo in December of the same
Thereafter the Balkan war provided some practical follow-up for the project, but it is still in limbo. France has been given the task of overseeing things and finding some satisfactory solution by
The very nature of the EU is a source of problems here. Any such military venture would involve yielding in areas key to the defence of national sovereignty. What's more, national states would have to provide greater funding for the European budget. In these times of budget cutbacks, working people would have to foot the bill.
In other words, without an upsurge in militarism, it will be difficult to go very far in this department. And yet the commanding heights of the EU are determined to stay the course, particularly in order to improve the relationship of forces with the USA. The three main EU countries (plus Italy) feel their economic and political interests are at
For Germany, this is really the only way it can give its "new economic might" some military punch, all the better to weigh in on the international
For France, the war in the Balkans highlighted the operational, technological and industrial weaknesses of the national autonomy it has so jealously guarded behind its nuclear arsenal.
As for Britain, now that major economic reasons have led it to embrace full membership in the EU, it has an obvious interest in playing — within an EU "common defence" framework — the global military role for which it is the best prepared of all EU memberstates.
Common defence without operational autonomy would be like a knife without a blade. It requires having one's own industrial program of research, technology and production, where the line between military and civilian sectors is increasingly blurred
The Americans are far ahead here. This is one of the cornerstones of their present dominant position in the world. Shirking the military side of things would have a direct and far-reaching impact on the overall competitiveness of the EU with American capitalism.
The USA is certainly fully aware of this. The EU's diplomatic absence at manoeuvring at Rambouillet — alongside the breathtaking display of military might in the war (notwithstanding slipwith the Stealth bombers Apache helicopters) — will hurt and fragment the European defence industry by taking post-war orders away from it and by unleashing a series of transAtlantic mergers controlled by Boeing, Lockheed and Raytheon.
In the wake of the Berlin summit, European governments have been exerting tremendous pressure companies in the war industry to rationalise and systematically cooperate with one another.
In mid-July 1999, one Council of Ministers meeting on industry and another on defence made public declarations to this effect. One of many problems they face is ownership of the companies in question - now that government has withdrawn, there are calls for them "to remain fully European" (Financial Times, 11 July
A major campaign is underway to build a big European defence concern. But beyond this there is a great ruckus over the manufacture of all types of war government constantly makes deputations to European governments on behalf of American giants in this sector. One such company, Raytheon, wants to get in on (EADS) that brought together DASA (Germany) and Aérospatiale-Matra
Other instances of cooperation are being negotiated: a joint-venture between British Aerospace and Finmeccanica, for example. This is just the beginning. Partial joint-ventures have emerged to conquer specific markets: for various types of missiles, and for satellites, planes, helicopters, detection systems and so forth.
The British government has been in the thick of things. When he was sworn in as NATO general secretary, George Robertson spoke of the ambiguous stance of the USA on European autonomy. In the months that have followed, we have seen a sharp increase in pan-European cooperation produce highly sophisticated missiles and in the preferential treatment accorded by European governments to military hardware "made in Europe".
This marks a real change in the situation. It might seem surprising, but is not so illogical as all that. After all, governments are both the "customer" and the co-owner/co-director of these whose research is often richly funded from the public purse. The public protest from American firms and Clinton's repeated calls to Blair show just how high the stakes are. Towards the "Greater Europe"
By declaring that over the coming 25 years we will enlarge the EU from 15 to 20 to 25 to 30 member-countries," (Financial Times, 15 September 1999) Prodi was basing himself on the new consensus among EU leaders and firing a daring twin salvo to restart enlarge-
First, he eliminated the humiliating "waiting room" system which saw aspiring members tripping over one another to gain entry. The EU will now negotiate with the governments of all these countries, giving them some "recognition" to brandish to domestic public opinion. Admission will depend on each country's ability to fulfill admission criteria! Very "visionary" indeed — in a flight of false generosity and "objectivity"
Second, by pushing back the deadline so far (25 years is an eternity in today's world!), he has resolved the dilemma that tore apart governments, political parties and the intelligentsia for years: should (economic) enlargement to the East be the priority or should it be the (political deepening of the existing EU?
In fact, there was only a problem so long as the EU was at an impasse -after Amsterdam (June 1997) and steeped in doubt over the viability of the Euro. With the likely imminent adoption by Britain of the Euro, prospects for common defence and strengthened Monetary Union, Europe will de facto become more political in as much as it will be forced to strengthen its "current" institutions (or run the risk of an existential crisis!).
International Viewpoint #319 February 2000 5
* European Union
The entry of between 10 and 20 new members means a real "process" involving admission citeria and the basic ground rules for a capitalismunder-construction. During the negotiations temselves, the de facto ties between the EU and the countries of the East will be strengthened on a countryby-country and à la carte basis.
Prodi has also said that those who do not gaın admıssion rıght away should be seen as "virtual members" for whom the substantive content will become more and more "real" along the way and in successive fields (Monetary Union, sectoral economic cooperation, forms of security and defence coperation, transitional observer status in EU bodies).
This political version of "enlargement" aims to create a stable and pacified eastern flank for West European capital. The goal is the progressive creation of a vast single market linked to the Euro zone. This project is already underway. Trade has increased, with the EU (especially Germany) having replaced the former USSR as the region's main trading partner.
Between 1992 and 1997, foreign direct investment from the EU has more than doubled in the former frontrunning "candidate" countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia) and increased almost tenfold in the second group of countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania).
But the fact remains that a managed transition to capitalism is complicated and very costly. The example of the former GDR is telling. The EU is not ready to shoulder this cost. Its total budget remains tiny (1.1 per cent of GDP with the ciling set at 1.27 per insignificant but fall below what is required. Agenda 2000 (overall EU budgetary allotments for the period 2000-2006) sets aside a total of 45 billion Euros spread out over seven years as structural assistance for ten candidate-countries. meting environmental requirements alone during the same period is estimated to be between 100 and 120 billion Euros (Notes économiques financières, Kredietbank-Cera, 15 January 1999).
To say the least, this is not an overall approach aimed at priority convergence around high social standards. Rather, it is an imperialist annexation in which the market (re)arranges things for capitalism while causing the disintegration of entire sections of society. This
International Viewpoint #319 February 2000 creates a zone of perpetual instability in which local wars and social upheaval are already commonplace. Controlling these conflicts in the East is a powerful argument used to justify the strengthening of EU military autonomy. It is also used to promote a policy of tighter "EU border defence and "migrationflow control", and of combatting international terorism and crime.
Lest it be forgotten, we are talking about a huge expanse of territory - a part of the European continent, the areas surrounding the Mediterranean and NATO's southeastern flank (Russia, the Caucuses, Turkey, the Middle East) - where various combinations and permutations of international rivalry play temselves out fully. Harnessing the entire repressive aparatus of the EU has thus become a priority. Next stage: EU as superpower?
The leap forward the EU is hoping to make now is of the same magnitude and as meaningful as the one made between 1985 and 1993. The new goals (monetary union, defence, enlargement, legal institutions) substantial extension and strengthening of the EU state aparatus - either by broadening the scope of matters dealt . with supranationally or by beefing up existing intergovernmental cooperation bodies (or both). The significance of this development will increase in much as the process itself reisters real
At the same time, there has been a
European-based multinational capital. While still not in the same leagues as the Americans (not by a long shot!), a real change has taken place over the past year in the area of "mergers and takeovers". While these have hit their lowest level in 18 months in the USA, they have shot up in Europe -surpassing the USA for the first time in seven years.
Europe is just catching up for lost time. This might simply intermediate stage which will be followed by a round of fusions and takeovers involving non-Europeans. But the change is unmistakable. The Euro has nurtured a single market and single unified financial market, with low interest rates and a mad dash to remain competitive ("cost cutting"). This has led to a breakdown in the traditional property structures of continental European capitalism.
Big European firms have bought 3.3 times more companies in the USA than US firms have bought in Europe (last year this ratio had already reached 2.6). The direction of capital flow has also changed. Just a few years ago, there was no clear preference of European multinationals to merge on one or the other side of the Atlantic. The centre of gravity has now decisively shifted towards intra-European mergers. The value of operations within the EU has more than doubled in the space of nine to 688.3 billion (Financial Times, 2 October 1999).
Here, too, there are two new and politically interesting developments. First, European multinationals are consolidating temselves in Europe itself. Second, this is most clearly the case in those sectors which historically have had the closest economic and personal links with national and European state institutions. To wit: banks, insurance, telecommunications, weaponry, utilities (gas, electricity, water).
We have two traditional "axioms" for charting the possible course of future developments.
First, we know that the logic of state institutions does not necessarily always cincide with the logic of the market. Big European firms are not consciously aiming at the creation of a social class "in itself" and "for itself". Nor do they necessarily seck to be in step with the policies of their governments.
Nevertheless, however internationalized they may be, it is
° ATLANTIC TERRORIST obvious that these firms do indeed rely on "their" national states — which they need in the global arena to win markets, to protect their investments, to gain or retain access to raw materials, and to vie with the competition.
There is undoubtedly a complex inter-relationship of these tendencies - more complex in fact NIRGANIZATIO than at any time in the past. On the one hand, the EU is an incomplete supranational state based on inter-state cooperation. On the other, the dominant classes are primarily rooted in their respective nations but also deeply involved in building the EU.
What can take place in this shifting framework? Can a series predominantly European very large companies — who also dominate the economic structures of the main member-countries - decide to take charge of the EU in its current phase and make it an instrument that will actively serve their interests? Especially when it comes to their competition and rivalry with the USA and US big capital?
The other option would be to seek shelter under the umbrella of the American state and accept its dominant position, including in Europe and whatever the economic and monetary consequences. What would happen to the Euro, for example, in an EU with no political punch? And what of eastward enlargement?
The bourgeoisies of Europe are increasingly faced with the choice between pursuing the EU project and letting it fall apart. In the latter case, the course of the past 15 years would have to be reversed and the result would be the realization of the trans-Atlantic enterprise, with the merger of big European and American firms under the wing of the latter (Herbert Schul, Courrier International, 9-13 September 1999).
Has the EU already crossed the point of no return (as Peter Gowan argues in the May 1999 issue of CounterPunch)? For the moment at least, things seem to point in the other direction. While the USA has been asserting its supremacy (after the Balkan war), we have also seen new attempts to strengthen the EU and extend its economic dominion right up to Russia's borders. In tandem, there has been an impressive rise in the fortunes of some key sectors of big European capital. Conflict across the board
There's many a slip twixt cup and lip. From the dream of an EU
SION
superpower to its fruition, there are many obstacles to overcome especially the conflicts between big member-states and the lack of material main conflict is between capitalism — in the process of being reorganized on a global scale — and the international proletariat. The working class in the EU remains the best organized, the most conscious and the most politicized social force — in spite of its failures, its ideological retreat and its structural weakening as a class and movement. It will be a tremendous obstacle to the EU's quest for power and
In his frontal attack on the very idea of a European social union, the well-known German bureaucrat and member of the European Central Bank directorate, Otto Issing, honed in on what he calls the "main enemy" (the organized working class) in his vast appraisal of the EU today (Frankfurter Allgemeine Leitung, 21 September 1999). Publications like the Financial Times regularly declare that the Spring 2000 negotiations between German employers and steelworkers will be decisive for incomes policy in the EU, and therefore for the Euro. As for Prodi, he had hardly been sworn in when he decided to descend upon the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) congress to plead for further labour "flexibility" in the name of competition with the USA.
But now that the EU is trying to advance to a new stage, the very legitimacy of the EU state apparatus has become something of a political truncheon. Lacking any strong historical and cultural identity, it must of necessity conjure up external enemies: the flow of refugees, for one, and America (given the disappearance of the yellow peril long ago, and of the communist menace more recently), for another.
Especially if it grows, the rivalry between the USA and the EU will be a perfect pretext for strengthening Europe against the USA and subordinating struggles and demands to the stability of the Euro, to a rising military budget, to the competitiveness companies, and more cynically still, to the "defense of the European social model" or to a "humanitarian" intervention on "our" borders or
We don't know if or to what degree the EU will manage to fulfill its dreams of power. But all anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist forces must rise to a higher level of struggle. Point by point, we must oppose policies. We must fight for a socialist and internationalist alternative.
And we mustn't miss the next opportunity for a huge mobilization at a Intergovernmental Conference in France late in the year 2000. * * Francois Vercammen is a member of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International. Translation from French: Raghu Krishnan
International Viewpoint #319 February 2000 7
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* Philippines On 26 December 1999 the Revolutionary Workers Party of the Philippines (RPMP) and the Estrada government agreed to peace negotiations. Jean Dupont The party, associated with the Fourth International, controls about 1/3 of Communist guerrillas in Mindanao and the Visayas islands. It regroups most of the revolutionary Marxists who split from the (Maoist) Communist Party
REFERENDUM (CPP) in the early 90s.
The main rebel groups in the Philippines, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the CPP's New Peoples Army are already engaged in separate peace talks.
The MILF may follow a similar path to the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which ended its armed revolt in exchange for very limited autonomy measures, and jobs in the police and administration. In Mindanao and the