A humanitarian catastrophe
O far as the international community towards the conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC), hence there is a total passivity towards Angola. Meanwhile, an already tragic situation for the people of Angola is getting worse.
The current conflict in Angola, the
FOR several months now, Angola has once again been at war. At fourth since independence in 1975, is devthe end of last year, heavy fighting broke out between the Angolan astating. According to UNICEF, nearly 3.7 million people out of a total population of army (the FAA) and Jonas Savimbi's UNITA, forcing the latter into
11 million) are directly affected by the war, a precipitate retreat. During the first months of this year, general including three million displaced persons.
Joa dos Matos, FAA chief of staff, predicted the imminent end of the
* The index of human development armed rebellion. Some months later, there seems no reason to expect established by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) puts
Angola in 94th place out of 164 countries.
* Since the beginning of 1999 and the last round of fighting, 1.7 million people
(75% of them women and children) have fled to the cities, notably Luanda
(500,000), Huambo (300,000) and Malanje
(100,000).
* Nearly 50% of the country, notably in the rural areas, is mined (at least 10 million antipersonnel mines according to the UN), a situation which has led to more than
86,000 people being killed or maimed in the past 10 years. In Zambia, Namibia and other neighboring countries, Angolan refugees are massing, often in very difficult conditions.
Catastrophe
In short, Angola now constitutes one of the biggest humanitarian catastrophes in
Africa. UNICEF estimates that Angola is the worst country in the world so far as children are concerned, with one child in five dying before the age of 5 years, mostly because of infectious diseases easily treatable in a normal situation. The rate of official infant mortality is 270 out of 1,000
(the third highest in the world after
Mozambique and Niger).
Since the beginning of their counter- offensive last summer, the FAA have managed to keep Savimbi's organization on the defensive: the territories it controls have been confined and encircled; its military capacities (notably its heavy arms) and logistic underpinnings (airports, systems of transport and supply) have been seriously damaged. The loss of Jamba (south of
Angola), followed by the capture, according to the Angolan government, of 600
UNITA soldiers at the end of December, have certainly been more than symbolic:
this locality has been controlled by
Savimbi for 25 years and was a veritable logistical center.
Angolan refugees fleeing the zones controlled by UNITA have told horrific stories (indiscriminate bombardments of villages by the FAA, with use of napalm and cluster bombs, panic and pillage on the part of UNITA, and so on). The defection of some UNITA military chiefs is also a symptom that something is going very badly wrong in Savimbi's kingdom. With the positioning of the FAA in Namibia, the southern frontier is much more dangerous for UNITA and complicates their supply lines enormously.
But UNITA still possesses strong capacities, as shown by the recent battles (January 2000) in the south and east of the country. On all the evidence, its best units have been preserved and are still capable of dealing some heavy blows, including around the urban zones. Even if UNITA's logistical limitations render major assaults against the cities impossible, at least in the short term, nothing would prevent them, as they say themselves, from redeploying as a guerilla army, an area in which it excelled in the 1980s, and which can easily destabilize such a vast and sparsely populated area. According to military sources, arms supplies continue to arrive to UNITA by light aircraft and by road, via Zambia.
Moreover, the situation is very confused in the northeast, in the Lundas where the prize, control of the diamond producing regions, could be decisive for UNITA which depends on the resources of this region for its survival. During the last but one round of the present war (September 1998) the FAA tried, with uneven success, an early end to the war. PIERRE BEAUDET to dislodge UNITA. But during the last few months, the fact that the fighting has not very much affected these regions remains difficult to understand: is it UNITA's military strength in these regions which holds the FAA at a distance? Is it the strategy of general Matos (chief of staff of the FAA) which seeks first to ensure control of the southern and eastern frontiers and then in a second stage to begin the assault against the northeast? Are some observers correct when they say that the FAA leaders want to preserve UNITA's control of the diamond producing zones because they themselves are the beneficiaries of it?
### Nothing settled
In short, on the strictly military level, nothing is definitively settled. It is then more than probable that the outcome of the current fighting will to a large extent be determined by political factors which will orientate the action as much of the government as UNITA
On the internal level, the current polarization continues to dominate. In declaring Jonas Savimbi to be a "war criminal", the government does not seem inclined, at least for the moment, to open negotiations to reactivate the protocol of Lusaka (drawn up in 1994). In Luanda it is very much the majority view that what counts is the erosion of UNITA both on the military and political levels, hence the importance attached to the defections of UNITA cadres. In fact, the government plays for time, counting on the exhaustion of UNITA and its bases, as well as on its international isolation.
Meanwhile, the ruling party, the International Viewpoint #322 June 2000 27
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Angola *
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Renamo into a "loyal" opposition) does not seem immediately on the agenda. But this does not mean that the situation cannot change. Certainly, faced with the current impasse, the malcontents inside UNITA are still more unhappy. They know also that the popular base of UNITA is still significant, that it could be remobilized in a political project. The big factor of blockage remains then Savimbi.
Parallel to the resumption of the war,
ANGOLA
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RHODESIA ( significant developments during the last period have taken place in the area of Angolan civil society, principally in the urban areas. In spite of practical harassment by the government against the independent media, some critical expressing the point of view of civil socie-
### NAMIBIA
[BOTSWANA Atlantic SOUTH AFRICA MPLA, does not envisage any major reform to assure greater transparence in public management and open up the political process. This mismanagement is particularly obvious in relation to the economic and social crisis affecting the vulnerable sectors of the population. Corruption has reached significant levels, notably in the appropriation of income drawn from oil production. The absence of a state of law, the distortion of the legal system to the benefit of those who have good contacts, the illegal activities of the police force, all adds up to a situation which makes life very difficult for the people. The question is posed: can the MPLA "Frelimoize" itself in the image of the old ruling party in Mozambique acceptance of the principles of a state of law)? A significant obstacle to such an eventuality is the "predatory" character of the group currently in power. It is in a position to "siphon" offshore resources (oil), which do not depend on labour and the local people. They are effectively drawing a "rent", and it means that the relations of reciprocity between the regime and the people are minimized. Meanwhile, the government remains suspicious of all those who seek to express and organize themselves in an 28 International Viewpoint #322 June 2000
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@cean independent manner. This situation is particularly worrying in the case of the independent media.
Nonetheless, the government must at least proclaim its good intentions to unfreeze the political process. The announcement of elections for the year 2001 by president Dos Santos during his address of January 31st goes in this direction. The mandate of the current national Assembly runs out this November. In his speech, Dos Santos appealed to UNITA to "lay down its arms and get involved in the political process". For its part, UNITA remains relatively impermeable to the current pressures. Diverse dissidents, like UNITA-Renovada and Abel Chivukuvuku's group, have not substantially weakened it.
### Reign of terror
The reign of terror practiced by Savimbi towards his own cadres constitutes a part of the explanation. The other factor is the fact that this organization remains rooted in the Ovimbundue (40% of the population) who feel themselves marginalized and excluded from power. To take up the Mozambiquan analogy, the eventuality of a "Renamoization" of UNITA (cooption inside the system of ty have demanded peace, national reconciliation and democracy. Several NGOs and churches are engaged in a movement of pressure for peace. "This war". Grupo Angolano de reflexao para a pas (GARP), *is a war of dispossession. The regime of the gun threatens everybody".
### Significant turn
Meanwhile, a significant turn has been made by the main Western states. The United States and Great Britain in particular have finally broken with UNITA. Between the lines, these powers have now made Savimbi's departure an indispensable precondition for peace and the integration of a demilitarized UNITA in the peace process and in government.
This evolution comes parallel to the initiative of the Canadian ambassador Robert Fowler at the UN Security Council, with the aim of sanctioning those who continue to arm the rebels. In his address to the Security Council last January, Ambassador Fowler said that sanctions had begun to weaken UNITA and explained, at least in part, its recent setbacks. But he also added that the "Angolan conflict could not be resolved only by military means and that the ultimate objective of the embargo was to force UNITA to return to the negotiating table."
According to British Foreign Office minister Peter Hain it is necessary "to put to the primitive fascism of an end UNITA". He suggests also that if UNITA wants to remain an actor on the Angolan political scene it has to "get rid of
Savimbi".
From all this then there is a fairly clear
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* Angola
message against UNITA and, above all, against Savimbi. But on other questions, divergences remain: inside the European Union, the dominant tendency seems to be to bet on the Angolan government and the president, José Eduardo Dos Santos (in spite of the reticence of some sectors of public opinion in Europe on the violations of rights and corruption).
But in Washington, the situation is less clear, all the more in that US policy on Angola (like US foreign policy overall) is the object of constant debates and conflicts between the administration and Congress. For the administration, the reestablishment of diplomatic links with Angola, as well as the establishment of a bilateral consultative commission between the two countries, certainly indicate a rapprochement with the Angolan government. But in a certain sense the scenario favored by the US implies the reintegration of UNITA in the process, albeit a tamed UNITA, probably without Savimbi, which could act as a counterweight to the government and the
The evolution of the Angolan situation is also important on the regional level, the more so in that Angola is heavily involved in the gigantic conflict shaking the Democratic Republic of Congo. The stakes there are immense. If there is a stabilization of the government of Laurent-Désiré Kabila, the winner would certainly be the Angolan government, and by deduction this could cost UNITA dear. If the opposite happens, this would create problems for the Angolan government, and also its allies like Zimbabwe. For the moment nothing is definitively settled in this area.
### Extension of fighting
Elsewhere in southern Africa, the extension of the fighting in the south and east has led to fears of a regionalisation of the Angolan conflict towards Zambia and Namibia. Here also, the stakes are significant. The Angolan government must seal its frontiers in order to pin down UNITA, while the latter would be tempted to carry the war across the borders to complicate things for the FAA. Hence the majority of member countries of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), including those who had sympathies for UNITA (Zambia for example), are now backing the Angolan government, albeit with reservations. The problem remains
South Africa, regularly attacked by the pro-government press in Luanda for being "lukewarm" towards the Angolan government. South African president Thabo Mbeki has several times expressed the view that the solution of the conflict must be primarily a political one, which strongly displeases the Angolan government. To reduce the tensions nonetheless, South Africa announced recently (January 26th) that it was going to organize a program of humanitarian aid for Angola, which could be perceived in Luanda as a sign of good will.
In a general fashion, all this leads to a net deterioration in the region, and seriously threatens the projects of long-term integration promised by the SADC, which are absolutely necessary to the development of the whole region, including South Africa and the other countries in the region not directly affected by the Angolan crisis.
### Paradoxical
In many respects Angola's economic situation is paradoxical. On the one hand, the country possesses wealth, notably oil and diamonds, which could potentially make it the "Kuwait" of Africa. On the other, it is a country where the people live in poverty and decay. The index of human development places Angola among the poorest countries: in the rural regions as in the urban zones, a great part of the population is dependent on food aid (the cereal deficit is estimated at more than 500,000 tones by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization). Certainly, this situation is aggravated by the intensification of the fighting, but fundamentally, it is "structural", conditioned by an ensemble of factors apart from the political and military situa-
For the moment "two" Angola's live side by side. On the one hand, there is the Angola which is rich and linked to the exploitation of oil and diamonds. On the other, there is the Angola which is dying of hunger and has neither medical services nor schools - the situation for 90% of the population.
From the point of view of the "rich" Angola, the government has a significant financial base with oil, all the more in that the reserves are abundant and prices are rising. The essence of these incomes is siphoned off by the group in power, serving to feed the military machine.
The Angolan economy remains very dependent on the oil sector (more than
Angola * 40% of GNP and 90% of goverment income). Angola is the second biggest African producer after Nigeria and counts for 7% of US oil imports. Most production is localized offshore, off the coasts of the Cabinda enclave. The state controls this sector via the public company Sonangol, sole concessionary for the exploration and production of oil, which has signed a number of agreements with the multinational companies.
The main multinationals involved are: BP-Amoco, Chevron, Daewoo, ElfAquitaine, Engen, ENI-Agip, Exxon, Falcon Oil, Mitsubishi, Mobil, Norsk Hydro, Occidental, Petrobras, Petrogal, Petronas, Phillips, Ranger, Shell, Statoil, Texaco and Total Fina. In the coming ten years these companies plan to invest US$18 billion in Angolan oil. Each contractor is allocated a specific zone for exploration. 60% of oil produced in Angola is exported to the USA, which makes Angola the sixth most important
Income
According to some experts, income from the sale of Angolan crude for the years 2003-2010 will reach more than USS3 billion per year. According to Global Witness, "a significant percentage of this income is diverted to benefit a small élite, including the president and his family, as well as several high ranking figures in the
The IMF estimates (April 1999) that 34.1% of the budget is devoted to the army. The weapons (bought from Russia, Byelorussia, China, South Africa) are paid for with banking credits guaranteed on the future production of oil, as well as liquid cash, concessions and other advantages.
In 1999, again according to Global Witness, these purchases reached USS870 million, in part covered by advances from the multinationals like BP-Amoco, Exxon and Elf. Some private enterprises belonging to the cronies of the high ranking Angolan political and military leaders are at the center of these transactions: this is the case in particular for the Companhia Angolana de Distribuicao Alimentar, registered in the Virgin Islands.
For UNITA, on the contrary, control of diamond production is more problematic and also very much less lucrative: on the one hand, its control of the producing regions is not conquered permanently; on
International Viewpoint #322 June 2000 29
the Angolan government on simple "Mozambiquan" situation. *
* Angola the other hand, the most accessible reserves of diamonds are not inexhaustible. For the moment however, Savimbi's organization disposes of an income of several hundred million dollars in the framework of the illegal export of diamonds, assured by all kinds of complicity in diverse African and Western capitals
Since 1992 UNITA has controlled 90% of the diamond producing regions of Angola. In 1995 total production was estimated at US$700 million, of which only S147 million had been legally registered by the parapublic company Endiama. The consolidated income of UNITA over 8 years is estimated at USS3.7 billion.
According to a number of sources, the FAA are also involved in the trade, partly
Education, health and public services are barely functional. Criminality is rising and the security of the cities, notably Luanda, is less and less assured.
The wages of civil servants, including the security forces, are paid in an erratic and late fashion (leading to very significant losses in the context of high rates of inflation), which leads to exactions, corruption, and the diversion of public goods. To give an example, a secondary school teacher is paid SUS22 a month, whereas according to the UNDP the income necessary to meet the needs of a family is
In February the situation was made still worse following an increase of 1,600% in the price of oil, which led to huge increasdemand. Some banks are kept alive in an artificial manner, because they serve as conduits for illicit payments (such is the case, among others, for the Caixa de credito agro-pecuaria e pescas).
The government has promised to privatize the banks, but neither concrete plan nor schedule has yet been put on the table. Meanwhile, corruption reaches stunning levels; this situation is known and admitted nearly everywhere, even among those who support the Angolan government.
### Negotiation ruled out
For the moment, a genuine negotiation, which would imply a real compromise with Savimbi's organization, is ruled out. It would be difficult to convince the FAA through a company, Tricorn, which is es in every sector including public transowned by the chief of staff of the FAA, general Joao Matos. The most important private company involved in diamonds, RDR, belongs to the president's daughter, Isabel dos Santos.
### Lucrative trade
According to Global Witness, this very lucrative trade has developed thanks to the collaboration of the mining and diamond companies, notably De Beers. The retailers are many and pass through complex circuits, in Belgium, Africa and Israel, which makes the task difficult for those who wish to control the flow of diamonds.
Since the information revealed by Ambassador Fowler to the UN, the situation of the diamond-producing sector has undergone some changes. De Beers has announced (October 1999) that it would henceforth refuse to handle diamonds which do not have a "certificate of origin" stating place of production and seller. The Angolan government has set up SODIAM, which should in principle completely control the marketing of diamonds. Parallel to this, the government plans greater regulation of the granting of concessions as well as the issuing of "certificates of origin" which if carried through effectively would allow control of the illegal trade.
The rest of national production is practically paralyzed, particularly agriculture, where Angola's resources are potentially significant. More than 60% of the population are refugees in the cities, and a significant part of these refugees are condemned to pauperization.
In the zones under government control, the management of the state is chaotic.
30 International Viewpoint #322 June 2000 port. In several towns the municipal authorities say they are no longer capable of paying their energy bills, leading to cuts in supply, including in essential services like hospitals.
At the level of macro-economic equilibria, the rate of inflation has risen (20% a month currently), although the government has tried to stabilize it by abolishing the artificially maintained exchange. For the moment, however, the government does not have too many liquidity problems: international private credits are easy to obtain when generally guaranteed by oil production, current and future. The foreign debt has reached new heights (more than 35% of export receipts), but precisely because of the factor mentioned previously, Angola is not immediately threatened with cessation of payments. In the longer term, however, renegotiation of the debt will be necessary to restabilize the economy.
### Instability
The recent efforts of Finance Minister Joaquim David prevented the predicted departure of the World Bank. But the more important negotiations envisaged with the IMF have stalled on the question of the transparency of state finances. The Futungo do not want to reveal the details of the machine which allows them to pocket immense profits from the oil revenues and juicy contracts for supplying the army.
The donor countries and international agencies are also demanding a clean-up of
Angolan banking institutions.
Traditionally, these latter grant credits to to halt their offensive and repeat the same process as in 1994, the more so given that, on the ground, they believe conditions are more favorable than ever to the erosion and indeed elimination of UNITA. Moreover, the unexpected arrival of sup plementary financial resources (linked to the increase in the price of oil means that the pressure is no longer as intense for the Angolan government. From the end of the rainy season (May-June), the FAA's attacks should resume.
In such a context, UNITA does not really have a choice and will undoubtedly opt to continue its military operations in the form of guerilla warfare, hoping that in the long term, conditions will allow it to resurface. This situation could of course change if a "coup d'État" happened inside UNITA and led to the overthrow of Savimbi. This is precisely the objective of some Western governments at the moment. In the meantime however, UNITA will try to minimize its losses and turn towards the
Another unknown in the equation relates to possible changes in the team in power in Luanda. President dos Santos is growing old, while general Joao de Matos has never hid his political ambitions. It remains to see what will happen within the other factions linked historically to the MPLA, whether "moderates" (those who might be open to negotiations) or "hawks" who hope to consolidate their power.
In short, we are a long way from a real peace process. Only the amalgam of internal pressures (civil society) and external (the international community) could eventually lead Angola towards