No justification for
Habre's Armed Forces of the North (FAN), at the time in opposition, criticised French support to the Goukouni government by accusing Paris of 'having kept up a large-scale war — militarily and politically — through delivering, daily and in enormous quantity, sophisticated arms
French troops in Chad to N'Diamena airport'. (2)
The southern leader Kamougue, presently allied to Goukouni and the Libyans, since he was France's tactical choice for a whole period himself, always turns out to be very understanding about the policy of
A process of internal decomposition was already developing in Chad over the last few years, as well as an incredible social and economic chaos. (1) The civil war, a result of imperialist balkanisation of black Africa, involves a multitude of regionalist military cliques. This turmoil has been aggravated by the intervention of French imperialism, as well as by other states in the region.
In some ways the conflict in Chad represents a concentration of all the most explositive problems facing the neo-colonial states in Africa - political and economic dependence, strong regionalism, weakness of the state, the rapacity of the dominant cliques, clientelism, etc.
Throughout the twenty years Chad has been independent France has intervened almost continuously, although in varying forms, to try and maintain the fiction of a centralised state. This has included direct administration of the north until 1964; substitution of the Mission for Administrative Reform (MRA) for the local administration in 1969; sending expeditionary forces in 1969, 1978 and 1983; aiding the intervention by the Inter-African Force in 1981, the permanent presence of hundreds, or sometimes even thousands, of military ploitation of local wealth; regular aid to prop up the central government's budget; and so on.
The two principal elements in this intervention are obvious from the share out of the money allocated to Chad. One is military aid to try to form a Chadian army, in a situation where France had failed to ensure the real existence of a state. The other is paying for the functioning of the local administration.
In 1976, 40 per cent of the military co-operation budget for the African coun tries was allocated to Chad. In 1979, of the 399 million francs of French aid (about £40 million sterling at the time) 204 million went to 'military assistance'. France reduced the Chad state to being completely dependent on Paris. nothing to improve the standard of living for the Chadian masses, capita income is estimated at 700 francs. French imperialism has substituted itself for the neo-colonial state in Chad. presence of the French commander, Governec, serving in a Chadian uniform, at the head of the intelligence services of the Chadian army from independence until 1976, is a striking proof of this. Francois CAZALS
In recent years, having been unable to overcome the centrifugal forces at work, and weld together an indigenous bourgeois layer around the state apparatus, Paris has simply supplied the various cliques with arms as they rose to power. Relations with the different local factions
But all this did whose annual per
It can be said that since independence
The French troops in CHad (DR) have nevertheless remained tactical and limited, since French imperialism has, despite everything, continued to pursue its own policy.
Thus, while there have been numerous collisions between Paris and its local proteges, none of these local tendencies represent a genuine anti-imperialist orientation. For example, in 1982 Hissene
French imperialism. Last November he made the following statement about French policy, "This is the attitude of France, we don't hold it against them. We know that if we were at N'Djamena, France would come along, as it did be fore. Leave France aside. At least, the aid it supplies benefits Chadians. (3)
To break with this sort of neo-colonial policy would have meant to refuse to sup port any of the military cliques, and to put into question all the neo-colonial agreements that keep the country within the French fold. To have done this would have been to orient towards an overall questioning of the system of domination that allows Paris to control the economies of a whole series of countries in black Africa. But, it was for precisely the opposite reason - to prove its capacity to defend the stability of the neocolonial edifice of French imperialism -that the Mitterrand-Mauroy government sent 3,000 soldiers to Chad in August.
From the time he came into office, Francois Mitterrand has demonstrated, with no beating about the bush, his respect for France's commitments towards its African neo-colonies, including in the military field. From the point of view of managing French capitalism, keeping these states as a special preserve for French economic expansion is vital. Taken together, the co-operation agreements France has with these states assure the survival of this sphere of influence.
Nevertheless, there were many reasons that prompted caution in the Chad affair. There were the experiences of the previous bourgeois governments in bogged down in the situation. There was the complexity of the local political situation, the instability of the state, and also the need to retain good commercial relations with Libya. The last was all the important since Tripoli had welcomed Mitterrand's election, and even invited French companies to participate in the different undertakings projected in the third Libyan development plan
MITTERRAND'S POLICY IN CHAD
The first intervention by the new French government in Chad in fact dates from 1981. At that time, Mitterrand proposed the formation of an inter-African 1. Cf International Viewpoint, No 36, 19 September 1983.
Le Monde, Paris, 10 February 1982 3. Liberation, Paris, 3 November 1982.
17
military force. It was to replace the Libyan contingent that Goukouni, then president of the Transitional Government of National Union (GUNT) in N'Djamena, had invited to help him repel the attacks by Hissene Habre.
Paris succeeded, in November 1981, after much pressure, in getting the Libyan troops withdrawn from Chad. exchange, it offered a small amount of aid to Goukouni, payment of the Chadian government employees, and the sending of military contingents from Zaire, Senegal and Nigeria, which were to be jointly supplied and financed by France and the United States. Paris characterised this as an 'African' solution to the conflict in Chad. The Libyan action, paradoxically, was characterised as external'. However, it goes without saying that it was French policy that was applied by the African soliders.
The promises of international aid made to Goukouni did not save him from being overthrown by Hissene Habre in June 1982. Paris, saying not a word about this "aggression' against a government characterised as "legitimate' few months before, gave its support to Habre. But Goukouni's troops, reorganised by Libya just as Habre's had been by Sudan and Egypt, took Faya Largeau on June 24, 1983.
The first reactions to Goukouni's offensive were marked by a certain prudence. The French minister for external relations, Claude Cheysson, called confrontations a 'fight between chiefs' and recognised that 'there is no foreign intervention in Chad'. (4) The former Gaullist colonial administrator, Pierre Messmer, also stated that, 'the civil war arises from the fact there is not a Chadian state nor a Chadian nation'. (5) In the same vein, the delegate for external affairs of the Rally for the Republic (RPR), the party of Jacques Chirac, former French ambassador to Kinshasa, stated that, 'the conflicts taking place in this country are the result of a war between the chiefs of opposing clans'. He even added categorically 'France has no interest in getting involved in these internal struggles.' (6)
Libya seemed to be on the same wavelength, and Colonel Qadhafi declared at the same period, "The conflict in Chad is a struggle for power which has lasted twenty years. N'Djamena is like a football of which both sides want to have possession. Goukouni was in N'Djamena, Habre chased him out. Now it is Goukouni who is attacking, and he will unin N'Djamena. nothing guarantees that he will stay there, and whoever arrives after him, Habre or will not have any guarantee of power either.' (7)
No one made a distinction between the two camps that were confronting each other, or attributed to either some anti-imperialist or destabilising dynamic. For several days the situation was treated as one of the numerous, sudden flareups of the civil war in Chad. However, the French government was soon to engage itself in a neo-colonial military adventure.
Hissene Habre, who received financial aid from Washington, called on France
The neo-colonial states in black Africa also put on pressure for this, while the bourgeois press widely circulated the notion that what was happening was aggression by Libya against the 'legitimate' government of Hissene Habre.
First of all, several tons of weaponry and several dozen military advisors were dispatched to N'Djamena. But on July 14, Francois Mitterrand was still saying, 'We have helped the legitimate government in Chad by all the means at our disposal, according to the terms of the 1976 agreement. go further than that, because beyond that nothing has been agreed by our coun
To reassure its African preserve, and to cover the ground militarily and diplomatically before Reagan, pursuing his anti-Libyan crusade, could take his own initiative, the French government got still more deeply involved. In July, 1,500 Zaire military, trained by French instrucsent, and operation was launched. The latter was claimed to be a 'training mission' for the instruction of Habre's troops. It led to the dispatch of 3,000 French soldiers in August.
### BUSES TANGASES
D'AFRIQUE
HORS
NATIONAL UNANIMITY AND THE
ANTI-LIBYAN CRUSADE
An anti-Libyan hysteria worthy of Reagan swept the ranks of the Socialist Party and the government. 18, the Socialist deputy Alain Vivien did not hesitate to accuse Tripoli of, 'preparing to launch an offensive to seize the
The French government had intervened supposedly to 'stop the invader him to negotiate, because, 'we cannot accept an African "Munich"".
The French military intervention took place in the context of a huge brainwashing of French public opinion. tent of Libyan aid to Goukouni was knowingly exaggerated. A journalist, who was at Faya Largeau at the beginning of July, wrote, dence received at Faya Largeau it appears that there are neither troops nor fighter planes from Libya, nor even the phantom 'foreign legion' of Colonel Qadhafi. On the other hand there are some dozen Libyan military personnel charged with maintaining radio contact with Libya, as well as handling certain logistical matters, particularly supply. (10)
What was presented by the Habre government as fifty Libyan aircraft bombing a town in northern Chad was, in reality, a foray by only two aircraft. And, after that, this propaganda camwent so far as to present what everyone agreed was a war of the clans, as an attempt to destablise the legitimate government. false to state that French troops intervened against Libyan aggression. truth is that the Mitterrand government, following the policy of its predecessors, wanted to act as guardian of the phantom Chadian state, and, in order to do so, found itself caught up in a neo-colonial type operation. Chad has seen many such operations in the past. Hypocrisy reached its height when the French leaders claimed that their military action should integrity of Chad, the right to self-determination, and independence of the peoples. affirmations had no other function than to obtain the support, or at least the tacit agreement, of the French masses for the neo-colonial policies of Mitterrand.
Thus, around this intervention, and on the basis of the anti-Libyan propaganda, a broad national consensus of the political parties was forged — of the majority and of the opposition. Jacques Chirac of the RPR, the former prime minister Raymond Barre, and Giscard d'Estaing all declared their agreement with the Mitterrand government.
Even the French Communist Party (PCF), although a little ill at ease, swallowed the pill. Moreover, it combined in its own way all the duplicity of the government's course supporting the dispatch of troops while insisting on the need for negotiations. Thus Pierre Juquin, member of the political bureau of the PCF, recognised the validity of the neo-colonial agreement with Chad, signed by Jacques Chirac, Giscard's prime minister, in 1976. However, the traditional position of the PCF is to demand the renegotiation of these agreements. cepting the need to come to the aid of
Habre, the same person whom 'Humanite, the PCFs daily newspaper, called a French counter-espionage agent a few years ago, Juquin covered his tracks, saying that, 'the number one question in Chad today is how to prepare the way for, and start negotiations. (11) French military intervention, the PCF leader remarked on nothing more than, 'the risks involved in sending forces into such a complex environment'.
THE LIBYAN ROLE
There is no doubt about the Libyan inside of Goukouni. Moreover, Libyan action in Chad is of
Le Monde, 29 June 1983. Le Matin de Paris, 7 July 1983. Le Quotidien de Paris, 8 July 1983 Le Matin, Paris, 1 July 1983. Le Matin, 18 August 1983. Liberation, 4 July 1983. Le Monde, 31 August 1983.
Africque-Asie, Paris, 24 March 1980.
Le Monde, 28 August 1983.
long standing.
Culturally, the populations in the north of Chad are very close to Libya.
In fact, we might even trace the connection back to the former Libyan king Idriss, who was spiritual head of
Thus, the Muslim warrior sect of the Senussi, a major force among the Toubous of
Chad. But in any case, Libya has always supported the Muslim peoples in Chad.
When Moammar Qadhafi came to power in 1969, after the overthrow of the monarchy and the corrupt former ruling layers, he increased Libyan aid to the
Chad
National
Liberation
Front
(FROLINAT).
In the name of a pan-Islamic policy
Libya supported the 'Northern' elements the most favourable to a rapprochement with the Arab world. The most faithful pro-Libyan faction is, moreover, a split from FROLINAT composed mainly
Arabs, who are an ethnic minority in
Chad.
Libya has clearly taken an expansionist attitude toward Chad.
denced particularly by the occupation, since 1973, of the Aouzou strip, which is believed to be rich in uranium and oil.
Libya has several times put on pressure to have Chad divided into zones of influence with France.
Thus, paradoxically, it has sometimes found itself in alliance with the secessionist "Southern' elements like Kamougue.
The Libyan regime has supported the different fractions in the struggle at every turn, and has participated in many nesame time as gotiations with France and the neo-colon-
France and Chad.
ial states in the region. In 1979, Tripoli gave its support to the installation of the
OF THE COLONIAL WAR
GUNT led by Goukouni. When this government, threatened by the
Hissene Habre, called for their aid, the
All this gives good objective reasons, for both sides, to try to come to a polit-
Libyans intervened massively in Chad at the end of 1980. However, Libya hardly ical settlement in Chad.
Any such arrangement would, as everyone knows, invested at all in the restart of the econonly be provisional, even if it overrode omic machine in Chad. When Goukouni the wishes of the forces on the ground.
demanded the withdrawal of the Libyan
Such an accord was in fact made before, troops at the end of 1981 they left in less than a week. But their precipitous when Libya and France sought to impose a ceasefire agreement on the Felix Maldeparture left the way open for an antiloum regime and FROLINAT in 1978.
government offensive by Habre.
This idea was also included in the recent thus, came to power in June 1982.
proposals by Qadhafi, who stated in June,
Libya's interest in Chad is undoubted-
*France must understand the key position ly motivated by its strategic concern to of Libya in Africa.
have a state on its southern flank that is stands that her interests lie on the side of not too hostile. It is certainly also look-
Libya, ane that, we are the best availing forward to being able to put its hands on certain mineral wealth in the country.
Moreover, the objective of the present
Libya has the financial means to devote tour by French diplomats in Africa is to to this undertaking, given its large oil try, on the basis of the relationship of
But, while it is being exposed revenues.
forces created by the French intervention to manifold pressures from the Reagan in Chad, to get Libya to come to an administration, Libya remains no less a agreement and force its protege Goudependent country.
This dependence is kouni to negotiate.
However, the unexpressed in the form of the dominance known factor in this operation is what of oil production in the economy of the sort of governmental and state formula country.
will be put forward, since everything, or
In fact, oil brings in the largest part of almost everything, has been already tried the state's income, with 40 percent being
This keeps sold to American companies.
For the sake of his demagogic propa-
Libya under the pressure of the internaganda campaign to fool the French worktional capitalist market.
The very development plans that are making Libya a present his action in Chad as a different
However,
Chadian the ist policy.
a deterrent.
to act.
is easy and of the
Ligue
Chad can
Chad.
Le Matin, 1 July 1983.
exemployees,
Beyond to of
It
In this against the Mitterthe
Revolutionnaire
Therefore, nothing
19
But, on the other side of the debate, have been scared by their politicians alliance with the far right.
As the referendum results came in, one hypocritical
"anti-abortion' TD member of parlia-